Engineering Famine: The Manipulation of Food Assistance in Sudan
By John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen
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Food insecurity in war-torn regions of Sudan is not a byproduct of indiscriminate fighting but a government objective that is largely achieved through the diversion and denial of humanitarian food assistance. During its 21-year civil war against the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Khartoum government denied food assistance to millions of its own citizens despite the presence of one of the world's largest humanitarian operations.
The government's counterinsurgency strategy begins with killing and displacement on a massive scale. As an element of this 'drain the pond to get the fish' approach, Khartoum calculates that a hungry and dispirited population will be unable to assist the rebellion. When the international community starts to take notice and the spotlight shines on government atrocities, the regime scales back the military assault and the chess game begins. The regime stage-manages humanitarian workers to deadly effect, denying them access to territory where vulnerable civilians need help.
In the wake of the catastrophic famine in Bahr el Ghazal in 1987-88, the government, the SPLA and the United Nations signed a tripartite agreement to create Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989. OLS quickly evolved into a $150 million per year food and medical relief operation for 2.5 million people across southern Sudan. Yet what made OLS groundbreaking—its framework for negotiated humanitarian access with a rebel group and a sovereign government—was also its Achilles' heel. Khartoum abused its power to veto relief flights, tactically denying access to suit its military objectives. The depopulation campaign in Western Upper Nile between 1999 and 2001 is illustrative.
To increase Sudan's oil production capacity in Western Upper Nile and finance its war machine, the government embarked on a brutal military operation to remove civilians from the oil fields. The manipulation of relief flights was an effective complement to government air strikes and ground assaults. Between 1999 and 2001 the government denied OLS, on average, access to twenty locations per month. These restrictions prevented the World Food Program (WFP) from providing assistance to populations that faced food shortages ranging from 50 to 100 percent.
Though not nearly as egregious as the government, the SPLA was also guilty of manipulating aid. During the first 10 years of the conflict, the SPLA stole food and cattle from civilians, diverted food assistance to feed its troops, and used displaced civilians as bait to attract more relief supplies.
Conflict in the western region of Darfur had been simmering beneath the surface for decades, and in early 2003 rebels launched a series of successful attacks against the government. Khartoum's response is well documented: the government organized, armed, and trained ethnically-based militias to attack civilians from ethnic groups suspected of supporting the rebellion. The Sudanese military coordinated closely with its proxy force—the Janjaweed—and laid waste to Darfur's Zaghawa, Fur, and Massalit populations. Attackers destroyed food reserves, looted cattle, killed donkeys, and polluted water sources with their victims' corpses. Food supplies dwindled, prices soared, malnutrition rates skyrocketed, and the government embarked upon a grimly predictable strategy to deny humanitarian assistance to its suffering citizens.
In November 2004, Khartoum blocked the first shipment of food bound for Darfur on the grounds that it was genetically modified. The Minister of Humanitarian Affairs argued that there was no food crisis in Darfur, and the government enacted labyrinthine procedures aimed at blocking and delaying the establishment of humanitarian operations. The government's embassies and consulates around the world processed visa requests at a glacial pace. When relief workers did eventually start arriving in Khartoum, they had to apply for travel permits to go to Darfur, and the delays continued. 'Death had moved to the administrative level,' wrote author Gerard Prunier.
Once humanitarian teams arrived in Darfur, they had to obtain permission from local officials to visit IDP camps outside of the regional capitals. The government usually cited 'security concerns' when issuing routine denials. Government customs delayed the release of vehicles, equipment, and relief supplies, including essential medicines. The Civil Aviation Authority issued a directive that planes with airframes older than 20 years could not enter Sudan, grounding many of the aircraft used to move food and relief supplies. While relief agencies had difficulty getting jet fuel for the planes that could still fly, Khartoum had little difficulty fueling its own Antonov planes and attack helicopters to bomb and strafe villages.
On April 8, 2004 the government and the rebels signed a 'humanitarian ceasefire.' Once again Khartoum offered an empty promise of unimpeded humanitarian access. Administrative delays continued throughout the summer, and WFP lacked the capacity to reach all those who needed assistance—some1.5 million people. Rains swept across Darfur and turned desert roads into impassable mud, and displaced civilians succumbed to hunger and disease while the world watched.
To employ starvation as a weapon is a violation of international law under the Geneva Convention and a crime against humanity according to the statute of the International Criminal Court. What should the international community do when a government like Sudan's routinely shirks its commitments and uses starvation as a weapon against its citizens?
First, the international community must respond with punitive action such as targeted sanctions, asset freezes, and travel bans on regime officials responsible for the denial of assistance. Those officials must be named, shamed, and held accountable for their crimes. When appropriate, the International Criminal Court should be invoked to deal with the most heinous offenders.
Second, international donors should invest in Sudanese communities and institutions (including local NGOs) to enable them to manage the response to their own emergencies, and should invest in prevention measures. There is significant expertise to call upon in the region, particularly in Ethiopia and Eritrea, where indigenous organizations managed humanitarian operations in opposition-held areas during the civil war that ended in 1991. Donors should also invest in infrastructure – roads, bridges, airstrips – to facilitate the delivery of assistance.
Third, when warring parties use starvation as a weapon, the international community must be prepared to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries. The international community must protect civilians from conflict, ideally through multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations.
John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jenses work for the INternational Crisis Group's Africa Program.
This piece was originally published in Bread for the World Institute's 2006 Hunger Report, Frontline Issues in Nutrition Assistance. Find out more about the publication or order your copy from our online store.
