

2017 Hunger Report

Fragile Environments, Resilient Communities



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Fragile Environments, Resilient Communities



Joseph Moleri / Bread for the World

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425 3rd St. SW, Suite 1200

Washington, DC 20024

Telephone: 202.639.9400

Fax: 202.639.9401

Email: institute@bread.org

www.bread.org/institute

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



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www.hungerreport.org

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Religious Leaders' Statement

As leaders of churches and Christian organizations in the United States, we give thanks to God for the progress made against hunger and poverty in recent decades. It is a time unparalleled in human history. From 1990 to 2015, the global poverty rate was cut by more than half. In 1990, 1 in 4 people experienced hunger; today it's 1 in 9. We are humbled by the opportunity God has given us to contribute to this progress.

We are also encouraged by the action of the nations of the world in adopting the comprehensive Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), one of which is to get to zero hunger in the world by 2030. Yet we recognize the road to ending hunger and poverty will be far from easy. When signing the SDGs, world leaders pledged to "leave no one behind." It is this principle of the SDGs that makes the SDGs bolder and

more visionary than the preceding Millennium Development Goals. The SDGs will be achieved only if they reach everyone everywhere. With a 2030 deadline, there is little time to waste.

Political instability, climate change, violence, displacement, and weak governance often create conditions of fragility—perhaps the greatest challenges on the road to 2030. Research shows, for example, that a child living in a conflict-affected developing country is twice as likely to be hungry as a child living in other developing countries. Hunger and malnutrition, especially for young children, lead to lifelong underachievement and poor health. These are real determinants of a child's, and a nation's, ability to flourish.

The challenges we see are not new to people of faith. Vulnerable communities are part of the sacred stories highlighted

SIGNATORIES

Mr. Leith Anderson
President
National Association of Evangelicals

Mr. Marv Baldwin
President and CEO
Foods Resource Bank

Bishop George E. Battle Jr.
Senior Bishop
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church

Rev. David Beckmann
President
Bread for the World

Ms. Carol Bremer-Bennett
Director, United States
World Renew

Ms. Linda L. Booth
President, Council of Twelve Apostles
Community of Christ

Rev. Dr. Joe Bush
Executive Secretary
Disaster Management Office
National Baptist Convention USA, Inc.

Mr. J. Ron Byler
Executive Director
Mennonite Central Committee U.S.

Mr. Patrick Carolan
Executive Director
Franciscan Action Network

Dr. Iva E. Carruthers
General Secretary
The Samuel DeWitt Proctor Conference

Rev. Walter Contreras
Pastor of Spanish-Language Ministry
Pasadena Presbyterian Church

The Most Rev. Michael B. Curry
Presiding Bishop and Primate
The Episcopal Church

Rev. Dr. John C. Dorhauer
General Minister and President
United Church of Christ

Mr. Jonathan Duffy
President
Adventist Development & Relief Agency International

Mr. Gary L. Edmonds
President and CEO
Food for the Hungry

Ms. Ruth Farrell
Director
Presbyterian Hunger Program, PC(USA)

Dr. Sandra Gadson
International President
Women's Home and Overseas Missionary Society,
AME Zion Church

Dr. Susan E. Gillies
Interim General Secretary
American Baptist Churches USA

Rev. Amy Gopp
Vice President for External Relations
IMA World Health

Ms. Virginia R. Holmstrom
Executive Director
American Baptist Women's Ministries (ABCUSA)

Ms. Sheila S. Hopkins
President
National Council of Catholic Women

Dr. Joel C. Hunter
Senior Pastor
Northland-A Church Distributed

Ms. Hyepin C. Im
President
Korean Churches for Community Development

Sr. Rose Marie Jasinski, CBS
President
Sisters of Bon Secours, USA

Commissioner David Jeffrey
National Commander
The Salvation Army in the USA

Sr. Margaret Mary Kimmins, OSF
Congregational Minister
Franciscan Sisters of Allegany

Mr. John Lyon
President
World Hope International, Inc.

Rev. Carlos L. Malavé
Executive Director
Christian Churches Together

Sr. Donna Markham OP, PhD, ABPP
President & CEO
Catholic Charities USA

Rev. John L. McCullough
President and CEO
Church World Service

in Scripture. Floods (Genesis 7:7), drought (1 Kings 17:7-9), famine and vulnerability of women (Ruth 1-5), political instability (1 Samuel 21:10), ethnic struggles (Acts 18:1-2), and religious persecution (Acts 8, 11, 12) have affected peoples throughout the ages. Stories such as Joseph being sold into slavery (Genesis 37:28) or Mary and Joseph's flight to Egypt to escape violence and death (Matthew 2:13-14) are key to the arc of our biblical narrative. Our ministries with people in need as well as Scripture convince us of the great resilience and strength of people rising in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges.

With abiding faith and courage, we address this challenge called fragility as a barrier to ending hunger—for all people regardless of their faith tradition. We urge the U.S. govern-

ment and the international community to come together to invest more in fragile countries to promote peace, create stability and opportunity, and build resilience. Reaching the “furthest behind first” will take unprecedented investments over the next 13 years. Humanitarian and development assistance are critical to achieve rapid progress, and we need to focus on peace and institution building to sustain progress and ultimately lead the way out of fragility. Here at home, we urge our government to focus on communities with concentrated poverty—they are fragile environments within our midst. We must make fragile environments everywhere a national priority.

With more political will and resources devoted to partnering with fragile countries, alongside national stakeholders rising to the challenge, we can end hunger and extreme poverty.

Rev. Vy T. Nguyen
Executive Director
Week of Compassion

Rev. Rubén Ortiz
Director of National Programs
Esperanza

Bishop Bruce R. Ough
President
The Council of Bishops
The United Methodist Church

Ms. Susan (Suzi) Youngblood Paynter
Executive Coordinator
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship

Sr. Mary Pellegrino, CSJ
President
Leadership Conference of Women Religious

The Reverend Dr. James C. Perkins
President
Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.

Dr. Alton B. Pollard III, Ph.D.
Dean and Professor of Religion and Culture
Howard University School of Divinity

Dr. Shirley Cason Reed
International President
Women's Missionary Society, AMEC

Dr. Gus Reyes, Ph.D.
Director
Texas Baptist Christian Life Commission

Dr. Bernard L. Richardson, Ph.D.
Dean of the Chapel
Andrew Rankin Memorial Chapel
Howard University

Rev. Daniel Rift
Director
World Hunger and Disaster Appeal
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Rev. Dr. Samuel Rodriguez
President
NHCLC/CONELA

Rev. Gabriel Saguro
Pastor, El Calvario Church Orlando, Fla.
President of the National Latino Evangelical
Coalition (NALEC)

Ms. Djamillah Samad
Executive Director
Church Women United Inc.

Rev. Monroe Saunders Jr.
Presiding Bishop
United Church of Jesus Christ (Apostolic), Inc.

Mr. Stephen Schneck
Director, Institute for Policy Research &
Catholic Studies
The Catholic University of America

Dr. Ronald J. Sider
Founder and President-emeritus
Evangelicals for Social Action

Rev. David A. Steele
General Secretary
Church of the Brethren

V. Rev. Archimandrite Nathanael Symeonides
Director, Inter-Orthodox, Ecumenical
and Interfaith Relations
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America

Dr. Steve Timmermans
Executive Director
Christian Reformed Church in North America

Mr. Stephen M. Veazey
President
Community of Christ

Ms. Jane Walsh
Executive Director
JustFaith Ministries

Mr. Gary B. Walter
President
The Evangelical Covenant Church

Rev. Cecilia Williams
Executive Minister
Love Mercy Do Justice

Ms. Carol Lloyd Winkler
Moderator
Presbyterian Women in the Presbyterian Church
(USA) Inc.

Mr. Jim Winkler
President and General Secretary
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA

Dr. Carolyn Y. Woo
President and CEO
Catholic Relief Services

Dr. Jerry Young
President
National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc.

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Foreword: David Beckmann

This report is about fragile states like Somalia and Mali, where hunger and poverty are made worse by violent conflict. A child in a fragile state is twice as likely to be hungry—and three times as likely to be unable to attend school.

The last chapter of this report focuses on communities of concentrated poverty in our own country. Children in these often violent communities are especially likely to suffer poor nutrition in their early years, drop out of school, remain stuck in poverty, and eventually be disabled with long-term health problems.

The world as a whole is making unprecedented progress against hunger, poverty, and disease. Thus, we can reasonably pray—and work—to virtually end hunger in our time. In 2015, all the nations of the world agreed on the Sustainable Development Goals, which begin with the goals of ending hunger and extreme poverty by 2030.

But a large and growing share of world hunger is concentrated in fragile states. The rest of the world has largely given up on some of the poorest fragile states. But to continue to move toward the end of hunger, we need to mobilize increased support for peacemaking and development in the toughest situations. This report outlines strategies that can help people in fragile states make improvements in their lives.

Many of the fragile states are especially affected by climate change, so climate-resilient agricultural development is important. Changes to reduce climate-damaging emissions here in the United States are also important to struggling people in the world's fragile states.

Conflict in the fragile states is a security problem for the United States and other industrialized countries: violence in low-income, often forgotten fragile states contributes to international terrorism. Also, most of the refugees who have flooded into Europe are fleeing from fragile states, and most of the undocumented immigrants coming into the United States are coming from three exceptionally violent Central American countries.

I am hoping that the president and Congress who take office in 2017 will increase U.S. funding for fragile states—in the interests of national security as well as because it is so clearly the right thing to do.



Rev. David Beckmann

President,

Bread for the World and Bread for the World Institute





Freedom House

Executive Summary

The world has made dramatic progress against hunger and extreme poverty in recent decades. In 1990, approximately one in four people in the world lived with hunger on a daily basis. By 2015, the hunger rate was cut nearly in half and stood at about one in nine. Over the same period, extreme poverty was cut by even more, from one in three people in the world to one in ten.¹

At no other time in human history has progress against hunger and poverty occurred so rapidly. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided a framework to mobilize global action against hunger and poverty and other development objectives. The MDGs were not the only reason for this dramatic progress but they made a difference. Buoyed by this progress, in September 2015, heads of state and government from around the world adopted a new and much more ambitious set of global goals known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 17 interrelated goals include goals to *end hunger and poverty* by 2030. See Figure ES.1.

Ending Hunger in Fragile Times and Fragile Places

Recent trends give optimists good reason to believe that ending hunger and poverty is within reach. At the same time, the world faces daunting challenges. Tragedies on an unimaginable scale are occurring in different parts of the world. The wars in Syria and South Sudan and the near famine conditions in places where war and climate change collide are enough to challenge anyone's optimism about ending hunger and poverty.

Syria and South Sudan are among a group of nations the international development community often refer to as fragile states. While there is no universal definition of fragility, these are nations where high rates of hunger and poverty are compounded by civil conflict, poor governance, and vulnerability to climate change. Fragile places present the greatest challenge in ending hunger and poverty.

Conflict is one of the greatest threats to ending hunger. More people die from hunger and disease in conflict zones than from violence.² Paul Collier, author of *The Bottom Billion*, describes the effects

on nations as “development in reverse.” Within two years of the start of the Syrian civil war, the country had lost 35 years of development gains, including 3,000 schools damaged or destroyed, another 2,000 converted to shelters for displaced people, nearly a third of all public health centers destroyed, half the population living in poverty, and half the workforce unemployed.³

The potential for climate change to destabilize countries in some of the most volatile regions of the world is why the U.S. military considers it to be a threat to national security.⁴ The

international community cannot afford to ignore the challenges in fragile states. Conflicts spill over national borders and threaten regional security, with ramifications for the security of nations around the world, as we've seen repeatedly since the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Fragile states are a breeding ground for terrorism. Violence in Syria and Central America drive refugees and undocumented immigrants into Europe and the United States.

Countries that are governed well have a 30-45 percent lower risk of conflict.⁵ While a nation's leaders are the face of governance, state institutions are what make it possible for governments to function and serve the public. Access to health care, education, and other services, especially among groups who have historically been excluded, are important steps towards achieving durable peace. The record shows that post-conflict societies are more likely to relapse into conflict if hunger remains a major problem.⁶

Any country can have fragile regions or communities. Some U.S. communities have poverty rates of 50 percent or more. As a community becomes poorer, there are more and more barriers

Post-conflict societies are more likely to relapse into conflict if hunger remains a major problem.

Every minute,
24 PEOPLE

leave everything behind to escape war, persecution or terror.¹



Hunger rates in developing countries in conflict are almost **3x higher** than in other developing countries.²



Figure ES.1 The Sustainable Development Goals



Source: Adapted from United Nations, 2015

to people lifting themselves out of poverty. The difficulties reinforce and amplify each other. A survey of the literature on concentrated poverty shows that the most negative correlates of poverty (e.g., high levels of food insecurity, failing schools, large numbers of youth dropping out, chronic joblessness, and violent crime) generally do not appear before neighborhood poverty rates reach 20 percent, and then become endemic as poverty rates rise to 40 percent or more.⁷

A Call to Action: Investing in Resilience at Home and Abroad

Ending hunger is a moral imperative. It is especially so in fragile situations where the odds are stacked against vulnerable people and the barriers that they face are the highest. If we continue on the current path, it is estimated that by 2030, two-thirds of the people who experience hunger will live in fragile states.⁸

The guiding principles of the SDGs are to “leave no one behind” and to “reach the furthest behind first.”⁹ The average poverty rate in the countries the World Bank classifies as fragile

30%

Climate change could result in global crop yield losses as large as **5 percent** in 2030 and **30 percent** in 2080.³

5%

In 2015, **42.2 MILLION** Americans were food insecure, including 29.1 million adults and 13.1 million children.⁴





Ellie Van Houtte / USAID

USAID pre-positioned emergency relief supplies in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to ensure rapid deployment to affected communities in advance of Hurricane Matthew in October 2016.

is 51 percent.¹⁰ The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report, *Conflict, Security, and Development*, noted that no fragile state was on track to achieve any of the MDGs.¹¹ By 2015, several of these nations had met at least one of the targets, but overall, the record leaves little room for doubt: fragile countries are furthest behind.¹²

Addressing the root causes of fragility now will prevent future conflicts, save lives, build resilience and put the world on a path toward ending hunger. In other words, investments today will reduce the need for humanitarian response and military intervention in the future.

At the beginning of 2016, there were 33 active conflicts around the globe,¹³ and the number of people forcibly displaced by conflict had reached 65 million, the highest number since World War II.¹⁴

Diplomacy and defense are obviously crucial to ending conflict and securing peace, but much more must be done to prevent crises and to ensure that a short-term crisis today does not turn into a long-term crisis through the intergenerational effects of malnutrition and the disruption of health care and education, especially among vulnerable children. A child in a developing country that is affected by conflict is twice as likely to be hungry and nearly three times as likely to be out of school as a child in a developing country at peace.¹⁵

The United States government is currently involved in fragile states. The U.S. military is present or assisting in many of these countries, and the United States is the largest contributor to the international humanitarian system. Between 2004 and 2015, humanitarian funding from all donors increased six-fold, from \$3.4 billion to \$21.8 billion, and fragile and conflict-affected countries have been the largest recipients of this assistance.¹⁶ But in spite of this dramatic increase in resources, donors meet less than two-thirds of the annual humanitarian needs.¹⁷ In 2014, and then again in 2015, the World Food Program had to temporarily suspend food aid to millions of refugees because of funding shortfalls.¹⁸

We need new tools and a new approach that focuses on building resilience through local institutions, so that communities and countries can avoid, cope with, and bounce back from crises. To address the long-term challenges posed by fragility, the United States should take a more comprehensive and balanced approach, with greater investments in diplomacy and humanitarian and development assistance. U.S. global development programs that build resilience in

A Focus on Fragility at Bread for the World

Jordan Teague, Bread for the World Institute

Many of the issues and legislation that Bread for the World works on are important to people living in fragile states. From food aid reform to poverty-focused development assistance, Bread for the World faithfully advocates for policies and programs that assist the most vulnerable people and their countries.

The Global Food Security Act (GFSA), passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in July of 2016, includes a provision to authorize emergency food assistance and other disaster response to populations affected by manmade and natural disasters. GFSA will ensure that millions of people in fragile and conflict-affected countries receive the humanitarian assistance that they need. Bread for the World also pushes for greater flexibility in U.S. food aid programs so that in a crisis aid can reach those in need faster and respond to emergency conditions in the most appropriate, cost-effective way.

The U.S. global food-security plan mandated by the GFSA proposes to expand USAID assistance for agriculture and nutrition in fragile states. GFSA also will make sure that all U.S. global food security programs build the capacity of local communities to better withstand shocks due to conflict or climate change. GFSA was a focus of both the 2015 and 2016 Bread for the World Lobby Days, and Bread members made thousands of phone calls and sent thousands of emails to their members of Congress urging support for this bill, and many engaged key members of Congress in more personal ways by visiting them in their district offices and on Capitol Hill.

The Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act (FATAA) was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama in July 2016. FATAA focuses on tracking foreign assistance spending and programs across all U.S. government agencies and will help make U.S. humanitarian and development assistance more accountable and effective in fragile states. Bread for the World and its members have been advocates of foreign assistance reform since the organization was founded, and foreign assistance reform has been the focus of three Offering of Letters campaigns since 2008.

Bread for the World and its members have helped achieve increases in funding for poverty-focused development assistance (PFDA) in each of the last five years. PFDA supports programs that help build resilience such as agricultural development, nutrition, education, and global health in low-income countries, as well as those programs that respond to humanitarian crises such as violent conflict, natural disasters, or famine. In addition to ongoing, yearly advocacy on the federal budget and appropriations for PFDA, Bread members focused on increasing funding for PFDA in four Offering of Letters campaigns over the last decade. This means that hundreds of thousands of personal letters and phone calls have reached members of Congress from Bread for the World in support of increasing funding for PFDA in recent years.

Bread for the World has also addressed budget issues at the macro level, working with others to maintain a circle of protection around programs focused on people in poverty in the United States and worldwide. Resisting deep, across-the-board cuts in poverty-focused programs has made it possible to pursue increases in international humanitarian and development assistance.

For more than forty years, Bread for the World's advocacy has helped to strengthen the U.S. government's leadership in reducing hunger and malnutrition in some of the most fragile places in the world.

Jordan Teague is the international policy analyst for food security and nutrition in Bread for the World Institute.

Bread for the World advocates for policies and programs to reduce hunger and malnutrition in some of the most fragile places in the world.



Joseph Molieri / Bread for the World

Two-thirds of people in the world who are hungry live in rural areas and earn a living as farmers or landless agricultural workers.

but they come and go without being brought to scale. We need a long-term commitment to resolve the many interconnected problems in high-poverty communities. There is no one-size-fits-all or a single all-encompassing policy solution. To aggressively reduce the rate of concentrated poverty, policymakers will need to use all tools at their disposal.

Bread for the World welcomes the ambitious agenda of the SDGs. We believe ending hunger and poverty by 2030 is within reach in all countries. We recognize that fragile environments present major challenges. We also know that with political will focused on the challenges we can succeed.

countries that are vulnerable to fragility are underfunded, especially relative to defense spending, and limited in scope. The legislation that governs U.S. foreign assistance was written in a different era for different challenges. Programming lacks flexibility, making it difficult to work across sectors and to address diverse needs on the ground. It is in our interest to take a pragmatic, forward-thinking and sustainable approach to fragility. This includes our engagement with international institutions. The SDGs and the Paris climate agreement in December 2015, which produced a global framework to fight climate change, are the most impressive displays of collective action to date. The annual conference on climate change provides a forum for all countries in the world to come together to address perhaps the biggest long-term development challenge facing humanity. U.S.

leadership at the global level can help bring people together and can leverage resources from other partners.

To end hunger in the United States by 2030, public policies and resources must be more focused on reducing concentrated poverty. In 2014, 55 percent of all people in poverty lived in a community where at least 20 percent of the population was poor—up from 43.5 percent in 2000.¹⁹ Some small-scale demonstration projects have shown promise,

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

INTERNATIONAL

Develop a whole-of-government plan to coordinate and expand U.S. government engagement in fragile states.

Work with the international community to increase official development assistance to conflict-affected and fragile countries, including through multilateral mechanisms such as the World Bank's International Development Association.

Work with the international community to ensure timely and reliable funding to respond to crises through bilateral programs and international organizations.

Fulfill U.S. commitments to the Paris climate agreement adopted in December 2015, including financing the Green Climate Fund.

DOMESTIC

Set a medium-term goal to end concentrated poverty in the United States, defined as no more than 20 percent of the population within a community, by 2025.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS HIGHLIGHTED IN THIS HUNGER REPORT

**INTRODUCTION:
THE FRAGILITY CHALLENGE**

- Allow for much greater flexibility in how USAID partners with governments and civil society in fragile countries.
- Increase funding to address the growing gap between humanitarian needs and resources.
- Strengthen coordination of humanitarian and development activities to build resilience to shocks and stresses.
- Invest in social protection and rural development with a focus on small-scale farmers, especially women farmers.
- Help countries build more effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions for all.

CHAPTER 1: CONFLICT FRAGILE

- Ensure that all people who are forcibly displaced are protected and their basic needs met.
- Provide more and better support to countries and communities hosting people who are forcibly displaced.

- Strengthen the capacity of national institutions in fragile states to deliver public services.
- Invest in sectors such as agriculture and infrastructure shown to have the greatest potential to reduce poverty and generate large numbers of jobs.
- Recognize and protect the legitimate land tenure rights of vulnerable groups.

CHAPTER 2: CLIMATE FRAGILE

- Invest in climate-smart social protection strategies so the people most vulnerable to climate change are not forced to adopt negative coping strategies.
- Strengthen the capacity of national and local partners to prepare for and respond to natural disasters.
- Make gender equality a core principle of all U.S. climate change assistance.
- Identify guiding principles and institutional frameworks to prepare for the relocation of large groups of people displaced by climate change.

CHAPTER 3: U.S. FRAGILE

- Provide housing assistance to all families with incomes of less than 30 percent of area median income.
- Extend the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to childless workers.
- Reform the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to ensure sufficient funding, increase states' accountability, and better connect families to child care and job training services.
- Create a public jobs program focused on connecting workers who have barriers to employment with in-demand job skills.
- Reform the criminal justice system by decriminalizing poverty, ending for-profit policing, and reducing barriers to work for formerly incarcerated individuals.



UN Photo / David Ohana

The Fragility Challenge

Summary

In 2015, world leaders adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a set of 17 interrelated goals representing a comprehensive strategy to end global poverty. The SDGs include a goal to end hunger, as well as others to address the main drivers of hunger. The clarion call of the SDGs is to “Leave No One Behind,” and “Reach the Furthest Behind First.” Fragile states present the greatest challenges in achieving the SDGs. These are countries where high rates of hunger and poverty are compounded by civil conflict, vulnerability to climate change, and poor governance. 2030 is the deadline for achieving the SDGs. Humanitarian and development assistance are critical to making rapid progress, but to sustain progress and ultimately lead the way out of fragility there must also be a focus on institution building.

KEY POINTS

- Develop a whole-of-government plan to strengthen U.S. development assistance in fragile states and work with the international community to increase official development assistance to conflict-affected and fragile countries.
- Allow for much greater flexibility in how USAID partners with governments and civil society in fragile countries.
- Increase funding to address the growing gap between humanitarian needs and resources.
- Strengthen coordination of humanitarian and development activities to build resilience to shocks and stresses.
- Invest in social protection and rural development with a focus on small-scale farmers, especially women farmers.
- Help countries build more effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions for all.

Getting to Zero

Between 1990 and 2015, the global poverty rate was cut by more than half. During this same period, the hunger rate was cut nearly in half. See Figure i.1. This is faster progress than during any other time in history. In 1990, approximately one in four people in the world experienced hunger as a daily reality. By 2015, it was one in nine. No one knows for sure what the future will


bring, but the recent past suggests that optimists have good reason to believe that ending hunger and poverty is within reach.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted by the international community in 2000, provided the institutional framework for this global mobilization against hunger and poverty. In addition to cutting hunger and poverty rates in half, the MDGs set hard targets in health, education, gender equality, and the environment to be achieved by 2015. Progress occurred more or less in all of these areas, but none was more impressive than what was achieved against hunger and poverty. We are not suggesting the MDGs were the main cause. The MDGs presented a simple, elegant

framework to mobilize public support for action against hunger and poverty and other development objectives.

One thing the MDG experience taught us is that goal setting matters. In September 2015, the international community adopted a new and much more ambitious set of goals known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A set of 17 interrelated goals, more than twice as

many as the eight MDGs, they include goals to *end hunger and poverty* by 2030. Within this one framework, we find most, if not all, of the major social, economic, and ecological challenges of our time; and they apply universally, meaning to all countries, rich and poor alike. That means



Dominic Chavez / World Bank

Ghana was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to cut hunger in half, due much to government investment in expanding school feeding programs.




A decade ago,
NATURAL DISASTERS
accounted for 80 percent
of global humanitarian assistance.

Today, 80 percent goes to
CONFLICT-AFFECTED CRISES.¹


Post-conflict countries
where high levels of
hunger are not addressed
are **40 percent** more
likely to relapse into conflict
within a 10-year timespan.²

Figure i.1 Progress Against Poverty and Hunger, 1990-2015

Global poverty, percent



Global hunger, percent



Note: Based on the \$1.90 per day poverty line.

*All numbers for 2015 and beyond are statistical projections.

Sources: World Bank (2015), *Ending Extreme Poverty and Sharing Prosperity: Progress and Policies*; United Nations, *Millennium Development Report 2015*

the United States, in addition to doing its part to help low-income countries achieve progress, has committed to ending hunger and poverty at home.

Today, most of the people who experience extreme poverty and hunger live in middle-income countries and their numbers are falling rapidly.¹ A rising share of middle-income countries has sufficient domestic resources now to end poverty and hunger without relying on external financial support. Increasingly, hunger and poverty will be concentrated in low-income countries that do not have adequate domestic resources and will need the help of international partners. Some low-income countries face much stiffer challenges than others. Countries affected by conflict and climate change face the biggest challenges, and this is where the international community should focus support.



From 1970 to 2010, the world population grew by **87 percent**, while the population in flood plains increased by **114 percent** and in cyclone-prone coastlines by **192 percent**.³



School feeding programs, the most common social protection and safety net system in the world, reach less than **15 PERCENT** of the poor, on average, in developing countries.⁴

15%



Graham Crouch / World Bank

Reducing gender inequalities in secondary and tertiary education matters greatly in accelerating progress in ending hunger by 2030.

geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.”³

To end poverty by 2030, many low-income countries will need to reduce extreme poverty by more than 3 percentage points per year, and to do so every year. Only 10 percent of all countries have ever reduced poverty at a rate of 3 percentage points a year, and no country has done it for so many years consecutively.⁴ At the household level, there is constant cycling into and out of poverty. The fact is, many families who are not poor are perpetually vulnerable to becoming poor, be it next month or next year. In several African countries, according to surveys, one-third to two-thirds of all households cycle into and out of poverty.⁵ In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, a study over a 25-year period found that an average of 14 percent of households in the selected communities got out of poverty every year; but over the same period, 12 percent of non-poor households fell below the poverty line.⁶ Thus, poverty is on the decline overall, but that will not do families who are newly poor any good.

It will not be possible to end hunger and poverty by 2030 by taking a business as usual approach. Ending hunger and poverty requires new thinking and innovations. The innovations most needed are not so much technical or about treating hunger as a scientific problem. They are more about how to work together, smarter and more efficiently. Multi-stakeholder partnerships are the only way we as humanity will realize the majestic vision of the SDGs. Success will come through more and better partnerships, whether government to government, governments working with civil society groups, civil society working with the private sector, or other configurations. But most of all, it requires participation from people who are living in poverty and enduring hunger. As Pope Francis said when he spoke at the 2015 SDG summit, “To enable these real men and women to escape from extreme poverty, we must allow them to be dignified agents of their own destiny.”⁷

When signing onto the SDGs, world leaders pledged to “leave no one behind.” The goals will only be considered achieved if they reach everyone everywhere. This makes the SDGs bolder and more visionary than the MDGs. The SDGs endeavor not only to leave no one behind but to “reach the furthest behind first.”² This will require focusing on the most disadvantaged members of society and tackling structural inequalities that leave so many behind. The Agenda for Sustainable Development, a plan of action for achieving the SDGs, calls for reviewing processes based on evidence and data disaggregated by “income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability,

Understanding Fragility

A term often used for the countries we are talking about, the places where it will be hardest to end hunger, is “fragile state.” That doesn’t have a universally recognized definition, and many of the fragile states object to being called fragile. Bread for the World recognizes that fragile state is an imperfect and controversial concept, but we use the phrase in this report essentially as shorthand for “places where it will be hardest to end hunger.”

The idea of a fragile state can easily be extended to sub-national areas—fragile regions or communities. Any country can have fragile areas. In areas of the United States, we find conditions that have noticeable similarities to those in fragile countries. Box i.1 is a definition of fragility used by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID’s definition is not meant to be used inside the United States, but we can recognize that there are places whose residents have, for example, reason to question the effectiveness of government institutions. Some U.S. communities have poverty rates of 50 percent or more. One test of the U.S. government’s commitment to the SDG framework will be its response to development challenges in our own fragile environments.

Fragile state is an imperfect and controversial concept, but we use the phrase in this report essentially as shorthand for “places where it will be hardest to end hunger.”

In the international context, general definitions are meant to help clarify which countries are considered fragile. The World Bank considers fragile states to be countries “facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability.”⁸ The average poverty rate in the countries the World Bank classifies as fragile is 51 percent.⁹ The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, *Conflict, Security, and Development*, focused attention on the development challenges in fragile states, noting that none of those listed

Box i.1

How USAID defines fragility

USAID has developed the following definition of fragility:

Fragility refers to the extent to which state-society relations fail to produce outcomes that are considered to be effective and legitimate.

Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to work with society to assure the provision of order and public goods and services.

Legitimacy refers to the perception by segments of society that the government is exercising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole.

Finally, fragility affects state-society relations in gradations, i.e., it is not a condition that is either completely present or absent. By implication, countries with the high levels of fragility can be expected to face steeper challenges in reducing extreme poverty than those with lower levels.

Source: USAID (2014), *Ending Extreme Poverty in Fragile Contexts*

as fragile was on track to achieve any of the MDGs.¹⁰ By 2015, several of these nations had met at least one of the targets, but overall, the record leaves little room for doubt: these are the countries furthest off track.¹¹

Not all fragile states are low-income. Syria and Iraq are middle-income fragile countries. Conflict in Syria and Iraq helps explain why their region, West Asia, is the only one in the world where the hunger rate increased during the MDG era.¹² In this report, we focus on development, but

we note that fragile states also need to be a priority for international mediation, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping support. No amount of humanitarian and development assistance can help if large groups of armed people continue killing one another or sowing terror.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also uses the term fragile state. Most OECD members are traditional donor countries—the United States, Canada, Japan, and Western European countries, including the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian nations. Figure i.2 lists the principles formulated to guide the OECD’s engagement with fragile states and situations. Like the World Bank, the OECD publishes an annual list of fragile states. Most of those on the OECD list are also conflict-affected countries, but the OECD interpretation

Figure i.2 Principles for Good International Countries Affected by Conflict and Fragility & Situations

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Ensure all activities do no harm
3. Focus on state building as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”)



Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

tion includes countries that are “vulnerable to internal and external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters.”¹³ Bangladesh, for example, appears on the OECD list of fragile states but not on the World Bank’s list. It is not a conflict-affected country, but it is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters and the effects of climate change.

As it turns out, though, many conflict-affected countries are also vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. For example, Somalia, one of the most conflict-affected countries in the world, is among the most vulnerable to climate change. According to one analysis, seven of the 10 countries most vulnerable to climate change are also at risk of conflict.¹⁴ The potential for climate change to destabilize countries in some of the most volatile regions of the world is why the U.S. military considers climate change a threat to national security.¹⁵

The United Nations does not use the term fragile state. Instead, U.N. agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) refer to countries in “protracted crises.” These are defined as “environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease, and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time.” Protracted crises are often the result of conflict or natural disaster

in areas where “the state has limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection.”¹⁶ Widespread hunger is a risk in any protracted crisis.¹⁷

As a U.S.-based grassroots advocacy organization, Bread for the World’s focus is on what the U.S. government can do to help end hunger. This is where the public can have the greatest impact on global hunger. Humanitarian relief is vitally important and saves untold lives every year, and later in this introduction, we will discuss how it can be strengthened. But ending hunger for good, “sustainably” as it’s often called, means getting at the root causes of hunger.

Risk and Flexibility

The MDG era produced new agreements between donors and developing countries on how to partner more effectively. The 2005 Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness is the most influential of these. Its first principle is ownership: countries themselves must lead their process of development. Other principles include, for example, that donors should base their support on a country’s development plan and priorities, and that donors should coordinate their efforts to be more effective overall.

Implementation of the Paris Principles has been slow. If anywhere there were the temptation for donors to ignore changing old habits, fragile states would be the place. There is an encyclopedia of risks associated with working in fragile states. The governance challenges add layers of risk to partnering in these countries and make donors ever more tentative about ceding control of aid to national governments. The challenges range from difficulties in working with understaffed and ineffective ministries, to strengthening institutions that are weak or need to be rebuilt from the ground up, and especially, of course, corruption.

A 2012 OECD report, *Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: Improving Donor Behavior*, says a lot by the title—and in these words of self-reflection: “While most donors have shown an increasing strategic interest in fragile states, few have developed approaches to risk that are specifically geared towards working in fragile and transitional contexts.”¹⁸ In the 2011 World Development Report, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia took the donor community to task for what she described as its “procedural conformism.” Months after taking office in 2006, President Johnson Sirleaf appealed for help in restoring electricity to parts of Monrovia, the capital city. The country’s infrastructure was shattered after two civil wars. Not a single kilowatt of electricity was



UN Photo / Stuart Price

A Ugandan soldier with an African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, one of the most fragile countries in the world.



Neil Brandvold / USAID

Shattered by civil war during the 1990s and early 2000s, Liberia's healthcare system was ill prepared to deal with the Ebola outbreak in 2014-2015.

being produced anywhere in the country. Governments in fragile states need to deliver visible short-term results to build legitimacy. Candidate Johnson Sirleaf had promised to begin restoring power soon after taking office. None of the donors she approached, including the World Bank, United Nations, the European Union, or United States, were able to act quickly. The Government of Ghana, another low-income country, was much more responsive, but all it was able to offer were two generators.

In 2010, Liberia was one of the founding members of an association of 20 conflict and post-conflict states known as the g7+. By being part of this association, fragile states are able to amplify their voices. "We, the member countries of the g7+, believe fragile states are characterized and classified through the lens of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing."¹⁹ In 2011, g7+ members forged a *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*, which was endorsed by donors, that puts g7+ countries in charge of driving their own development agenda. The g7+ was also influential in the inclusion of Goal 16, to "promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies,"²⁰ in the SDG framework, insisting that peacebuilding and state building be recognized as a foundation of economic and social development.²¹

What g7+ countries say they want from donors is flexibility and a higher tolerance of risk.²² The United States may be the most risk averse of all the large donors. For example, the United States does not provide budget support, except to a very few countries it has special arrangements with, and usually for diplomatic or military purposes. Budget support provides funding directly to national governments to spend on national or local development priorities. The United States on principle does not route aid through government systems; that is, for example, instead of providing aid directly to the ministry of education, the United States will pay to build a school and handpick the contractors it wants to do the job. The World Bank, on the other hand, routes all of its aid through government systems. Despite the additional risks of working in fragile states,

the Bank has reported its projects in fragile states often outperform those in nonfragile states, according to both internal and external evaluations.²³

We're not calling for all U.S. aid to be provided as budget support. But the flexibility to do so should be available. Most Americans are familiar with the success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding countries after World War II. The Marshall Plan routed U.S. aid through country systems. These were fragile states at the time, including some recent enemies. Today, it is hard to imagine anything that looked like the original Marshall Plan in U.S. foreign policy.

"Slowly, almost imperceptibly, over several decades, the compliance side of U.S. government aid programs has grown at the expense of the technical, program side," writes Andrew Natsios, former administrator of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), describing the compliance side as a counter-bureaucracy: "a set of U.S. government agencies charged with command and control of the federal bureaucracy through a set of budgeting, oversight, accountability, and measurement systems that have grown over several decades to a massive degree, with extraordinary layer upon layer of procedural and compliance requirements."²⁴

The counter-bureaucracy discourages innovation and is hostile to the risks and uncertainties common to doing business in fragile states. For example, in 2013, the United States Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) recommended suspension of a health program that USAID was funding. Between 2003 and 2012, USAID invested in expanding low-cost health services, led by the Afghan Ministry of Public Health. The program involved building a chain of health clinics across the country, but it's real objective was institution building, trying to ensure what was achieved under the program would be sustainable once the Afghan government took it over. Under the program, child mortality rates were cut by more than half, life expectancy increased from 42 to 62 years, and 90 percent of the population was covered by basic health services, all at a cost of \$4.50 per head.²⁵ The program was successful beyond all expectations, yet SIGAR recommended cancelling it not because it found any waste or fraud; the problem was the Afghan Ministry of Public Health had failed to comply with the required U.S. government accounting standards.²⁶

"Development," says Natsios, "is at its root an effort to build or strengthen institutions (public, private profit-making, and nonprofit civil society) in poor and fragile states, with the ultimate goal of developing a capable state, market economy, and civil society that can manage public services, design good policies, create jobs, and protect human rights and the rule of law on a reliable, sustainable basis after the aid program is over and funding ends."²⁷



Graham Crouch / World Bank

Midwifery students in Afghanistan, where there is a critical need for maternal health care services, particularly in rural areas.

Civil Society—Vital Partners in Development

Faustine Wabwire, Bread for the World Institute

Civil society around the world has played a critical role in achieving progress on key development outcomes. Civil society is defined as “the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.”²⁸

Civil society has enabled dialogue and exchange of information between marginalized communities and government. Evidence shows that improved delivery of services depends on the ability of citizens to engage with the government and advocate for themselves. Deepened civil society engagement has the potential to inform evidence-based policymaking in key sectors, such as agriculture, health, gender equality, and education, among others.

Donors have not focused enough on strengthening the capacity of civil society in developing countries. Capacity building takes time and requires patience, particularly in challenging post-conflict environments. Strengthening the capacity of civil society on important issues affecting development outcomes, such as

analysis of government budgets, makes it possible for citizens in developing countries to hold their governments accountable.

In 2011, President Obama, in partnership with seven other heads of state, launched the Open Government Partnership (OGP) at the U.N. General Assembly. OGP’s 70 participating countries represent one-third of the world’s population. As a result of the OGP, more governments are opening up their budgets to public scrutiny.

In January 2017, the United States will have a new administration. It should build on the work the Obama administration has done in forging meaningful relationships between civil society and governments in developing countries.

Faustine Wabwire is the senior foreign assistance policy analyst in Bread for the World Institute.



Joseph Molieri / Bread for the World

Faustine Wabwire, right, and Chifundo Patience Chilera of Malawi at the June 2016 Pan-African Women of Faith Conference held in Washington, DC.

Zeroing in on Conflict and Climate-related Disaster

Famine was declared in Somalia in May 2011 and continued through October of that year. It was the first, and so far the only, full-fledged famine of the 21st century. Conflict and climate change converged to push this chronically hungry nation into starvation. Two years of severe drought—the worst in the country in 60 years—caused a collapse in food production. At the same time, fighting among several militia factions closed millions of people off from humanitarian supply lines from outside. The death toll was more than 250,000. About 200,000 survivors sought refuge in neighboring Kenya or Ethiopia and an additional 200,000 were displaced from their homes but remained in Somalia. Nearly half a million children younger than 5 were malnourished. In some areas, levels of severe acute malnutrition, also known as wasting, exceeded 50 percent.²⁹

A child living in a developing country that is affected by conflict is twice as likely to be hungry as a child living in a developing country that is at peace. Even short bouts of hunger and malnutrition during early childhood can cause death or lifelong damage.³⁰ A child growing up in a country affected by conflict is nearly three times as likely to be out of school as a child in a nation at peace.³¹ In Syria, 2.1 million children are out-of-school, plus another 700,000 living as refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.³²

In 2015, one in eight live births worldwide took place in a conflict zone, more than 16 million babies.³³ The number of babies born in conflict zones has been rising steadily over the last decade, along with the number of conflicts. Between 2004 and 2014, the number of major civil wars nearly tripled, from four to 11, compared to the previous decade when the number had been declining. At the beginning of 2016, there were 33 active conflicts around the globe, and the number of people forcibly displaced by conflict reached 65 million, the highest number since World War II.³⁴

More people die from hunger and disease in conflict zones than from violence.³⁵ Conflict is one of the greatest threats to human development. Paul Collier, author of *The Bottom Billion*, describes the effects on nations as “development in reverse.” Within two years of the start of the Syrian civil war, the country had lost 35 years of development gains: 3,000 schools damaged or destroyed, another 2,000 converted to shelters for displaced people; 31 percent of public health centers destroyed; half the population living in poverty, half the workforce unemployed.³⁶




UN Photo / Stuart Price

Somali woman hands her severely malnourished child to a medical officer in 2011. Severe drought and civil war combined to push the country into famine.

The effects of conflict endure long after the fighting ends. Four decades after the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war, researchers found that people born during the war were shorter (stunted) on average than others in the population.³⁷ Similar findings were reported among people born during violent conflict in Burundi³⁸ and Zimbabwe.³⁹ Stunting occurs as a result of chronic malnutrition during the 1,000-day period between pregnancy and age two. In addition to shorter stature, the enduring effects include increased risk of chronic illness, poor school performance, and reduced labor productivity. Preventing stunting is one of the most cost-effective strategies to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. All it entails is simply providing children, as well as pregnant and lactating women, with adequate nutrition during this critical growth phase. Presently 156 million children under 5 years of age are stunted.⁴⁰ Stunting and wasting are both higher in fragile than nonfragile states. See Figure i.3.

Figure i.3 Stunting and Wasting Rates in Fragile and Nonfragile States



Source: International Food Policy Research Institute (2016), *Global Nutrition Report 2016: From Promise to Impact: Ending Malnutrition by 2030*.

Climate change is growing in importance as a cause of fragility. More than 200 million people per year are directly affected by climate-related disasters, and their numbers are rising. Most are in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the regions with the highest rates of stunted children and hunger. Four out of five people experiencing hunger live in areas susceptible to natural disasters.⁴¹ Climate-related disasters are a subset of natural disaster. Floods, droughts, tropical storms, heat/cold waves, and forest fires are considered climate-related.⁴² Sub-

Saharan Africa is disproportionately affected by drought, while South Asia is disproportionately affected by flooding.⁴³ Drought is the world's costliest natural disaster, and one of the main reasons African farmers give up trying to earn a living from their desiccated soils and migrate to cities.⁴⁴ Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, densely populated countries in South Asia, are highly vulnerable to flooding. In the summer of 2010, heavy monsoon rains swelled the Indus River in Pakistan and flooded one-fifth of the country. It was the worst flood so far this century, affecting more than 21 million people, more than the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake combined.⁴⁵

In 2015, the medical journal *The Lancet* reported that climate change could undermine 50 years of progress in global health.⁴⁶ Diseases that mainly affect poor people are expected to increase the most due to climate change.⁴⁷ Eighty percent of the deaths related to climate change occur among children in developing countries.⁴⁸ Most could be prevented with better access to safe water and improved sanitation.⁴⁹ Drought forces people to use lower quality water sources that increase the risk of contamination. Diarrheal outbreaks occur after flooding when drinking water becomes contaminated. The linkages between stunting and diarrhea are well documented.⁵⁰ Children with diarrhea are unable to absorb nutrients, compounding the effects of malnutrition.

Rising temperatures increase the chances that infectious diseases will spread to new areas. For example, climate change is expected to cause malaria-bearing mosquitoes to spread. Ninety

percent of the people who die of malaria live in sub-Saharan Africa—of whom 78 percent are children under the age of 5.⁵¹ This is mainly due to limited access to health facilities in rural areas. Dengue fever, on the other hand, is predominantly an urban disease, due to poorly managed water and solid waste systems. There has been a 30-fold increase in global cases of dengue in the last half century, with most cases in the Asia-Pacific region.⁵² Climate change has also been implicated in the spread of the Zika virus.⁵³

The international community has the tools to address the humanitarian and development challenges outlined above, and in the following sections we will delve into the toolbox. The traditional role of humanitarian actors has


been to provide food assistance and other forms of relief to people in emergencies. Two-thirds of humanitarian aid goes to people who have needed it for eight or more years.⁵⁴ In this context, it makes little sense for humanitarian and development actors to be working separately, with relief on one side and development on the other.

As we see in Figure i.4, poverty has become more concentrated in fragile states, which are the least likely places of all for relief and development to follow a linear progression. With the average length of displacement at 17 years, longer than a child's full school career, relief and development must be treated as flexible concepts. People affected by conflict and natural disaster are themselves asking for durable solutions. As Eva von Olreich, president of the Swedish Red Cross, says, "Affected people don't see the institutional divides between humanitarian and development aid. They only know whether the support they get is relevant and useful and helps them to be independent."⁵⁵

Modernizing Crisis Response


Donors are providing more humanitarian assistance than ever before. Between 2004 and 2015, humanitarian funding increased six-fold, from \$3.4 billion to \$21.8 billion,⁵⁶ and fragile and conflict-affected countries have been the largest recipients of this assistance. But in spite of this dramatic increase in resources, donors now meet less than two-thirds of the annual humanitarian needs.⁵⁷ See Figure i.5. In 2014 and again in 2015, the World Food Program had to temporarily suspend food aid to 1.7 million Syrian refugees because of funding shortfalls.⁵⁸ U.N. appeals for Syria brought in only 53 percent of the \$7.4 billion needed.⁵⁹ And this was for a refugee crisis that receives constant media attention, unlike dozens of others that are generally out of sight and out of mind. For example, Gambia, a West African country that receives almost no media attention

Figure i.4 Number of People in Poverty: Fragile States Versus Stable Countries, Official Estimates and Baseline Scenario, 1990-2030



Laurence Chandy, Natasha Ledlie, and Veronika Pencikova (April 2013), *The Final Countdown: Prospects For Ending Extreme Poverty By 2030*, Brookings Institution.

Figure i.5 Humanitarian Funding Requirements and Proportion of Requirements Met, 2015



Notes: The data does not include the Yemen Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. To avoid double counting of the regional appeals with the country appeals, the Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) does not include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) component; the Central African Republic RRRP only includes the Republic of the Congo component; the Nigeria RRRP is not included. CAR: Central African Republic; DPR Korea: Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Data is in current prices.

Source: Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016*.

in donor nations, received only 5 percent of requested funding.⁶⁰

The international community will simply not be able to end hunger by 2030 without adequate financing for the global humanitarian system. A steady, reliable stream of revenue commensurate with the level of need is essential. Every day, more than 40,000 people are displaced by violence and conflict,⁶¹ while another 60,000 are displaced by climate and weather-related disasters.⁶² Donors need to give more and they also need to give better, allowing for more flexibility in how humanitarian resources can be used. It is significant that as we go to press, the World Bank is negotiating the terms of the 18th replenishment of its zero-interest rate lending arm, IDA, which for the first time could substantially increase World Bank funding to deal with the refugee crisis, especially in Syria, and to work in fragile countries.⁶³


Presently, humanitarian assistance is financed on a voluntary basis. As we can see from the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, this just does not work. Humanitarian aid is a public good—all people should be able to count on it in times of need. It should therefore be financed with mandatory contributions from all countries with the means to contribute. Charges should be levied at the national level in the same manner that contributions are collected to finance UN peacekeeping operations, a system that is also woefully underfunded and needs to be strengthened.

Closing the funding gap will require a transformational change in how the humanitarian system works. Resources are currently raised through an annual appeal. Hundreds of humanitarian organizations and U.N. system agencies delivering food, medicine, shelter, and other assistance in conflict- and disaster-affected areas assess their annual needs and together present an appeal

to donors. Nearly two-thirds of the global humanitarian assistance provided by governments comes from five countries. The United States gives the most in absolute dollars.⁶⁴ See Figure i.6. Donor governments altogether provide three-fourths of global humanitarian assistance, with the rest coming from private sources.⁶⁵ The aid is not necessarily distributed strictly according to need. Donor governments are more interested in some countries than others for security reasons. Private funding comes mainly from individuals. Generally, people are more willing to donate to assist victims of natural disasters, but that has changed for now with the Syrian crisis, which received the most private funding in 2015.⁶⁶

A yearly fundraising cycle, like voluntary contributions, is a poor way of handling complex crises. For one thing, it wastes money: WFP has estimated that with multi-year financing, it could save between 23 percent and 33 percent on the cost of purchasing and transporting commodi-

Figure i.6 Top Government Donors of Humanitarian Assistance in 2015



Source: Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016*

ties.⁶⁷ Being able to plan multi-year programs is not only more cost-effective, but also enables humanitarian assistance to better help people, particularly children, in the long run. If child nutrition programs could be planned further in advance, and the ready-to-use therapeutic foods that save children's lives could be ordered and on hand, more children would survive and more survivors would avoid the lifelong damage caused by stunting.



EU / ECHO / Peter Biro

Using debit cards, the World Food Program is providing Syrian refugees with both cash and voucher assistance, allowing them to buy their own food from local shops.

Another important reform is to move toward giving cash rather than shipments of food aid. Assistance could be delivered more quickly and aid workers could stretch limited resources further. Currently, cash transfers and vouchers combined are only 6 percent of international humanitarian aid.⁶⁸ In one study, 70 percent of a sample group of Syrian refugees traded their in-kind food assistance for cash.⁶⁹ The cash offered the flexibility to obtain what they (not someone else, perhaps thousands of miles away) considered to be their most immediate needs.

Advances in digital payment systems make it possible to transfer cash efficiently on a wide scale. Digital delivery of cash transfers using mobile phones can reach people where in-

kind aid is not a viable option. During the 2011 famine in Somalia, aid agencies were able to get millions of dollars in cash to people to buy food in areas deemed too insecure to deliver food aid.⁷⁰ We may think of people in crisis areas as being malnourished and at risk of death because there is no food where they are. This is sometimes true, but not always. Food may be available in local markets, but people cannot afford it at the inflated prices.

Cash doesn't work best in all circumstances, but in appropriate settings it is unequivocally more efficient. The U.S. government, the largest donor of humanitarian food assistance, provides mostly in-kind food aid sent from the United States on U.S.-flagged ships. Speed and agility mean everything in a crisis, and when food is available in local markets, it doesn't make sense to ship it from thousands of miles away. WFP uses debit cards that refill each month to provide food assistance to millions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan.⁷¹ The boost to local economies in these countries helps compensate for some of the financial burden they bear in hosting refugees.

A much-needed change is for donors to move toward partnering directly with national and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in crisis-affected countries. In 2014, only 0.2 percent of humanitarian funding was routed directly to national and local NGOs.⁷² International NGOs, favored by donor governments, employ local NGOs as subcontractors, meaning their contributions to lifesaving work go largely unnoticed. Donors don't recognize their distinct

contributions because of a lack of transparency in the humanitarian aid funding chain. If all the links in the chain were documented, clarifying the value of everyone involved, donors would have a much better sense of local capacity. The direct involvement of national and local actors not only improves the effectiveness of the efforts in progress, but extends the impact of humanitarian relief since these organizations and professionals will have more experience and capacity to manage future emergencies in their countries.

The obstacles to improving coordination between humanitarian and development activities have been debated for many years. There are clear differences in operational cultures and in the circumstances of much of their work. With the current financing structure, humanitarian actors have no choice but to plan for short-term operations. Development organizations more often enjoy multi-year financing. Humanitarian actors operate in risky environments that require them to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Development actors are conditioned to be averse to risk, as we heard earlier from Andrew Natsios. National ownership is the guiding principle of development actors, while humanitarian actors operate under the inviolable principle of neutrality. In 2014, 329 aid workers were killed, kidnapped, or wounded.⁷³ In conflict zones, where allegiances have consequences, neutrality or perceived neutrality can be a matter of life and death.

All of these differences do not preclude better coordination between humanitarian and development actors. Most aid organizations that do humanitarian work also provide development assistance. USAID has created joint planning cells to bring together relief and development teams to “layer, integrate, and sequence” humanitarian and development assistance.⁷⁴ Notwithstanding these positive steps, there is still not enough coordination between the agency’s humanitarian and development specialists. Neither humanitarian nor development programs are doing enough as yet to help people build resilience, although the concept of resilience has reframed the work of both humanitarian and development actors operating in fragile environments. USAID defines resilience as “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.”⁷⁵ This is obviously a critical concern in fragile environments.

The World Humanitarian Summit held in 2016 was the first-ever dedicated to the humanitarian landscape. Bread for the World was represented at the summit by board chair Sandra Joireman. Organizers attempted to address some of the differences that complicate efforts to more closely coordinate the work of humanitarian and development programs. U.N. Secretary-General



Mohamed Azakir / World Bank

Refugees from Syria line up in front of the registration center in Tripoli, Lebanon, a port city that is one of the first stops for Syrians fleeing their embattled country.

Ban Ki-moon, who presided over the meeting, said, “Achieving [better coordination] will require international providers to set aside artificial institutional labels of “development” or “humanitarian,” working together over multi-year horizons with the SDGs as our common overall results and accountability framework.”⁷⁶ The Summit produced several “commitments,” including expanding the use of cash and scaling up funding to local and national NGOs. But countries were under no obligation to make commitments, and the United States committed to neither of these.⁷⁷

A less heralded but significant breakthrough for coordination was the announcement of the Education Cannot Wait Initiative. Presently, less than 2 percent of humanitarian aid goes towards education. In 2015, there were 80 million school-aged children and youth whose education had been disrupted by conflict or natural disaster, 37 million out of school altogether and the remainder receiving uneven support.⁷⁸ The MDG era produced significant gains toward universal primary education, particularly among girls, and the SDGs promise children everywhere access to a quality, free primary and secondary education by 2030. With a funding target of \$3.85 billion over five years,⁷⁹ the Education Cannot Wait Initiative is a down payment on that promise for children trapped in crisis-affected countries, as well as a big step towards leaving no one behind and reaching the furthest behind first.

Rural Development and Social Protection

In 2015, the three U.N. food and agriculture organizations—FAO, WFP, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)—calculated how much it would cost to end hunger by 2030. In their report, *Achieving Zero Hunger*, they estimated an annual cost of \$265 billion

from 2016 through 2030, or about 0.3 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). That’s an additional \$160 per year per person living in extreme poverty.⁸⁰

At the launch of the report, FAO Director-General José Graziano Da Silva underscored that whatever figures are used, they are a fraction of what hunger costs societies, economies, and individuals.⁸¹ In human terms, the amount of suffering that would be prevented is incalculable. But let’s continue with economics. In a 2011 paper for the Copenhagen Consensus on Human Challenges, economists Sue Horton and Richard Steckel modeled the losses in global GDP from hunger over the course

of the 20th century, and then projected the losses out to 2050. Based on historical trends, they project a 6 percent loss in global GDP through 2050, and as much as 12 percent in countries with exceptionally high poverty rates.⁸² In other words, it doesn’t make financial sense *not* to invest in ending hunger—since 0.3 percent of



Margaret W. Nea for Bread for the World

More than two-thirds of people in the world who are hungry live in rural areas of developing countries, the majority of them in Asia, earning what little income they make in the agricultural sector.

Hope for Refugee Children Through Education

Jesuit Refugee Service

Lebanon has welcomed about 1.5 million Syrian refugees since civil war erupted in neighboring Syria in 2011, accounting for about a quarter of Lebanon's current population. But the influx of an estimated 502,000 school-aged Syrian refugee children has stretched the host country's public schools to the limits.

Even when Syrian refugee children are accepted into Syrian schools they often find it difficult to assimilate, as they face challenges such as language barriers, discrimination, bullying, social and economic issues, and unpredictable enrollment regulations.

So in response, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) offers extensive education and language training programs in Jbeil and in Kafr Zabad—two areas in Lebanon with high concentrations of Syrian refugees—to help refugee children prepare for Lebanese public schools.

In 2015, more than 800 children were enrolled in JRS-classes in Jbeil and in Kafr Zabad during the first half of the year—about double compared with the same time period in 2014. And despite the program's progress, increasingly high demand for classes mean there is a waiting list of potential students eager to enroll.

All of the more than 170 JRS students in Jbeil and in Kafr Zabad who took placement tests for the Lebanese school system during the first half of 2015 earned passing grades. But with classroom space tight, it's uncertain how many children will have the opportunity to attend regular public schools.

Increasingly desperate living conditions of refugee families have created stressful home environments that threaten to undermine their children's education, with some children dropping out of school so they can work to support their family. So JRS added social workers to its educational programs in 2015. Absentee and dropout rates since have dropped significantly.

In addition to education needs, JRS also routinely provides refugee families with food baskets, hygiene products and items to help them cope with winter, such as blankets, heaters, drapes and carpet.

JRS students in Lebanon say they're grateful for the opportunity to continue their studies but can't wait to return one day to their home country.

Find out more about Jesuit Refugee Service at jrsusa.org.



Dominic Chavez / World Bank

Syrian refugees learn finger painting from their Lebanese teacher during class in the Lebanese village of Zouq Bhanin.

global GDP is far less than 6 percent.

The basic formula for ending hunger is simple, according to *Achieving Zero Hunger*: economic growth to raise incomes and lift people out of poverty, along with social assistance programs (which we call social protection in this report) to meet urgent human needs. The key economic sector is agriculture. FAO has shown that investment in agricultural development in low-income countries is up to five times as effective in reducing hunger and poverty as investments in any other sector.⁸³ Box i.4 has examples of the agricultural investments we're talking about. In the countries with the lowest per capita incomes, an average of 70 percent of the workforce is employed in agriculture. Most fragile states have economies based on agriculture.⁸⁴

Despite the importance of their agricultural sectors, fragile states are more dependent on food imports than other developing countries.⁸⁵ This makes them more vulnerable to international price shocks, as we saw in 2007-2008 when global food prices skyrocketed, pushing millions more families into poverty and triggering protests and rioting in 48 countries.⁸⁶ The Middle East and North Africa region, which includes the countries of the Sahel that border the Sahara Desert, is the most dependent of all on imported food. This is one of the most conflict-prone areas in

Box i.4

Agricultural development assistance—key interventions to support small scale producers:

- Improve road infrastructure to expand market access.
- Build storage facilities to reduce post-harvest losses.
- Invest in research to increase crop productivity and resistance to pests and diseases.
- Intensify use of climate-smart agriculture practices.
- Diversify production to increase consumption of nutritious foods.
- Strengthen governance of land tenure and other natural resources.
- Empower women farmers with inputs, extension, credit and other financial services, labor- and time-saving technologies, and legal rights.



the world, and also one of the most affected by climate change.

After the 2007-2008 food-price crises, donors committed to increasing investments in agricultural development. The food-price crisis was a wake-up call for them. For the better part of two decades, donor governments had been reducing support for agriculture and pressing developing country governments to open their markets to cheap imports from subsidized farmers in rich countries. It is fair to say that donor countries contributed to making poor countries more vulnerable to the food-price shocks.

Haiti is a perfect example. In the 1970s, the country was fully self-sufficient in rice production. In the 1980s, market deregulation and trade liberalization led to rapid disinvestment in the agricultural sector. Donors, led by the United States, insisted that the Haitian government invest less in agriculture and more in other sectors. Cheaper, subsidized rice from the United States flooded the domestic market. In addition, the Haitian government's capacity to respond to hunger emergencies was eroded by insufficient budget support to programs that once addressed food security.⁸⁷ Haiti stands out among all the countries affected by the 2007-2008 food price crisis, because rioting in Port-au-Prince, the capital city, led to the fall of the government.

Feed the Future, the U.S. government's global hunger and food security initiative, was born out of the food-price crisis. So too was the Global Agricultural and Food Security Program, a multilateral trust fund managed by the World Bank and supported by the United States and other donors. Neither of these programs is targeted exclusively to fragile states. In fact, most of the countries where Feed the Future is active are not fragile. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the most fragile region, do however receive the largest share of assistance through Feed the Future. Africa never had a Green Revolution, as did Asia and Latin America beginning in the 1960s. From 1960 to 2010, per capita cereal production increased by 44 percent and 48 percent in Asia and Latin America respectively, while production decreased by 13 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.⁸⁸

Investments in agricultural development are essential to ending hunger. But it is also essential to support social protection programs. *Achieving Zero Hunger* argues that we don't need to wait for improvements in agricultural productivity to end hunger. The world can end hunger very quickly by expanding social protection. Ghana, the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to cut hunger in half during the MDG era, linked investments in social protection with agricultural development. School meal programs sourced their foods from local farmers, providing the farmers with a guaranteed market and school children with a daily meal. Brazil was the first country to create



FAO/ALC

Trade policies imposed on Haiti in the 1980s displaced local production and made the country dependent on food imports. Food imports continue to frustrate local producers and stifle much needed economic growth.

this linkage as part of its nationwide food security strategy, developed under the leadership of the former Minister of Food Security José Graziano Da Silva.

Social protection emerged only in the last couple of decades as a key policy tool to reduce hunger and poverty in developing countries. It started in Latin America with the adoption of

conditional cash transfers. Parents of young children receive a cash allowance from the government to keep their children in school and ensure they receive vaccinations and other basic health care. The number of countries that have conditional cash transfer programs has grown from 27 in 2008 to 64 in 2014.⁸⁹ Educational attainment and good health are building blocks for overcoming the cycle of intergenerational poverty.

Because they apply to both boys and girls, the transfers also reduce gender inequalities, which are a root cause of hunger and poverty. In developing countries, girls still receive fewer years of education than boys, particularly at the secondary school level. One reason is that they are more likely to be pulled from school to work and help support the family. Almost always, cash transfers are given to a woman. In Brazil, in fact, it's legally required for the transfers to be controlled by women.

Women are more likely than men to

Table i.1 Social Protection Includes Safety Nets, Social Insurance, and Labor Market Policies

Category	Examples
Social safety nets (or social assistance)	• Conditional and unconditional cash transfers, including noncontributory pensions and disability, birth and death allowances • Food stamps, rations, emergency food distribution, school feeding and food subsidies • Cash or food-for-work programs • Free or subsidized health services • Housing and utility subsidies • Scholarships and fee waivers
Social insurance	• Old age, survivor, and disability contributory pensions • Occupational injury benefits, sick or maternity leave • Health insurance
Labor market policies	• Unemployment, severance, and early retirement compensation • Training, job sharing, and labor market services • Wage subsidies and other employment incentives, including for disabled people

Source: World Bank (2016), *Shock Waves*.

spend an increase in income on their children, including on the quality and quantity of foods they consume.⁹⁰

In addition to conditional cash transfers, there are many other instruments of social protection. The three main forms of social protection are social safety nets, social insurance, and labor market measures.⁹¹ See Table i.1. School feeding is the most common safety net program in developing countries.⁹² The international community has supported school feeding for decades. In El Salvador, the school meals program was started by WFP in the midst of a civil war in the 1980s, and it was not until 2007, after many transition phases, that the government of El Salvador finally assumed full control over the program.⁹³ Thirty-eight countries have successfully taken over school meal programs started by donors in the past 45 years.⁹⁴

More than 2 billion people in the developing world are benefiting from some form of social protection.⁹⁵ The lowest coverage and the fewest services are in countries with the highest poverty rates. Two-thirds of those living in extreme poverty are not covered by any type of social safety

net, and in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the regions with the highest concentrations of extreme poverty, the coverage is thinnest of all.⁹⁶ Historically, national governments have not invested in expansive social protection programs until their countries have had several years of strong economic growth. National social protection systems are mainly financed with a country's own resources, and this is true today in middle-income countries. The world's five largest social protection programs are in middle-income countries and, combined, reach more than 526 million people.⁹⁷

In September 2015, USAID released *A Vision for Ending Extreme Poverty* to coincide with the adoption of the SDGs. The document outlines

a strategy based on five pillars of inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Social protection—or more specifically, safety nets—is one of these pillars. This could signal a shift in how USAID works with national governments. A donor cannot contribute to a social protection system without working closely with and through the national government. A system is not the same as a program or collection of programs. As FAO puts it, if a social protection system “is not institutionalized in domestic budgets, structures, tax and labor market policy and overall political processes—if they are not part of a dynamic social contract between the state and citizens—then they are not a real social protection system.”⁹⁸



Scott Wallace / World Bank

Food-for-work and cash-for-work programs are widely used forms of social protection. Bangladesh, a country frequently struck by natural disasters, uses these to repair and upgrade roads.


Good Governance and Inclusive Institutions

During the 2007-2008 food-price crisis, protests were common in countries around the world. Those that turned violent occurred mostly in countries with poor governance.⁹⁹ Good governance is an effective shock absorber and has been shown to reduce the risk of conflict by 30 percent to 45 percent.¹⁰⁰

Good governance may best be understood by what it requires, starting with accountability to citizens. Peaceful protest is a way for citizens to make their voices heard, a form of holding government accountable. In stable democracies, citizens expect to be heard at the ballot box and for elections to be legitimate. Most definitions of good governance though stop short of requiring elections.¹⁰¹ In post-conflict countries, it is recommended not to rush into elections, which can be destabilizing before peace has had time to take root.¹⁰²

Good governance requires transparency in government decision making. A lack of transparency provides cover for corruption. Transparency International publishes an annual

Figure i.7 Official Development Assistance (ODA) Commitments to Tax and Development Capacity Building



Source: IMF, OECD, UN, and WBG (July 2016), Enhancing the Effectiveness of External Support in Building Tax Capacity in Developing Countries: Prepared for Submission to G20 Finance Ministers

Corruption Perceptions Index, based on surveys in more than 100 countries. In general, the poorer the country, the more corruption is perceived and reported. Most people's perceptions of corruption are based on their experience with public services they desperately need. Transparency International's surveys ask whether you have had to pay a bribe for public services in the past year. A weak governance environment with little or no accountability provides myriad incentives for private gain. Public servants in these countries earn very little compared to their peers in rich countries, and some, such as police officers and lower level administrators, may be earning barely enough to feed their families. Accepting bribes may be more a matter of survival than anything else.

The professionalization of the civil service is necessary to improve governance. Building and maintaining a professional administration to fulfill government responsibilities requires a reliable source of financing. As Figure i.7 shows, strengthening local tax systems has not been a high priority for donors. Even low-income countries can raise substantial tax revenue. Fragile states are frequently rich in natural resources. Conflicts are often fought over control of these resources. The people profiting from extractive industries, whether inside or outside government, are naturally not eager to pay taxes. Ways of holding elites accountable must be built into government structures—not an easy task. One way for international partners to help is by enabling governments to set up effective financial management systems.

Donor governments often pressure national governments to be more accountable to citizens, but it's not easy to create political will when it doesn't already exist to some degree. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. development agency that provides aid to low-income countries committed to good governance, requires partner countries to meet strict criteria on a checklist of items such as controlling corruption and spending on health and education. But donor resources can never be fully insulated from the political context of the country. MCC was forced to abruptly terminate compacts in 2009 with Madagascar and in 2012 with Mali because of military coups.

A nation's leaders are the face of governance, while state institutions are the vital organs that pump life into systems that make it possible for governments to function and serve their populations. The World Bank's 2011 report *Conflict, Security, and Development* tells us that it takes, on average, anywhere from 15 to 40 years to reform state institutions.¹⁰³ Not only do institutions change slowly, the direction of change can be very unclear as it is taking place.¹⁰⁴

Donors can do little independently to build effective institutions. They have tried their hand at institution building, and when it is done with a heavy hand, the results have not been good. The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s attempted to accelerate economic growth and development in developing countries. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund led the charge by imposing strict conditions on countries to qualify for aid. The results were mixed, especially in Africa. One lesson from this period stands out. Reforms should not be forced on a country that are not supported by leaders or a majority of citizens.

Institution building is an internal process, steered by local actors. These may be government leaders, but civil society and others outside government can also have a strong influence. One good example of how international partners can support local actors in strengthening institutions is from Guatemala. The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (*Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala*, CICIG) was created in 2007 by an agreement between the United Nations and the Guatemalan government. The motivation to establish the commission, however, came from pressure by Guatemalan civil society groups to do something about wide-scale government corruption and its links to rising levels of violence.

CICIG works with the country's judiciary and security institutions, building their capacities to investigate and prosecute organized crime—capacities Guatemala had previously lacked.¹⁰⁵ In 2015, CICIG, working jointly with the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor's Office, unearthed a massive multimillion-dollar corruption scheme that reached all the way up to the president. The investigation led to the president's resignation and subsequent prosecution on corruption charges.¹⁰⁶ None of this would have been possible without the advocacy of civil society groups and the courage of a committed group of government officials able to stand up to intimidation.

The successes against corruption in Guatemala through CICIG, and in countries that have qualified for MCC funding through their commitment to improved governance, hinge on the broader principle of respect for the rule of law. Where there is the rule of law, government cannot arbitrarily use its power against citizens. Legal frameworks are transparent, and all people are accountable to the same laws. In societies that fully respect the rule of law, the rights of all citizens are upheld, regardless of wealth, social status, political affiliation, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.



Nerdoguate

Tens of thousands of Guatemalans flooded the streets of the capital, Guatemala City, in August and September 2015 to demand the country's president, Otto Pérez Molina, resign, after a wide-ranging investigation revealed his involvement in an extensive corruption scheme.

Getting to Zero in the United States

One chapter of this report is on the United States. The United States is not a fragile state, and we're not suggesting that it is. But this report is about the places where it will be most difficult to end hunger and poverty by 2030. Within the United States, those places are areas of concentrated poverty—communities where 20 to 40 percent, or even more, of residents live below the poverty line.

The path out of hunger and poverty is similar in every country. First, people need to be able to earn a living so that they can provide food, shelter, and other necessities for their families. Second, social protections to cope with shocks, such as a serious illness; or to manage barriers to work, such as access to affordable child care. Third, a system that is just and treats all people fairly.

Almost 14 million people live in communities of concentrated poverty—twice as many as in 2000.¹⁰⁷ The number of people who live in high-poverty neighborhoods has risen much faster than the number of people in the United States as a whole who fell below the poverty line. As a community becomes poorer, there are more and more barriers to people lifting themselves out of poverty. The difficulties reinforce and amplify each other. A survey of the literature on concentrated poverty shows that the most negative symptoms of poverty (e.g., chronic joblessness, dropping out of school, crime, among others) generally are not seen in neighborhoods whose poverty rate is less than 20 percent. But they appear and begin to increase at poverty rates of more than 20 percent, and they increase rapidly as the poverty rate rises to 40 percent or more.¹⁰⁸

To end hunger in the United States by 2030, public policies and



Joseph Molieri / Bread for the World

Nate Gordon strives to give his children the life he never had. Like many men who struggle after serving time in prison, he was near despair before he found a program that helps men like himself reintegrate into their communities. Now he is co-director of that program, HELP, in Cincinnati, Ohio.

resources must be much more focused on reducing concentrated poverty. Some small-scale demonstration projects have shown promise, but they come and go rather than being brought to scale. We will need a long-term commitment to resolve the many interconnected problems in high-poverty communities.


Expanding access to affordable housing would make a big difference. The majority of families in poverty spend more than 50 percent of their income on housing, and in some metropolitan areas it is more than 70 percent, leaving little room for food or much else.¹⁰⁹ Federal housing assistance lifts a higher share of its recipients out of poverty than any other safety net program.¹¹⁰ The problem is that only one in four low-income families who is eligible for housing assistance actually receives it.¹¹¹ In Chapter 3, we discuss some proposals to improve housing policies and their implementation. For example, one idea is to establish a universal voucher program for families who earn less than a specified income.

Progress against hunger is interconnected with justice for all. We all know from the news, if not from personal experience, that the law and law enforcement are not applied objectively or fairly. All over the country, there have been incidents of police killing unarmed African American men. People who are convicted of similar crimes do not get similar sentences. Race weighs heavily in the outcome. Black men are 6 times as likely to be incarcerated as white men and 2.5 times as likely as Latino men.¹¹²

The incarceration of so many men, mostly young men, has devastated the communities where they are from, and these are among the most disadvantaged communities in the country. Two-thirds of families with a member who is incarcerated struggle to meet basic needs such as food and housing costs.¹¹³ Much of the “collateral damage” of incarceration is inflicted on children. Children from families with someone imprisoned are more likely to drop out of school and to have contact themselves with the criminal justice system.¹¹⁴

Concentrated poverty is a reflection of some of the most charged political and social problems in the United States and an enormous barrier to ending hunger and poverty. There are other issues that affect hunger and poverty, but the racism embedded in government institutions is at the top of the list. To leave no one behind means we must call institutionalized racism what it is and move aggressively to dismantle it.

Figure i.8 Change in Concentrated Poverty in United States Since 2000



Source: Paul A. Jargowsky (August 2015), *The Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the Concentration of Poverty, and Public Policy*.

International Law is Limited on the Rights and Treatment of Refugees and Displaced People

Sandra F. Joireman

Up until the turn of this century, the 1951 Convention on Refugees has provided a flexible approach to dealing with individuals and groups of refugees. The Refugee Convention gives authority to the 146 signatory states and to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to assess and protect refugees. However, times have changed in terms of both conflict and climate change, and this framework is less useful than it has been in the past. Indeed, we are in need of more and better international agreements that can address the challenges of forced migration in the 21st century.

There are two key documents on refugees, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its implementing legislation, the 1967 protocol, both of which define a refugee as “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”¹

Individuals who want refugee status need to prove they are threatened with harm in order to receive asylum in another country. However, since the 1960s, UNHCR and states have also recognized groups of people fleeing risk of harm (*prima facie* refugees) who “on the basis of readily apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin” qualify for refugee status.² This is typically determined by states or the UNHCR in situations of armed conflict. For example, Syrians are right now considered to be *prima facie* refugees, so the possession of a Syrian passport is enough to qualify as a refugee, without any need for an individual to prove a threat of harm.

One of the most significant problems with the Refugee Convention is that it only applies to those who have crossed an international border. Many people are displaced within their countries of origin and remain without international protection and sometimes without any assistance. This is a particular problem when the state is a party to the conflict that is causing forced migration. There are twice as many internally displaced people as there are refugees worldwide. In 2015, there were 27.8 million new displacements due to conflict, violence and disasters, bringing the overall total to 40.8 million internally displaced people worldwide.³ The African Union has developed the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), or the Kampala Convention, which applies international humanitarian law to internally displaced people and compels states to both monitor internal displacement as well as to protect and assist the internally displaced. The Kampala Convention stands alone; other regions of the world have not developed similar instruments for the protection of IDPs, nor has there been any additional international law. Without an international convention that applies to displaced people, there is no obligation on states to count, monitor, or provide for the displaced.



UNICEF

Syrian children at the reception center near the town of Gevgelija, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, after crossing the border from Greece with their families.

A second problem with the Refugee Convention is that it cannot address the increasing numbers of people forced to migrate as a result of climate change. While many climate migrants move within their own countries, for example farmers who change residence from rural to urban areas due to drought, some also cross borders. In the case of sudden-onset disaster situations, the closest place of safety may be across an international border. For example, when the Haiti Earthquake occurred in 2010, many Haitians fled to the neighboring Dominican Republic, but they are not refugees nor could they be considered such under international law. This has been an issue of concern for some time. Indeed, the Nansen Initiative, launched in 2012, was a state-led consultative process designed to address the issue of protection for those forced to cross borders by natural disasters and climate change. The Nansen Initiative resulted in agreement on a protection agenda in 2015, but the agreement, which only garnered the acceptance of 109 state delegations, is non-binding and does not hold the weight of an international convention. Thus, the problem of protecting climate change migrants, both the internally displaced and those crossing state boundaries, remains.

The third problem with the international law regarding refugees is that it does not address the concerns of migrants displaced by violence that is not the result of civil or international war. In 2014, the number of unaccompanied child migrants from Central America trying to cross the border into the United States surged to levels never seen before. They were fleeing the threat of harm from gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, some of the most violent countries in the world. According to U.S. law, each of these children must individually be assessed for their asylum claims. U.S. law, based on the Refugee Convention, allows individuals to apply for asylum in the United States if they can show past persecution or prove, *as an individual*, a well-founded fear of future persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This is obviously extraordinarily difficult for children to do, particularly if they do not have legal representation.⁴ These children, though fleeing violence, would not qualify as *prima facie* refugees, as there was no war and the United States did not choose to recognize the children as a protected class.⁵

There is every reason to expect that with a rising global population, more climate change-related weather events, and poor civilian protection within some states, these sources of forced migration will continue. The 1951 Refugee Convention was agreed upon in the era immediately following World War II in response to the massive population displacement that was seen at that time. While states remain strong supporters of the Refugee Convention, they may be reluctant to adopt any new international legal instruments that would require them to take on the responsibility for additional groups of displaced people, however great the needs of those groups may be.

Sandra F. Joireman is chair of the board of directors for Bread for the World and Bread for the World Institute and the Weinstein Chair of International Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Richmond.



UNICEF

Hundreds of refugees stuck in freezing conditions as border changes create confusion and chaos.



UN Photo / Catianne Tjerina

Conflict Fragile

Summary

Conflict-affected countries are the hardest places to end hunger. Their number has increased in the last decade, and so has the number of refugees and internally displaced people. Ending hunger by 2030 will depend on a much stronger response to the needs of people displaced by conflict. Diplomacy and defense, obviously crucial to preventing and ending conflict and securing peace, are not a focus of this chapter, which deals primarily with humanitarian and development activities in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Post-conflict societies are more likely to relapse into conflict as long as hunger remains a major problem. International support is crucial to helping national governments and civil society meet the challenges of reconstruction. Two of the most pressing issues in post-conflict countries are restoring services and creating jobs. Laying the foundation for sustainable development requires strengthening institutions and governance.

KEY POINTS

- Ensure that all people who are forcibly displaced are protected and their basic needs met.
- Provide more and better support to countries and communities hosting people who are forcibly displaced.
- Strengthen the capacity of national institutions in fragile states to deliver public services.
- Invest in sectors such as agriculture and infrastructure shown to have the greatest potential to reduce poverty and generate large numbers of jobs.
- Recognize and protect the legitimate land tenure right of vulnerable groups.

Conflict and Hunger

In December 2013, South Sudan, the world's newest nation, descended into civil war after little more than two years of independence. By the end of 2015, 2.3 million South Sudanese had been driven from their homes to escape the violence.¹ In interviews with aid workers, groups of

forcibly displaced people who found protection at a U.N. camp inside the country explained how they survived the ordeal. As described by the aid workers, “The only water they could get was from swamps and they neither boiled nor filtered it ... They described eating the ‘gum,’ the part of the tree exposed when one cuts a branch diagonally ... People suffered days and days of hunger ... The people we interviewed reported witnessing one woman who died of hunger on this long walk to the camp and hearing of others.”²

The highest hunger levels since the war began were reported in 2016.³ More than a third of South Sudan's population faced severe food shortages. An estimated 237,000 children younger than 5 have received



UNICEF Ethiopia/2014/Ayene

A group of health professionals advise South Sudanese mothers at a treatment center for children suffering from severe acute malnutrition, a life-threatening condition.

treatment for severe acute malnutrition—essentially starvation. Severe acute malnutrition can be quickly reversed with the right therapeutic foods. These include super-fortified pastes such as Plumpy’Nut. Even those who receive treatment and survive, however, may have suffered irreversible damage. They could have chronic health problems, limited physical and cognitive development, and lower lifetime earning potential. “South Sudan is now at risk of losing a generation of children,” the

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) declared in 2016.⁴

Armed conflict is the impetus for the worst crimes by far that humans commit against each other—killings on a massive scale up to and including genocide, accompanied by systematic rape,

\$13.6 trillion:

The cost of conflict, terrorism, and political instability to the global economy in 2015.¹


Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011,

63 PERCENT

of the country's population have fled their homes and are now refugees or internally displaced.²

SYRIA

Figure 1.1 Newly Displaced Persons per Minute, 2003-2015 (end-year)



Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016), *UNHCR Global Trends 2015*.

torture, and wholesale destruction that leads to famine. Civil wars and other violent conflicts have been the main causes of famine both in the 20th century and so far in the 21st century.⁵ Many more people would have died of starvation in conflict situations were it not for the global humanitarian system, which for all its shortcomings has done a good job of minimizing the number of famines. Still, people in conflict-affected countries are three times more likely to suffer hunger than those in countries that are not in conflict.⁶

In 2015, an estimated 12.4 million people worldwide were newly displaced by conflict or persecution. People were displaced at four times the rate in 2005.⁷ See Figure 1.1. No country has been more affected than Syria. The Syrian war is the largest driver of displacement in the world. By the end of 2015, 4.9 million Syrians had fled their country and were living as refugees and another 6.6 million were internally displaced.⁸ But the shocking numbers alone cannot convey the suffering caused by the Syrian civil war, especially among people trapped inside the country.

Conflict-affected countries are home to over **20 PERCENT** of all children of primary school age, and nearly half of all the out-of-school children of that age.³

Approximately **2 in 3 maternal deaths** (due to causes related to pregnancy and childbearing) take place in countries affected by a humanitarian crisis or fragile conditions.⁴



Table 1.1 Conflict-Affected Countries with Populations Facing Severe Levels of Malnutrition and Hunger (November 2015)

Country	Number of people	Share of total population
Afghanistan (18 vulnerable provinces)	2.5 million	25 percent
Burundi	2.3 million	23 percent
Central African Republic	1.8 million	36 percent
Lake Chad Basin (includes areas of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria)	4.6 million	25 percent
South Sudan	4.8 million	40 percent
Syria	8.7 million	37 percent
Yemen	14.1 million	51 percent

Source: FAO/WFP (July 2016), *Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations*.

In Aleppo, once the most populous city in the country, homes and buildings have been bombed to smithereens or crumbling carcasses. People there have been targeted by combatants while in the queue for food aid and shot dead.⁹ In April 2016, a hospital run by the international aid organization Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders was bombed, killing 14 patients and two doctors. In September, a U.N. aid convoy carrying food and other supplies was bombed, killing at least 20 people.¹⁰ At this writing, 200,000 civilians in Deir ez-Zor are trapped in a battle for control of the city between the Islamic State (ISIS) and Syrian

government forces, with airdrops the only safe way to deliver food aid.¹¹

Urban warfare clearly comes with its own horrors. But most conflicts occur in rural areas, where the vast majority of people are employed in agriculture. Food security deteriorates rapidly once conflict breaks out and agricultural production is disrupted. Fear of attack prevents farmers from working in their fields or taking food to markets. Combatants plunder crops and livestock. An aid worker in Liberia told us that he finally realized peace was at hand when he saw farm animals roaming freely again.¹² In South Sudan, the livelihoods of 80 percent of the population depend on livestock. The livestock are not only people's most valuable asset, but also the main source of nutrition.¹³

Table 1.1 lists the conflict-affected countries with the highest levels of severe malnutrition and hunger. Humanitarian agencies use a five-level scale to indicate which areas need the most help. The people in the countries listed are at level three, *crisis*, or level four, *emergency*. Level five is *famine*.

We will need to find ways to more effectively assist people in areas of conflict—making schools available for the children, for example—and, more importantly, reduce conflict to get to the end of hunger. It is possible to make rapid progress against hunger once there is peace. Less than 10 years after the end of Nepal's decade-long civil war, the nation's hunger rate had been reduced by more than half.¹⁴

Putting People First

In 2015, the number of people forcibly displaced because of conflict, persecution, generalized violence, or human rights violations reached 65.3 million, the highest number since World War II, and an increase of nearly 6 million over 2014.¹⁵ Presently, there are more people forcibly displaced than the populations of the United Kingdom, France, or Italy.¹⁶


Twenty-five years ago, there was roughly an even split between the number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).¹⁷ Today, IDPs make up two-thirds of all displaced people. IDPs are almost twice as likely as refugees to die from conflict-related causes, including starvation and diseases related to malnutrition.¹⁸ This is mainly because so many of them are beyond the reach of international protection.

More than half of all forcibly displaced people come from five countries: Syria, Colombia, Palestine, Sudan, and Iraq.¹⁹ When conflicts drag on and on, displaced people are said to be living in “protracted crises.” Temporary camps mutate into permanent settlements. The average length of time a person remains displaced has now reached 17 years.²⁰ The political and social unrest created by countries in conflict are increasingly felt beyond their borders as people move to escape violence and power vacuums create opportunities for terrorists.


Developing countries host 86 percent of all refugees.²¹ Countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with humanitarian needs of their own, face perennial shortfalls in

funding from donors to provide adequate support to refugees. The largest refugee camp in the world is Dadaab, located in northeastern Kenya along the border with Somalia. The “camp” is actually a sprawling city with a combination of tents and tin-roof buildings and a population of 330,000. In 2016, the Kenyan government announced that it would shut down Dadaab, citing concerns about infiltration of the camp by al-Shabaab, the Somali terror group that has waged deadly attacks inside Kenya.²² This is not the first time the government has said it will shut the camp down, but at this writing it appears resolute about following through. The refugees, most from Somalia, are to be returned to Somalia or sent to other countries. Among the older residents of Dadaab, few have a home in Somalia any longer—their land was seized during the country’s long civil war. Tens of thousands of other refugees were born and raised in Dadaab and have never set foot in their “home country.”

Figure 1.2 Major Source Countries of Refugees, 2014-2015 (end-year)



Major Refugee-Hosting Countries, 2014-2015 (end-year)



Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016), *UNHCR Global Trends 2015*.



Joseph Molieri / Bread for the World

Prince Tarnah and his family fled Liberia in 1990 when civil war broke out and spent the next seven years as refugees in Sierra Leone.

Hundreds of thousands of children and adolescents are growing up in refugee camps. Prince Tarnah was one of these. He was 13 years old in 1990 when his family piled into their car and fled Liberia to escape the oncoming civil war. For the next seven years, they and thousands of other Liberian refugees lived in a camp on the outskirts of Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone. The camp was run by the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. agency in charge of coordinating international action in all humanitarian emergencies worldwide.

UNHCR ensured that the refugees in Sierra Leone had shelter, food rations, basic medical care, and education. Tarnah finished secondary school while living in the camp. Had the family stayed in Liberia, he might not have had a school to go to, and it's even possible he could have ended up a child soldier. Today, he has a law degree and has worked for international organizations on contracts with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). When the Ebola crisis broke in Liberia, the international staff of the

organization he was working for evacuated the country, leaving Tarnah in charge to manage the ongoing work.

"Life in a refugee camp was far from pleasant," Tarnah says. "But when I think of how far I've come, I owe much to the opportunities I was given there." Families struggled to get by on the available food rations. Tarnah's family was forced to trade some of their rations for firewood or cash to purchase other necessities. Tensions ran high between local

people and refugees competing for resources, primarily the firewood both relied on for cooking. It was dangerous for Tarnah or other refugees to gather wood, although they did so when they had no other means of cooking their food. Today, aid organizations are more aware of the inherent tensions between refugees and local communities. "Conflict-sensitive assistance" is an approach wherein organizations providing in-kind aid make sure to include the local communities surrounding a camp.²³

People living in refugee camps are the face of displacement. But in fact, only about 40 percent of refugees live in camps,²⁴ and it would surely be fewer if people had better alternatives. The majority of forcibly displaced people, both refugees and IDPs, live in urban areas, where there are

better opportunities to earn money than in rural camps. Tarnah's father had been an electronics technician in Liberia, so he had valuable skills to trade. As his skills became known throughout the local community, people brought him their radios and other gadgets to repair. Outside the bartering that took place, it was a challenge for him to find employment. "Your skills as a refugee have to be exceptional," says Tarnah. "Countries have their own problem providing jobs, and they don't want the refugees to be seen as competition for employment with locals."

International law on refugees requires states to guarantee a range of rights to refugees, including the right to work and the right to education. Governments in host countries

find ways to get around international law. Refugee-hosting countries, aiming to protect national labor markets, adopt policies that limit the rights of refugees to work. Government leaders may also be concerned that refugees will not want to return to their country of origin. In 2015, only 1 percent of refugees chose to return home.²⁵ The World Bank has offered to make grants and low-interest loans available to middle-income countries Jordan and Lebanon at rates reserved for low-income countries. These two countries are hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees. Lebanon's overall population has swelled by a third with the influx of Syrian refugees. In the United States, this would be the equivalent of adding more than 100 million people to the country's population.

More than five years into the Syrian crisis, rich countries have done far too little to support countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees. Long-term displacement carries significant costs to the host countries, from providing services to managing the domestic politics. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has encouraged governments of the host countries to integrate services for refugees into their national development plans.²⁶ Understandably, the host governments have resisted. Their own people are impatient with the presence of so many foreigners, and it looks like a zero-sum game: money spent on refugees is money not spent on citizens.

Refugees can be viewed as assets to their host countries rather than liabilities. When refugees are permitted to work, they typically do more than just "earn their keep." For example, a study of refugees in Cleveland, Ohio, found their economic impact over a 12-year period to be 10 times as much as the cost of refugee services.²⁷ A study in Denmark, also over 12 years, found that the wages of Danish people in communities that hosted refugees increased more quickly than wages in communities that did not.²⁸ In a study of refugees in Kampala, Uganda, researchers found similar positive impacts on the local economy.²⁹



UNICEF / Romenzi

A girl climbs the hill overlooking an informal settlement for Syrian refugees in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

The Power of Faith Over Fear: Interfaith Action in the Central African Republic

Stephen R. Hilbert and Stephen M. Colecchi

In late 2012, fighting in the Central African Republic (CAR) between government forces and a group of various Seleka militia intensified. Three religious leaders, Pastor Nicolas Guerekoyame, an Evangelical leader; Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga, Catholic Archbishop of Bangui; and Imam Omar Kobine Layama, leader of the Muslim community, met in Bangui to discuss the alarming situation and how they could respond to help define a path away from violence.

Their first action was to meet with then-President Francois Bozizé to convince him to cease the anti-Muslim rhetoric that only served to inflame the conflict by pitting the religious communities against each other. About half of the population in CAR is Christian; Muslims make up approximately 15 percent; and adherents to traditional religions represent the rest.

The Seleka forces originated in the Northeast part of CAR, an area dominated by Muslim populations. They were joined by other Muslim militia from Sudan and Chad to plunder the rich natural resources in CAR, including diamonds and gold. The faith leaders knew that the conflict was essentially a struggle among a handful of political leaders over power and access to mineral wealth. They desperately wanted to prevent the political conflict from being transformed into a religious one that would tear apart the social harmony that had always existed among the faith communities.

Despite a ceasefire negotiated in January 2013, the religious leaders' first attempt at peacebuilding failed. In March 2013, the Bozizé government fell and the Seleka leader, Michel Djotodia, took power. Seleka forces roamed the country attacking villages and towns. The religious leaders' worst fears had come true. Villages made up of Christians and animists fought Muslim communities in what became a "religious" conflict.

Throughout 2013 and 2014 Archbishop Dieudonné, Pastor Nicolas, and Imam Layama traveled throughout the country, at great personal risk, to engage Muslim and Christian/animist villages, urging them to stop attacking one another. The three leaders formed the Religious Leaders Platform (RLP) and traveled to Europe and the United States to raise awareness of the conflict in CAR and to call for international assistance.



Left to right, Pastor Nicolas Guerekoyame Gbangou, Imam Omar Kobine Layama, and Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga in Washington, DC, in March 2014.

In January 2014, Michel Djotodia was forced out of power and the National Assembly appointed an interim leader, Catherine Samba Panza, although fighting continued. In March and November 2014, the RLP traveled to Europe and the United States to persuade the international community to increase its support to the interim government. By this time, the religious leaders' work had become better known and acclaimed. These faith leaders also inspired action by religious leaders in the United States. The State Department and USAID worked with the Catholic Church, the Muslim community, and Evangelical leaders to send a delegation to CAR in May 2014 in a gesture of solidarity. Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and Islamic Relief Worldwide joined together to develop and implement an interfaith peace program that USAID co-financed. The program, which began in early 2016, gives the RLP a staff and the resources to rebuild the social fabric of CAR torn apart by the political manipulation of its past leaders.

In November 2015, Pope Francis made an unprecedented visit to the war-torn country to show his fraternal concern for a people suffering the misery of conflict. He visited the central mosque of Bangui. Many in the country report that his presence visibly reduced tensions in the lead-up to difficult elections. In February 2016, the first free and fair elections in CAR's history came to fruition and brought President Faustin-Archange Touadera to power.

Archbishop Dieudonné, Pastor Nicolas, and Imam Layama braved violence and death threats to silence the drums of war and rebuild peace for CAR. They continue their work today, with the help of American faith-based groups supported in part by the U.S. government, to heal the societal wounds of conflict and to improve prospects for peace.

Stephen R. Hilbert is Foreign Policy Advisor for Africa and Global Development in the Office of International Justice and Peace at U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops; Stephen M. Colecchi is Director of the Office of International Justice and Peace for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.

Many refugees are highly educated and motivated to work and would much rather not be dependent on humanitarian aid. Recognizing this, the Center for Global Development (CGD), a U.S.-based think tank, has proposed a plan to set up an investment fund that would help connect refugees with jobs. The fund, supported by donors, would make payments in the form of vouchers to countries willing to accept refugees if, in exchange, the refugees are guaranteed the right to work and access to public services.³⁰ The host country could then choose refugees to admit based on the skill sets needed to fill shortages in their labor supply, with the vouchers covering the upfront costs.


This idea might appeal to several European countries with aging populations and a need for workers to pick up the slack and help finance their ever-growing pension programs. The Humanitarian Investment Fund, the name CGD has proposed, could be financed in the same manner as GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance—with private capital that donors repay over time.

States of Siege

“We cannot deny the humanitarian crisis,” said Pope Francis in February 2016, speaking at the U.S.-Mexico border. “Each step, a journey laden with grave injustices ... Injustice is radicalized in the young, persecuted and threatened when they try to flee the spiral of violence and the hell of drugs ... Then there are the many women, unjustly robbed of their lives.”³¹

In 2012, rising numbers of unaccompanied children started arriving at the U.S. southern border. By 2014, 70,000 minors were stopped at the border, 73 percent of them from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.³² Despite stepped-up enforcement at the border, the children continue to come, alone or with a parent and other family members. See Figure 1.3. The women and children that Francis was talking about are

Figure 1.3 Unaccompanied Children and Family Unit Members Apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico Border, October 2009-May 2016



Source: Washington Office on Latin America

primarily fleeing the Northern Triangle and its staggering levels of violence from organized crime groups and street gangs.

Gang violence sounds almost too pedestrian to describe the nature of the threat people in the region are experiencing. The women and children who are apprehended at the U.S. border have been exposed to extreme levels of violence on a near-daily basis. In 2015, screenings carried out by U.S. asylum officers revealed that 82 percent of women from Northern Triangle countries would

qualify for asylum or protection under the [UN] Convention against Torture.³³ El Salvador and Guatemala rank first and third respectively in the world for countries with the highest female murder rates.³⁴ Women and girls related to gang members are considered the property of the gang, and the rape and murder of female family members are common forms of punishment for betrayal, real or perceived. Boys who refuse to join or later try to leave put sisters, girlfriends, and mothers at grave risk, so it is common for the family to escape together

The United States is their destination of choice, influenced in part by the presence of family members in the country. When the body of an 11-year-old Guatemalan boy was found in Texas, near the border with Mexico, in his pocket was the telephone number of a brother in



UNICEF / Zehbrauskas


Sisters Ashley and Nakisha on the porch of their home in Travesia, Honduras. The children migrated to the United States with their mother to escape the gangs but were deported back to Honduras.

Chicago.³⁵ Mexico and other countries in the region—Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panamá—are also destination points. In Mexico, the second destination of choice, the number of asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle countries tripled between 2011 and 2014.³⁶

In 2015, 7,422 people were murdered in the Northern Triangle, a higher death toll than any war zone in the world except Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Northern Triangle countries have higher levels of violence today than during their civil wars that ended decades ago. It seems clear that they are fragile countries, but since there is no declared or recognized war, neither the World Bank's nor the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) list of fragile states includes them. The cause of their fragility is weak government institutions that have been corrupted by organized crime. Criminal organizations have penetrated state institutions to such a degree that they can operate with virtual impunity.³⁷ Only five percent of homicide cases in the region lead to a conviction.³⁸ These countries are transport routes for illegal drugs moving north towards destinations in the United States and Canada. Gang violence and drug trafficking are not separate problems, since the gangs are heavily involved in the lucrative drug trade.

The situation in the Northern Triangle reinforces the argument that it is critical to bolster weak state institutions immediately after the fighting stops, in the early post-conflict period. El

Figure 1.4 Homicide Rate in the Northern Triangle and United States (per 100,000)



Note: U.S. data for 2015 not available when the Hunger Report went to press.

Sources: Washington Office on Latin America; U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Uniform Crimes Reports

Salvador and Guatemala, and to a lesser extent Honduras, illustrate the consequences of missing these opportunities during a post-conflict transition.

In 1996, Guatemala ended a 36-year civil war in which more than 200,000 people were killed. But when the war finally ended, the combatants never really became ex-combatants. Instead, paramilitary groups, including death squads and counterinsurgency forces, were joined by some former military and police in forming criminal organizations. The peace accord committed the Guatemalan government to dismantling these groups, but the government never followed through.³⁹

El Salvador's 12-year civil war ended in 1992. During the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans fled to the United States. Some of the children became members of street gangs as they grew up. Once the war ended, the United States began deporting Salvadorans who were incarcerated here. They reconstituted their gangs back in El Salvador. But these gangs were much more violent than the gangs that had been in El Salvador before.⁴⁰ The country's murder rate increased by 70 percent in 2015.⁴¹

Honduras alone of the three Northern Triangle countries did not endure a long, bloody civil war. It has been politically unstable, however. The most recent coup, in 2009, deposed a democratically elected president, making way for an administration that has shown little political will to reduce crime and improve security in the country. Honduras is on par with Guatemala and El Salvador in terms of sexual and physical violence. In fact, Honduras was the murder capital of the Western Hemisphere until El Salvador replaced it in 2015. See Figure 1.4.

Violence against women and children in post-conflict societies is often a feature of war. Governments must make deliberate efforts to restore the rule of law to protect vulnerable groups.

Otherwise, the breakdown in social and moral order that prevailed during the conflict will continue. People will shrug and say that it's just how things are in that culture.

Change starts at the peace table. Peace agreements in which women play a substantive role are shown to be 50 percent more likely to be durable.⁴² Every peace process must deliberately include women in negotiating the terms of peace agreements, because it will not happen automatically. "Out of 1,168 peace agreements signed between January 1990 and January 2014, only 18 percent make any references to women or gender," writes U.N. Women.⁴³ Since 2000, the percentage of agreements that include such references has increased to 27 percent.

Women did participate in the writing of Guatemala's 1996 peace agreement, but as U.N. Women observed in a critique, "Even though women's organizations continued their advocacy after the agreement, and they had two reserved seats in the National Council for the Implementation of the Peace Accords, their efforts were mostly effaced by the lack of political will, the weakness of implementation mechanisms, the expansion of transnational companies engaged in extractive industries, the significant growth of organized crime (mainly drug trafficking), and the resulting insecurity and militarization."⁴⁴

Government, working together with faith-based institutions and other civil society partners, has the



UNICEF

Eight migrant minors eat lunch in a Guatemalan shelter after being deported from Mexico while trying to reach the United States. In 2015, deportations from Mexico of unaccompanied young people were almost five times higher than 2010.

power to change cultures of violence, achieve peace, and re-build livelihoods after a crisis, provided it has the will to tackle institutional reform. In Nicaragua, gender-sensitive reforms have earned the police force praise for its success in addressing sexual violence.⁴⁵ Women hold half of the senior ranks at the National Police Headquarters and constitute a sizeable share of officers on patrol. Data show that women who have been sexually assaulted are more likely to report the crime when they know a woman police officer will be available.⁴⁶ By 2008, there was a *Comisaría de la Mujer y de la Niñez* (Women's and Children's Police Station, or CMN) in each department and regional capital as well as one in each district of Managua.⁴⁷ CMNs work closely with women's organizations and other nongovernmental and state actors to combine policing, medical, psychological, legal, and other services such as emergency shelter.

Neither the United States nor Mexico has responded well to the humanitarian crisis in the Northern Triangle. The U.S. policy response primarily has been to double down on immigration enforcement and to pressure Mexico to do the same. Mexico as well as the United States has detained more unaccompanied children from the Northern Triangle. There was a 70 percent increase in 2015 over 2014.⁴⁸ UNHCR estimates that as many as half of these children are fleeing

for their lives,⁴⁹ but the National Institute of Migration, Mexico's immigration agency, granted a protected status to less than 1 percent of the unaccompanied children apprehended in 2015.⁵⁰ The vast majority of these children are in detention or have been deported.

Since 2014 alone, the United States deported more than 10,000 children who arrived unaccompanied by an adult.⁵¹ As the main consumer of the illegal drugs shipped from the Northern Triangle, the United States bears a large responsibility for the violence that has forced so many families to flee. One barrier to assuming more of our country's responsibility is that public discourse about undocumented immigration doesn't recognize the distinction between people who are coming for "push" reasons and those who are "pulled" here. Women and children who have survived and witnessed brutality and violence and been pushed out of their own countries are viewed as no different than people who are motivated to come by the demand for labor in various industries.⁵²

Bread for the World supported President Obama's proposal for a \$750 million aid package to Northern Triangle countries that included additional funding for USAID to address the "root causes" of the violence in the region. Congress approved these funds in December 2015. When Congress takes up immigration reform, addressing root causes should also become part of U.S. immigration policy.



Buddy Bleckley for Bread for the World

Bread for the World joined a pilgrimage walk in Southern California to demonstrate solidarity with undocumented immigrants. El Camino del Inmigrante (The Path of the Immigrant) began on Saturday, August 20th at the U.S.-Mexico border at Tijuana and ended in downtown Los Angeles on August 30th.

Building the Beginnings of a Durable Peace

At the end of a civil war, countries have approximately a 50-50 chance of lapsing back into conflict within five years.⁵³ That statistic emerged from a World Bank study in the early 2000s by Paul Collier and colleagues. Since then, the number of major civil conflicts has tripled. The pressure is growing for the international community to help post-conflict societies improve their odds of remaining at peace. The primary objective should be to support government and civil society in building a durable peace. The renewal of violence in a post-conflict state, even beyond the cost in lives and livelihoods, has implications for regional and global security.

In a multi-country study of post-conflict societies, men typically saw peace in terms of political stability at the regional and national level, and they highlighted the need for jobs. Women, on the other hand, were more inclined to talk about peace in terms of the fulfillment of basic rights, expressed through service delivery such as access to food assistance, education, or being able to give birth in a hospital bed rather than on a dirt floor. The women also identified reducing gender-based violence as important to peace.⁵⁴


In the early phases of post-conflict reconstruction, policies that favor the women's concerns have been shown to be very effective in promoting peace: policies that promote access to health, education, and other forms of social protection, especially among groups that have historically been excluded from these services. Inequality and marginalization are usually among the root causes of the conflict. See Figure 1.5.

In Rwanda, the government invested in universal health coverage after the 1994 genocide. At first the government presented universal health coverage as a vision for the future so that people understood that it would take time to put into place. Today, nearly 80 percent of the population is insured.⁵⁵ Rwanda is not a model of democracy, but the fact that Tutsis and Hutus have lived together in peace after Hutus killed hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in an attempted genocide does say that they're getting something right.

Providing services is a natural part of state-building and is something that aid agencies can support. After a protracted conflict, these partners may be the only ones able to keep schools and hospitals running. Food assistance that helps people meet their basic needs has been shown to build confidence in the peace process.⁵⁶ Food-for-work or cash-for-work programs have been used to simultaneously assist vulnerable populations and rebuild infrastructure such as roads. Food assistance has been used to reintegrate ex-combatants and build social cohesion. Food assistance

Figure 1.5 What Are Citizens' Views on the Drivers of Conflict?

In surveys conducted in six countries and territories affected by violence, involving a mix of nationally representative samples and subregions, citizens raised issues linked to individual economic welfare (poverty, unemployment) and injustice (including inequality and corruption) as the primary drivers of conflict.



Source: World Bank (2011), *The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*.

can facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs. Food assistance to pregnant women and mothers of young children reduces the risk of child malnutrition while also contributing to women's short-term needs and the nation's long-term development agenda.

School meals programs also play several roles. In addition to feeding children and strengthening educational institutions, meals programs are potential markets for local farmers. The World Food Program (WFP), through its Purchase for Progress (P4P) program, is working to improve links between school feeding programs and agricultural development.⁵⁷ USAID's Feed the Future program operates in only a small number of post-conflict countries, and it also focuses on improving the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, while the McGovern-Dole Food for Education program supplies U.S. commodities for school meals in developing countries. It would be good to see more alignment between McGovern-Dole and Feed the Future in countries where both programs operate, focused on ensuring that smallholder farmers have a guaranteed market for their products and can get them to the schools. School meal programs have also been shown to increase enrollment rates for girls, and this is an even bigger issue in conflict-affected countries than in other countries. Post-conflict societies have very high poverty rates, and parents may decide to pull daughters out of school to earn income to help support the family.

"Around the world, people believe a government that cannot feed its people has forfeited its legitimacy," writes Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University.⁵⁸ International actors operating in a country according to their own agenda pose a significant risk that the national government will be seen as illegitimate. Donors and international aid organizations should follow national leadership.

To put it succinctly: "Ownership of development assistance is intertwined with its legitimacy," write Alastair McKechnie and Marcus Manuel.⁵⁹ Even if development assistance is funding most of a national government's budget, donors should not undermine the country's leaders and national stakeholders by establishing themselves as authorities who determine the country's development priorities. It should be left to countries themselves.

The g7+, an alliance of countries that are or have been affected by conflict, state that their intent is to "rebuild and enable our own state institutions to raise revenues and meet the financing needs of our development. This is a key element of state building and the path to long term peace."⁶⁰ The average tax-to-GDP ratio in post-conflict countries is only 14 percent, compared to an average of 17 percent in other developing countries and 34 percent in the devel-



USDA Photo

Malian schoolchildren line up for a daily lunch provided by the United States Department of Agriculture's McGovern-Dole Food for Education Program.



Stephanie Malyon / CIAT

Rwanda's One Cow per Poor Family Program reduces child malnutrition rates (through increased milk consumption) while increasing household incomes of poor farmers from milk sales.

tax revenue to distribute more than 130,000 dairy cows to rural poor households. The cow's milk is a source of protein, and the manure serves as fertilizer that can be used to produce biogas for cooking. To help build a sense of community responsibility, families are expected to give the first female calf to a neighbor.⁶⁴

Jobs, Farms, and Roads

Jobs are one of the most pressing issues in fragile states. In a typical fragile state, nearly 40 percent of the population is younger than 15, with populations growing at twice the rate of nonfragile states.⁶⁵ The working-age population in sub-Saharan Africa, the most fragile region, is expected to increase by 74 percent between 2010 and 2030, requiring 13 million new jobs every year just to absorb new workers.⁶⁶

Researchers reviewing decades of data found that countries with large percentages of unemployed and uneducated young men are more prone to civil war.⁶⁷ If the economy is not producing jobs, the country is at risk of sliding back into war. Gangs in the Northern Triangle stoke the frustrations of jobless young men. Jihadist groups exploit the humiliation of young men who cannot provide for their families. See Box 1.2.

oped OECD countries.⁶¹ External partners with technical expertise can provide very valuable assistance by enabling countries to strengthen their public sector capacity to raise revenues.

Several low-income and post-conflict countries have shown that, with political commitment at the highest levels of government, it is possible to substantially increase domestic revenues. Between 2002 and 2012, Afghanistan, a member of the G7+, increased revenue ninefold, which allowed the government to implement a package of universal health services.⁶² The package is basic, but today in Afghanistan, every family is entitled to prenatal, obstetrical, postpartum care, and family planning services; child immunization; micronutrient supplementation and

nutrition screening; and tuberculosis and malaria control.⁶³

Governments can gain legitimacy by showing the direct link between tax collection and public services. Between 1998 and 2005, Rwanda increased domestic revenue from 9 percent of its GDP to 14.9 percent. This has enabled the government to improve services, such as the expanded health insurance coverage we described earlier.

Since 2005, Rwanda's One Cow per Poor Family Program has used

Breaking the Cycle of Fragility in Somalia

Somalia is the fifth-poorest country in the world with a per capita income of less than \$1.25 per day, according to the World Bank. More than 70 percent of the population is under 30—members of a generation that has known nothing but cycles of conflict and grinding hunger and poverty.

Two-thirds of the people of working age are unemployed. With few jobs and limited access to education beyond primary school, young Somali men are preyed on by militant groups such as Al-Shabaab that promise material and spiritual wealth and a chance to join a movement that carries status among their peers. The name Al-Shabaab is Arabic for “The Youth,” a name intended to challenge them to claim their destiny.

Set against these cynical and destructive forces, the Somali Agency for International Development (SAFID) works to empower young men and women to build skills and self-esteem by developing small businesses, rehabilitating public infrastructure, participating in community mobilization initiatives and vocational training, and attending seminars to build their leadership capacity. SAFID was established by a group of young Somali professionals living in exile. Led by executive director Mohamed Dore, SAFID returned to the homeland in 2011. In recent years, its activities have expanded to include joining the fight against female genital mutilation and forced marriage.

SAFID has helped to empower Gulled Adan Abdi, a 13-year-old orphan, to stay in school. Gulled has a talent for creating new things from salvaged metal and other leftover materials. Now he builds toy airplanes and armored cars, as well as fans, and sells them to help pay his school fees. SAFID has also worked with women’s groups to establish 240 small business enterprises. Amran Ali Sudi, 30 years old and a mother of four, is one proprietor. The income she earns by selling vegetables from a kiosk in Mogadishu makes it possible for her to pay school fees, the most important thing she believes she can do to protect her children from the militias. “Children are future leaders and if they can get good education they can change the current situation in the country,” she says.


The Global Youth Innovation Network (GYIN), based in Washington, DC, has provided a platform for SAFID to connect with donors and other youth organizations around the world. As U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said, “To unleash the power of young people, we need to partner with them.” At a time when there are more young people in the world than ever before, and most are growing up in poverty, organizations like SAFID need partners in order to maximize the life-saving work they do in the most challenging of all environments.



SAFID

One of the 240 women the Somali Agency for International Development (SAFID) has helped to start a small business. The organization was established by members of the Somali diaspora.

Figure 1.6 External Infrastructure Investment Commitments in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Sector, 2000-2012, in US\$ Millions (Current)



Source: Jeffrey Gutman, Amadou Sy, and Soumya Chattopadhyay (March 2015), *Financing African Infrastructure: Can the World Deliver?* Brookings Institution.

In addition to creating much-needed jobs, job programs are an effective way to reintegrate ex-combatants into society. In 2002, at the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the government and its development partners launched a farmer field school initiative to support the reintegration of tens of thousands of ex-combatants. The young men most likely to participate in armed conflict were from rural areas, and many were ill-equipped to earn a living after laying down their arms. The farmer field schools were also crucial for food production because most farms had been abandoned during the war. In addition, the jobs program helped to promote social cohesion by being a catalyst for the

establishment of new farmer organizations. This helped get the beneficiaries more invested in post-conflict reconstruction. Its success was corroborated by the high voter turnout in areas where the organizations were formed. This was a strong signal that the country would not lapse back into conflict,⁶⁸ since people accepted that there was an alternative way to be heard.

Ex-combatants are often shunned by their communities for acts of violence committed during the war. An additional objective of reintegration programs is to help rebuild trust between ex-combatants and the rest of the community.⁶⁹ In Rwanda, tens of thousands of ex-combatants also received training in farming. Surveyed more than a decade later, the majority of them reported that they were satisfied with their reintegration.⁷⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, the public does not always support such programs. In Cambodia, for example, people were outraged when the government gave land to members of the Khmer Rouge to farm in an effort to induce them to lay down their arms.

Most conflict-affected countries are agrarian societies. Jobs in the public sector and with registered private sector enterprises account for less than 10 percent of total employment.⁷¹ In Mozambique, more than 80 percent of the jobs are in agriculture.⁷² After gaining independence in 1975, Mozambique descended into civil war. Since the end of the war in 1992, the country has been remarkably stable and lauded for its good governance.⁷³ But that has not been enough to escape the poverty trap. Today, young people are abandoning rural areas and moving to urban centers, where there are few prospects of finding regular employment that pays more than a poverty wage.⁷⁴

More off-farm employment is needed in these societies, but there is no way to get there without first investing in the agricultural sector. In 2003, at the African Union Summit, heads of state from across the continent pledged to reverse decades of underinvestment in agriculture. The Maputo Declaration that was adopted at the summit endorsed the African Union-led Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) as the primary framework for agri-

cultural development on the continent. CAADP is designed to “help African countries reach a higher path of economic growth through agriculture-led development, which eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and food insecurity, and enables expansion of exports.”⁷⁵ More than 30 countries have signed CAADP compacts that commit their governments to allocating at least 10 percent of the national budget to agriculture. So far, only a handful of countries have managed to reach this target.


One of the CAADP priorities is to improve rural infrastructure for smallholder farmers, especially women. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is an enormous development challenge in its own right, and weak infrastructure is one of the biggest barriers to developing the agricultural sector. Only one-third of Africans living in rural areas are within two kilometers of an all-season road, compared with two-thirds of the population in other developing regions.⁷⁶ Some communities are still virtually inaccessible during the rainy season. Reliable roads make it easier for farmers to get their products into urban markets. A World Bank evaluation of rural road repairs in Uganda estimated the rate of return on investment to be as high as 40 percent.⁷⁷

Because infrastructure projects are labor intensive, they are one of the best ways to create off-farm employment. Investments in infrastructure do more than create jobs in post-conflict countries—they also provide hope by offering people tangible ways of watching their country rise from the ruins of war. External financing for infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa tripled between 2004 and 2012.⁷⁸ See Figure 1.6. Four of the top six recipient countries (calculated as financing per dollar of GDP) are fragile states, with Liberia leading the way.⁷⁹

China invests in infrastructure in low-income fragile states, but to a much lesser extent than in non-fragile low-income ones. See Figure 1.7. China is sub-Saharan Africa’s single largest trading partner.⁸⁰ Africa figures prominently in China’s economic rebalancing. As operating costs increase at home, Chinese firms are looking to move more low-skill production offshore. More than 2,000 Chinese enterprises are currently operating in sub-Saharan African countries. Chinese investment in manufacturing could become a significant source of jobs, but without major improvements in infrastructure, the potential for this to happen will evaporate.

The largest source of external financing to fragile states, other than in the telecom sector, is official development finance from multilateral institutions (especially the World Bank and the African Development Bank) and OECD donor countries combined. Broadening the sources of financing to include more private investment will require national governments to put a significant emphasis on reforming governance and reducing corruption, especially as infrastructure is known to be a sector with a high risk of corruption.⁸¹

Figure 1.7 Chinese Infrastructure Investment Commitments to Fragile Versus Non-Fragile Low-Income Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2005-2012, in US\$ Millions (Current)



Source: Jeffrey Gutman, Amadou Sy, and Soumya Chattopadhyay (March 2015), *Financing African Infrastructure: Can the World Deliver?* Brookings Institution.



Links Media for USAID

Asilya Gemmal proudly displays her land certificate given by the Ethiopian government. The security of having tenure on the land is a powerful incentive to farmers to invest in and increase food production and conserve natural resources for the long term.

Land and Peace

Once a peace agreement is reached, people who have been displaced take advantage of the improved security to return and reclaim the land they left behind—but when they arrive, they may find someone living there. The new people may have also been displaced from their original home during the war. It's par for the course in countries whose conflicts have gone on for years, even decades. People are forced to move again and again and again.

Land disputes tend to mushroom as refugees and IDPs return. In Afghanistan, land disputes were a principal obstacle to the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs.⁸² Not everyone returns at once. The timing depends on a number of factors, including how safe people feel. During the

conflict, the rule of law broke down. An end to the fighting and a signed peace agreement don't necessarily mean it snaps right back into place.

The conflict may have been about land in the first place—either overtly or as an underlying cause. Competition for scarce water resources in Africa's dry areas has spurred many violent clashes between pastoralists and farm communities.⁸³ Since 2000, land issues have played a significant role in 27 out of Africa's 30 interstate conflicts.⁸⁴ Impoverished families in rural areas depend on the land to provide food for their households and income to meet other needs. Encroachment is therefore

viewed as an existential threat. Losing land puts the household's very survival at risk.

Land is often seen as part of the "spoils of war," which in turn means that people defend their own land at all costs. Combatants seize control of land for strategic advantage or to exploit natural resources. The expression "take that hill" could mean a homestead or a village. The war in Darfur, Sudan, was about land as much as it was about ethnic enmities.⁸⁵ The Sudanese government lured pastoralists away from grazing areas in Darfur, promising them land with better access to water but in reality driving them straight into the guns of allied militia.⁸⁶

It is essential that land rights be written into peace agreements. Often the focus is on broader issues, such as power sharing arrangements, drafting a new constitution, or scheduling elections. In 2016, the Government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) reached a peace agreement, ending 50 years of armed conflict that displaced hundreds of thousands of families from millions of acres of land. Comprehensive Rural Reform, the first point in the peace agreement, established conditions for equitable access to land.⁸⁷ It is unprecedented for land reform to be front and center in a peace agreement, but land issues were recognized as central to why the war dragged on and on.

Land acquisition deals, less favorably known as "land grabs," are another source of conflict. Commercial investors, sometimes in corrupt deals with governments or particular officials, can

take advantage of opaquely written laws to displace communities who had been informally considered the owners for generations. Land grabbing was one of the main reasons the fighting in Colombia continued for so many years.⁸⁸ In Honduras, hundreds of thousands of peasants have been forcibly displaced to clear land for palm oil investors working with the country's "agro-oligarchs."⁸⁹

In Madagascar, an attempted land grab by a foreign company led to a political crisis that forced the president to resign.⁹⁰ The government negotiated a deal with a South Korean company to lease more than a million acres of prime agricultural land to grow crops for export. In a country where a third of the population is hungry, and half of all children are malnourished, the public would not stand for it.

In 2014, Italian and U.S. researchers, examining a global dataset of large-scale land acquisitions, published a study showing that between 300 million and 550 million people could be fed by crops grown on these acquired lands.⁹¹ The land in these deals was in countries with some of the world's highest rates of hunger and malnutrition. Governments in fragile states, desperate to attract foreign investment, have proved all too willing to trade land to investors at bargain rates. Agribusinesses typically claim that they will reduce hunger by applying modern technologies to increase productivity on the acquired land. In fact, many of these deals are intended to produce crops for export or to produce biofuels. Reducing hunger and poverty in the host country is not a priority when crops can instead go to paying customers.

The International Finance Corporation, the business lending arm of the World Bank, has been roundly criticized for its participation in land grabbing.⁹² It is a major facilitator of land acquisition transactions in developing countries. The Bank has an admirable set of voluntary principles on responsible land governance that it shares with clients, but the problem is just that: they are voluntary guidelines.⁹³ The Bank should be doing more to uphold these principles.

Of the estimated 570 million farms worldwide, the vast majority, as many as 85 percent, are less than two hectares in size (roughly 5 acres) and run by families with no formal title.⁹⁴ Secure tenure gives farmers the needed confidence and the incentives to invest in the land to improve productivity. Growth in the agriculture sector from improved productivity has been shown to do more to reduce hunger and poverty than growth in any other sector. In the early 1990s, a post-conflict, still fragile Vietnam enacted reforms that radically expanded land rights, leading to some of the most dramatic reductions in hunger and poverty the world has ever seen. Between 1993 and 2010, per capita food production in Vietnam increased by about 4 percent a year, and



FoEI / ATI - Jason Taylor

Florence Bakenya of Uganda, a single mother of four children, farms three acres of common land. She worries that it will be taken from her by a palm plantation that has displaced other families in the community. Without her land she has no means to provide for her family and no security for her future.



Chau Doan / World Bank

In Vietnam, a landmark law was passed in the early 2000s making it mandatory for both husbands and wives' names to appear on land titles.

legitimacy of customary systems.⁹⁷ Botswana, the first African country to formally recognize customary systems in 1968,⁹⁸ has been one of Africa's most stable and free countries over the last half century.

Customary tenure systems are more adaptable, which can be a good thing in post-conflict situations where large numbers of people need to be resettled. In Liberia, for example, where 80 percent of the population was displaced during the two civil wars, communities were willing to grant land use rights to people not originally from those places, contributing to the country's peaceful transition. "While not every post-conflict customary setting is as accommodating, it is hard to imagine such a thing happening in a situation with formalized land rights," write Sandra Joireman and Laura Meitzner Yoder in a study on land tenure and customary law.⁹⁹

The question of land rights is undoubtedly one of supreme importance to global food security. By 2030, the world population is projected to reach 8.5 billion.¹⁰⁰ That means the world will need food for 1.2 billion more people—what amounts to adding a second India. FAO studies classify 33 percent of the world's soil resources as degraded.¹⁰¹ Thus, whether it is possible to produce enough food to feed everyone will depend largely on how the land currently in use is managed. Land rights are at least as important to solving that problem as technologies to increase productivity and sustainable practices to restore degraded land.

There is no one right way forward that all countries should follow. As with other questions of institution building, the context means everything. At the national level, the best way forward may be to bring together all parties concerned to resolve differences and seek common ground. Change is bound to be slow, uneven, and hard to quantify—again, the way institutional change usually occurs. That doesn't exclude international aid agencies from constructive involvement, but their most useful contributions may be to facilitate change, through support for dialogue and negotiations, rather than to play their more familiar role of trying to lead change.

the poverty rate fell from 58 percent to 10 percent.⁹⁵

In Africa, land reforms that promote individual ownership have not achieved the same productivity gains as they have in Asia or Latin America. Individual ownership is not automatically considered the best way—in many African societies, local chiefs control how land is distributed. Land rights are conferred on individuals based on their membership in a community, clan, or other kinship group. National government efforts to change these systems are at best slow and complicated. In Nigeria alone, there are 350 ethnic groups, each with its own set of customary laws.⁹⁶ In 2010, the African Union adopted the Framework and Guidelines for Land Policy in Africa, urging member states to recognize the

The Convergence of Conflict and Climate Change

Mounting evidence points to a relationship between climate change and conflict.¹⁰² In this section, we focus on the destabilizing effects of climate change in some of the most conflict-affected regions of the world, and where these situations may be heading as climate change intensifies over the coming decades. We're taking a regional approach, both because climate change does not respect national borders, and because climate change only multiplies the threats and complications already present in a region.

In the **Middle East and North Africa (MENA)** region, there are four all-out civil wars—in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. Egypt, Tunisia, and others in the region still feel the aftershocks of the Arab Spring. In 2016, the Turkish government put down an attempted coup. The longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues. Finally, MENA countries remain the primary recruiting ground of the terror group ISIS.

Climate-related pressures could make the region more unstable than it already is. The population of the MENA region is expected to double by mid-century. At the same time, climate change is worsening environmental conditions to the point that large areas might become uninhabitable. Researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry have been studying how temperatures can be expected to change in the region over the course of the century, and


their findings are alarming. By the middle of the century, the region is expected to experience increases in heat extremes. Even at the lower end of global warming projections, there will be five times as many days in which temperatures reach 114 degrees Fahrenheit—up to 80 days a year.¹⁰³

More severe desert dust storms could also make many areas unlivable. In Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria, air pollution caused by desert dust has increased by 70 percent since the beginning of the century.¹⁰⁴ The desert dust is largely caused by sand storms, which are increasing because droughts throughout the

MENA region have been on the rise since the 1960s.¹⁰⁵

The MENA region is one of the most dependent of all on food imports, making it particularly vulnerable to instability and conflict when global food prices surge. Rising food prices were seen as a catalyst for the Arab Spring.¹⁰⁶ In addition to the heat and dust, water scarcity will limit food production. Crop yields are expected to decline by 30 percent at the lower range of global warming projections and by as much as 60 percent at higher projections.¹⁰⁷

The **Sahel** region stretches from Africa's west coast to its east coast, along a belt of countries that separate the Sahara Desert to the north from savannah terrain to the south. The Sahel is also where Africa's Muslim north meets its Christian and animist south, where Arabs and Berbers in the north meet black Africans in the south.¹⁰⁸



Climate change does not respect national borders and only multiplies the threats to stability already present in a region.

Lake Chad Region



The region has long been rife with conflict and instability. In the past decade, areas that have become uninhabitable desert have proven to be fertile ground for violent extremism and transnational terrorism. Organized crime and violent extremists can move freely throughout these areas because the Sahel's resource-strapped governments have minimal capacity to police them and national borders are porous.

Agadez, Niger, is a desert outpost, on the southern tip of the Sahara. Agadez is one of the main thoroughfares in Africa's booming human trafficking industry. Every week, thousands of migrants pass through, driven by climate change to try to cross into Europe. The migrants pay hundreds of dollars to make the perilous journey, guided by smugglers through war-torn Libya. The profits from human smuggling operations fund various armed groups, enabling them to corrupt government officials and penetrate state institutions.¹⁰⁹

We will discuss one of the Sahel's subregions, the **Lake Chad Region**, again in the next chapter. Parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon make up the Lake Chad Region. It has become Africa's fastest-growing displacement crisis, with 2.8 million people forced to flee their homes¹¹⁰ by Boko Haram. In 2016, nearly half of the 20 million people who live here are in need of life-saving nutrition assistance. Boko Haram, the deadliest and perhaps most fanatical of the Sahel's militant groups, originated in Nigeria's Borno State, where desertification, recurrent drought, and government neglect provided the breeding ground.

The **Congo River Basin** is a massive territory in western and central Africa. The rainforests of the Congo River Basin are second only to the Amazon in providing the Earth with its best natural defenses against climate change. But tropical forests and the communities that depend on them are also particularly vulnerable to climate change, and the Earth's "second lung," as this region is sometimes called, is beset with conflict.

Nearly 60 percent of the entire Congo River Basin lies within the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Other parts of the region are in the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. The DRC has been plagued by conflict continuously ever since independence in 1960. It is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa, and its conflicts radiate beyond its borders. The Central

Congo River Basin



African Republic, directly north of DRC, has also been unstable most of the years since independence. Both of these countries, two of the poorest in the world, are endowed with tremendous mineral wealth. This could be used to improve Congo River Basin residents' ability to adapt to climate change, but the plunder and mismanagement of these resources has brought nothing but misery to the populations.

There is yet another reason why stability in the Congo River Basin is vital to all of humanity. Some of the deadliest contagious diseases in modern times have emerged from this area. The Lobéké Forest in southeastern Cameroon has been identified as the location where HIV crossed the species barrier from nonhuman primates to humans. This led to the global AIDS pandemic. The Ebola virus, another global pandemic that emerged after crossing the species barrier, is named for the Ebola River in the DRC and is believed to have originated there.

"With climate change expected to put increasing pressure on food security in Africa, food shortages will push more people to alternative food sources and consumption of bushmeat, like bats, will likely increase," says Kris Murray, research scientist at the Grantham Institute at Imperial College London.¹¹¹ The 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa appears to have stemmed from transmission of the virus from a bat to a 2-year-old boy in Equatorial Guinea.¹¹²

The **South Asia** region includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. It is one of the world's most politically unstable regions. With nearly 2 billion people, the region also has the largest absolute number of people suffering from chronic hunger and malnutrition. Climate change, in the forms of rising temperatures, irregular rains, sea



A man carries his daughter across an expanse of flood water in the city of Digri, in the Sindh Province of Pakistan in 2011. The flooding affected 8.9 million people.



UNICEF / Warrick



UNICEF

In the drought-ravaged Tadjoura District of Djibouti, a country in the Sahel, it has not rained for three years. In the remote, mountainous village of Dora, boys carry containers of water they have collected from a generator-powered well provided by UNICEF.

level rise, and floods, is already displacing people at a troubling rate. Every day, for example, an estimated 2,000 people displaced by sea level rise arrive in Dhaka,¹¹³ the sprawling capital of Bangladesh.

Water scarcity is another major problem as glacier melt accelerates in the region's three giant mountain ranges, the Himalaya, Karakoram, and Hindu Kush. Together with the Tibetan Plateau, these mountain ranges have been called the "Third Pole" because they contain Earth's largest amount of snow and ice on the planet after Antarctica and the Arctic.¹¹⁴ Forty percent of the world's population depends on the rivers that drain from these mountain ranges for their water supply.¹¹⁵

Once glaciers have melted away they cannot be restored.

A 2016 report by three retired military leaders from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh warns that water scarcity could undermine peace and security in South Asia.¹¹⁶ In India, two consecutive years of punishing drought have led to water shortages in as many as 10 states, forcing authorities to post armed guards at dams in order to prevent desperate farmers from stealing water.¹¹⁷ In Afghanistan, drought has driven some young men to join armed groups as the

only way to provide for their families. Pakistan is also facing acute shortages as ground water supplies are being rapidly depleted.

"Some may say that loose nukes and Islamist militant takeovers are the big fear for Pakistan. For me, the nightmare is water scarcity, because in Pakistan it is very real and already upon us," says Michael Kugelman, South Asia expert at the Washington, DC-based Woodrow Wilson Center. "And worst of all is that the authorities have given no indication that they plan to do anything about any of this."¹¹⁸

In the Western Hemisphere, one region that is both conflict-affected and extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change is *Central America*.¹¹⁹ As we saw earlier in this chapter, the levels of violence from gang- and drug-related activities in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, the subregion called the Northern Triangle, are comparable to those of most countries with acknowledged civil wars.

Central America is an isthmus, surrounded by the Pacific Ocean on one side and the Caribbean Sea on the other. This means it is in the path of tropical storms striking from either side. Extreme weather events such as droughts, heatwaves, and flooding caused by hurricanes have become increasingly routine. From 1994 to 2013, Honduras was the world's top country affected by extreme weather events, with Nicaragua lining up fourth, Guatemala ninth, and El Salvador twelfth.¹²⁰ In 2011, flooding in El Salvador, caused by tropical depression 12E, destroyed an esti-

mated 60 percent of the entire national corn and bean crops and led to a 4 percent loss in GDP.¹²¹ The people most exposed to all of these dangers are poor residents of rural areas.

No one can say for sure how much of the migration to the United States from the Northern Triangle is climate-induced. Climate change and violence together are closing off many of the options. In the past, droughts in Guatemala usually led farmers to go to the cities to find another way of earning a living, but cities are now seen as less of a viable option because of gang control.¹²² The deforestation rates in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, among the highest in the world, are directly linked to drug traffickers, who clear large areas of the forests to create pasture for cattle production, mainly as a front to launder money.¹²³ They rely on political influence and bribes to get state and local officials to turn a blind eye.

Traffickers also tear up forests to strengthen their control of territory and drive out rivals.

“Narco-deforestation,” a new term for an increasingly common phenomenon, also leads to displacement of rural people as traffickers forcibly take land from farmers and indigenous groups. With both climate change and narco-violence making people in rural areas more desperate, and Northern Triangle cities no safer than a war zone, heading north to the United States may seem to be the only possibility.



A Honduran farmer prepares his field for planting. In 2015, the country faced the most intense drought in its history.



Neil Palmer / CIAT

We are the Democratic Republic of Congo

An essay by students of the Christian Bilingual University of Congo (UCBC), located in Beni, North Kivu Province, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Dr. Paul W. Robinson, former member of Bread for the World's board of directors, and a professor at UCBC, has been our liaison to the students. Through Dr. Robinson's class Global Perspectives, February-March 2016, we asked students to discuss how the international community can engage more constructively with the DRC to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development. The following is a collated and edited version of the class's response.

We are young women and men, students studying at the Bilingual Christian University of Congo (UCBC), located in Beni, North Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo. In this year, 2016, we continue to live in a war zone, despite the peace agreements of 2002 that marked the *official* end of our country's Great War, and despite the presence of a national government first elected in 2006.

We live in a state of fear and anxiety. Militia groups, neighboring countries' armies, international peace-keeping organizations, members of our own security forces, bandits, and others with various interests in our instability continue to wreak havoc on our villages, towns, and cities.

Our country is at best a *fragile* state, and at worst a *failed* state. In spite of the violence and persistent poverty, we refuse to despair; we live believing that change is possible in Congo. We choose to participate in the development of our country and to envision a future of hope.

We are Congo's future leaders, in all walks of life, in all our communities, in our government, civil society and faith communities. We can and will be the change we want in Congo.

We are Congo's Past

Between the 16th and late 19th centuries, our ancestors—young people like us—were seized and brutally taken from this land to be enslaved in the Americas and elsewhere. Between 1885-1915, during the first 30 years of Belgian colonial rule, 10 million of us were beaten, whipped, maimed, and killed; forcibly conscripted to build roads, railroads, and infrastructure for the colonial state to export rubber and other of our abundant resources.

Belgian colonial rule came to an abrupt end in 1960. But independence did little to change the violence and poverty that defined pre-colonial and colonial Congolese society. The European powers remained, joined by new players such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peoples' Republic of China, seeking to influence our loyalty in the Cold War and to assure a flow of our resources to their industries and consumers.

They (you) are still present, wielding influence and control over us and throughout postcolonial Africa. Our former rulers and new 'friends' promised to help develop us after independence, but that help has been largely conditional on the export

of our wealth and cooperation in their interests. In this, we of course share the blame. But an African proverb affirms: "*The hand that gives is always above the hand that receives.*"

Between 1996-2002, six African countries and more than 30 militia groups raped, slaughtered, terrorized, and pillaged our country for control over our vast resources. Somewhere between 3-5 million people died. Nobody really knows how many Congolese died. Not many people around the world cared about Congolese deaths at the beginning of the 20th century; not many people cared at the end of the century.

We are Congo's Present

We know what drove our most recent cycle of conflict and war is primarily our mineral wealth and our abundant and fertile land. We have suffered because we possess strategic and rare minerals that drive high-tech industries. We are induced to trade our minerals for empty promises of 'development' and weapons so that certain of our people can control and profit from this exchange. Our leaders bear much responsibility for our condition. They sign agreements in which we are obliged to develop our resources for the benefit of others.

We were told by Belgian colonialists—and the wider world since then—that to be developed was to evolve from being Congolese to being culturally and linguistically something *other* than Congolese. The goal of our parents' and grandparents' generations in being educated in the colonial era was to become *Belgian* rather than *Congolese*. To be successful in Congo, we still need to speak and think French and to be someone other than what we see when we look in the mirror. We do not value who we are, what we produce, or how we live. We are at best passive, at worst imitative.

Apart from cultures of poverty and violence, we have inherited very little from our long encounter with the outside world. We possess more than enough resources to live into a good destiny. We have fertile lands in a benevolent climate. We have abundant strategic minerals we can use for our benefit. Yet our poverty is such that we import our food from outside. We allow outsiders to come and exploit us with imbalanced contracts that essentially steal our wealth. Our own leaders have become the new benefi-

ciaries of the old inequalities. Corruption has become our *daily bread* at all levels of the state, business, and services of all kinds. We are passive when it comes to becoming who we could be, and we are passive in the face of injustices.

We ask ourselves the questions: “Why?” “Who are we called to be and what are we called to do?”

We are Congo’s Future

“Oh beloved country, Congo, we shall make you a country better than before.” This stanza from our national hymn sums up our vision for our country. We will be a voice for our nation and our people. We are committed to being a new generation of leaders who will responsibly lead our nation.

Living our destiny is not only a dream; it is possible if we truly want it. We have sufficient resources to make our vision a reality. We are endowed with 50 percent of Africa’s rainforests. We have rich, abundant soils, plentiful rainfall, and one of the most extensive riverine systems in the world. Our hydroelectric potential could power all of sub-Saharan Africa; our agriculture has the potential to feed much of our continent.

What we require and what we ask of those who would be our friends are three things: access, knowledge, and transformation. A popular saying states: *Instead of giving me a fish to eat today, teach me how to fish and I shall eat everyday.* We say that this is not enough. Yes, we need knowledge to know how to fish in the pond. But we then also need access to the pond. We long for the day when our country will have an equal seat at the table in the community of nations, when Congo will participate with self-respect and be respectfully heard. Listen to us; let us listen to one another.

We want to suggest two areas of transformation that we believe would impact our world for the better. The place where we must start is with global arms manufacture and trade, which simply increases violence and the misappropriation and misuse of wealth and power. We and our communities have been terrorized for four centuries by the transfer of weaponry and military technologies from Europe and North America. President Nyerere of Tanzania noted in 1985 (an observation that holds equally true in 2016) that: “All the guns you see in Africa are manufactured in the developed North. Just as there are pushers of drugs in your cities, so there are pushers of guns in our countries.”¹ Underdevelopment, poverty, and hunger persist in Congo because of chronic violence and insecurity. We must work towards putting an end to the lucrative global arms manufacture and trade.

Additionally, we need developed countries to end their exploitation of our resources for their benefit. We need both to develop our resources to meet our needs and improve our lives, and then to develop our resources and engage in fair and legitimate trade that mutually benefits both producer and buyer. This requires transformation, and we believe this is best achieved as we come to the table as partners. As more than partners really. We need to recognize that our future is dependent on each other. So we say in Swahili, *tukopamoja* (we are together).

We long for the kind of collaboration that enables us to achieve our vision. Yes, we are Congo’s future. You, who read our words, are also our future.

Read more about Congo Initiative and the Christian Bilingual University of Congo (UCBC) at <http://congoinitiative.org/> and www.ucbc.org.



Christian Bilingual University of Congo

Students of the Christian Bilingual University of Congo (UCBC) who contributed to this essay send us their greetings.



UN Photo / Logan Abassi

Climate Fragile

Summary

Climate change is a reality that must be confronted. Many national leaders understand they can no longer wait to act. Climate change is contributing to fragility or worsening already fragile conditions. Today, we see the effects of climate change everywhere, from parched farmland to rising sea levels to mosquito-borne illnesses in new parts of the world to people fleeing climate-related disasters and conflicts. A weak response to climate change will make it harder to realize the goal of ending hunger by 2030. The populations most affected by climate change are the same as those at risk of hunger. Their vulnerability is due more to chronic poverty and social exclusion than their exposure to natural hazards. Helping them to mitigate, adapt, and become more resilient to the negative effects of climate change aligns seamlessly with a strategy to end hunger.

KEY POINTS

- Fulfill U.S. commitments to the goals defined in the Paris climate agreement adopted in December 2015.
- Invest in climate-smart social protection strategies so the people most vulnerable to climate change are not forced to adopt negative coping strategies.
- Strengthen the capacity of national and local partners to prepare for and respond to natural disasters.
- Make gender equality a core principle of all U.S. climate change assistance.
- Identify guiding principles and institutional frameworks to prepare for the relocation of large groups of people displaced by climate change.

Climate Impacts

“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal,” noted the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC, in 2007.¹ A decade later the heat has been turned up on government leaders everywhere to confront the greatest of all sustainable development challenges.

The IPCC was established in 1988 by member governments of the United Nations and is recognized the world over as the most comprehensive scientific authority on climate change. Its regular assessment reports distill the research of thousands of experts across a range of

scientific disciplines studying the effects of climate change on the earth’s ecosystem.

In its 2014 assessment report, IPCC concluded that if temperatures continue to rise at their current trajectory, the repercussions for global food security could be dire by the end of the century.² This did not take into account governments’ efforts to slow and contain climate change. Governments working in concert can still minimize the damage.


The current trajectory, without effective intervention, would mean a rise of 4 degrees Celsius (7.2 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial level by the end of this century.³ Scientists believe that an increase of this magnitude would be catastrophic.

Some of the impacts include a drastic reduction in crop yields, significant soil erosion and degradation, dramatic losses in biodiversity, more animal and plant disease, and destruction of marine life due to ocean acidification. Sea levels will rise by several feet, displacing hundreds of millions of people residing in coastal communities, causing waves of migrants unlike anything the world has ever seen.⁴



Scott Wallace / World Bank

A global response to climate change is needed to ensure that ending hunger is sustainable.



97 percent of scientists believe humans contribute to global warming.¹



December 1984: the last month when global temperatures for land and oceans were below the 20th century average.²

Climate and the Food System

Many of the effects of climate change on our food systems will be obvious long before the end of the century. The global food system is already under tremendous pressure to be more productive to meet the needs of a growing population. We have already noted increases in extreme weather events. Thus far, the impact has fallen most heavily on countries near the equator. These are also countries where most of the population depends on agriculture to earn a living. Extreme weather events such as cyclones, flooding, and droughts reduce or ruin harvests, meaning that farming families have lower incomes and more hunger.

Between 1985 and 2015, low-income countries as a group experienced 1.5 times as many storms, floods, and droughts as middle- and high-income countries as a group. The poorest households suffered the most.⁵ According to one study from Uganda, based on data from 2005 and 2011, a 10-percent reduction in water availability due to changing rainfall patterns resulted in a loss in crop income of almost 20 percent for the poorest households.⁶ Climate change will exacerbate water scarcity and land degradation, jeopardizing the livelihoods and food security of hundreds of millions of people across Africa who are dependent on rain-fed agriculture.⁷

The earliest signs of climate change were impacts on vulnerable groups who depend on agriculture and live in high-risk areas where much of the land is already degraded. Prolonged droughts since the 1970s in the Sahel region of Africa, sometimes dubbed “ground zero” for climate change, have made large parts of this region uninhabitable to pastoralist groups like the Fulani in Burkina Faso. The Sahel remains one of the most severely affected regions on earth. “Animals are dying all the time now, not just in the dry season,” said Samba Dicko, a Fulani pastoralist interviewed by Heifer International. “For us Fulani, we don’t know any other way besides keeping animals: cows, goats, and sheep.”⁸



Philippe Berry / IFPRI

Agricultural research has helped farmers to increase productivity in Vietnam, a country bearing some of the worst brunt of climate change.

Four out of five
people experiencing hunger live in
areas susceptible to natural disasters.³



Absent climate-smart development
and emissions-reductions,
there could be more than

100 million
additional people in poverty by 2030.⁴


The flip side of the widespread damage to agriculture is that the sector has a great deal of potential to mitigate climate change. Nearly 80 percent of agriculture's emissions of methane, one of the most potent greenhouse gases, comes from livestock. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that the sector could eliminate about 30 percent of its baseline emissions from livestock production—methane as well as other gases.⁹ See Box 2.1.

Climate and Decision-Making

Agriculture also offers opportunities for communities to adapt to changing weather conditions and strengthen their resilience to climate shocks. In low-income countries, better infrastructure combined with up-to-date information on food storage and handling could significantly reduce the agricultural sector's carbon footprint by reducing the massive amounts of food (estimated at 40 percent of what is grown) that spoils before it can be consumed.

We know that climate change is profoundly affecting today's agricultural sector, including crops, forestry, fisheries, and livestock. See Figure 2.1. But there is still a great deal we do not know about how climate change affects food systems. One challenge to efforts to learn more

Figure 2.1 How Climate Change Affects all the Elements of the Water Cycle and the Impact on Agriculture



Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016), *Climate Change and Food Security: risks and responses*.

Tackling Climate Change Through Livestock*

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

As poverty rates continue to fall around the world, many more people will be able to afford to add animal products to their diets.

The global livestock sector contributes a significant share to greenhouse gas emissions, but it can also deliver a significant share of the mitigation effort to address climate change. Beef and cattle milk production account for the majority of emissions, while pork, poultry meat, and eggs contribute a smaller share of the sector's overall emissions.

A major opportunity to reduce emissions is to improve grazing systems in developing countries. Better feeding, animal health, and herd management practices would substantially reduce emissions.

Public policies should help to reduce the risk for farmers in adopting these practices. This is particularly important in countries where limited access to credit and risk-averse strategies discourage farmers from adopting novel options requiring upfront investment. Public and private sector policies also have a crucial role to play in supporting research and development to improve existing technologies and to provide new solutions for mitigation.

It is only by involving all sector stakeholders (private and public sector, civil society, research and academia, and international organizations) that solutions can be developed that address the sector's diversity and complexity. Climate change is a global issue and livestock supply chains are increasingly internationally connected. Mitigation actions also need to be global.

* Adapted from Pierre J. Gerber et al. (2013), *Tackling Climate Change Through Livestock: A Global Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Opportunities*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.



Crystalline Randazzo for Bread for the World

The global livestock sector contributes a growing share of the greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change.



Scott Wallace / World Bank

A farmer tends to his field in Northeast Brazil, a region that faces severe water shortages.

tropics,” VanWey said. “This is where the vast majority of agricultural development is going to happen in the next 30 to 50 years. So understanding how people respond in this kind of environment is going to be really important.”¹²

The data showed reductions in crop production over the 2002-2008 period. The study found that a 1-degree Celsius increase in temperature led to substantial decreases both in the overall area planted by farmers, and in the area where they double cropped. (Double cropping is a common farming strategy in the tropics—it means simply that farmers plant two crops in the same field during a single growing season.) Farmers’ decisions about how much to plant and whether to double crop accounted for 70 percent of the decrease in production.

The Brazil study illustrates the larger point that crop yields are determined not only by changes in climate, but also by farmers’ reactions to the changes. As temperatures continue to rise, human behavior will be even more important in determining outcomes for food production. Left to struggle with climate change on their own, farmers make decisions to protect themselves against catastrophic losses. These decisions could lead to cascading reductions in yields. On the other hand, the fact that 70 percent of the loss in crop production was within human control is encouraging. The more that’s known about how farmers react to climate change, the better the chances that the world can respond more effectively. Higher temperatures may be a fait accompli, but not all of the repercussions have to be.

Climate and Hunger

Climate change carries economic and political costs at the national and global levels as well as in rural communities. Extreme weather events and unpredictable growing seasons that lower food production also impact the availability and cost of food. For example, unprecedented 2010

is that the data we have so far don’t take human behavior into account.

A study published in 2016 suggests that earlier models may have underestimated the role of climate change in reducing global food production. This is because they use single indicators of yield and do not account for how climate change alters farmers’ production decisions. “The real missing pieces have been people’s decision making,” said Leah VanWey, senior director of the Institute for Environment and Society at Brown University and one of the authors of the study.¹⁰ VanWey and colleagues analyzed satellite data from 2002 to 2008 of a significant agricultural region of Brazil.¹¹ “This is an agricultural frontier in the

floods in Pakistan decimated national wheat production. The flooding wrecked vital infrastructure, which included major roads and bridges essential to transporting food to urban consumers in other parts of the country.¹³ Prices rose by 50 percent above pre-flood levels.¹⁴

International agricultural markets are even more closely interwoven than some other parts of the global economy. A drought in a major exporting country may quickly turn into a crisis of soaring prices for basic foods in other parts of the world. Droughts in the 2000s caused cereal stocks to fall to their lowest levels since 1974, contributing to skyrocketing prices in 2008 that fueled protests in dozens of countries and pushed more than 100 million additional people into extreme poverty.¹⁵

In 2010, a drought in Russia caused food prices in the Middle East to spike. The political fallout from prices so high that many families were unable to afford food contributed to the events of the Arab Spring.¹⁶ Globally, this 2010-2011 food-price crisis temporarily pushed an additional 44 million people into extreme poverty.¹⁷

Some effects of climate change are more obvious in hindsight—insidious, gradual damage over the long term.¹⁸ In Bangladesh, rising seawater levels have destroyed coastal rice growing areas by poisoning the soil with increased salt concentrations.¹⁹ In the Sahel, the region bordering the Sahara Desert, desertification has forced pastoralists to abandon their traditional grazing routes. This has caused violent clashes with settled farming communities that are struggling to hold on to their own diminishing resources.

In a neighboring region of Africa, climate change has caused destruction on an epic scale: Lake Chad has almost completely dried up. Fifty years ago, the lake was about the size of Maryland (25,000 square kilometers). Today, it is only a tenth of that size.²⁰ The lake—shared by Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon—once provided a source of income for fishing communities and irrigation for surrounding farm communities. Now, the region is better known as a source of recruits by the terror group Boko Haram. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported in 2016 that Boko Haram's violence in the Lake Chad Basin has displaced 3 million people.²¹

Climate and Migration


As early as its first assessment report in 1990, the IPCC warned, “The gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration.”²² Since 2008, nearly 175 million people in developing countries have been displaced by climate-induced disasters.²³ As the effects of climate change



Flore de Preneuf / World Bank

Climate change threatens the food security of hundreds of millions of people across Africa whose livelihoods depend on agriculture.

Figure 2.2 Push Factors as Interrelated Drivers for Migration and Determinants for Decision Making



Source: World Bank (2014), *Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal*.

intensify, we can expect domestic and international migration to increase. See Figure 2.2.

Many of those leaving rural areas will head for coastal cities in their own countries. But some of these cities will themselves soon be at serious climate risk. Low-lying, small-island nations face the worst consequences of all: these nations are sinking as climate change brings rises in sea level, and within a few decades some may no longer exist.²⁴ Member states of the Alliance of Small Island States, which includes both small islands and low-lying coastal countries, are all vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change. Members are drawn from all of the world's major oceans and, combined, are home to 5 percent of the world population. They include, for example, Jamaica, Singapore, Fiji, and the Seychelles.²⁵

Small island states contend that their populations displaced by climate change should be recognized under the 1951 Refugee Convention.²⁶ According to international law, refugee status must be based on a "well-founded fear of persecution." Currently, there is no accepted legal definition for people migrating across borders due to climate change.²⁷ (See *International Law is Limited on the Rights and Treatment of Refugees and Displaced People* by Sandra F. Joireman on page 38-39.)

National laws and policies have not caught up with the reality and scope of migration induced by climate change either. The governments of countries that are not directly threatened by climate change, not surprisingly, have little interest in expanding the definition of refugees to include climate migrants. The United States offers temporary protected status to certain people

affected by natural disaster or conflict, but it applies only to people already in the United States who are unable to return home. There is no provision for people who have migrated because slow-onset climate change has destroyed their livelihoods.

Countries that can expect to receive climate migrants should ensure that their immigration laws account for climate-induced displacement.²⁸ There is no country where this will be particularly palatable. But there is no other way to resolve the looming climate migration crisis and protect vulnerable humans who have lost their homes and livelihoods.

Poverty Worsens Vulnerability to Climate Change

In a village in Malawi, women cook using planter-size clay stoves they make out of the rich red earth that is abundant in this region. The National Association of Small Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM) provided them with molds and helped them build a kiln to fire the stoves once made. Local women now earn an income manufacturing stoves and selling them to people in other villages. The stoves require a fraction of the firewood the women used previously to feed their families. Their use not only preserves the ecology of the forests that had been sources of firewood, but also saves women and girls hours of drudgery each week collecting wood.

The rural poor depend on ecosystems for their survival. Climate change is eroding ecosystems, maybe faster than human ingenuity can devise clever, sustainable work-arounds. Because they are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, the poorest households in developing countries are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. They have limited capacity to cope: their savings are small, if they have any, and any other assets they hold, mostly livestock, are exposed to natural hazards that only intensify with climate change. With no resources to serve as a buffer, crop failure, a rapid rise in food prices, or another shock means that they may be forced to sell these assets simply to keep a roof over their heads or a small plot of land to grow food. See Figure 2.3, next page.


Disasters such as floods or drought affect everyone living in the area. Nonpoor households have more to lose in absolute terms, but the poorest households lose a far higher percentage of what they have. For example, after damage caused by floods in Bangladesh, a study found that households living below the poverty line lost 42 percent of their income on average, compared to 17 percent of the income of nonpoor households.²⁹ In Hon-



Dominic Chavez / World Bank

If gender inequalities were eliminated in the agricultural sector, women farmers would be able to increase their production—and reduce hunger.

Figure 2.3 The Effects of Drought



Source: Vincent Gitz and Alexandre Meybeck (2012), "Risks, vulnerabilities and resilience in a context of climate change," in Alexandre Meybeck et al., *Building Resilience for Adaptation to Climate Change in the Agriculture Sector*, FAO and OECD.

duras, a study investigating losses in rural areas in the wake of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 found that in relative terms, the poorest households lost nearly three times as much as other households.³⁰

Beyond selling what assets they have, poor families have few options but to reduce their consumption.³¹ They eat fewer meals and sacrifice dietary quality. Sometimes this is a short-term coping strategy, but it could become the "new normal." In the 1990s, severe droughts hit Ethiopia and Tanzania. Even 10 years later, the consumption levels of poor households in the worst-affected communities were 17 to 40 percent below their pre-disaster levels.³²

Dietary quality matters most for young children and pregnant and lactating mothers. The period known as the "1,000-day window," between pregnancy and a child's second birthday, is the most critical in human development, when the

impact of nutrition on physical and cognitive development is greater than at any other time in life. Vitamins and minerals are no less important than calories, and deficiencies of certain key micronutrients (iron, iodine, vitamin A, folate, and zinc) can have consequences that last a lifetime.

Vitamin and mineral deficiencies, often called "hidden" hunger, affect many more people than the number who don't get enough calories. Worldwide, at least half of all children between the ages of 6 months and 5 years suffer micronutrient deficiencies.³³ Families who are forced to reduce their food consumption in the aftermath of a weather-related shock may not realize that it is the youngest children, followed by pregnant women, who most need whatever food is available. In Ethiopia, researchers found that as early as six months after a weather-related shock, children in families that had reduced consumption were already displaying signs of stunting.³⁴

We have been emphasizing that poverty means far fewer choices. Nutrition is one of the few ways that poor people can protect themselves from illness. But climate change is reducing the nutritional quality of food itself. One study shows that increasing levels in the soil of carbon dioxide (CO₂), the most abundant greenhouse gas, reduces the protein content of wheat, rice, barley, and potatoes.³⁵ In wheat, and to a lesser extent in rice, higher levels of CO₂ are associated with reduced levels of zinc and iron,³⁶ both essential micronutrients for maternal and child health. Climate change can also worsen a population's health more directly. For example, high rainfall levels lead to an increase in malaria and diarrheal diseases.

The British medical journal *The Lancet* describes climate change as “the biggest global health threat of the 21st century.”³⁷ *The Lancet*, more than any other single source, has lifted the issue of child stunting to the top of the international development agenda. Recently, it has also been contributing a vital perspective on climate change. “Health puts a human face on what can sometimes seem to be a distant threat,” write editors Helena Wang and Richard Horton. “Public concerns about the health effects of climate change, such as undernutrition and food insecurity, have the potential to accelerate political action in ways that attention to carbon dioxide emissions alone do not.”³⁸

Everyone who is born into poverty is more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, caste, or other socioeconomic distinctions adds layers of vulnerability for members of some groups. One of the main determinants of who suffers most from the effects of climate change is gender. Within all marginalized groups, females are more vulnerable than males.

Women and girls are more likely to die in disasters than men and boys. In 2013, in Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, nearly twice as many people who died were female.³⁹ In 2008, in Cyclone Nargis in Burma, again, nearly twice as many of those killed were female.⁴⁰ In 2004, the Asian tsunami that struck Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka killed four times as many women as men.⁴¹ The reasons for the higher female death toll from the Asian tsunami range from women being likely to stay behind to look for their children and other relatives;⁴² to the tsunami’s onset at a time (Sunday morning) when many women were waiting at water’s edge to meet returning fishing boats; to many women not knowing how to swim or climb trees.⁴³ Because they spend more time cleaning after a flood, women and girls run a higher risk of contracting waterborne diseases.⁴⁴

Both women and men are dependent on ecosystems for their livelihoods; again, climate change affects everyone. However, women earn less from their labor, have fewer assets, and have more household responsibilities, including greater responsibility for the welfare of children and elders.⁴⁵ Women farmers have less access than men to productive resources such as land, credit, and productivity-enhancing inputs. Studies have found that if resources were distributed equally, women would be able to increase their production—and reduce hunger.⁴⁶ In Rwanda, when women gained tenure security, they invested more in soil conservation and other land improvements, amounting to more adaptive capacity.⁴⁷



Thomas Cristofolotti for USAID

Community health workers in Nepal teach new and expectant mothers about nutrition and other health practices critical to adapting to climate change.

Table 2.1 List of Selected Technologies, Services and Practices with Labor-Saving Potential for Women

HOUSEHOLD TASKS	Task/activity	Existing practice	Technologies, services and practices with labor-saving potential
	Water collection	Walking to fetch water from potentially unsafe water source	Improved household water sources (protected dug/shallow well and pump – protected spring – tube well/borehole & pump – public tap/standpipe – roof rainwater harvesting – piped water into house, plot or yard – simple water filters)
	Fuelwood collection	Wood collected from communally owned resources	- Woodlots - Agroforestry practices - Improved fallow
	Cooking	Cooking on traditional open fires using traditional biomass or charcoal as fuel	- Fuel-efficient stoves, using traditional biomass or modern biofuels - Solar cooking - Small-scale low-cost power supplies, using diesel or renewable energy sources
	Care work	Looking after family while simultaneously undertaking essential domestic and productive tasks	- Rehabilitation/construction of care center infrastructure - Support to local stakeholders to set up and run care services

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2015), *Running Out of Time: The Reduction of Women's Work Burden in Agricultural Production*.

Agriculture programs need to identify and compensate for gender discrimination, both in land tenure and in other areas. Extension services, when they are available, are mainly geared toward men and the crops they produce. Female farmers also have less access to financial services. Financial inclusion makes it possible for women to protect their savings and reduce their vulnerability.

Women also spend countless more hours than men on household tasks such as gathering firewood and water. Labor saving technologies, such as the stoves described earlier, can reduce this burden. See Table 2.1. By 2030, there could be as much as a 40-percent shortfall in global water availability.⁴⁸ Without changes in the division of household labor, women and girls will be forced to spend even more of their time walking to retrieve water. As we discussed in much more detail in the 2015 Hunger Report, *When Women Flourish ... We Can End Hunger*, the persistence of gender inequality could prevent the world from ending hunger, with or without climate change.

A Global Response to Climate Change

Governments appear to be yielding to public pressure to take meaningful collective action on climate change. The 21st Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP 21 for short, took place in Paris in December 2015. Leaders from around the world succeeded in forging a global, legally binding agreement that possibly could avert the worst climate change scenarios that scientists warn are becoming increasingly more likely without concerted action. The Paris agreement requires all countries to address climate change according to their abilities, under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”⁴⁹


The Paris agreement aims to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Developed countries will take the lead in reducing emissions, but developing countries are expected to set targets to limit future emissions growth. Developing countries combined produce a larger share of global CO₂ emissions than developed countries as a group, but developed countries produce far more emissions per person.⁵⁰

Cumulatively, the United States and Western European countries together have contributed the majority of all CO₂ emissions since 1850.⁵¹ See Figure 2.4. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, negotiated at COP 3, was ineffective largely because the emissions reductions targets applied only to developed countries. The U.S. government refused to comply, arguing that it was unfair that rapidly developing countries such as China and India were not obliged to reduce their emissions. They would be “free riding”—meaning that since climate does not respect national borders, the benefits of one country’s reducing its emissions accrue to all countries. The Paris agreement overcomes this vexing issue, which had stalled negotiations for years. Under the Paris agreement, each country must submit national climate targets every five years and agree to outside review to assess progress.


Mitigation policies are necessary to limit the long-term damage of climate change. Earlier in the chapter, we described some of the main effects of climate change that will make it more difficult to end hunger and poverty. They will only get worse the longer we wait to decarbonize. Fossil fuels are the focus of the challenge to decarbonize. Renewable energy technologies must be brought to scale, but this will not happen until there are stronger incentives for private sector investment.

The single most important policy for decarbonizing is carbon pricing. Countries can set carbon prices through straightforward taxes, such as surcharges on fuel consumption, or through trading systems, or through a combination of both. Taxes may be a better option in developing countries with weak capacity to enforce regulations on trading, or whose carbon markets might be small to begin with.⁵² A modest charge of \$30 per ton of CO₂ in advanced economies would have raised \$25 billion in 2014, according to the International Monetary Fund.⁵³ Research on the

Figure 2.4 Cumulative CO₂ Emissions 1850-2011 (% of World Total)



Cumulative Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-2011 (% of World Total)



Source: World Resources Institute



Abbie Trayler-Smith / Panos Pictures / Department for International Development

Clean energy technologies like solar power are spreading rapidly to rural areas of developing countries.

In 2010, the World Bank estimated that adapting to projected global warming of 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels by 2050 would cost between \$70 and \$100 billion a year.⁵⁶ In 2009, at COP 15 in Copenhagen, the United States and other advanced economies pledged to provide \$100 billion in financing for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries by 2020. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised that the United States would lead in raising the \$100 billion.⁵⁷ A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released months prior to COP 21 reported that climate finance among its member countries was only \$62 billion in 2014.⁵⁸ The Paris agreement reiterated the pledge to provide \$100 billion by 2020, and, in 2025, to set a new, unspecified higher target. Updated estimates from the UN Environmental Program found that even with reduced emissions, the cost of adaptation under a 2 degrees scenario was likely to reach \$150 billion by 2025, and could rise as high as \$250 billion to \$500 billion a year by 2050.⁵⁹

By a wide margin, most climate finance so far has been for mitigation rather than adaptation.⁶⁰ Mitigation, as mentioned, is primarily aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. Everyone on the planet benefits from mitigation efforts made in any country. Adaptation finance is designed to help the poorest and most vulnerable countries cope with the adverse effects of climate change, such as rising sea levels, storms, drought, and the spread of unfamiliar diseases. The benefits from adaptation finance are specific to one area, either in one country or primarily in one country with some spillover effects. Of course, the damage from climate change often crosses national borders as well. Competition for scarcer resources is a potential cause of conflict. Transboundary water resources such as lakes, rivers, and aquifers might need to be managed through regional agreements.

It is not always easy to distinguish adaptation finance from development assistance. Adaptation facilitates development and vice versa. For example, adaptive infrastructure can also promote economic development—improved roads that can withstand storms also make it easier for farmers to transport their products to market. The World Resources Institute has offered the concept of an adaptation continuum to clarify the relationship of adaptation and development.⁶¹

effects of a per-ton carbon tax in this price range suggests that the impact on economic growth in the United States would be no more than -0.03 percent,⁵⁴ which comes to, for example, \$3 on \$10,000 in economic output.

French economists Thomas Piketty and Lucas Chancel have proposed a global tax on airfares to help finance climate adaptation in low-income countries. Piketty and Chancel found that a \$196 carbon fee on business class tickets and \$20 on economy class tickets could raise more than \$150 billion per year.⁵⁵ A tax on airfares seems a fair way to pay for climate change adaptation. Presumably anyone who flies on a commercial airline, particularly in business class, has a vastly larger carbon footprint than the billions of people who have never set foot on a plane.

On one end of the continuum are the fundamental drivers of any kind of vulnerability: food insecurity, poverty, gender inequality, poor health and education, and the like. Efforts to address these longstanding problems are usually traditional development tools. On the other end are specific drivers of climate vulnerability and efforts to address those, such as providing farmers with drought resistant seeds, training communities in efficient water use, and building disaster resistant housing.⁶²

Funding for adaptation can be considered compensation to the most vulnerable countries for the collateral damage they sustained during the 150 years of carbon-intensive industrialization that made developed countries rich. This argues that it should come in addition to official development assistance. Adaptation finance should also be provided directly to recipient countries to determine for themselves how best to use these resources. Countries can prepare their own climate-change adaptation plans as they do their national development objectives. Both planning processes should be led by the government in cooperation with civil society and other key stakeholders.

The low-income countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change largely overlap with those on the World Bank and OECD lists of fragile and conflict-affected states. This means that adaptation funding should align with the state-building goals articulated by the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected countries, including an emphasis on national ownership and strengthening state institutions. Strengthening institutions that help these countries adapt to climate change will advance regional security and also will have major implications for U.S. national security.

Helping countries
adapt to climate
change will advance
regional security and
have implications
for U.S. national
security.

To support developing countries, the Green Climate Fund was established at the global climate change conference in Cancun in 2010 but was not fully operational until 2015.⁶³ It is a multilateral financing mechanism administered under the aegis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The multilateral nature of the fund is a strength since it minimizes the power of interest groups in developed countries to dictate or influence how the funding can be used. Another strength is that the Green Climate Fund is committed to dedicating half of its funding to adaptation, whereas bilateral assistance is skewed much more towards mitigation efforts.

At the end of 2015, 37 countries altogether had pledged support to the Green Climate Fund, including eight developing countries; but the total pledged was only \$10 billion, with the United States pledging the most (\$3 billion), followed by the United Kingdom (\$2 billion) and Japan (\$1.5 billion).⁶⁴ Many operational issues remain unclear, such as precisely who in beneficiary countries will be accredited to receive funding. Will local civil society organizations be able to meet the fiduciary standards? One thing that is certain: without urgent action for adaptation, the most fragile countries could face profound harm from climate change, regardless of whether global agreements succeed in containing the temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius.

Climate-Smart Social Protection

The El Niño weather pattern is a natural phenomenon that occurs every three to seven years, producing above-average surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean. Ocean warming associated with climate change now appears to be strengthening the effects of El Niño.⁶⁵ The effects are

Deforestation: Seeing the Forest for the Trees

Halting tropical deforestation is a low-cost and effective way to slow climate change. It also has the potential to deliver big benefits to those most at risk of hunger: rural poor people.

When forests are cleared, carbon dioxide stored in the soil and vegetation is released into the atmosphere, accounting for as much as 10 percent of total carbon emissions.⁶⁶ That may sound small relative to overall emissions, but forests also remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, storing it in the soil and vegetation. Deforestation destroys the world's safest and most natural form of carbon capture. Ending tropical deforestation and allowing forests to grow back could capture between 25 and 35 percent of carbon emissions from all other sources.⁶⁷

In 2010, developed countries agreed in principle to provide incentives to developing countries to reduce deforestation on a pay-for-performance basis. The initiative, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and

Forest Degradation, or REDD+, is modeled on a bilateral agreement struck between Norway and Brazil, in which Norway provides development assistance to Brazil in exchange for Brazil's reducing deforestation in the Amazon.⁶⁸ Between 2004 and 2014, Brazil reduced Amazon deforestation by 75 percent, proving that making substantial reductions very quickly is possible.⁶⁹ Results are easily verified with satellite imaging.

Deforestation destroys the world's safest and most natural form of carbon capture.

Payment-for-performance systems are designed so that donors essentially buy the outcomes they want, rather than paying for inputs, while the aid recipient gains the autonomy it wants to determine how

those outcomes will be achieved. In the United States, the Center for Global Development is the most prominent champion of pay-for-performance systems, or what it calls Cash on Delivery (COD) aid, and has written extensively about how the REDD+ is ideally suited to a COD approach. "The key advantage of a COD approach," says William Savedoff of the Center for Global Development, "is that it is consistent with our current understanding of how development happens: through domestic accountability, ownership, innovation, and adaptation. Recipients can still seek technical assistance and external ideas for their programs and policies, but the agreement itself does not constrain the recipient to follow preordained blueprints, which tend to interfere with real development and real progress."⁷⁰

Developing countries certainly recognize that deforestation will make them more vulnerable to climate change. But here and now, food-insecure rural communities lack alternatives to cutting down trees for firewood or clearing hill slopes for food production. Rural households need to be compensated for lost income, and they will need complimentary supports such as fuel-efficient cook stoves, extension services so they can learn evergreen agriculture, and enhanced social protection programs. Brazil offers a monthly cash transfer to low-income households that commit to both zero deforestation and sending their kids to school. It has also instituted a process for granting land tenure to hundreds of thousands of indigenous smallholders, provided that they comply with regulations on deforestation.⁷¹

Developed countries reiterated their support for REDD+ in the Paris Climate Agreement reached in December 2015 at COP 21. The Green Climate Fund is a mechanism for multilateral investments in programming oriented around REDD+ and is especially valuable to the United States. U.S. bilateral support for REDD+ is impeded by regulations limiting the provision of aid directly to governments. It is hard to envision having real impact on reducing tropical deforestation and not working directly with governments, as they have the capacity to work at the scale necessary to deliver significant reductions in deforestation in their countries.

experienced to varying degrees everywhere. The Caribbean region was already in a drought when El Niño arrived in early 2015. In Haiti, crop production fell by as much as 70 percent in some areas, and the country's hunger rate doubled in only six months.⁷²

In 2015 and 2016, the El Niño weather pattern brought exceptionally dry weather to sub-Saharan Africa. Drought occurs regularly in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa, the hungriest region in the world, is extremely vulnerable because of its dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Drought conditions in 2011 caused the only famine of the 21st century in Somalia, a country embroiled in a civil war. The war prevented delivery of emergency food aid to large parts of the country. Delivery to areas that could be reached was delayed as donors failed to heed the early warnings of approaching famine.

Somalia shares a border with Ethiopia, which has its own tragic history of famine. Ethiopia was spared Somalia's fate in 2011 due in large part to its stability and Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). In 2005, the government of Ethiopia and an alliance of international agencies, including the World Bank, the Office of Food for Peace at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and others, launched the PSNP to reduce the country's dependence on emergency food aid. In 2011, the PSNP expanded its coverage from 6.5 million beneficiaries to 9.6 million in a period of just two months.⁷³ In 2016, the PSNP once again helped prevent a much worse hunger emergency. An estimated 10.2 million people still required emergency food aid,⁷⁴ but the impact of the drought could have been much worse without the PSNP. In Somalia, the situation is not as bad as 2011, but it is still quite bad by any measure with close to 200,000 children under the age of five suffering acute malnutrition by late 2016.

In times of natural disaster, social protection programs that are rapidly scalable are vital to preventing widespread hunger and malnutrition. Both rich and poor countries use social protection programs in times of natural disaster. In the United States, the first line of defense against hunger after a natural disaster is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program). SNAP is the largest U.S. domestic hunger safety net program, and in the wake of a disaster is able to quickly offer temporary food assistance to affected households. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the federal government quickly issued emergency SNAP benefits to 1.4 million affected households.⁷⁵

Ethiopia's PSNP is a development-oriented social protection program. It targets the poorest households in chronically food-insecure rural areas of the country and is designed to build



Fitsum Aregawi / USAID

Somali boys displaced by civil war and drought at a refugee camp in Ethiopia, another country where drought is just as common.

community resilience and support adaptation to climate change. In exchange for cash or in-kind food assistance, households with adults who are able to work are required to participate in various public works projects, such as road improvements and soil and water conservation.⁷⁶

Latin American countries, especially Brazil, have been leaders in showing the rest of the world how to use social protection to achieve multiple development objectives. That said, there is no one-size-fits-all social protection program. SNAP is not like the PSNP, and neither is like

Bolsa Floresta, a Brazilian conditional cash transfer program. Bolsa Floresta pays a monthly stipend to households in designated areas of the Amazon rainforests to help with conservation efforts. Read more about this program on page 86.⁷⁷

People living in poverty do not have many options in case of natural disaster, conflict, or spiking food prices. They cannot afford to take risks. It is sobering to think of families cutting meals and then running out of food altogether because they could not afford to put aside money for emergencies. Social protection, by providing some additional resources in times of need, enables people to try higher-risk, higher-return livelihood strategies—for example, planting a new crop on



Binyam Teshome / World Bank

Beneficiaries of the Productive Safety Nets Program in Ethiopia, social protection financed by donors and administered by the national government.

part of their land or buying a bicycle to get crops to market.

Perhaps even more important, social protection programs prevent households affected by natural disaster from having to use negative coping strategies, such as selling livestock or pulling children out of school. In 2012, the Chars Livelihood Program, a large regional social protection program in Bangladesh, helped 95 percent of its beneficiaries in villages affected by floods to hold on to their assets.⁷⁸

Subsistence farmers tend to use their assets conservatively, and a comprehensive review of social protection programs found that on average, beneficiaries actually increase their asset holdings.⁷⁹

The social protection revolution that would eventually spread through Latin America had not yet come to Nicaragua in 1998, when Hurricane Mitch struck. After the hurricane, child labor rates increased by more than 50 percent in affected areas.⁸⁰ A conditional cash transfer program such as those in Mexico and Brazil could have spared parents from having to pull their children out of school. The outcome for school-age children was much different just a few years later, in 2002, when coffee prices plummeted to their lowest level in 50 years. In the midst of what Nicaraguans call the “coffee crisis,” school enrollment rates among children held steady. This success was due to the recently established conditional cash transfer program, Red de Protección Social.⁸¹


Conditionality is important to building public support for social protection programs. However, in times of crisis, it makes sense to be flexible. After Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in 2013, the national government distributed millions of dollars in emergency unconditional cash transfers through the country's biggest existing conditional cash transfer program.⁸² International partners, including the World Food Program and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), were also asked to deliver assistance through this program, and they did. When a large-scale social protection program already exists, it makes little sense for international partners to use parallel systems to distribute benefits. Not only is it inefficient, but it also undermines the role of the government as the legitimate body leading and coordinating the disaster response. As earlier mentioned, one of the provisions of the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* is that international partners should not bypass government systems.⁸³

In low-income countries, social protection programs are overwhelmingly financed by donors. Ethiopia's PSNP is almost 100 percent donor financed,⁸⁴ although its success stems from the national government's ability to run the program within its own structures. See Figure 2.5. The government is strengthening these structures by building the capacity to administer social protection programs as needed when donor support is no longer available or required.

The PSNP cannot change Ethiopia's exposure to climate change, but it can reduce its vulnerability. A 2014 study found that the PSNP had reduced hunger among beneficiaries by a third.⁸⁵ Its annual cost, 1.2 percent of GDP, is just a fraction of the hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance the country receives annually. In fact, a World Bank study concluded that if all of this humanitarian aid were channeled through the PSNP, the program could provide regular support to almost all Ethiopians living below the poverty line.⁸⁶

USAID is one of several donors contributing to the PSNP in Ethiopia. In Haiti, the Western Hemisphere's most fragile country, USAID is leading the development of Kore Lavi, a social protection program that targets ultrapoor households. The focus of the program is on maternal and child nutrition. Haiti has the highest child mortality rate and one of the highest stunting rates in the hemisphere.⁸⁷ Pregnant and lactating women in the program receive nutrition edu-

Figure 2.5 Roles of Federal Institutions in Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)



Source: World Bank (2013), *Building Resilience to Disaster and Climate Change through Social Protection*.



Binyam Teshome / World Bank

Yambo, a young Ethiopian boy, is one of the first beneficiaries of a new daycare center funded by the Productive Safety Nets Program.

cation and a food basket consisting of staples and vouchers to purchase fruits and vegetables grown locally. Through the voucher program, Kore Lavi indirectly supports farmers in the same or nearby communities.

Kore Lavi, although it is part of Feed the Future, USAID's signature global food security initiative, is not integrated with other Feed the Future projects focused on increasing the productivity of small-holder farmers. Integration would strengthen the mutually reinforcing objectives of Feed the Future. Some of the households targeted for the nutrition intervention are also struggling to earn a livelihood from farming.

FAO reports that worldwide, relatively few agricultural interventions are coordinated or integrated with social protection programs.⁸⁸ In Ethiopia, however, households that received PSNP transfers as well as complementary agricultural support were more likely to be food-secure than others that received only the nutritional benefits.⁸⁹ The poorest communities in developing countries are based on agriculture, and agricultural development is their only likely path out of poverty. While

social protection is an important tool in ending hunger, social protection alone is not enough to enable poor rural communities to overcome all of the obstacles they face.

Institutional Capacity to Prepare for and Respond to Natural Disasters

Of all the countries on earth, Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Disaster always seems to be a distinct possibility, not least because during a normal rainy season, one-fifth to one-third of the land would flood. Bangladesh is also one of the world's most densely populated countries. When a tropical storm hits, there is little chance that it will be a sparsely populated area bearing the brunt of it. Instead, storms slam into crowded coastal areas. In 1970, Cyclone Bhola took the lives of more than half a million people.

But Bangladesh has worked hard on disaster preparedness since then. With support from both international partners and the federal budget, the government of Bangladesh has invested heavily in disaster risk reduction. It has paid off. When Cyclone Sidr, Bangladesh's most powerful storm yet, hit in 2007, the death toll was 3,400. This is less than 1 percent of the deaths from Cyclone Bhola,⁹⁰ and that's with population growth in the meantime.

While extreme weather events cannot be prevented, they don't have to turn into disasters. Disasters occur when a country does not manage risk effectively. Communities and countries have always needed to be prepared for emergencies, but climate change is increasing the frequency of extreme

Church World Service in Haiti

For 12 years, Church World Service (CWS) Haiti, collaborating with Foods Resource Bank, has supported a network of 12 agricultural cooperatives through Haitian partner organization Christian Centre for Integrated Development/Sant Kreyen pou Devlopman Entegre (SKDE). The cooperatives include more than 6,000 members, 57 percent of whom are women.

Via a small projects fund, CWS provides grants for community development. One of the grants has been used to build a road in a rural community so far flung that it was previously accessible only by a two-hour walk uphill.

Partnership goes beyond just the financing of projects. Each cooperative sends a representative to training programs run by either CWS or SKDE. Training is offered in participatory planning, needs assessments, financial management and project administration. The training is designed to equip groups with the tools needed to analyze and articulate their needs and develop plans for addressing them. CWS also provides training in children's rights, which is important given the high number of children who become child domestic servants in the cities.

Through a micro-credit scheme, members access grants that enable them to start small businesses. Colas Clarinette Olibrice received a micro-credit loan and now sells goods at a popular market. With the profits she has earned from her business, she purchased chickens and goats and pays for the education of her three children.

By starting community stores, many women help themselves and their neighbors by reducing the distance they have to travel to purchase basic items. In the village of Lamontay, a new bakery feeds local people and allows Alase Naissance to work much closer to home.

Supporting emerging, often fledgling community groups has many challenges. All are at different stages of institutional development. Some are highly motivated, but weak in accounting or administration. Many have clear visions for community enterprises, but require help to realize their plans. Others struggle to ensure that community driven projects are inclusive and managed democratically. Addressing varying strengths and weaknesses only happens over time and through sustained support, often painstakingly.

But the lessons offered by CWS's rural cooperatives are clear: Community groups are the agents of their own economic transformation. Direct support and accompaniment is the model that helps them get there. When sustained and scaled up, such efforts can address the food and nutrition needs of Haiti's poorest. Communities can be critical stakeholders in implementing food security strategies at a national level, especially in an increasingly climate constrained world.

Rony Janvier, Margot DeGreef, and Jasmine Huggins of Church World Service contributed to this article.



Alex Morse / Foods Resource Bank

Eliza Santilus with the bread she baked at a new bakery in her village built with support from Church World Service.



Stephan Bacheneimer / World Bank

A teacher and students at one of the many cyclone shelters in Bangladesh capable of holding thousands of people.

weather events and requires a careful and deliberate strategy to reduce the risk of disaster. Bangladesh's strategy includes disseminating cyclone warning signals through an extensive telecommunications network; providing and assisting in first aid, rescue, relief, and rehabilitation operations; and establishing, strengthening, and coordinating initiatives in community capacity, disaster management, and development. Between 1970 and 2007, 1,500 cyclone shelters were constructed, each able to protect up to 5,000 people.⁹¹

The national government has primary responsibility for disaster risk reduction, but a successful strategy must engage actors in local communities. A strong social compact between the state and society, particularly an atmosphere

of mutual trust, will enable the national government and local actors to work in closer cooperation. Box 2.4 highlights an example of such close cooperation, between the New York City affiliate of Catholic Charities and local and national government agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012.

Countries with weak national governments are the most vulnerable to natural disaster. For example, building codes are a key element of disaster preparedness. Most deaths related to earthquakes occur in countries or regions where building codes are not enforced. The 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti killed 200 times as many people as another earthquake in Chile a few weeks later—even though Chile's earthquake was measured at 500 times stronger.⁹² Failure to enforce building codes was a major factor in the much higher death toll in Haiti.

World Bank analysis confirmed that strong local institutions, both formal and informal, are essential in order for community-based adaptation strategies to be successful.⁹³ Adaptation includes more than just improvements to physical infrastructure, important as they are. Poor health and lack of access to health care also makes communities more vulnerable and less resilient. In rural areas, where the number of professional health care providers is limited, women in the community often fill this gap. In Nepal, the Female Community Health Volunteer (FCHV) program relies on 50,000 village women to serve as peer educators, advising pregnant women, parents, and caregivers about nutrition.⁹⁴ FCHV is one reason why Nepal is achieving such remarkable progress against childhood stunting. From 2001 to 2011, the rate of stunting fell from 57 percent to 21 percent,⁹⁵ much of it during a protracted civil conflict.

Disaster risk reduction on the scale needed in a populous low-income country such as Bangladesh is financially out of reach without substantial commitments from donors. USAID and the National Science Foundation funded the development of an early warning system designed

to reduce the damage from tropical storms and flooding. The Climate Forecast Applications Network (CFAN) accurately predicted three major floods in 2007 and 2008, allowing farm households to harvest crops, shelter animals, store clean water, and secure food ahead of time.⁹⁶ Peter Webster, one of the scientists at Georgia Tech who helped develop CFAN, writes that extending the network to the rest of South and East Asia would cost approximately \$1 million per year, while averting “billions of dollars of damage and protecting thousands of lives.”⁹⁷

According to a study commissioned by the UK Department for International Development, every dollar spent on disaster risk reduction in Bangladesh yielded \$5 of savings from avoided losses, reduced humanitarian spending, and development gains.⁹⁸ In Kenya, the same study found that early drought response was nearly three times more cost-effective than humanitarian aid.⁹⁹ It is an understatement to say that disaster risk reduction has not been a priority for donors. Tara Gingerich and Marc Cohen of Oxfam America, reviewing 20 years of official development assistance (1991-2010), report that less than 1 percent was used for disaster risk reduction.¹⁰⁰ Notwithstanding successful efforts such as those of Bangladesh and Ethiopia, spending on disaster risk reduction rarely reaches the places it is most needed.¹⁰¹

Box 2.4

Partners in Relief and Recovery After Hurricane Sandy

by Margaret Tran, Bread for the World

In the days following Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, in and around New York City, Catholic Charities Community Services (CCCS) assisted thousands of families affected by the disaster.

Because of its leadership in these initial relief efforts, CCCS was approached by New York City and Westchester County agencies to provide follow-up disaster information and services. CCCS case managers staffed three restoration centers in New York City, 12 hours a day for three months after the storm, and a similar Westchester County Emergency Operation Center, 12 hours a day for several weeks.

As a result of its fine work in these first two phases of the Hurricane Sandy recovery, New York State selected CCCS as the managing agency for the federally-funded long-term Disaster Case Management (DCM) Program for Hurricane Sandy. This DCM program has been operating since January 2013 to address the needs of people still affected by Hurricane Sandy. It is the oldest and largest federally-funded DCM program to date. At its peak, the CCCS DCM Program subcontracted with 18 other agencies to serve the 13 impacted counties in New York.

The DCM program serves people from populations that are especially vulnerable to hunger, such as elderly people, people with disabilities, and those who were uninsured or under-insured.

Disaster case managers work with families individually to assess their needs and determine whether they may be eligible for any of the recovery benefits programs offered. After a home visit and benefits eligibility screenings, the case manager helps the family complete a budget and a plan listing their goals for recovery. The DCM staff also submit applications for financial assistance.

“The New York Disaster Case Management Program has made an incredible difference in the lives of thousands of individuals and families who would otherwise still be trying to recover from Sandy,” said Felicia Minerva, program director of the CCCS Long Island DCM team.

Margaret Tran is a Bread for the World organizer based in New York.

More than 100 countries—most of them in Africa—rely on outdated systems to monitor local climate conditions.¹⁰² Modernizing these systems must be a priority. One barrier to making these upgrades is a longstanding battle over technology transfer in the U.N. meetings on climate. Developed countries are guarded about what technologies they are willing to share, with a main concern being the protection of intellectual property rights. Developing countries point to the existing needs and the benefits the technology could bring.

The global community can now predict food crises with sophisticated early warning systems. The USAID-sponsored Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS Net) monitors food supply and demand in low-income food-deficit nations. The 2011 famine in Somalia that killed at least 250,000 people did not happen for lack of early warning capacity. The alarm was sounded

well in advance, but the international response came very late. A famine “early warning” system can only work if government leaders follow through with the needed resources while it is still “early” in the crisis.

Disaster risk reduction should begin to get more support as a result of the December 2015 Paris agreement. Earlier in 2015, at the annual Group of 7 (G-7) summit of developed countries, donors unveiled a plan to increase insurance coverage of climate-related risks in the most vulnerable developing countries. As a background paper prepared by the G-7 host, Germany, noted: “Climate risk insurance can play numerous roles: setting incentives for prevention; providing certainty for weather-affected public and private investments; and easing disaster-

related poverty and spurring economic development.”¹⁰³ The plan set a goal of expanding what’s called parametric risk insurance to 400 million people by 2020. Most new participants will be smallholder farmers. The United States pledged \$30 million for climate risk insurance initiatives.¹⁰⁴

In Thailand, in 2011, people flee their homes on the outskirts of Bangkok, the capital, during the worst flooding in half a century.



Greenpeace / Sataporn Thongma

Conventional agricultural insurance requires on-the-ground inspection to assess an individual policyholder’s losses prior to any payment of benefits. The administrative costs make such insurance cost-prohibitive for smallholders. Parametric risk insurance is different. It pays out to all covered policyholders when specific environmental benchmarks—such as rainfall over a specified time period—are met. This makes parametric risk insurance much less costly to administer.

Parametric insurance instruments have sprung up in many developing countries in the past decade. The Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), the first multinational parametric insurance model, was launched in 2007. CCRIF was capitalized with support from Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Bermuda, Japan, the World Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank. It is sustained by fees paid by the 16 insured countries.¹⁰⁵

The value of parametric insurance to participating governments is that it has the short-term liquidity needed to respond quickly to a major disaster and then help communities recover.¹⁰⁶ For example, when Hurricane Tomas struck the Caribbean in 2010, CCRIF paid out 50 percent of the obligated funds within seven days and the other half within 14 days of the disaster.¹⁰⁷

The African Risk Capacity (ARC) is another multinational parametric insurance pool. Designed specifically to respond to drought, ARC was launched in 2014 by the African Union with the support of several international partners, including USAID. As a form of social protection, parametric risk insurance makes it possible for people exposed to climate change to continue supporting themselves in the event of a shock, sparing them from having to use undesirable ways of coping, such as reducing their food consumption or selling productive animals such as dairy cows.



Flore de Preneuf / World Bank

Between 2011 and 2016, East African farmers, like this Kenyan man, experienced two of the worst droughts in the region in more than half a century.

Climate Fragile in the United States

In the United States, Native American communities are already being hit hard by climate change. A 2009 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office identified 31 Alaskan Native villages facing an imminent threat from erosion and flooding.¹⁰⁸

Newtok, a village of 350 on the west coast of Alaska, is on the verge of sinking into the Ninglick River. The permafrost beneath the ground is melting and destroying the foundation of homes and buildings. Joel Niemeyer, the federal co-chair of the Denali Commission, a federal-state partnership on infrastructure projects, expects that by 2020 Newtok will no longer be a viable community. “Within four years, the river will be right next to the school. It’ll already have gobbled up the community water source. And then not far behind, it’s the airport.”¹⁰⁹ Villagers have been waiting nearly a decade for federal and state help to begin relocating them.¹¹⁰ The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has estimated the cost of relocation to be as high as \$130 million.¹¹¹ And that’s just for Newtok. It will cost a similar amount for other Alaskan Native villages at risk.¹¹²

The United States does not have an institutional framework or process for managing the relocation of these communities in Alaska—or elsewhere in the country.¹¹³ Tribal communities in Florida, Louisiana, and the Pacific Islands could also potentially be displaced by rising sea levels. In 2016, Isle de Jean Charles in southeastern Louisiana became the first tribal community to receive a federal grant to relocate. Ninety percent of the island’s land mass has been lost since 1955.¹¹⁴ The \$48 million relocation grant will move 60 people to nearby safe ground. “We see this as setting a precedent for the rest of the country, the rest of the world,” said Marion McFadden, who is managing the resettlement for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.¹¹⁵

Coastal communities up and down the Eastern Seaboard are vulnerable to rising sea levels. Much of New York City and Miami could be underwater within 50 years, according to scientific modeling.¹¹⁶

Sea level rise typifies the slow onset of climate change. Hurricanes deliver the quick blow. The intensity, frequency, and duration of hurricanes have all been increasing since the 1980s.¹¹⁷ In

the decade after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued 632 major disaster declarations, compared to 529 from 1995 to 2004.¹¹⁸ A major declaration is reserved for disasters “of such severity that it is beyond the combined capabilities of state and local governments to respond.”¹¹⁹ Between 2010 and 2015, there were already more than twice as many major disaster declarations as during the entire 1980s.¹²⁰

Hurricane Katrina caused the forced migration of 1.5 million people from Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. It was the largest climate-induced migration since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s.¹²¹ But the Katrina migrants all left in 14 days. The Dust Bowl migration took place over a period of eight years.¹²²

In New Orleans in particular, emergency planners did not anticipate and did not have data available on how many people lacked their own vehicles and needed to use public transportation. The city’s public transportation system was overwhelmed. It was people living in the poorest neighborhoods who were trapped when Katrina made landfall. Most were African American women and children.¹²³

In one study conducted four years after Katrina, 33 percent of the low-income mothers who participated met the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.¹²⁴ In a separate study conducted about the same time, 45 percent of parents surveyed said their children were still experiencing emotional or psychological problems as a result of Katrina.¹²⁵

Katrina was by far the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history, causing an estimated \$153.8 billion in damage.¹²⁶ Upgrading the housing stock, particularly in vulnerable communities such as New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, makes sense in order to minimize future damage and costs.¹²⁷ The Lower Ninth Ward, the poorest neighborhood in the city, suffered devastating property damage. Ten years after Katrina, while much of the rest of the city had recovered, only 37 percent of households from the Lower Ninth Ward had returned.¹²⁸

As rising sea levels and hurricanes alike have shown, low-income communities need help in coping with climate change. A third effect of climate change is drought, and severe droughts in California and other western states have led to wildfires that destroy homes, displace thousands of people, and cause hundreds of millions of dollars in damage.¹²⁹



Lieut. Commander Mark Moran, NOAA Corps, NMAO/AOC.

An inundated New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in September 2005.


Clearly, it must be a priority to boost the preparedness and resilience of communities that are in the path of hurricanes and other weather-related shocks. Destruction can be minimized with improvements in infrastructure. New Orleans has a levee system to prevent flooding during storm surges, but the system failed catastrophically during Katrina. Since climate change is leading to more frequent hurricanes of this intensity, improving our national infrastructure can no longer be delayed.

Upgrading infrastructure carries significant upfront costs, of course. But even beyond saving lives and communities, and investing now to avoid even costlier disasters later, there are other compelling reasons why now is the right time. Interest rates on government bonds are at historically low levels, so it is an especially cost-effective time to finance large-scale investments in infrastructure.¹³⁰ Major investments in infrastructure would also create millions of jobs, benefiting the economy in the near term and generating revenue to help pay for the upfront costs. Studies have confirmed that money used to upgrade degraded infrastructure has one of the highest rates of return of any public sector investment.¹³¹

A national climate preparedness and resilience strategy should be a national priority. In November 2013, President Obama issued an Executive Order on Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, which noted that the impacts of climate change “are often most significant for communities that already face economic or health-related challenges.”¹³² A strategy commensurate with the size of the climate change challenge calls for a whole-of-government approach, involving all departments and agencies. It is essential to strengthen and establish on-the-ground coordination among federal, state, and local groups. It is also of the utmost importance to start by listening to community residents and include them as full participants throughout the planning. In many cases, they are the first responders, and people who know their community and its residents can identify better than anyone else what is needed to become more resilient and what resilience would look like.

The United States, as the country that produces the largest per capita level of greenhouse gas emissions, has a responsibility both to make reducing emissions a clear priority and to encourage other countries to follow suit by living up to its climate action commitments. The federal government also has a responsibility to protect people who are directly in harm’s way because of climate change, such as young children, who are likely to be among the most vulnerable people in our society. See Figure 2.6. There is no reason to see these responsibilities as conflicting.

Figure 2.6 Percentage Change in 2050 U.S. Infant Mortality with Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and Without



Source: Allison S. Larr and Matthew Neidell (Spring 2006), “Pollution and Climate Change,” *Future of Children*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Brookings Institution/Princeton.

Are We Listening to the Haitian People?

Rev. Diane Ford Dessables, Bread for the World

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and the most fragile. More than half of the population (10.4 million people) is living under the national poverty line of \$2.42 per day, and one-fourth is under the national extreme-poverty line of \$1.23 per day. As in many low-income countries, agriculture is critical to the livelihood of families. Sixty percent of the population depends on agriculture for food security and livelihoods. Not only is the country poor, it is one of the hungriest and most malnourished countries in the world, 10th from the bottom on the Global Food Security Index.

In March 2016, a small team of Bread for the World and Bread for the World Institute staff went to Haiti to learn more about the country's current humanitarian and development challenges. We spoke with several community leaders involved in local organizations who are intimately familiar with the country's development challenges and work closely with Haiti's most impoverished communities. We heard from most of them that the United States is not a trusted partner in development.

The United States and Haiti have had an uneasy relationship for as long as the two countries have existed. In 1804, Haiti gained its independence—and the United States refused to recognize it. France had

controlled the territory since the early seventeenth century, building an agricultural colony on the backs of African slaves. Haiti emerged as a free nation out of what began as a slave rebellion in 1791, when slavery was still a legal institution in the United States. It would not be until slavery was abolished during the Civil War that the United States would finally recognize Haitian sovereignty.

The United States and Haiti have had an uneasy relationship for as long as the two countries have existed.

Camille Chalmers, a professor who directs the Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA), believes the distrust also dates back to the U.S. military occupation of the country from 1915-1934. In modern jargon, we'd call this a land grab. Whereas

land ownership had been restricted to Haitians only, the United States, he says, drafted a new Constitution for Haiti and suspended the legislature when they refused to ratify it. By the 1920s, American firms were buying land from the Haitian government to establish agricultural enterprises. Thousands of smallholder farmers were displaced as vast tracks of land were deforested to make way for production of sugar and other export crops.

Another person we spoke with was Jean Gardy Marius, a doctor and the director of Oganizasyon Santé Popile/Popular Health Organization (OSAPO). We met with him at the OSAPO Health Center in Rousseau, a rural community about a half day's drive north of Port-au-Prince. People walk to this health center from as far as 50 miles away.

Gardy co-founded OSAPO in 2008 after more than a decade of frustration working with several international aid organizations in Haiti. He was frustrated by their top-down approaches to programming, rigid guidelines, and how little interest they demonstrated in understanding the real needs of the people they were trying to help. To illustrate, he shared a recent episode. OSAPO was awarded a grant to conduct a Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Program (WASH). By the end of 2014, more than 1 in 20 Haitians were infected with cholera. Since the initial outbreak, OSAPO has treated thousands of Haitians who became infected by drinking contaminated water.

OSAPO conducted the program according to the rigid protocols required by the donor. When the program ended, the donor offered OSAPO a second grant to conduct the same program for a much larger population in another part of the country. The program would present the same material as the first WASH program. This time OSAPO turned it down. The program covered sanitation, but offered no support for building latrines; it covered good hygiene practices, such as hand washing, but the population the

program was serving was far too poor to afford soap; and it also instructed beneficiaries not to drink water from the rivers, but they had no alternative. Gardy proposed rewriting the second grant to use a share of the funding to provide latrines. It would mean serving a smaller population, but would have more impact on the population served. The donor rejected his proposal, so OSAPO turned down the grant. So much development assistance, he explained, seems more intent in racking up numbers of people served than providing services that would actually make a difference.

History and current experience result in skepticism and contempt in Haiti of American aid and business interests. Against this reality, this Hunger Report argues that fragile countries cannot end hunger and poverty by 2030 without international assistance. The U.S. government provides more development assistance to Haiti than any other donor, and the State Department has designated Haiti a priority country. The voices of Haitian leaders beg many questions about how best to provide assistance. And while we don't have all the answers, we can begin a conversation.

How can the needs of Haitians take precedence over American interests? Can Haiti be strengthened through local institutions, which are prized for prioritizing local voices as key development actors and increasing access to social protection programs? In what ways might the United States ensure that Haitians' efforts to fight hunger and poverty aren't undercut by other areas of U.S. policy, such as trade? Do U.S. development partners invest in Haitian community-led programs that could stimulate domestic markets and economic growth? Might development agencies work more closely with both the Haitian government and Haitians in local communities to determine priorities and prioritize food security and nutrition? Might the United States consider adapting its policies to protect the legitimate land tenure rights of Haiti's rural majority? Might U.S. NGOs work in partnership with Haitians to develop a more transparent way of sharing the details of program activities and funds disbursed?

Only by looking at these questions through the lens of the priorities and needs of Haiti's people will it be possible for the relationship between the United States and Haiti to be transformed into one that emphasizes healthy, just, and mutually beneficial policies. Cantave Jean-Baptiste, executive director of Partenariat pour le Développement Local/Partnership for Local Development, expressed this very clearly: "People from other countries come to Haiti and ask me what can they do to help Haitians escape poverty, and my answer is to tell your governments to stop making decisions for us and listen instead," and to respect the will of the Haitian people.

Rev. Diane Ford Dessables is the senior associate for denominational relations in the church relations department of Bread for the World.



EU / ECHO / Evelyn Hockstein

Haiti had not recovered from the shock of the January 2010 earthquake when a cholera epidemic was declared nine months later. UN peacekeepers from Nepal introduced cholera in Haiti by improperly disposing of their human waste.



Rick Reinhard

U.S. Fragile


Summary

The United States has adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) along with the rest of the world, and in doing so has committed to ending hunger and poverty and achieving the other goals, both domestically and internationally by 2030. Every country is primarily responsible for achieving the goals within its own borders. As in all countries, the guiding principles in the United States are to leave no one behind, and then to reach the furthest behind first. These are principles sewn into the fabric of our nation since its inception. While we may not have lived up to them at all times, we have always recognized we can do better. With the SDGs we embrace this opportunity to do better for ourselves and the world as a whole.

KEY POINTS

- Provide housing assistance to all families with incomes of less than 30 percent of area median income.
- Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to childless workers.
- Reform the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to ensure sufficient funding, increase States' accountability, and better connect families to much needed child care and job training services.
- Create a public jobs program focused on connecting workers who have barriers to employment with in-demand job skills.
- Reform our criminal justice system by decriminalizing poverty, ending for-profit policing, and reducing barriers to work for formerly incarcerated individuals.

Figure 3.1 Change in Concentration of Poverty in Metropolitan Areas of Different Sizes Since 2000



Source: Paul A. Jargowsky (August 2015), *The Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the Concentration of Poverty, and Public Policy*, The Century Foundation.

Place Matters

Since 2000, poverty in the United States has become dramatically more concentrated. Another way to think of it is that living in poverty is increasingly a place-based experience. This is alarming if we hope to eliminate hunger and poverty and achieve other development goals in the United States. The places where people live determine many of the opportunities they have, as well as the barriers they face to escape poverty once and for all. Community-level resources play a vital role in helping individuals to be resilient and able to cope with shocks and stresses.

In 2014, 46.6 million people in the country (14.8 percent of the population) were living in poverty, defined that year as just under \$24,000 a year for a family of four. Almost 14 million people lived in extremely poor communities, defined as com-

munities with poverty rates of 40 percent or more—twice as many as in 2000.¹ Fifty-five percent of all people in poverty live in a community where at least 20 percent of the population is poor—up from 43.5 percent in 2000.²

2015 produced the first substantive indicators of broad based economic growth, with incomes growing the most for the lowest-earning workers. Between 2014 and 2015, the national poverty rate fell by 1.2 percent, the largest single-year reduction since 1999; there were 3.5 million fewer people living in poverty in 2015 than in 2014.³ As the Hunger Report goes to press, we do not yet have comprehensive data on concentrated poverty, but we do know in the 100 largest metropolitan areas, where 70 percent of people living in concentrated poverty reside, the poverty rate fell by a smaller margin of 0.9 percent.⁴

Large metropolitan areas may be the geographic center of concentrated poverty, but it is the mid-size and smaller metropolitan areas where concentrated poverty has grown the fastest.

1 in 4 African Americans and **1 in 6** Latinos live in high-poverty neighborhoods compared to **1 in 13** whites.¹

African American

Latino

White

In 2014, among all public schools,

42.6 percent of students of color were in high-poverty schools

while only **7.6 percent** of white students were.²

See Figure 3.1. Two such areas are Syracuse, New York, and Dayton, Ohio. Syracuse and Dayton are Rust Belt cities that have lost thousands of manufacturing jobs as firms moved overseas or to lower-cost states. The Great Recession and slow recovery since then have not been kind to either Syracuse or Dayton. Between 2007 and 2013, Syracuse lost 27 percent of its manufacturing jobs.⁵ Much of Dayton's manufacturing sector is hitched to the auto industry, and when the industry began shedding jobs decades ago, Dayton shed jobs with it.

The bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 and then the onset of the Great Recession in 2007 led to increases in poverty nationwide. But this by itself cannot account for the dramatic rise in concentrated poverty. Elizabeth Kneebone and Natalie Holmes of the Brookings Institution explain, "If that growth had been shared evenly across places—imagine every census tract experienced the same percentage point increase in its poverty rate—then we might have expected just over 800 neighborhoods to cross the 40 percent threshold to become extremely poor over that time period. Instead, more than 2,700 tracts—over three times the expected number—joined the ranks of extremely poor neighborhoods."⁶

The growth in concentrated poverty has affected people of color more than whites. About half of all those living in poverty are white, but they are less than one-fifth of those in areas of concentrated poverty. Among people living in poverty, Latinos are more than three times as likely to be living in communities of concentrated poverty as whites are, and blacks are almost five times as likely.⁷ Syracuse led the list of metropolitan areas with the highest concentrated poverty rates for black and Latino residents. Nearly 59 percent of poor black and 62 percent Latino residents lived



Todd Post for Bread for the World

People line up to collect food boxes at a distribution site in Saginaw, Michigan, where poverty rates have soared in recent decades with the loss of manufacturing jobs.


59 PERCENT

of U.S. households with annual incomes of less than \$20,000 spend more than half of their income on rent alone.³

An estimated
1 in 5 individuals
leaving prison becomes
homeless as soon as he or she
passes through the prison gates.⁴



Figure 3.2 Syracuse Metropolitan Area



Source: U.S. Census 2000 and ACS 2009-2013. Paul A. Jargowsky, *The Architecture of Segregation* (online appendix). Century Foundation and Center for Urban Research and Education (CURE), Rutgers University - Camden. August, 2015.

in extremely poor neighborhoods in 2010-14.⁸ Figure 3.2 shows how concentrated poverty has increased for all Syracuse residents since 2000.

The growth in concentrated poverty is, in part, a resurgence of racial and ethnic segregation. Laws have been passed and government policies implemented to reduce racial inequalities and segregation. Many were the fruits of the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty. But the share of black children growing up in concentrated poverty has not improved much as a result.⁹ One can travel to areas of the country where local officials appear never to have been informed of *Brown vs. Board of Education*, the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision that declared separate public schools for black and white students unconstitutional. Today, public schools are more segregated than in 1968.¹⁰ The Civil Rights Project at UCLA reports that the percentage of schools described as “hyper-segregated, in which 90 percent or more of students are minorities,” has more than tripled since 1988, from 5.7 percent to 18.4 percent.¹¹

Living in poverty is hard under any circumstances, but when so many of your neighbors are also struggling, you face many other burdens besides low income. High-poverty communities have fewer job opportunities and thus higher unemployment, poorer performing schools, increased violence and more street crime, fewer full-service grocery stores and more fast food, more exposure to environmental toxins through substandard housing, and less access to health care and other services to facilitate economic mobility.¹²

A survey of research literature shows that the negative effects of concentrated poverty (e.g., crime and violence, youth dropping out of school, chronic food insecurity) typically are not visible in neighborhoods with less than 20 percent poverty. They appear in neighborhoods at about

20 percent and increase rapidly as the poverty rate rises to 40 percent or higher.¹³

The effects on children of growing up in concentrated poverty start with mothers who are more likely to be malnourished and hungry during pregnancy and last a lifetime. See Figure 3.3. Research shows that regular exposure to violence impairs children's cognitive development and academic performance and thus has a direct effect on economic mobility.¹⁴


Recent contributions to the research on economic mobility show that upward mobility is as much a function of the places people live as of the people themselves.¹⁵ Based on a study of 5 million low-income families, Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren of Harvard's Equality of Opportunity Project found that for every year a child spends in a better neighborhood environment, her or his chances of economic success as an adult increase proportionally. To measure success, they use indicators such as income, attending college, and avoiding teenage pregnancy.¹⁶

For most households that have been poor, having an income below the poverty line is a temporary situation. From the start of 2008 through the end of 2009 (a period coinciding with the worst recession in 75 years), nearly one-third of the U.S. population spent at least one month living in poverty; a fifth spent at least six months; and less than one-twentieth spent every month of this period in poverty.¹⁷

As we saw in developing countries, people move into and out of poverty, if poverty is indicated by a specific income. There may be reprieves, but generally households that move out of poverty don't suddenly earn three times what they did before. They are still on the margins of poverty. If they live in the same place, conditions in their neighborhood probably haven't changed. A little more income flowing into a household does not improve the schools or make the streets any safer. The destabilizing effects of living in a poor community are still a constant pressure. Despite this, too, people don't automatically leave the old neighborhood as soon as their income rises a bit. They signed a lease, their children are settled in school. Moving out of poverty takes more than some extra hours of overtime pay.

Thus, the United States needs to focus special attention on communities of concentrated poverty to end hunger in the United States by 2030. There may not be a one-size-fits-all or a single all-encompassing policy solution that will get us there, but much progress can be made in reducing instability and fragility by setting and meeting the medium-term goal of reducing poverty rates in the very poorest communities to no more than 20 percent.

Figure 3.3 Mechanism by Which Adverse Childhood Experiences Influence Health and Well-Being Throughout the Lifespan



Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Reversals in Life Expectancy in Rural America

Since the 1990s, there has been an unprecedented increase in midlife death rates among rural white women. Midlife death rates among rural white men are also rising, but not as dramatically as for women. The death rates among women ages 25-29 have increased by 37 percent, ages 30-44 by 48 percent, and ages 45-49 by 25 percent. Meanwhile, the death rates of rural people of color in these age groups, both men and women, continue to decline.

The last time researchers noted such a dramatic drop in life expectancy—anywhere in the world—was in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russian men's life expectancy fell by seven years due to alcoholism and other unhealthy behaviors.

The causes of the rising death rates among rural white women are a combination of drug and alcohol abuse, smoking, diseases related to obesity, and suicide.¹⁸ Women in their early 50s are dying of cirrhosis

of the liver at a rate double their rate at the end of the 20th century. Obesity increases the risk of liver disease, and a combination of obesity with alcohol abuse is particularly deadly, says George Koob, director of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.¹⁹ As we now know, smoking greatly increases the risk of lung cancer, which now kills more women than breast cancer.

In a December 2015 study, Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton found that the increase in death rates was highest among whites with a high school education or less.²⁰ Using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), they did not break down their findings by place, but Joel Achenbach and Dan Keating of the *Washington Post* since the study appeared used the same data to analyze the geographic implications.²¹

Although the increased death rate is occurring in rural areas nationwide, the South as well as Central Appalachia have been hardest hit. One likely reason is the declining number of jobs in the coal industry and manufacturing.

People with less education are having a more difficult time finding work—and paying for health care. At the same time, unemployment leads to poverty, unemployment and poverty contribute to obesity, depression, alcoholism, and drug addiction.

Achenbach and Keating quote Johns Hopkins University sociologist Andrew Cherlin, who suggests that the rising rates of self-destructive behavior may also be linked to dashed expectations. “The idea that today’s generations will do better than their parents’ generation is part of the American Dream,” says

Cherlin. “It may still be true for college-educated Americans, but not for the high-school-educated people we used to call the working class.”

These stressors have increased for everyone, but perhaps they are particularly harsh for women who may now be their family’s only or main breadwinner, while continuing to care for children and fulfill domestic responsibilities. Clearly, rising death rates call for increased attention to the struggles of many people in rural America.



USDA / Bob Nichols

Access to healthcare services is a problem in low-income rural areas, with fewer providers and a larger share of the population lacking health insurance compared to urban areas.

More and Better Affordable Housing

Housing costs are at the center of concentrated poverty. People live in poor communities because it's what they can afford. Housing consumes the largest share of a low-income family's budget, effectively dictating where the family can live. Federal housing programs assume that families spend no more than 30 percent of their income on housing. But the majority of families in poverty spend more than 50 percent of their income on housing, and in some metropolitan areas they spend more than 70 percent, leaving little room for food or much else.²²

"Some days children go hungry because the rent eats first," writes Matt Desmond, a sociologist at Harvard and author of *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City*.²³ It's a matter of simple arithmetic: if housing costs are reduced from 50 percent or 70 percent of family income to 30 percent, it will not only reduce the number of evictions and increase neighborhood stability, but also free up additional resources for food, clothing, medicine, and other necessities.

Evicted is focused on Milwaukee but tells a much broader story. From 2000 to 2010, median rents across the country increased anywhere from 21 percent to 37 percent, while the cost of utilities soared by more than 50 percent. Over the same period, median incomes did not nearly keep pace, rising only 7.3 percent for families headed by a high school graduate, and less for those without a high school degree.²⁴

Given rent and utility costs rising far faster than incomes, evictions were bound to increase. This is precisely what the data show. In 2013, according to the American Housing Survey, one in eight poor families renting reported they could not pay rent consistently and expected to be evicted.²⁵ Evictions rates are highest for women of color. If their household includes children, the risk of eviction triples. In Milwaukee, one in five black women report having been evicted at some point in her adult life; among Latinas, it is one in twelve; and among white women, one in fifteen.²⁶

Ironically, most public housing authorities, whose purpose is to make housing more affordable for low-income people, count an eviction as grounds for disqualifying an applicant for housing assistance. This creates a vicious circle where the families most in need of housing assistance are systematically denied help. Private landlords, of course, have the right to reject applicants with past evictions, but this also feeds into a relentless force pushing poor families with children into poorer and poorer neighborhoods, where living conditions are worst and crime rates are highest.

The good news is that adequately funded housing policies could be instrumental in reducing concentrated poverty and diversifying communities. In 2010, federal housing assistance lifted 37 percent of families that received it out of poverty, a higher share than was achieved by any other safety net program.²⁷ The problem is that only one in four low-income families eligible for housing assistance receives it. It is basically not available to anyone who has fallen on hard times recently,²⁸ because applicants spend years, sometimes decades, languishing on wait lists.

There are proposed solutions. One, which came out in 2013, was "perhaps the most radical recommendation to come out of a bipartisan commission in 40 years,"²⁹ according to Barry Zigas, director of housing policy for the Consumer Federation of America and a member of the Bipartisan Housing Commission that made the recommendation.³⁰

The bipartisan proposal was for a universal housing voucher program. The current voucher program would be extended to all households whose incomes are less than 30 percent of an area's median income. For example, if half the families in a particular area earn more than

Adequately funded housing policies could be instrumental in reducing concentrated poverty and diversifying communities.

Figure 3.4 Units of Affordable Housing Available per 100 Low-income Renter Households by State

State	Units of Affordable Housing Available per 100 Low-income Renter Households
AK	21
AL	41
AR	41
AZ	21
CA	21
CO	25
CT	36
DE	32
FL	22
GA	28
HI	36
IL	33
IN	30
IA	39
ID	27
KS	39
KY	38
LA	35
MA	45
MD	34
ME	40
MI	29
MN	37
MO	37
MS	41
MT	41
NC	30
ND	64
NE	36
NH	32
NJ	31
NM	28
NV	17
NY	32
OH	38
OK	47
OR	22
PA	35
RI	40
SC	39
SD	43
TN	37
TX	24
UT	33
VA	30
VT	53
WA	29
WI	26
WV	50
WY	41

Source: National Low Income Housing Coalition (2016), *The Gap: The Affordable Housing Gap Analysis*.

Currently the program costs about \$51 billion a year. The extension would increase the cost by an estimated \$22.5 billion a year through 2023.³¹ Let's put that number in perspective by first considering its value in stabilizing communities—there is very clear evidence that it does.³² Second, let's compare it with another housing policy, also said to be essential to family and community stability, that costs \$90 billion a year.³³ Its usefulness in increasing community stability hasn't really been shown by the studies done on it, however, and it may have contributed to the housing bubble³⁴ that precipitated the Great Recession.

The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) documents a nationwide shortage of 7.2 million rental units for extremely low-income renter households.³⁵ See Figure 3.4. NLIHC

reports that by reducing the amount of a mortgage eligible for a tax deduction from \$1 million to \$500,000, it would be possible to save more than \$20 billion that could be invested in affordable housing programs.³⁶

The National Housing Trust Fund is a new program targeting housing assistance to very low-income families, the first such program since the Section 8 voucher program was created in 1974. While vouchers are a demand-side solution to the affordable housing shortage because they lower a family's rent, the National Housing Trust Fund works on the supply side, providing grants to states to rehabilitate and build new units of affordable housing, 90 percent of which must be for rental housing. The National Housing Trust Fund was included in the 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act. But it was not capitalized until 2016 and is still under attack by some members of Congress.³⁷

Coping with Permanent Recession

Food insecurity and poverty both spiked during the Great Recession, reaching highs of 14.9 and 15.1 percent respectively. They would certainly have risen higher but for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). This \$831 billion stimulus injected into the economy by the federal government also kept the unemployment rate from rising above 10 percent. ARRA created jobs and expanded the safety net to help people cope as production in the private sector slowed and then stopped. In times of recession, safety net programs are the most immediate and effective way government can help unemployed or underemployed workers and their families, the human casualties of recession.


The Great Recession officially ended seven years ago, but in many parts of the country, it did not end, or not entirely. If poverty rates, food insecurity rates, and unemployment rates remain the markers of a recession, then in many communities, recession is a fixed state. As far as anyone can tell, it appears to be a “new normal.” It follows that residents of these communities need safety net programs as much as ever.

We know that the negative impacts of poverty and hunger touch all members of a community.

The household, rather than the community, is the primary focus of government safety net programs. As a result, we know less about the direct impact of safety nets on community-based outcomes than we do about household outcomes. We know that the negative impacts of poverty and hunger touch all members of a community, so it's reasonable to presume the same of positive impacts—that the safety net improves conditions in the community. Internationally, there is growing recognition that safety net programs and other social protections can help foster community resilience—to climate change, for example. When disaster strikes a community, safety net programs that already exist can scale up quickly. Resilience is about more than bouncing back after a shock—before a shock hits, be it a recession or an earthquake, safety nets reduce the vulnerability of people in the community by keeping them healthy.

In 2012, safety net programs lifted 48 million people out of poverty and reduced the annual poverty rate from 29.1 percent of the U.S. population to 13.8 percent.³⁸ The safety net continues to play a large role in reducing poverty. In 2015, safety net programs cut the poverty rate nearly in half. See Figure 3.5, next page. In the previous section, we mentioned that a sizeable share of the families that received housing assistance were lifted above the poverty line as a result. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as

Figure 3.5 Safety Net Cut Poverty Rate Nearly in Half in 2015



Note: Figures use the federal government's Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM).
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

food stamps) have the largest effects of all in reducing poverty among non-elderly households with children, and will be the focus of sections below.

EITC

The EITC, a “refundable tax credit,” benefits both workers and employers by subsidizing low-wage work. It helps support employment because with the federal subsidy, it is not as expensive to employ people. Workers who can claim the EITC (and workers with children who can claim the Child Tax Credit) get a refund on their taxes. In tax year 2014, the EITC and the CTC together lifted an estimated 9.4 million people out of poverty, 5 million of them children.³⁹

The EITC is delivered in a lump sum payment that many families must use to pay off bills that have

accrued, including back rent. According to Desmond, February is the month with the fewest evictions, and it’s also when the majority of EITC payments are issued.⁴⁰ Eligible filers in rural areas are less likely to claim the credit than filers in metropolitan areas, and at least one study suggests this may be because there are fewer tax preparers in rural areas.⁴¹

Low-wage workers who are childless adults do not benefit much at all from the EITC. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that about 7.5 million low-income childless adults are taxed into poverty or deeper into poverty because the federal tax code is not supportive of them.⁴² Among the “childless” adults are many non-custodial parents, who could be making a significantly larger contribution to their children’s welfare if the EITC was expanded to include them.

Many workers who stand to benefit from extending the EITC to noncustodial parents are people with criminal records. In fact, nearly half of all children in the United States have a parent with a criminal record.⁴³ In not quite four decades, the number of people who have been incarcerated rose by 500 percent. Communities of color have been affected most. The incarceration of so many people, particularly African American men, has had devastating consequences for families and communities. Robert DeFina and Lance Hannon of Villanova University estimated that if incarceration had not soared to the point where the term “mass incarceration” was coined, the U.S. poverty rate would be lower by at least 20 percent, perhaps by substantially more than that.⁴⁴

The Center for American Progress calculates that expanding EITC benefits to childless workers would lead to \$1.7 billion to \$3.3 billion of community benefits annually in the form of improvements in public safety and lower recidivism, with the largest benefits accruing to communities that have been most affected by mass incarceration.⁴⁵ This measure was proposed by the Obama administration and has gained bipartisan support in Congress.

SNAP

For nonelderly households, SNAP has the greatest impact on reducing poverty of all of the safety net programs. In 2014, SNAP kept 10 million people out of poverty, roughly half of them children.⁴⁶ More than half of these households were in deep poverty, meaning that their incomes were half or less than half of the poverty line. In 2016, this would mean an income of \$10,080 or less for a family of three. SNAP does more to lift children out of deep poverty than any other safety net program.

While SNAP benefits go directly to households, the program has clear economic benefits in local communities as well. Every dollar spent on SNAP generates \$1.74 in economic activity. Most of this stays in the local community, where SNAP benefits are generally spent promptly.⁴⁷ Economists Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi analyzed ARRA policies to determine which made the biggest difference in mitigating the effects of the Great Recession. Temporarily increasing SNAP benefits produced one of the biggest bangs for the buck.⁴⁸

Beyond deep poverty, some people fall into the category of “extreme poverty,” meaning that they live on \$2 a day or less. SNAP is the most important safety-net program for families in extreme poverty. In 2012, 1.33 million children (1.7 percent of all children) in the United States lived in extreme poverty for seven or more months of the year. Another 1.89 million children (2.4 percent of all children) were in extreme poverty for three to six months.⁴⁹ Luke Schaeffer and Kathryn Edin, whose research is credited with drawing attention to \$2-per-day poverty in the United States, show that SNAP benefits, when counted as income, reduce the extreme poverty rate by half.⁵⁰ See Figure 3.6. But even with SNAP benefits included, there has been a statistically


There has been a statistically significant increase in \$2-per-day poverty since the beginning of the century.

significant increase in \$2-per-day poverty since the beginning of the century. What Schaefer and Edin have shown very clearly is that for the poorest families, life has become a lot more precarious since the beginning of the century.

Schaefer and Edin’s methodology and conclusions have been challenged by analysts who argue that in the United States, people in extreme poverty consume more than their incomes would suggest.⁵¹ For example, if children receive a free breakfast and lunch in school, these in-kind benefits alone add up to more than \$2 per day. This is the same criticism lodged against the official poverty measure—that failing to capture government benefits gives an incomplete picture of a family’s resources. Schaefer and Edin answer their critics by noting: “To be without cash income in the United States is to be without a flexible resource that is vital to having a chance of bettering one’s circumstances in this country.”⁵² One cannot use SNAP benefits to pay bus fare to get to a job interview, or to put shoes on a child’s feet at the start of the school year.

Figure 3.6 SNAP Cuts Extreme Poverty Almost in Half

Number of households with children, in 2011, living on \$2 or less per person per day



Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

Lessons from Policy

Why did \$2-per-day poverty rise, and with it, the importance of SNAP/food stamps as a lifeline for families in the most precarious circumstances? These changes were set in motion by welfare reform legislation in 1996. Welfare reform replaced the open-ended cash assistance program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a more restrictive program called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF is time-limited (“temporary”) and requires parents to meet work requirements.

In theory, work requirements sound like a good thing. Parents need to build skills in the workforce so they can become self-reliant when the program’s time limits expire. The problem is that parents have many barriers to employment that the program does not take into account and makes no provisions for. When TANF was enacted, Congress and the president promised that there would be adequate support for child care, which the program mostly has failed to deliver.

Jobs that pay a living wage are the only sustainable path out of hunger and poverty in the United States.

They promised that the program would provide adequate support for transportation, which it mostly has failed to deliver; and they promised increased opportunities for training and education, which again TANF has mostly failed to deliver. Federal TANF support for education or training activities is limited to one year.


The biggest problem of all with TANF was the decision to turn it into a state block grant. This gave states blanket permission to establish eligibility criteria, design work requirements, and decide how to use federal and state dollars in the program. Several states have exploited the flexibility they were granted. They have used TANF dollars for other purposes with federal lawmakers unable to hold them accountable—for example, funding college scholarships for individuals who are not receiving or do not meet the eligibility criteria for TANF cash assistance.⁵³ The block grant is not indexed to inflation and Congress has not increased funding for it, so its value has been eroded by one-third over the past 20 years.⁵⁴

For these reasons and others, TANF is certainly no model for reducing hunger and poverty in the United States—yet many in Congress have touted the “success” of the 1996 welfare reform law. Some measure success not by reducing poverty, but by reducing the number of families receiving benefits. Bread for the World has participated in efforts with coalition partners to fight efforts in Congress to block grant SNAP, and in 2016 there has been no Congressional attempt to block grant the program.

When welfare reform was enacted, the U.S. economy was entering a boom that is unique in the past 30 years. The boom ended in 2000 when the dot-com bubble burst. The tight labor markets that made it possible for TANF parents to find jobs have vanished. Since then, a chronically weak labor market and an oversupply of low-wage workers has made it much more difficult for these families to gain a foothold in the economy. As their time limits in the program expired, they had neither jobs, nor skills, nor cash assistance. They sank deeper into poverty, some all the way into extreme poverty.

TANF completely failed to respond to the Great Recession. As Liz Schott of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities explains, “While the number of unemployed doubled in the Great Recession, TANF caseloads rose only modestly, by 13 percent from December 2007 to December 2009. See Figure 3.7. In some states, caseloads even fell as the state reduced access to benefits. In contrast, SNAP provided the automatic counter-cyclical response that a safety net program

Figure 3.7 TANF Responded Only Modestly to Recession



Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.

should have. TANF's modest response to the recession would have been even weaker if the 2009 Recovery Act had not included additional funding to reimburse states for caseload increases."⁵⁵

In earlier chapters, we highlighted the role of conditional cash transfers in reducing poverty and hunger in developing countries. Cash transfers, conditional or unconditional, are a major reason the global poverty rate was cut in half and hunger was nearly cut in half between 1990 and 2015. In developing countries, the "conditions" are usually for parents to allow children to attend school rather than work on the family farm or for pregnant and nursing women to attend to their own and their children's healthcare needs. Parents are not expected to build a school or clinic, or staff them with teachers or doctors, in order to receive the cash transfer.


In contrast, the 1996 welfare reform converted an unconditional cash transfer program into a conditional one, yet there was little support for parents to find and compete for a job within commuting distance, pay for transportation, or find and pay for child care on their earnings from a low-wage job. These are in fact societal problems that individuals are expected to solve by themselves.

Bouncing Off the Safety Net and Into the Job Market

Jobs that pay a living wage are the only sustainable path out of hunger and poverty in the United States. In low-income communities, the problem is not just a dearth of jobs, but that too few of the jobs that are within commuting distance pay living wages. For residents of high-poverty neighborhoods, the problem of job proximity has gotten worse since 2000.⁵⁶ See Figure 3.8.

There is not one state, metropolitan area, or county in the United States where workers earning the prevailing minimum wage could afford a modest two-bedroom rental unit.⁵⁷ A worker earning

Figure 3.8 Change in Number of Jobs Near the Typical Large-Metro Resident, by Race, Ethnicity, and Poverty Status, 2000 and 2012



Source: Elizabeth Kneebone and Natalie Holmes (March 2015), *The growing distance between people and jobs in metropolitan America*, The Brookings Institution.

the federal minimum wage of \$7.25 per hour in 2016 would need to work 112 hours per week, all 52 weeks of the year, just to afford a modest two-bedroom rental unit at a fair market rate.⁵⁸ Some people used to say that this didn't matter because minimum wage workers are teenagers supported by their parents. But in fact, most are not. Seventy percent of minimum wage workers are age 20 or older, and 45 percent are 25 or older.⁵⁹ Many are single parents struggling to balance work and family responsibilities.

Through the EITC, federal policymakers have committed to making low-wage jobs pay better for households with children. Also, 26 states and the District of Columbia have enacted their own versions of the EITC to complement the federal policy.⁶⁰ State EITC benefits are often just a fraction of the federal

benefits, but every bit counts to a family struggling to get by on low-wage work. In 2014, Washington, DC, became the first jurisdiction to extend the EITC to adults without dependent children. As discussed earlier, this is an important measure that helps both low-wage workers without children pay their bills and noncustodial parents contribute more to their children's support.

A single parent working full-time, year-round at the federal minimum wage (\$7.25 an hour) is paid \$15,080, not enough to lift any family with a child over the poverty line. Table 3.1 shows the 2016 federal poverty guidelines for different family sizes. With SNAP, the EITC, and the CTC, a single parent has an additional \$9,300 in resources, lifting her annual income to \$24,403 and putting her family over the poverty line. It's still not a lot to live on, but it's a substantial boost over what she is paid as a minimum-wage worker.⁶¹ In 2013, congressional Democrats proposed raising the federal minimum wage to \$10.10 an hour, and since then, some of the country's lowest-paid workers have organized to demand a federal minimum wage of \$15 an hour. Figure 3.9, page 116, shows what the net effects would be of increasing the minimum wage to \$10.10 an hour and \$15 an hour for four family types. Critics argue that a jump to \$15 will lead employers to find ways to hire fewer low-wage workers. Studies show that modest increases in the minimum wage do not depress employment. Some states and cities have adopted the \$15 minimum wage, and the outcomes will be instructive.

Even with the EITC, low-wage workers are long overdue for a raise. For decades they have contributed to the increasing productivity of the U.S. economy and have not been compensated to any degree that's even close to fair. From 1945 through 1970, workers up and down the income ladder received higher pay as productivity grew.⁶² Since 1970, however, wage growth and productivity

growth have been decoupled. If the minimum wage had continued to rise along with productivity growth, it would have been \$18.42 an hour in 2014.⁶³

This means that it's not only minimum-wage workers who have been shut out of the benefits of the nation's increasing productivity growth, because in 2015, the median hourly wage for *all* occupations was only \$17.40.⁶⁴ In other words, at least half of all workers today are earning less than what the minimum wage would be if everyone had gotten a fair share of productivity growth. Those who understand the wage and productivity trends, yet argue that the country can't afford to raise the minimum wage, appear to be at best disingenuous.

The U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) tracks several indicators of unemployment and workforce participation. What we most often hear about, particularly in major media outlets, is the official unemployment rate. In BLS terminology this is the U-3 rate, defined simply as people who are out of work and looking for a job. The U-6 rate is a larger category that includes the U-3 population plus people who are "marginally attached" to the labor market. These are people "who are neither working nor looking for work but want and are available for a job and have looked for work sometime in the past 12 months; and people who work part time for economic reasons, who would have preferred full-time employment but were working part time because their hours had been cut back or because they could not find a full-time job."⁶⁵ The U-6 rate is typically twice as high or more as the U-3 rate.⁶⁶ In August 2016, the most recent data available at this writing, the U-3 unemployment rate was 4.9 percent and the U-6 rate was 9.7 percent.⁶⁷

Hard to Employ

Some groups and individuals face barriers to employment. The education system has left some people poorly prepared to compete for jobs in today's economy. The high school graduation rate is higher than at any time in the nation's history,⁶⁸ yet the U-3 and U-6 rates for high school graduates between the ages of 17 and 20 who are not enrolled in further schooling are 17.9 percent and 33.7 percent respectively.⁶⁹ For more and more jobs, a high school diploma is no longer enough.

It's not only those right out of high school who are struggling. There are far too few opportunities for people in their twenties who cannot afford a postsecondary education, or don't excel in traditional academic settings, but are motivated to work. In 2013, the unemployment rate among 23- and 24-year-olds not attending school was 28 percent, up from 20 percent at the turn of the century.⁷⁰

Table 3.1 Federal Poverty Level Compared with Gross Earnings from Full-Time, All Year Work at the Federal Minimum Wage, 2016


Federal Poverty Level is for the 48 Contiguous States and the District of Columbia

Family Size	Federal Poverty Level	Gross Earnings, Full-Time All Year at the Current Federal Minimum Wage	Minimum Wage Earnings as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level
1	\$11,880	\$15,080	127%
2	\$16,020	\$15,080	94%
3	\$20,160	\$15,080	75%
4	\$24,300	\$15,080	62%
5	\$28,440	\$15,080	53%
6	\$32,580	\$15,080	46%

Source: Gene Falk (April 2016), *Federal Minimum Wage, Tax-Transfer Earning Supplements, and Poverty, 2016: In Brief*, Congressional Research Service.

Figure 3.9 Net Earnings, SNAP, and the EITC and Child Tax Credit, for a Full-Time, Full-Year Worker at Select Minimum Wages, 2016

Current Minimum Wage of \$7.25 per Hour plus Illustrative Increases to \$10.10 per Hour or \$15.00 per Hour



Source: Gene Falk (April 2016), *Federal Minimum Wage, Tax-Transfer Earning Supplements, and Poverty, 2016: In Brief*, Congressional Research Service.

The communities most affected by high rates of youth unemployment suffer the most direct consequences. One of these is crime. Youth who are neither working nor in school are at much higher risk of becoming involved in crime, and ages 16 to 24 is also the time in a person's life when he or she is most likely to commit a crime. This age group commits 37 percent of all violent crimes and 43 percent of property crimes, and nearly two-thirds of offenders in this age group are disconnected from school and work.⁷¹

The United States needs a comprehensive youth employment strategy. Employers say they cannot recruit enough skilled workers to fill available positions.⁷² There is growing demand for skilled workers in some sectors, including health care, advanced manufacturing, con-

struction, and information services.⁷³ Compared to other advanced economies, the United States gives short shrift to apprenticeship programs, but these can prepare young people for a variety of positions in the workforce. In Australia and Germany, apprenticeships make up 4 percent of the workforce, compared to only 0.2 percent in the United States. Four percent of the U.S. workforce would be more than 6 million jobs.⁷⁴


Other people are shut out of the labor market due to laws that discriminate against people with felony convictions. Ex-offenders face a staggering number of legal barriers to employment. The American Bar Association has documented 38,000 statutes nationwide that apply to individuals with criminal records, over half of which can be used to deny employment.⁷⁵ Laws that make it difficult for people released from prison to successfully reintegrate into their communities increase the risk of recidivism.

Compounding the problem, there are also laws that make it more difficult for those returning from prison to get safety net assistance—both while they are trying to find work and if they can't find work. Fourteen states ban people convicted of drug felonies from participating in SNAP for the rest of their lives, and 18 more have a modified ban.⁷⁶ People with a criminal record can be denied housing assistance, and in some cases family members who receive housing assistance can be evicted if they are found to be sheltering a family member who has been convicted of a felony.⁷⁷

The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) estimates that the losses to the U.S. economy caused by barriers to employment for people with felony convictions amount to between \$78 billion and \$87 billion annually.⁷⁸ While the economic costs to the nation are eye-popping, it is the affected families and communities that bear the highest cost. Two-thirds of families with

Figure 3.10 State and Federal Prisoners per 100,000 Residents

Men, by race/ethnicity and age: 2013



Source: U.S. Department of Justice.

an incarcerated member struggle to meet basic needs such as food and housing costs.⁷⁹ Children growing up in a family with an incarcerated parent are at increased risk of being homeless⁸⁰ and are more likely to drop out of school.⁸¹

Communities most affected by mass incarceration are among the most disadvantaged in the country, and they are disproportionately communities of color with the highest poverty and food insecurity rates. See Figure 3.10. Desmond argues that the disproportionately higher rates of eviction for single-parent families headed by black women are collateral damage from the incarceration of so many black men.⁸² One in nine black men between the ages of 20 and 34 is incarcerated.⁸³ The incarceration of so many young men has caused a devastating loss of human capital in their communities.

Racism is undeniably a reason that so many black men have been sent to prison. Racial discrimination is evident in many areas, such as housing, education, employment, finance, health care, and the justice system. The evidence of racial disparities in sentencing is overwhelming. There are literally a million more whites than blacks with felony convictions, but there are more blacks than whites serving time for a felony.⁸⁴ Black males are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white males and 2.5 times more likely than Latino males.⁸⁵

BLS does not report separately on employment data of people with criminal records. According to a 2015 Kaiser Family Foundation/New York Times/CBS News Poll, 34 percent of prime working age men (25 to 54) who were not working reported having a criminal record.⁸⁶ A plethora of online databases has made it easy for employers to verify whether an applicant has a



Rick Reinhard for Bread for the World

For close to thirty years, D.C. Central Kitchen in the District of Columbia has trained hundreds of people with histories of incarceration for careers in the culinary arts.

ment Law Project, a proponent of ban-the-box, argues what these two studies show is the entrenched racism of some employers. It cites examples from Washington, DC; Durham, North Carolina; and Atlanta, Georgia, which show that banning the box increases the chances that people with criminal records will get jobs.⁸⁸

Stereotyping all members of a group is illegal. Victoria Lipnic, head of the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission, says: “Where, in the absence of a criminal background check an employer chooses to use race as a proxy for criminal history, that employer is patently violating federal civil rights law. Were such a charge brought to the Commission and found to be true, I would have no difficulty bringing the full force of the agency to bear on such a transgressor.”⁸⁹ Capable and accountable state institutions that will enforce the law, as we’ve highlighted in other parts of this report, play an important role in leading countries, including the United States, toward leaving no one behind.

criminal record. Surveys show that nine out of 10 employers conduct criminal background checks when hiring. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates criminal background checks for employment; for example, employers are prohibited from posting job ads that include statements such as “no one with a criminal record need apply.”⁸⁷ But the law is not aggressively enforced and many employers know this.

Some states have adopted what are known as “fair-chance” hiring practices. The term “ban the box” refers to no longer including on job applications a box to check whether or not one has ever been convicted of a crime. Answering yes, predictably, disqualifies most job applicants. For some types of jobs, employers may have a legitimate reason to know whether an applicant has a criminal record, but for the vast majority of jobs, it is unnecessary and becomes dis-

criminatory. Ban-the-box advocates, including Bread for the World Institute, contend that job applicants should at least have a chance to present themselves and their credentials first.

Research on the effects of ban-the-box policies has yielded mixed results so far. Two studies show that banning the box leads to fewer hires of black men and suggests that employers are stereotyping all black men as likely to have a criminal record. The National Employ-

Direct Job Creation

During recessions, it's standard operating procedure for governments to create jobs. It's a "countercyclical" tactic, which simply means it's intended to counteract the recession. Many of us learned in school about the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, which employed millions of people during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

During the Great Recession, the ARRA stimulus package funded a program known as the TANF Emergency Fund. The program operated in 2009 and 2010 and provided 260,000 jobs, mainly in the private sector, in 39 states and the District of Columbia. An analysis of the impacts of the program showed that it had enduring benefits.

Participation led to significant increases in employment and earnings. Those who got a job through the program were more likely to be employed and have higher earnings a year after it ended, compared to a control group who had applied but did not get a subsidized job. Overall, the employers were satisfied with the workers and their productivity. Two-thirds of employers created positions for the workers after the program ended.⁹⁰ The program particularly helped those who were "long-term unemployed," meaning out of work for 27 weeks or more.

The success of the TANF Emergency Fund initiative makes a strong case for an ongoing federally-funded jobs program. The purpose of any public jobs program should be to support job creation when the economy is weak. Communities where the poverty rate is 40 percent or more have a perpetually weak economy. Such a program should target these communities and specifically include workers whom private sector employers would not be likely to hire, such as people with felony convictions, disconnected youth, and people who have been unemployed for a long time.

Investments in upgrading the nation's infrastructure are both long overdue and absolutely essential to sustaining productivity growth.

Policymakers subsidize job creation to fulfill governmental responsibilities as well. For example, every 10 years, the Census Bureau employs hundreds of thousands of people temporarily to complete the decennial census. The 2010 Census employed 564,000 temporary workers, more than double the number supported by the TANF Emergency Fund.⁹¹

Census workers are employed to address a specific need. Similarly, government investments could help jump-start private sector job creation to meet urgent public needs. Investments in upgrading the nation's infrastructure are both long overdue and absolutely essential to sustaining productivity growth. Retrofitting homes and office buildings to improve energy efficiency would help meet international agreements on reducing carbon emissions that contribute to climate change—and help save the planet. A \$1 billion investment in the National Housing Trust Fund would support the construction of 10,000 rental homes and create an estimated 15,000 construction jobs.⁹² As we saw earlier, such affordable housing units are badly needed. All of these examples offer excellent opportunities for entry-level workers in construction. Construction jobs have traditionally enabled large numbers of people without a college degree to earn a good living.

Employment opportunities for individuals with criminal records could also be created by scaling up national service programs such as AmeriCorps, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), or the National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC). These programs could improve the quality of life and promote economic development in communities of concentrated poverty by targeting unmet needs and opportunities. When staffed by people from the communities, they could also contribute to social cohesion.

Jubilee Housing

Marlysa D. Gamblin, Bread for the World Institute

Jubilee Housing is a faith-based organization in the District of Columbia that offers affordable housing and other supports for low-income individuals and families. Among the groups they serve are people who've recently been released from jail or prison.

Securing a safe and affordable place to live is one of multiple challenges returning citizens face. Many are released without a housing plan. Historically, corrections departments view this responsibility as outside of their agency's mission and purview.

The reality is that the majority of those returning from jail or prison nationwide are either homeless, living in a shelter, or living with a family member short-term. David Thacher of the University of Michigan has highlighted the rising number of landlords relying on criminal background checks when screening renters, which he terms as "institutional exclusion."⁹³

Jubilee's Housing Reentry Initiative is a direct response to meet the housing needs for Washingtonians returning to DC each year from incarceration in a climate of gentrification and high housing costs. The Reentry Initiative provides two separate homes in mixed-income neighborhoods for men and women to communally live for six months to a year while each resident is given the emotional, career, and spiritual support needed to make the next step to full self-sufficiency. Each resident is paired with a case manager and eventually secures employment to start saving for a place to live long-term.

One former resident of the reentry initiative,

Alma Hunt, now has her own apartment. "If I didn't have my own housing, my life would be in shambles. I was homeless, hungry and depressed before I went to Jubilee Housing and it got me on the right track. I was able to get a job because of their help and I didn't feel like I was doing this all by myself since I was in a group setting. Being in the transitional housing prepared me for having my own apartment. Jubilee Housing meant a lot for me and now my stress and depression have gone down and I have my life back!"

Alma Hunt has her own apartment through Jubilee Housing's Reentry Initiative, a program that helps returning citizens transition from incarceration back to the community.

According to the Center on Housing Policy, those who are unable to find adequate housing upon their release from prison are more than twice as likely to re-offend as those with stable housing. Julian Castro, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), said that "the ability to find housing is an indispensable part of that second chance"⁹⁴ for people returning to their communities from jail or prison.

Marlysa D. Gamblin is domestic advisor for policy and programs, specific populations, at Bread for the World Institute.



Joseph Molieri / Bread for the World

Presumed Guilty

“At many points in American history, law enforcement enforced the status quo, a status quo that was often brutally unfair to disfavored groups,” said FBI Director James Comey in a 2015 speech on law enforcement and race.⁹⁵ The speech was motivated by what Comey said was an absence of candor and a reluctance to face hard truths about the United States’ long history of racism.

The speech came one day after the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil lawsuit against the City of Ferguson, Missouri. The lawsuit cited routine “police misconduct, including discriminatory policing, unconstitutional stops, searches and arrests, and the use of unreasonable force.”⁹⁶ At a press conference announcing the action, Attorney General Loretta Lynch described Ferguson as “a community in distress, in which residents felt under assault by their own police force.”⁹⁷

Since the summer of 2014, millions of people of all races have come to see Ferguson as a symbol of a status quo that is brutally unfair to African Americans in particular. On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an 18-year-old African American man, was shot and killed by a white police officer, Darren Wilson. Brown and a friend, also a black man, had been stopped for jaywalking. Wilson alleges that Brown, who was unarmed, attacked him, although eyewitnesses disputed Wilson’s version of what happened.⁹⁸ A grand jury heard testimony from Wilson and others and decided not to indict him.


Millions of people of all races have come to see Ferguson as a symbol of a status quo that is brutally unfair to African Americans in particular.

In the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death, protests were staged in Ferguson and other communities around the country. The fledgling organization Black Lives Matter emerged as a leader of the movement against racially-motivated police violence. Since Brown’s death, more unarmed black men have been killed by police. News and even images of their deaths have been posted on social media platforms, corroborating some “hard truths,” to use the FBI director’s words, about race and justice.

In July 2016, Stop the Killing Inc., an activist group located in Baton Rouge, LA, released footage that showed Alton Sterling, a 37-year-old African American man, being shot by white police officers. “You have to thank God for social media,” said Arthur Reed, the founder of the organization. “These stories are not new stories to the urban community. We’ve been saying that police are killing people and covering it up. But there’s that other side of society that hasn’t ever seen anything like this and will be quick to say, oh, man, no police officer is going to just kill you. These people are crazy. But now that we have footage, and we have video, we’re showing you exactly what’s going on and how it has been going on for so long. Right now, we just have a way of exposing it. And the sad part about it is that even though we are getting the video and we’re getting the actual killings, there’s still no accountability for what has taken place.”⁹⁹

Police officers are rarely convicted of homicide or manslaughter for a fatal on-duty shooting,¹⁰⁰ and it’s this failure of the criminal justice system to take action that particularly angers communities of color. In July 2016, following Alton Sterling’s death and the death of another African American man, Philando Castile, during a routine traffic stop in Falcon Heights, MN, eight police officers were killed in two separate attacks by lone gunmen in Dallas and Baton Rouge. Leaders of Black Lives Matter in these cities joined in grieving the deaths of the police officers.

Figure 3.11 Ferguson Traffic Stops: Population Searched, Contraband Hit Rate, and Arrest Rate, 2013



It is important to recognize the systemic nature of routine police misconduct. To illustrate this, we return to Ferguson. Soon after Michael Brown's death, details emerged about the deep-rooted and significant tensions between Ferguson's residents, a majority of whom are black, and the city's police department, 95 percent white at the time. Arch City Defenders, a nonprofit legal defense organization, reported that the city of Ferguson's second-largest source of revenue was fines and court fees, collected by "inflicting a kind of low level harassment involving traffic stops, court appearances, high fines, and the threat of jail for failure to pay."¹⁰¹ In 2013, the city generated \$2,635,400 in revenue this way—about \$321 per household. The policy was worsened by the discriminatory way it was implanted as Figure 3.11 shows.

That was the context in which Darren Wilson stopped Michael Brown for jaywalking. It is certainly not common for a person stopped for jaywalking to end up dying at the hands of police, but the beginning of the incident was an all-too-common experience for Ferguson's African American residents. Brown's death exposed an "offender-funded" justice system that is widely practiced around the country, and Ferguson is typical of how it is applied mainly to communities of color.

The Offender-funded Justice System

Increasingly, it is people charged with offenses who pay the criminal justice system's costs, according to a survey of all 50 states by National Public Radio and the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School.¹⁰² In a majority of states, defendants can be billed for a public defender, inmates for room and board in jails and prisons, and parolees for the cost of their supervision. These revenue-generating practices have been adopted in many of the United States' 6,500 municipal courts, according to Vanita Gupta, head of the civil rights division in the U.S. Justice Department.¹⁰³ Some courts charge people "booking fees" after an arrest, regardless of whether the arrest results in a criminal charge.¹⁰⁴ Fees imposed by courts are used to cover a range of expenses. In Allegan County, Michigan, court costs were used to finance a new fitness center for county employees.¹⁰⁵

People of color, particularly those who are poor, face a much higher risk of being fined, arrested, and even incarcerated for minor offenses than other Americans.¹⁰⁶ In 2013, Qumotria Kennedy, a single mother of two from Biloxi, Mississippi, spent five nights in jail because she owed \$1,000 of unpaid fines from a traffic violation two years earlier. While she was in jail, she lost her part-time job cleaning motel rooms.¹⁰⁷ "This is the real cycle of poverty," says Barbara

Ehrenreich, author of *Nickel and Dime: On (Not) Getting By in America*. “Criminal charges in turn lead to ever-mounting debt and, despite laws prohibiting debtors’ prisons, to incarceration.”¹⁰⁸

Every year, Texas has a statewide “event,” the Great Texas Warrant Roundup, focused on collecting overdue fines from traffic violations. Police arrest and jail anybody who cannot pay, namely poor people. Judges will literally force people to empty their pockets in the courtroom, threatening them with jail time if they refuse.¹⁰⁹ Valerie Gonzales, a 31-year-old woman with five children, is one of the plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against the city of Austin. The Gonzales family is chronically poor and often homeless.

“The judge asked me no questions about my circumstances or my income,” said Gonzales, who had accumulated thousands of dollars in fines by failing to pay two parking tickets. “He asked me nothing about my background or my commitments or why I had been unable to pay earlier fines. All he told me was that I would go to jail if I didn’t pay a thousand dollars that day.”¹¹⁰ Gonzales did not have \$1,000, so the judge sentenced her to 45 days in jail. Fortunately, a lawyer from the Texas Fair Defense Project filed a motion on her behalf that succeeded in converting her jail sentence to community service, and she spent only four days in jail. Gonzalez did not have a lawyer when she was originally sentenced because she could not afford the required court fee to be represented by a public defender.

Poor people of all races are less likely to contest such fees. They have few resources to hire an attorney and legal aid services are woefully underfunded. In Augusta, Georgia, Thomas Barrett, who is white, was jailed for failing to pay more than a \$1,000 in fees added to a misdemeanor charge in 2012.¹¹¹ At the time he was jailed, Barrett was homeless and had been selling plasma to pay off the fees.

Among low-income people, however, African Americans and Latinos are particularly vulnerable to being jailed because they are overrepresented among households that are asset poor. Families are considered asset poor when they do not have enough savings to live for three months on a poverty-level income. This requires “liquid” resources, assets such as bank accounts that can be quickly turned into cash. In 2014, African Americans and Latinos had a median liquid wealth of just \$200 and \$340 respectively, compared to \$23,000 for whites.¹¹²

The United States does not have such extreme wealth disparities by accident. Past and present unjust public policies deliberately created them. Between 1934 and 1968, households of color received just 2 percent of Federal Housing Association loans. This was because of “redlining,” a policy of refusing loans to residents of an entire geographical area. People of color were therefore almost entirely shut out from buying a home, the single biggest asset most families will ever have.

The Fair Housing Act of 1968 banned redlining, but housing discrimination continued under less blatant, often unwritten practices. Most recently, lenders stripped huge amounts of wealth from communities of color during the subprime lending boom that led to the housing bubble of the early 2000s. Subprime lending is lending money at very high interest rates to borrowers who would not qualify for a mortgage loan at the prime rate. Subprime loans were pushed onto African American and Latino borrowers, even when they qualified for loans at the prime rate. The targeting was predatory and systematic. When the housing bubble burst, foreclosures proliferated across communities of color nationwide. Median wealth of African American and Latino households fell by 53 percent and 66 percent, respectively.¹¹³

African Americans and Latinos are particularly vulnerable to being jailed because they are overrepresented among households that are asset poor.

Poverty Is a Crime

During the first half of the 20th century, most people of color were excluded from welfare, the cash assistance safety net for poor families. Legal scholar Kaaryn Gustafson has written extensively about racial discrimination and welfare policy, showing that public attitudes towards welfare turned decidedly hostile once it was opened to African Americans.¹¹⁴ By the mid-1960s, black single mothers were stereotyped as criminal, lazy, promiscuous welfare cheats.¹¹⁵

Some politicians encouraged such hostility, notably Ronald Reagan, who as governor of California in the 1960s and 1970s and as president in the 1980s, frequently portrayed welfare mothers as cheats who were defrauding the government and the taxpayers who supported them.¹¹⁶ To the contrary, however, during Reagan's presidency the Department of Health and Human Services (then Health, Education, and Welfare) found that, "The greatest cheaters, according to the audits, are not individual welfare or health care recipients, but doctors and pharmacists and other providers of services who overbill the government."¹¹⁷

The height of the hostility from policymakers came in 1996 with "welfare reform." The criminal justice approach of get-tough-on-crime was politically popular, and, as Gustafson notes, welfare reform adopted that approach. The new welfare system, TANF, blurred the line between welfare and the criminal justice system. TANF participants give up some of their civil rights. For example, once someone provides the welfare system with her personal information, law enforcement is permitted to access it without any basis to suspect that she has been engaged in wrongdoing.¹¹⁸

The new welfare system, TANF, blurred the line between welfare and the criminal justice system.

TANF criminalizes many coping strategies that families use out of economic necessity. TANF benefits are simply not enough to live on anywhere in the country. In 2015, TANF benefit levels for a family of three were less than \$300 a month in 14 states, and the nationwide median for a family this size was \$429 a month.¹¹⁹

Another source of income is essential. But if someone is found to have unreported earnings, she can be prosecuted for welfare fraud, which is a felony offense.¹²⁰ Not reporting income from babysitting or braiding hair is a felony. Taking in a relative who helps pay rent or shares groceries is also a felony, even if it's on an ad hoc basis. As Gustafson explains, "When it comes to violating the welfare rules, most welfare recipients are damned if they do and doomed if they don't."¹²¹

Desperation often forces parents to take risks that could get their benefits terminated or send them to prison. In November 2011, Anita McLemore, the mother of two teenagers, was sentenced to three years in prison in Jackson, Mississippi, for failing to report an earlier drug felony on applications for food stamp/SNAP benefits in 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010. At the sentencing, she pleaded with the judge to allow her to postpone reporting to prison for two months so she could work extra hours to give her children money to visit her at the prison, six hours away. The judge denied her request. At no time did the judge ask about the family's financial situation or allow McLemore to explain why she had not reported her drug-related felony convictions.¹²²

The media often portray the dramatic decrease in the number of households receiving TANF in the late 1990s as a transition "from welfare to work." This is not entirely true. About a quarter of the decline was due to sanctions¹²³—loss of benefits for failing to follow the rules. Between 1997 and 1999, more than half a million families were subject to sanctions that applied to the

entire household. Sometimes, terminating a family's cash assistance was a response far out of proportion to the "offense"—in some cases, it was for missing an appointment with a caseworker due to lack of transportation.¹²⁴ States with proportionately more African Americans receiving TANF benefits were more likely to impose stricter sanctions.¹²⁵


Criminalizing coping strategies associated with economic desperation creates an endless loop between poverty and punishment. Welfare fraud laws, the "War on Drugs," mandatory minimum sentences, and the crashing economy were some of the factors that led to large numbers of poor people with criminal convictions. The "solution" was mass incarceration, particularly of black men.

Earlier we discussed the devastation of neighborhoods with large numbers of men behind bars. Sooner or later, 95 percent of those currently incarcerated will return to the community. For men with criminal records, especially men of color, jobs in the formal economy are often simply out of reach. Alton Sterling had been trying to earn a living by selling CDs on the street when he was killed by police officers in Baton Rouge. Eric Garner, an unarmed black man whose death during an encounter with police was captured on video in 2014, had been trying to earn a living by selling cigarettes on the street in New York City.

Exiled from the formal economy because of their criminal records, these men have little choice but to rely on street hustling to survive. "The black men most likely to be left out of the formal economy—who have to engage in various illegal hustles to make ends meet—are far more likely to suffer from police violence than other black men," says Lester Spence, a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University.¹²⁶

This explosion in the size of the prison population has caused large gaps in state, county, and municipal budgets. Criminal justice is the second-fastest-growing category of state budgets, behind only Medicaid, and 90 percent of that spending goes to prisons.¹²⁷ See Figure 3.12. Marc Mauer of The Sentencing Project has calculated that at the current modest rate of decline in the size of the prison population, it will take until 2101 to return to the 1980 level.¹²⁸ Simply releasing people, which is going far too slowly in any case, will not undo the damage caused by mass incarceration. The policy changes so far will not be enough to help end concentrated poverty. Those who are released need jobs and help reintegrating if they are to become resilient resources for their fragile communities.

Figure 3.12 State Expenditures on Corrections in Billions, 1985-2013



Source: Sentencing Project (January 2016), Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections

Fighting Racial Profiling in New Mexico

Marlysa D. Gamblin, Bread for the World Institute

The police department of Hobbs, New Mexico (population 43,000) has been accused of racial profiling since 2000. More than one federal civil rights lawsuit has been filed against it, and it has come in for criticism by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

Local civil rights organizations say that the majority of complaints of police bias that they receive come from the poorest areas of Hobbs, neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, where more than 20 percent of the residents live below the poverty line.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is a national faith-based civil rights organization committed to ending hunger and poverty through advocacy. Recognizing the reality of racial discrimination in criminal justice, the local NAACP branch continues to work with local officials and people in the community to bring racial profiling to an end.

Such profiling can carry very serious consequences for individuals who are targeted. Larry Singleton, 61, is a veteran of the Navy who has lived in Hobbs for five years. Aggressive ticketing, fines for late payment or nonpayment of fines, and court costs ultimately led to Singleton's car being impounded and his driver's license revoked. It took him a month to regain his license—a month during which he was unable to go to work and was pushed into hunger. Joe Cotton, president of the local NAACP branch, explained that there are disproportionate police patrolling and ticketing in the southeast part of town, home to many low-income Latinos and African Americans.

"Over-policing has resulted in many of our residents falling deeper into hunger and poverty," Cotton said. "And when residents try to complain, the police department has given some residents the runaround ... I receive complaints from residents almost weekly about harassment by the police officers who flood the [southeast] areas."

The mayor of Hobbs has stated categorically that racial profiling is never acceptable, and there have been reports that the police department has recently improved. But part of the problem is that there is no public, transparent data to show what has changed or track the progress that is still needed. The Hobbs NAACP branch is calling for the police department to publish data on where police are patrolling so that residents can gauge whether law enforcement personnel and resources are being distributed fairly.

At the national level, the NAACP's objectives include removing all barriers of racial discrimination through the democratic process and seeking the enactment and enforcement of federal, state, and local civil rights laws. Noting that racial profiling is a national problem that has not been improving,

The mayor of Hobbs has stated categorically that racial profiling is never acceptable.



Joseph Molieri / Bread for the World

the NAACP continues to advocate for improvements, examine records and trends of police activity, and include the issue as a legislative priority.

One bright sign at the state level, in April 2015, the New Mexico state legislature unanimously enacted legislation to end “civil asset forfeiture.” This practice is also known as “policing for profit” because it allows the police to seize personal property without ever charging a person with a crime. Thus, private citizens’ valuables reportedly often become the police department’s own property.

Emily Kaltenbach, the director of the Drug Policy Alliance’s New Mexico office, said, “Like other drug war programs, civil asset forfeiture is disproportionately used against poor people of color who cannot afford to hire lawyers to get their property back.” The victory shows that when policymakers track and scrutinize law enforcement activities, they can take action against some of the most unfair practices.

Marlysa D. Gamblin is domestic advisor for policy and programs, specific populations, at Bread for the World Institute.

Joe Cotton, president of the NAACP branch, is working with the mayor and other officials in Hobbs, New Mexico, to address racial tensions between the police and black community.

Conclusion: Ending Hunger by 2030

Cynthia Woodside, Bread for the World Institute

Fragility Can Exist Anywhere

This 2017 Hunger Report shows that there are many fragile areas in the United States. Fragile areas are those with deep pockets of persistent poverty, a dearth of economic opportunities, and weak, or in some cases harmful, institutions. These conditions are not unlike those in fragile states in the developing world.

The report makes the case that pockets of persistent poverty are the long-term consequences of racism, coupled with a frayed safety net, unequal harm from economic downturns and unequal benefits from economic recoveries. Conflict and climate change also are drivers of the fragility in these areas. The conflict is often between residents and the institutions charged with their protection and well-being.

The similarities between fragile states in the developing world and here at home can be found in the lack of safe drinking water in Flint, Michigan and a city like Dhaka, Bangladesh, the lack of justice in Ferguson, Missouri and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and the high level of food insecurity in Mississippi and Burundi.

Without the long-standing strength and support from local churches and neighborhood organizations, and the resilience and sharing of resources among the residents themselves, these fragile communities would be more destitute and subject to even greater harm.

Sustainable Development Goals: Leave No One Behind

The 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), endorsed by the United States and 192 other countries in September 2015, provide the call to action necessary to seriously address the issues facing fragile communities in the United States and around the world.

The 17 SDGs are interrelated and universal and address social, economic, and environmental issues. The goals call for ending hunger and poverty, ensuring good health, providing quality education, decent work and economic growth, ending inequality, ensuring gender equity, creating sustainable cities and communities, and building strong institutions and partnerships to ensure peace and justice.

All countries have committed themselves to meeting the goals by 2030, including the United States. The interrelated-

ness of the goals necessitates the breaking down of barriers, not only between and among programs and funding sources, but also between and among sectors—government, business, foundations, faith-based and other nonprofit organizations, other members of civil society and the people themselves.

The overarching goal of the SDGs is to leave no one behind. With only 14 years left to meet our shared mandate, it is imperative that plans be developed and actions taken to drastically lower the rates of poverty in our fragile communities. As the goals prescribe, to do so will require addressing the needs of these persistently poor communities holistically. Separate programs targeting separate problems will be insufficient to lower poverty and increase opportunity in our most fragile, left-behind areas.

Overhauling How We Work

The beauty and the challenge of the goals is the need and opportunity to fundamentally overhaul how we as a country work together to meet common goals that support our shared beliefs. Those beliefs embrace the view that one's zip code should not determine one's destiny and that each and every one of us should have the opportunity to develop our talents and pursue our dreams.

The responsibility for achieving the goals does not fall entirely to government. Government must lead, but all sectors of society must play a part in achieving the goals. According to the report, *Business and the United Nations: Working Together Towards the Sustainable Development Goals*, “multi-stakeholder partnerships among governments, companies and civil society organizations will be central for setting common policy agendas, mobilizing necessary resources, and ensuring shared accountability; private sector investments and market-based solutions, as well as philanthropic contributions and blended finance or hybrid models, will be needed to achieve scale and sustained impact in many sectors; and country-level leadership, prioritization and ownership of outcomes will be essential for driving transformative or systemic change.”¹

Nonprofit organizations, foundations, and corporations all must incorporate work on the goals into their organizations' strategic plans and engage residents of the fragile communities in developing plans. All parties must be prepared to fundamentally rethink their own organizational structures and programs and be willing to reconfigure internal structures and goals. All sectors must be willing to abandon their comfort zones and reach out to

nontraditional partners. This work is already underway, but must be universally embraced and vigorously pursued in the months and years ahead.

Nonprofit organizations must work with the federal government and foundations to restructure funding from individual programs to a more comprehensive, integrated set of programs focused on meeting the goals. Goal-focused funding would foster cooperation and collaboration rather than competition among organizations and better serve the target populations.

Advocacy organizations must re-examine their support for programs based on outcomes and impacts, be willing to abandon programs with marginal benefit toward meeting the goals, promote expansion of programs with proven positive outcomes, and work to create new programs to address root causes, not simply address symptoms.

Foundations, too, must restructure their programs and funding to align better with the goals. The Council on Foundations is working with its members to expand their collaborations and engagements with grassroots leaders, cultivate a willingness to take risks, and leverage resources to align their domestic grant making within a global development framework.²

Businesses must begin mapping their performance against the goals and using them in developing their business strategy. A recent survey by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, FleishmanHillard and the United Nations Foundation found that 65 percent of business executives support SDG 8, promoting sustained economic growth and decent work and SDG 5, promoting gender equity, but only 47 percent of respondents said their company's executives understand the opportunity the SDGs present to business, while 55 percent needed more information.³

What's at Stake?

The SDGs provide the framework not only to clearly illustrate the connections between issues such as jobs and poverty and hunger and health, but also to highlight the interconnectedness of everyone. For all of us to survive and thrive as individuals, we all—rich and poor alike—need clean air and clean water, and to survive and thrive as a country, we all need safe, functioning communities where everyone has an equal opportunity to reach their potential.



Joseph Moller / Bread for the World

Bread for the World trains young people in anti-hunger advocacy before visiting their representatives in Congress on Capitol Hill.

The costs range from lost opportunities for individuals to lost contributions for communities and lost economic output for the nation as a whole. For example, the cost of failing to address food insecurity in the United States results in at least \$160 billion in annual unnecessary healthcare expenditures,⁴ and the cost of failing to address poverty reduces the country's gross domestic product by at least 3.8 percent.⁵

We Can Do It

Fifteen years ago, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided a similar opportunity for the developing world, and the developing world, with some assistance from donor countries, responded. In the developing world, the proportion of the population living below the extreme poverty line dropped by half between 2002 and 2012, from 26 to 13 percent; and the proportion of the population suffering from hunger declined from 15 percent in 2000-2002 to 11 percent in 2014-2016.⁶

The SDGs provide an even greater opportunity for both the developing and now the developed world, not only to reduce poverty and hunger, but to go even further. The SDGs call for the elimination of extreme poverty and the end of hunger and all forms of malnutrition—to truly leave no one behind. There is no reason why it cannot be done.

Cynthia Woodside is a senior domestic policy analyst in Bread for the World Institute.

2017 Hunger Report Study Guide

The 2017 Christian Study Guide includes four small-group sessions rooted in the content of *Fragile Environments, Resilient Communities*. Session 1 introduces the Report's overall theme and the other three sessions develop specific topics that the Hunger Report emphasizes. The four sessions do not coincide with the four chapters in the Hunger Report and do not cover all the issues in the report. If your group cannot do all four sessions, we recommend that you do Session 1 and then as many others as you can.

Each session includes:

- **The Word:** Biblical reflection materials with some questions to consider.
- **The Issues:** A summary of themes in the Hunger Report with suggested reflection questions.
- **The Application:** Activities to engage group members in analyzing current realities, using content from the Hunger Report, hungerreport.org, and their life and community experiences.

Planning your Study

As discussion leader, your role is to guide the process, in one or more sessions, as the group reads and discusses parts of the report. You will be learning with the others; you are not expected to be an expert on the issues covered in the report. But your attention to process is important, so here are some key steps for leaders to take:

- Review Sessions 1-4 and refer to the 2017 Hunger Report for more details.
- Consider your own goals for the class and feel free to adapt the guide to enhance the experience for your group. The guide is designed for Christians of many theological and political viewpoints.
- Develop your schedule—select one or all of the sessions for your group.
- Confirm the dates, times, and location of your meeting and invite participation.
- Bring a Bible to each session. Encourage participants to bring additional translations to enrich the biblical reflection.

- Bring session materials for each participant and have newsprint, a flip-chart, or a whiteboard available for activities and discussions. Consider giving participants the session outlines below, or your revision of them, to help them follow along. Each session includes an activity requiring access to the Internet. If your group will not have Internet access, have someone print out relevant pages or data should you choose to do that activity.
- Plan for each session to include prayer time, especially remembering those most affected by the topics that you discuss. Sessions as outlined in this guide may take an hour to 90 minutes each, but may be modified to meet your scheduling needs. After familiarizing yourself with the outline of the sessions, adapt the activities to best serve the needs of your group. We include more options for activities than you may want to try and accomplish in one session.

Group Expectations

If you haven't led an adult learning group before or it has been a while, here are some suggestions:

- Adults want to know what they're going to discuss. Be clear and focused about your goals and your schedule.
- As you begin, help participants make connections with each other—through introductions and a short response to a question like "What do you hope for from our time together?" Including time for prayer at each session also helps build community.
- Encourage all participants both to speak and to listen. Allow each person who wants to speak to have the time to do so.
- Encourage "I" statements (I feel..., I wonder..., etc.) instead of "you" or "they" statements (you don't know..., they always... etc.).
- Adults bring lots of experience to the conversation. Appreciate their need to integrate new material with what they already know, but also keep the conversation focused.
- At the start of each session, invite participants to write down one question they would like to have

answered. Before the closing prayer, invite participants to return to the question and write a response—new information or perhaps new questions.

Facilitating discussion

The study guide includes a number of questions for discussion. To stimulate full participation, consider using one or more of these techniques:

- Divide the group into smaller groups and ask each group to discuss and report on one assigned question. Give them a set time and then have them report to the larger group. Ask the individuals in the larger group to comment on (add to or question) what they're hearing.
- Ask each person to consider the question at hand, and write down a word, phrase, or other response in 1-2 minutes. Separate the group into pairs and have them share their responses. Allow 3-4 minutes. Then pair up the 2-person teams to create groups of four to broaden the discussion. After another 3-4 minutes, invite participants to say what they heard. What key words were used? Is there shared interest in one particular issue?
- Divide the group into teams of 3-4. Place poster paper on the walls, one sheet for each question. Give the teams 8-10 minutes to discuss the assigned questions and post their "answers" on the poster paper. Give a 2-minute warning. At the end of the allotted time, review the responses, noting similarities, themes, concerns, or ideas.

Additional Resources

For more social policy resources on the Hunger Report themes, search the web site of your denomination or national group. Throughout the year, www.hunger-report.org is updated with new stories and statistics you

2017 Hunger Report

Fragile Environments, Resilient Communities



can use. Bread for the World's website, www.bread.org, has even more resources, including current advocacy campaign materials at www.bread.org/ol. The Alliance to End Hunger, an organization affiliated with Bread for the World and the Institute, has created an Advocacy Playbook that enables organizations and volunteers involved in hunger-related service activities to be effective advocates with political leaders to end hunger. See www.alliancetoendhunger.org/advocacy-playbook. Another Bread publication you may find helpful is the *Biblical Basis for Advocacy to End Hunger*, which can be downloaded or ordered at www.bread.org/library/biblical-basis-advocacy-end-hunger.

Session 1: Fragility and Hunger

The Word

Ask for volunteers to read these passages aloud: Genesis 42: 1-24, Exodus 5: 1-23, Ruth 5: 1-22, Psalm 72, Isaiah 58, Matthew 21: 12-17.

The Bible is full of stories about vulnerable people who rely on God for blessing and protection. It's also full of stories about God's using unlikely individuals to make a difference in the world.

There's the story of Joseph's family who, suffering from hunger, must ask the brother they sold into slavery for food. There's the story of the Hebrews enslaved in Egypt, suffering abuse and horrible working conditions from the Egyptians. They flee Egypt with the Egyptian army at their backs. Later in the story, they wander in the wilderness for 40 years, awaiting the day when they enter the land of Canaan and find themselves at home.

And, of course, there's the story of Naomi and Ruth. Famine forces Naomi to leave her home along with her husband and two sons. They take refuge in Moab where her sons marry Moabite women. After losing her husband and sons, however, Naomi is vulnerable in this strange land with no family. She decides to return home, but she is vulnerable there too, even with her daughter-in-law Ruth's insistence on staying by her side.

These stories illustrate the vulnerability of human beings, but they also remind the Israelites time and again that they should care for those who are vulnerable—the widow, the orphan, and the sojourner. Sacrifices to God in the temple were not only to support the livelihood of the priests—they were also to support those who were vulnerable. Another way of supporting hungry people was the practice of gleaning, which, as noted in the story of Ruth and Naomi, required farmers to leave leftover grains in the field after the harvest so that those in need could collect or “glean” it.

Right worship, led by the priests, includes care for vulnerable people. In Isaiah 58, the prophet rails against those who offer hollow sacrifices of animals and grain while exploiting the laborers and vulnerable people in their midst. When the Israelites want to be more like the nations around them, e.g., having a king to rule them, God appoints kings and calls prophets to keep the kings accountable

to their mandate to care for the vulnerable among them. Psalm 72 outlines the duties of the king, saying,

“For he delivers the needy when they call,
the poor and those who have no helper.

13 He has pity on the weak and the needy,
and saves the lives of the needy.

14 From oppression and violence he redeems their life;
and precious is their blood in his sight.”

Jesus is highly critical of the Pharisees and the priestly class for their hypocrisy. They pray publicly and give extravagant sacrifices while exploiting the poor and vulnerable in the temple. In fact, he turns over the tables at the temple in anger, because these elites are charging exorbitant fees for changing money into the temple currency. They are also selling the animals and grains given as sacrifices at high prices to make a profit.

1. Who are the vulnerable people in these stories? What has happened to put them in danger?
2. Who was in a position to change their situation?
3. What might they do for themselves? How?
4. What role does hope play in these stories?

The Issue

Fragile: Handle with Care. We see these words on packages with fragile contents—objects that are easily breakable. We know what fragile objects are, but how can a state be fragile? It takes a little longer to describe a fragile state than a fragile object, but it really comes down to the same idea: something that is easily stretched past its limits, so it's not as durable as it could be or perhaps needs to be. In the case of nations, what is easily overstretched is the government and its institutions. The government can't always fulfill its basic responsibilities, such as providing emergency food to all who need it or protecting villages from attack by armed groups.

Fragile states are not all alike, but each has a combination of shortcomings that converge to make ordinary people extremely vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition. The list of these potential shortcomings is long, but this year's Hunger Report explores three of the most important: climate change, conflict, and poor governance.

Each of these is an immense challenge—but responding to each of them is necessary in order to end hunger for good without leaving anyone behind.

Every year, more than 200 million people are affected by climate-related disasters, which include droughts, floods, tropical storms, heat/cold waves, and forest fires—and the number is growing. Disasters are one of the main causes of hunger. In fact, four out of five of the world's hungry people live in areas susceptible to environmental disaster. Low-income countries are more likely to be struck by disasters, with the most vulnerable people in any affected community suffering most. Disasters destroy crops, causing food scarcity. They destroy communities, leading to migration and overwhelming humanitarian needs.

It makes sense that war is another major cause of hunger. In fact, more people die from hunger and disease in conflict zones than from violence. Children who live in developing countries affected by conflict are twice as likely to be hungry as children in other developing countries, and three times as likely to be out of school. Some countries that are extremely poor, but at peace, have made impressive progress against hunger.

Around the world, the majority of those most vulnerable to hunger depend on agriculture to make a living. Being displaced from their land by conflict or climate-related disaster means, quite simply, that they can't grow food to eat. As of 2014, more than 60 million people were displaced. The media image tends to be of women and children in foreign refugee camps, but more than two-thirds of all displaced people remain in their own countries. They are more likely to die of hunger, disease, and violence than those who manage to flee to other countries.

Finally, poor governance can also make a country fragile. Poorly-governed countries rarely improve the lives of their people, particularly those from the lowest-income households. Ineffective government agencies and dysfunctional public services, as well as rampant corruption, mean that a national government cannot reliably protect its people, respond to emergency situations, or encourage human and economic development.

1. What are some ways to describe a fragile environment? How does a fragile environment seem



Stephanie Malon / CIAT

to be different from a vulnerable person or family? How might they be similar?

2. How does fragility lead to hunger?
3. What are some countries that could be considered fragile states?

Activities

1. Break into small groups and assign each group a story from Chapter 1, Section 7, about climate and conflict. Next, each group will create a news story about the links between the situation and hunger. Set up a mock newscast and have one reporter from each group share the story. You may even want to use participants from other groups as interviewees for authenticity during the newscasts.
2. Print out a copy of the graphic for the Sustainable Development Goals found on page 5. Pick a few of the 17 goals to discuss. Suggestions include Zero Hunger and Malnutrition (Goal 2), No Poverty (Goal 1), Gender Equality (Goal 5), Reduced Inequalities (Goal 10), and Peace and Justice (Goal 16). Discuss the challenges that the international development community will face in efforts to leave no one behind. How might your church engage? After today's session, reflect on the ideas presented and the discussion. Bring one new idea for church engagement to the next study session.

Session 2: Causes of Fragility

The Word

Read: Genesis 47: 1-12 and Exodus 1: 8-22

In the Genesis passage, Joseph was beloved by his father Jacob, but his jealous brothers sold him into slavery and told their father that he had died. When he arrived in Egypt as a slave, he was betrayed by his master's wife and imprisoned. Eventually, however, he gained the Pharaoh's favor by interpreting the Pharaoh's dreams, particularly one that he interpreted to mean that there would be seven years of good harvests in Egypt followed by seven years of famine. The Pharaoh put Joseph in charge of storing up grain in preparation for the famine. And when the famine eventually reached Jacob's family, they had to go to Egypt to ask for food. As it turned out, it was their brother Joseph, whom they did not recognize, that they had to ask. God uses the actions of Joseph's brothers for good.

It is from Jacob's family that the 12 tribes of Israel are born. Eventually, all of Jacob's sons moved to Egypt, and there their families grew. But a new king who had no connection to Joseph came to power and was not pleased with the growth of the Hebrews in Egypt. Slave masters were put over them and they were forced into mortar and brick labor. But they continued to multiply, so the Egyptian king called for the killing of all the male babies born to Hebrew women. This time Moses, who was raised in the home of the Pharaoh, came to the rescue. After he killed an Egyptian slave master who was treating the Hebrew forced laborers poorly, he ran away to Midian, got married, and encountered God in the burning bush. Moses was called to stand up to the Pharaoh and set the Hebrews free. As the story continues, God promised the Hebrews their own land of Canaan where they would be free. But before they arrived there, the passage tells us, they would wander in the desert for 40 years, relying on God for their survival.

1. Who in these stories is vulnerable?
2. What has happened to put them in danger?
3. Who was in a position to change their situation?
4. What might they do for themselves? How?

The Issue

When we talk about “fragility” in the United States, we are not saying that our country is a fragile state. The federal government has access to the knowledge and resources it needs to fulfill its responsibilities. In case of a natural disaster, we would certainly expect the government to have enough vehicles to transport emergency supplies, for example. And because there is no armed conflict in the United States, we would certainly *not* expect people to go hungry because they are trapped in areas that the government does not control.

On the other hand, it's very clear that there are places in the United States where the government has failed to protect people and ensure that they are equipped to support themselves and their families. The most notable are communities of “concentrated poverty”—where 40 percent or more of the population lives below the poverty line. Currently, that means their incomes are less than about \$24,000 for a family of four. Communities with poverty rates between 20 percent and 40 percent are already suffering from a range of problems that affect everyone who lives there, whether they live below the poverty line or not. These worsen rapidly when the poverty rate climbs to 40 percent or more. Some of these community-wide problems are more visible: for example, lower-resourced schools, more students dropping out, and higher crime rates. Others cannot be readily seen but nonetheless carry serious consequences. For example, it is harder for people to get out of poverty once they fall into it. Families in poor neighborhoods remain poor longer than poor families in more prosperous neighborhoods.

Alarming, the number of areas of concentrated poverty is on the rise in the United States, and a greater percentage of poor people live in concentrated poverty communities. People of color are disproportionately represented in these communities.

Areas of concentrated poverty have fewer job opportunities, fewer full-service grocery stores, more exposure to environmental toxins in substandard housing, and less access to health care. Employment is at the center of the problems in concentrated poverty neighborhoods. Jobs that pay far less than a living wage, combined with

a critical shortage of affordable housing, make it very difficult to make ends meet. Unstable housing situations, evictions, and food insecurity are just a few of the consequences of living with poverty. Safety-net programs such as SNAP (formerly food stamps) can help, but even full-time low-wage workers with safety-net support still have trouble meeting their families' basic needs. Households headed by elders or people with disabilities face even greater difficulties.

Far too often, the government is anything but a positive force in concentrated poverty communities. Systemic racism, political pressure and/or financial incentives to issue tickets and make arrests, soaring rates of incarceration, and the great difficulty that people with any kind of criminal record have in finding a job all perpetuate the cycle of poverty.



Lieut. Commander Mark Moran, NOAA Corps, NMAO/AOC.

1. What are the short-term and long-term barriers that people living in high-poverty parts of the United States typically confront?
2. What are some of the challenges facing community leaders, elected officials, and others charged with improving the lives of people in areas of concentrated poverty? What might be some solutions to the main problems?

Activities

1. The Sustainable Development Goals are universal, meaning that they apply to the United States as well as to other countries. Print out a copy of the graphic for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), found on page 5. Pick a few of the 17 goals to discuss. You might choose Zero Hunger and Malnutrition (Goal 2), No Poverty (Goal 1), Gender Equality (Goal 5), Reduced Inequalities (Goal 10), and Peace and Justice (Goal 16). Talk about the challenges that U.S. institutions must overcome if our country is to meet these goals without leaving anyone behind. What might be the role of the U.S. government and of state and local governments? What is the role of educational institutions? Of churches? What other institutions might contribute? How might your church get involved?
2. Have members of the group consider what it takes to escape poverty in the United States. Use a chalkboard or whiteboard to draw out a path as the group discusses what is needed. Next, read Chapter 3, Section 5, "Presumed Guilty." Draw some of the barriers in the path to escaping poverty.
3. On a piece of butcher paper, write the word "employment" at the center and draw a circle around it. Next, read Chapter 3, Section 4, "Bouncing Off the Safety Net into the Job Market," and Chapter 2, Section 5, "Jobs, Farms, Roads." Draw spokes from the center of your circle and write down the impacts of job shortages on a community. How do these impacts relate to one another?

Session 3: Who is most vulnerable in fragile states and communities?

The Word

Read: Ruth 1-4

The story of Ruth and Naomi is one of many biblical stories of migration. Naomi leaves Judah with her husband and two sons to find food in the midst of famine. They live in Moab for many years, and the sons marry Moabite women. When her husband and sons die, Naomi is left with her daughters-in-law, Ruth and Orpah, without men in their family to protect them. When she learns that God has provided for her people in Judah, she sets out on a journey to return to her home. Despite Naomi's pleas for Orpah and Ruth to return to their families, Ruth insists on accompanying her to Judah.

We do not know all of the challenges that Ruth and Naomi faced. Where did they live? How did they find food? How did they stay safe without being connected to a husband or son? How were they received? Did people in Judah remember Naomi? How did they feel about Moabites?

What we do know is that Naomi sent Ruth to glean in the fields of Boaz, who was a distant relative. Ruth found favor with Boaz because he heard of her loyalty to Naomi. Boaz provides protection from the men in the fields. He gives her water to drink while she is following the women workers gleaning behind the harvest. And later, he marries her and takes responsibility for her livelihood.

Ruth and Naomi, while vulnerable in their travels and in Bethlehem, used their own ingenuity and knowledge of the culture to find their way. Ultimately, Ruth becomes the grandmother of King David.

1. What makes Ruth and Naomi vulnerable, both in Moab and in Bethlehem?
2. Imagine how Naomi feels when she returns to her home after many years away. What might she be anticipating? Imagine how Ruth might feel, going to a new land and not knowing how she might be received in this new place. What might she worry about?
3. Who is in a position to change the two women's situation?

4. How do Ruth and Naomi participate in changing their situation?

The Issue

The global count of refugees and internally displaced people is at its highest since World War II—at least 60 million. Most are from one of five countries: Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, Colombia.

It's no coincidence that this list brings up the word "war" for many people. Violence is the top cause of forced migration. Currently, 80 percent of humanitarian aid dollars go to help people affected by conflict. But both violence and climate change are forcing people to migrate in search of safety and food, and the effects of climate change are growing worse with each passing year.

Not all people forced to abandon their homes because of violence are caught in a war declared by two opposing forces. Increasingly, breakdowns in the rule of law have left civilians vulnerable to gang violence, acts of terrorism, trafficking, and other abuses that may affect fewer people, but are no less devastating for those who are brutalized. Gangs and other forms of organized criminal activity are the main reason for the surge in recent years of unaccompanied children fleeing Central America's Northern Triangle countries—Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Boys are forcibly recruited into the gangs. Refusing to take part will put not only themselves, but their mothers and other female relatives, in great danger. The gangs regard girls as their personal property, with many subjected to rape, torture, and murder. Parents hope that sending their children north will help protect them. Many women and older girls have already been victimized. U.S. asylum officers who screened women arriving from Northern Triangle countries in 2015, for example, found that 82 percent would qualify for asylum or protection under the U.N. Convention against Torture.

In fragile states, conflict and weak governance join to form a vicious circle. Conflict not only prevents government from protecting people, but often results in

the government's treating all residents of disputed or rebel-held territories, even children, as enemies. It destroys critical infrastructure such as roads, reducing government's ability to provide public services. Countries with weak governance also have governments that are not protecting people and providing services to the extent needed—which, in turn, aggravates grievances that fuel conflict and leaves vacuums that are easily filled by extremist groups or criminals.

Refugees and internally displaced people suffer hunger and a multitude of other hardships on the way to relative safety. Many find that while they may feel safer in their new surroundings, they are hardly better off in material terms. Displaced people are still in the same conflict- or climate-affected nations, but without most of their possessions and separated from their communities and their means of earning a living. Most of the world's refugees live in neighboring developing countries. About 40 percent live in refugee camps, with the rest living among the host populations. Bread for the World members have been working for several years to make humanitarian assistance more helpful and responsive to the needs of the recipients.

Without significant global humanitarian assistance, it is difficult for host governments to justify devoting scarce resources to people who are not their own citizens. Recent appeals to the international community for increased funding to respond to the increased needs have met with mixed success, however.

1. Has your community hosted refugees? How has this impacted the local community and economy?
2. There is evidence that refugees contribute far more to local economies than the cost of their initial resettlement programs. In Cleveland, OH, in fact, the economic growth attributed to refugees added up to 10 times the amount that refugee services cost. In an example from further afield, Danish communities with refugees enjoyed faster increases in wages than those without. But despite the findings that newcomers can make economic contributions almost right away, many host communities prevent refugees from working or being otherwise included in the



UNICEF / Romenzi

community. Why do you think this might be the case? What arguments do you have for or against allowing refugees to work?

Activities

1. Break into groups and assign each group a story from Chapter 1, Section 3, "States of Siege," which discusses refugees and internally displaced people. Have each group develop a news story that makes the links between the situation people are confronting and hunger. Some suggested areas of focus are Syria; South Sudan; and the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, particularly unaccompanied minors from that region. Have one reporter from each group share the story in a mock newscast.
2. Think back to Hurricane Katrina and the periods before and after the hurricane itself. Divide participants into two groups—one representing people living below the poverty line and the other playing the role of New Orleans residents who are not poor. Ask each group to describe their experiences during the disaster. What helped each to survive and recover? What posed difficulties, whether immediate dangers or barriers to returning home and rebuilding? What might the government, local civic groups, and/or churches have done to be more prepared in advance and more effective during the crisis?

Session 4: No One Left Behind

The Word

Read: Luke 15: 1-10

The stories of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the prodigal son are among a number of stories that judge rather harshly those who are more loyal to their wealth than they are to God. Jesus criticizes the Pharisees in particular for being hypocrites. They follow all the rules, but they judge others harshly and put their own interests ahead of those of people who do not follow the letter of the law. At the beginning of this passage, in fact, the Pharisees and scribes are whispering among themselves about how Jesus is eating with sinners. And in response, Jesus tells these three stories.

We often read these stories and imagine that the shepherd, the woman, and the father represent God while the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the lost son represent the tax collectors and sinners. But what if the lost coin, the lost sheep, and the prodigal son represent the Pharisees and scribes? Jesus is responding directly to the Pharisees and scribes, so it makes sense that he would mean them rather than those who are gathering around him to listen.

So what does that mean for the Pharisees? They see themselves one way, as people who preserve the faith and teach others. But in reality, they are missing the point—that they may not be so different from the sinners that Jesus is welcoming. They uphold the law, but their allegiance is to their own privileged positions of power, education, and wealth.

1. Who is vulnerable in the parables?
2. Who is vulnerable in the situation in which Jesus tells the parables?
3. Who is in a position to change the situation of those who are vulnerable?
4. What can those who are vulnerable do to change their situation?

The Issue

The world came close to cutting hunger in half between 1990 and 2015. That reflects enormous effort and progress. But not surprisingly, the half that was

eliminated was the easier half—hungry people who were relatively less isolated and better equipped to make use of new resources and opportunities that came their way.

Goal 2 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to end hunger and malnutrition altogether, is far more challenging. “Leave no one behind” is essentially the motto of the SDGs. Many of the remaining people living with hunger are from countries affected by conflict, climate change, and weak governance. While development assistance can help bolster a country’s efforts to achieve its goals on hunger, poverty, and other problems, the United States generally does not give development assistance to war-torn nations, or to governments considered corrupt, dictatorial, or both.

While this approach certainly makes sense from the perspective of making sure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are not misused, it may be that programs in fragile states need more flexibility. This does not mean going to the other extreme, heedlessly delivering assistance that will not help the people it is intended to help, but rather considering each situation on a case-by-case basis and updating development projects as circumstances change. This will help enable civil society groups and various levels of government to exercise leadership, ultimately strengthening fragile states.

Building or rebuilding a country is clearly a complex task. But countries that have emerged from conflict and/or natural disasters have valuable experience that can help others. Improving governance, for example, starts with a durable peace. One way to build peace and stability is to take deliberate steps to ensure that women are well-represented among the leaders and participants in peace negotiations; in fact, the evidence suggests that these peace agreements are 50 percent more likely to succeed. Yet even now, in the 21st century, women are rarely consulted and included in such processes.

As a country’s recovery phase continues, some investments in development have proven to be particularly helpful. These include investing in agriculture and rural infrastructure; helping governments improve their ability to uphold the rule of law, particularly laws that protect vulnerable people and groups; reducing inequalities that fuel conflict; and providing “social protection,” which



Nerdoguate

can be safety nets such as emergency food assistance and pensions, programs that reward families for having their children vaccinated or sending them to school, and/or a wide range of other initiatives to benefit the most vulnerable people.

1. What are some of the political and economic dynamics of a country emerging from conflict or crisis? Who has power?
2. What are the challenges facing government leaders? What resources might leaders need to better govern?
3. How can people in local communities find greater agency to improve their lives and those of their children?

Activities

1. Ask the group to describe the governance structure of the church or organization that has convened these study sessions. Who makes decisions? Is there space for the voices of minority opinions? What happens when people act in ways that are not in accord with agreed-upon community norms? Is there a discipline process? Next, have participants read Section 7 of the Introduction, “Good Governance and Inclusive Institutions.” Discuss the ways in which the church or organizational governance structure maintains transparency and credibility. Ask participants to consider similar questions about the wider community, the state, and the federal government.
2. Have the group read Box i.2, “A New Dawn: Civil Society, Governments, and Citizens at the Same Table.” What is the role of civil society in creating and maintaining government accountability? What are some civil society organizations at the community, state, and national levels?
3. Take a look at Figure i.3, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.” In what ways might these principles be relevant or adaptable to local communities in the United States?

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Acronyms

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union	IOM	International Organization for Migration
AFDC	Aid to Families with Dependent Children	IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ARC	African Risk Capacity	ISIS	Islamic State
ARRA	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act	JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
BLS	Bureau of Labor Statistics	MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
CAR	Central African Republic	MENA	Middle East and North Africa
CCCS	Catholic Charities Community Services	NAACP	National Association of Colored People
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility	NASFAM	National Association of Small Farmers of Malawi
CEPR	Center for Economic and Policy Research	NCCC	National Civilian Community Corps
CFAN	Climate Forecast Applications Network	NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
CGD	Center for Global Development	NLIHC	National Low Income Housing Coalition
CICIG	Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
CMN	Comisarías de la Mujer y de la Niñez	OGP	Open Government Partnership
CO2	Carbon dioxide	OSAPo	Oganizasyon Santé Popile/Popular Health Organization
COD	Cash on Delivery	PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
CTC	Child Tax Credit	REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
CWS	Church World Service	RLP	Religious Leaders Platform
DCM	Disaster Case Management	RRI	Comprehensive Rural Reform
DOJ	United States Department of Justice	SAFID	Somali Agency for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
EITC	Earned Income Tax Credit	SIGAR	United States Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	SKDE	Sant Kreyen pou Devlopman Entegre
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	SNAP	Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
FCHV	Female Community Health Volunteer	TANF	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency	UCBC	Bilingual Christian University of Congo
FEWS Net	Famine Early Warning System Network	UN	United Nations
G-7	Group of 7	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
GDP	Gross domestic product	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GYIN	Global Youth Innovation Network	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
HUD	United States Department of Housing and Urban Development	VISTA	Volunteers in Service to America
IDA	International Development Association	WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Program
IDPs	Internally displaced persons	WFP	World Food Program
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development		

Glossary

Alliance of Small Island States:

A coalition of 44 small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change.

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA):

The economic recovery plan enacted in February 2009 with provisions for federal tax cuts and incentives, investments in infrastructure repair, expansion of unemployment benefits and other social entitlement programs, as well as support to states so that they could continue to fund services.

Area median income: The income level at which half of households in a designated geographic area earn more and half earn less.

Bilateral aid: Aid from a single donor country to a single recipient country.

Block grant: A vehicle the federal government uses to provide state and local governments a specified amount of funding to assist them in addressing broad purposes.

Capacity building: Development assistance specifically designed to build skills and/or technical and management capacity among the beneficiaries.

Carbon markets: A market-based approach to reducing carbon dioxide emissions, the primary greenhouse gas causing climate change.

Conditional cash transfer: A government transfer of cash

based on conditions that promote poverty reduction and long-term self-sufficiency, such as enrolling children in schools, regular medical check-ups, vaccinations, or more nutritious eating.

Developed countries: Highly industrialized nations such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan; also referred to as high-income.

Developing countries: These include low- and middle-income countries, where extreme poverty, hunger and other hardships remain common.

Development assistance: Grants and loans to developing countries by donors to spur economic development and poverty reduction.

Earned Income Tax Credit

(EITC): A federal government program that provides a cash benefit to many low-income working people by refunding a portion of their income taxes.

Extreme poverty: The international poverty line of \$1.90 USD per person per day.

Famine: An extreme collapse in local availability and access to food that causes a widespread rise in deaths from outright starvation or hunger-related illnesses.

Feed the Future: The U.S. government's global hunger and food security initiative, through which the United States works with host governments, development partners, and other stakeholders to sustainably tackle the root causes of global poverty and hunger.

Food insecurity: Uncertain availability or inability to acquire safe, nutritious food in socially acceptable ways.

Food security: Assured access to enough nutritious food to sustain an active and healthy life with dignity.

g7+: A voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are transitioning to the next stage of development.

Governance: The norms by which a government operates, measured in terms such as transparency, accountability, rule of law and strength of institutions.

Great Recession: The worst economic downturn in the United States since the Great Depression. It started in December 2007 with the bursting of a housing bubble that led to a financial crisis and a steep rise in unemployment.

Green Climate Fund: A fund set up through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the intent to raise money from developed countries to help developing countries cope with the impacts of climate change.

Green Revolution: Modification of agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s to improve agricultural production of high-yielding varieties of grains (such as rice, wheat and corn) through the use of new technologies, including new machines, fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation and cultivation methods.

Greenhouse gas emissions: Gases that trap heat in the atmosphere and are linked to global climate change.

Group of 7 (G-7): The wealthiest industrial countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

Gross domestic product (GDP): The value of all goods and services produced within a nation during a specified period, usually a year.

Hidden hunger: A deficiency in the vitamins, major minerals and trace elements needed for a healthy, balanced diet.

High-income country: Determined by the World Bank as any country that earns an annual income per capita of more than \$12,476 USD or more in 2015.

Housing bubble: An unsustainable rise in home prices fueled by cheap credit and speculation in the real estate market.

Hunger: A condition in which people do not get enough food to provide the nutrients (carbohydrate, fat, protein, vitamins, minerals and water) for fully productive, active, and healthy lives.

International Development Association (IDA): The part of the World Bank that provides assistance to the world's poorest countries with grants and low interest loans covering primary education, basic health services, clean water and sanitation, agriculture and nutrition, business climate improvements, infrastructure, and institutional reforms.

International Monetary Fund (IMF): An international organization that makes loans to countries with short-term foreign exchange and monetary problems.

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): The IPCC was established jointly by the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organization in 1988. The purpose of the IPCC is to assess information in the scientific and technical literature related to all significant components of the issue of climate change.

Land grab: A large-scale land acquisition in a developing country, usually on very favorable terms to the purchaser and sometimes involving the displacement of the resident population.

Low-income country: Determined by the World Bank as any country that earns an annual income per capita of \$1,025 USD or less in 2015.

Malnutrition: An abnormal physiological condition caused by inadequate, unbalanced or excessive consumption of macronutrients and/or micronutrients.

Mass incarceration: A term to describe the high rates of incarceration in the United States.

Micronutrients: The vitamins, major minerals and trace elements needed for a healthy, balanced diet.

Middle-income country: Determined by the World Bank as any country that earns an annual income per capita of \$1,026-\$12,475 USD. It is further divided between lower

middle income countries, (\$1,026-\$4,035) and upper middle income countries, (\$4,036-\$12,475).

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): An independent U.S. government foreign aid agency that provides aid to countries that demonstrate principles of good governance such as respect for the rule of law and development of accountable state institutions.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A global agreement officially adopted at the United Nations in the year 2000. The goals served as a road map for development outcomes to be achieved by 2015.

Multilateral aid: Financial or material assistance channeled to developing countries via international organizations such as the World Bank, the European Union or UN agencies (as distinguished from bilateral aid).

New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States: An agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, international development partners and civil society to improve current development policy and practice in fragile states.

Northern Triangle: A region of Central America made up of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Official Development Assistance (ODA): The term used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for grants and loans to developing countries undertaken by governments to pursue economic development at concessional financial terms.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):

A group of 35 industrialized countries that pursue economic development while fostering good governance in the public sector and in corporate activity. OECD countries make up the traditional class of donors.

Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness:

An international agreement signed in 2005 by more than a hundred senior government officials of donor countries and aid-recipient countries that committed their respective governments to better coordinate their efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Plumpy' Nut: A ready-to-use therapeutic food that comes in the form of a fortified peanut paste for treating severely malnourished children.

Safety nets: Government policies and charitable programs designed to ensure basic needs are met among low-income, disabled and other vulnerable social groups.

Smallholder farmer: A farmer who works a small plot of land, generally less than five acres. The greatest number of people living in extreme poverty consists of smallholder farmers and their families.

Social protection: A cash or in-kind transfer to a household to protect against financial hardship resulting from conditions such as disability, old age, poor health, unemployment, care of children or elderly, food insecurity, or lack of housing.

State building: Building effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development.

Stunting: A result of chronic malnutrition during the formative years of childhood. The most visible sign is when a child fails to grow to normal height, but may also result in decreased mental capacity and long-term health problems for the rest of a person's life.

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Previously called the Food Stamp Program, SNAP supplements the food budgets of low-income households with monthly benefits in the form of an electronic benefits (EBT) card that they can use like cash at authorized retail stores.

Sustainable development: Development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

Sustainable development goals (SDGs): A set of 17 international development goals agreed to by 193 countries at the United Nations General Assembly in 2015. The SDGs succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the most prominent international development framework, and they include goals to end hunger and extreme poverty globally by 2030.

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Monthly cash assistance program for poor families with children under age 18, sometimes referred to as welfare, and formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children before welfare reform legislation in 1996.

United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Also known as the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR is mandated to protect and support refugees at the request of a government or the UN itself and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID): A federal agency that supports long-term and equitable economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives.

War on Poverty: An initiative launched by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964 that included the establishment of a set of government programs, including, among others, Head Start, Medicaid and Medicare, the Food Stamp Program, and improvements to Social Security.

Whole-of-government plan: A plan that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of government toward a shared goal.

World Bank: An intergovernmental development bank that makes long-term loans to governments of developing nations and conducts research and analysis on issues of global economic importance, particularly related to economic development and poverty reduction.

World Food Program (WFP): A U.N. body providing logistical support necessary to get food to the right people at the right time in response to emergency food shortages and in development work.

Table 1

Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Population						Life expectancy	Human development index (HDI)	Employment	Remittances	Migration		
	total 2015	ages 0-14 (%) 2015	growth (%) 2015	density (per sq. km) 2015	rural (%) 2015	urban (%) 2015	life exp. at birth (years) 2014	score (0-1, 1 is most developed) 2015	employment to pop. ratio (% of total pop. Above age 15) 2014	workers' remittances & compensation received (current US\$) 2011-2015	net migration (number of people) 2012	number of refugees fleeing 2014-2015	number of refugees granted asylum 2014-2015
World	7,346,633,037	26.1	1.2	56.6	46.1	53.9	71.5	..	59.7	368,363,196,773	0	17,531,780	17,531,780
High-income countries	1,187,189,841	16.8	0.6	33.8	18.9	81.1	80.6	..	55.8	105,101,709,909	15,359,563	50,163	1,892,020
Low- & middle- income countries	6,116,026,441	27.9	1.3	66.5	51.6	48.4	69.6	..	60.6	262,772,069,768	-15,380,665	14,772,233	16,942,942
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	1,000,888,081	42.9	2.7	42.4	62.3	37.7	58.6	..	64.6	8,386,070,930	-1,687,443	4,860,592	3,648,902
Angola	25,021,974	47.7	3.2	20.1	56.0	44.1	52.3	0.53	65.3	45,380	102,322	9,550	15,474
Benin	10,879,829	42.2	2.6	96.5	56.1	44.0	59.5	0.48	72.2	304,253,965	-10,000	352	415
Botswana	2,262,485	32.0	1.9	4.0	42.6	57.4	64.4	0.70	62.8	30,501,740	20,000	236	2,645
Burkina Faso	18,105,570	45.6	2.9	66.2	70.1	29.9	58.6	0.40	80.7	395,780,910	-125,000	1,862	31,894
Burundi	11,178,921	44.8	3.3	435.3	87.9	12.1	56.7	0.40	77.0	50,791,126	40,000	217,360	52,936
Cameroon	23,344,179	42.5	2.5	49.4	45.6	54.4	55.5	0.51	67.3	251,296,967	-60,000	10,854	226,489
Cape Verde	520,502	29.7	1.3	129.2	34.5	65.5	73.1	0.65	61.6	200,806,008	-11,052	27	0
Central African Republic	4,900,274	39.1	2.0	7.9	60.0	40.0	50.7	0.35	72.9	..	10,000	470,568	7,694
Chad	14,037,472	47.7	3.3	11.1	77.5	22.5	51.6	0.39	66.6	..	100,000	48,362	452,897
Comoros	788,474	40.3	2.4	423.7	71.7	28.3	63.3	0.50	53.9	120,640,549	-10,000	562	0
Congo, Dem. Rep.	77,266,814	46.0	3.1	34.1	57.5	42.5	58.7	0.43	66.2	4,717,384	-95,920	535,323	119,754
Congo, Rep.	4,620,330	42.6	2.5	13.5	34.6	65.4	62.3	0.59	66.1	..	-60,000	14,745	54,842
Côte d'Ivoire	22,701,556	42.5	2.4	71.4	45.8	54.2	51.6	..	64.6	378,459,817	50,000	72,158	1,925
Equatorial Guinea	845,060	39.3	2.9	30.1	60.1	39.9	57.6	0.59	79.8	..	20,000	173	0
Eritrea	4,789,568	42.5	2.1	47.4	79.0	21.0	63.7	0.39	78.7	..	-160,001	383,869	2,898
Ethiopia	99,390,750	41.4	2.5	99.4	80.5	19.5	64.0	0.44	79.3	646,129,793	-60,001	88,149	659,524
Gabon	1,725,292	37.1	2.2	6.7	12.8	87.2	64.4	0.68	49.0	..	5,000	173	1,013
Gambia, the	1,990,924	46.2	3.2	196.7	40.4	59.6	60.2	0.44	72.0	191,145,820	-13,476	5,136	11,608
Ghana	27,409,893	38.8	2.3	120.5	46.0	54.0	61.3	0.58	67.8	4,982,442,362	-49,999	22,182	18,450
Guinea	12,608,590	42.5	2.7	51.3	62.8	37.2	58.7	0.41	70.7	94,777,657	-10,000	16,009	8,766
Guinea-Bissau	1,844,325	40.8	2.4	65.6	50.7	49.3	55.2	0.42	68.3	46,753,487	-10,000	1,321	8,684
Kenya	46,050,302	41.9	2.6	80.9	74.4	25.6	61.6	0.55	61.2	1,440,846,022	-50,000	7,474	551,352
Lesotho	2,135,022	36.1	1.2	70.3	72.7	27.3	49.7	0.50	48.9	365,584,504	-19,998	17	44
Liberia	4,503,438	42.3	2.4	46.8	50.3	49.7	60.8	0.43	59.3	495,200,000	-20,000	13,570	38,587
Madagascar	24,235,390	41.7	2.8	41.7	64.9	35.1	65.1	0.51	85.2	431,979,679	-5,000	286	11
Malawi	17,215,232	45.2	3.1	182.6	83.7	16.3	62.7	0.45	76.8	38,487,244	-30,000	363	5,874
Mali	17,599,694	47.5	3.0	14.4	60.1	39.9	58.0	0.42	60.7	923,395,699	-302,449	146,667	15,195
Mauritania	4,067,564	40.0	2.4	3.9	40.1	59.9	63.0	0.51	37.3	..	-20,000	34,121	49,635
Mauritius	1,262,605	19.3	0.1	622.0	60.3	39.7	74.2	0.78	54.1	1,312,427	0	93	0
Mozambique	27,977,863	45.3	2.8	35.6	67.8	32.2	55.0	0.42	65.1	195,566,063	-25,000	59	4,536
Namibia	2,458,830	36.7	2.3	3.0	53.3	46.7	64.7	0.63	48.4	8,712,736	-1,371	1,185	1,767
Niger	19,899,120	50.5	4.0	15.7	81.3	18.7	61.5	0.35	61.4	156,750,802	-28,497	1,172	77,830
Nigeria	182,201,962	44.0	2.6	200.1	52.2	47.8	52.8	0.51	52.0	20,829,173,623	-300,000	120,303	1,239
Rwanda	11,609,666	41.1	2.3	470.6	71.2	28.8	64.0	0.48	85.2	161,400,117	-75,001	76,898	73,820
São Tomé and Príncipe	190,344	42.6	2.1	198.3	34.9	65.1	66.4	0.56	..	19,980,197	-5,599	22	0
Senegal	15,129,273	43.8	3.1	78.6	56.3	43.7	66.4	0.47	69.0	1,643,550,251	-99,996	23,404	14,274
Sierra Leone	6,453,184	42.4	2.2	89.4	60.1	39.9	50.9	0.41	65.1	62,430,112	-21,000	4,962	1,372
Somalia	10,787,104	46.7	2.5	17.2	60.4	39.6	55.4	..	52.2	..	-400,000	1,105,618	2,729
South Africa	54,956,920	29.2	1.6	45.3	35.2	64.8	57.2	0.47	39.4	825,253,480	600,000	426	112,192
South Sudan	12,339,812	42.1	3.5	..	81.2	18.8	55.7	0.67	..	1,985,610	865,000	744,102	248,152
Sudan	40,234,882	40.5	2.2	22.1	66.2	33.8	63.5	0.48	45.7	151,392,010	-800,000	640,919	244,430
Swaziland	1,286,970	37.4	1.4	74.8	78.7	21.3	48.9	0.53	44.8	24,495,452	-6,000	162	515
Tanzania	53,470,420	45.2	3.1	60.4	68.4	31.6	64.9	0.52	86.3	389,368,775	-199,999	859	88,492
Togo	7,304,578	42.2	2.6	134.3	60.0	40.0	59.7	0.48	75.4	427,292,255	-9,994	9,226	21,778
Uganda	39,032,383	48.1	3.3	194.7	83.9	16.1	58.5	0.48	74.5	1,049,033,127	-150,000	7,185	385,513
Zambia	16,211,767	45.9	3.1	21.8	59.1	40.9	60.8	0.59	68.7	58,300,302	-34,490	318	25,578
Zimbabwe	15,602,751	41.6	2.3	40.3	67.6	32.4	57.5	0.51	82.0	..	-219,922	22,210	6,079
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13

Table 1
Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Gross domestic product				Military spending	Debt & inflation		Exports & imports of goods & services		Exports & imports of food		Income inequality
	GDP (current million US\$) 2011-2015	growth (%) 2011-2015	per capita (current US\$) 2011-2015	per capita PPP ¹ (current int'l \$) 2011-2015	% of gov't spending 2010-2014	value of external debt (current million US\$) 2014	annual inflation, consumer prices (%) 2012-2015	exports (% of GDP) 2010-2015	imports (% of GDP) 2010-2015	exports (% of merchandise) 2010-2015	imports (% of merchandise) 2010-2015	GINI* index, scale (0-100, 100 is maximal inequality) 2010-2013
World	73,433,644	2.5	9,996	15,465	9.0	..	1.4	29.3	28.7	9.4	8.2	..
High income countries	46,985,247	1.9	39,577	44,696	9.1	..	0.3	30.5	29.8	9.2	8.4	..
Low & middle income countries	25,960,680	3.6	4,245	9,769	..	1,644,626	3.1	25.5	25.3	9.0	7.6	..
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	1,571,434	3.0	1,570	3,693	7.0	168,116	3.5	29.1	35.3	12.8	11.7	..
Angola	102,643	3.0	4,102	7,371	13.8	24,498	10.3	37.3	37.8	..	..	..
Benin	8,476	5.2	779	2,110	7.4	1,225	0.3	26.9	35.9	29.9	47.6	43.4
Botswana	14,391	-0.3	6,361	15,807	7.6	1,221	3.1	49.7	49.5	2.0	8.9	..
Burkina Faso	11,099	4.0	613	1,659	11.4	1,565	1.0	33.4	35.3	26.5	12.7	..
Burundi	3,085	-2.5	276	736	..	290	5.6	7.1	32.9	72.1	13.1	..
Cameroon	29,198	6.2	1,251	3,123	..	3,817	2.7	17.0	25.9	17.5	17.4	..
Cape Verde	1,630	2.5	3,131	6,690	..	1,204	0.1	31.5	60.3	86.1	32.5	..
Central African Republic	1,503	5.5	307	597	14.8	317	1.5	9.2	30.3	0.1	26.4	..
Chad	10,889	1.8	776	2,171	..	2,267	1.7	29.8	37.3	..	..	43.3
Comoros	624	2.1	810	1,435	..	63	0.6	17.3	62.6	78.2	31.4	..
Congo, Dem. Rep.	35,238	6.9	456	783	10.2	..	1.6	29.5	35.0	..	..	42.1
Congo, Rep.	8,553	2.6	1,851	6,368	13.6	2,247	0.1	69.3	96.4	0.2	17.8	40.2
Côte d'Ivoire	31,753	8.4	1,399	3,496	11.6	7,195	1.2	45.4	42.4	52.0	16.8	..
Equatorial Guinea	9,398	-12.2	11,121	30,041	..	..	4.8	98.0	80.3	..	..	..
Eritrea	2,608	8.7	544	1,411	..	649	..	14.4	23.2	..	..	..
Ethiopia	61,537	9.6	619	1,626	10.3	9,530	10.1	9.8	27.3	71.7	10.6	33.2
Gabon	14,340	3.9	8,311	20,010	..	..	4.7	45.9	28.1	..	..	..
Gambia, the	851	0.9	441	1,636	..	207	5.9	29.2	40.9	49.4	40.9	..
Ghana	37,864	3.9	1,381	4,201	2.8	9,956	17.1	44.1	54.8	32.0	16.8	..
Guinea	6,699	0.1	531	1,207	..	930	9.7	26.8	51.3	7.6	25.4	33.7
Guinea-Bissau	1,057	4.8	573	1,453	..	201	1.4	15.2	21.7	..	..	50.7
Kenya	63,398	5.6	1,377	3,083	8.5	8,052	6.6	15.8	29.0	46.2	10.7	..
Lesotho	2,181	3.6	1,034	2,648	..	587	3.2	40.4	101.2	14.3	20.8	54.2
Liberia	2,050	0.3	456	836	..	210	9.8	23.5	88.9	..	..	..
Madagascar	9,981	3.0	412	1,459	7.5	1,686	7.4	33.2	36.5	25.1	16.0	40.6
Malawi	6,565	3.0	381	1,183	..	866	21.2	28.1	33.8	69.2	9.7	46.1
Mali	13,100	7.6	744	2,428	8.8	2,098	1.4	21.8	28.9	20.3	13.7	..
Mauritania	5,442	4.2	1,371	3,886	..	2,645	3.5	37.7	66.0	37.2	12.0	..
Mauritius	11,511	3.5	9,117	19,480	1.1	1,532	1.3	49.8	59.6	32.1	22.1	35.8
Mozambique	14,689	6.3	525	1,186	3.7	4,794	3.6	26.2	65.4	20.0	11.9	..
Namibia	11,546	5.7	4,696	10,414	10.2	..	3.4	43.9	67.6	19.7	11.4	..
Niger	7,143	3.6	359	954	..	1,662	1.0	17.2	39.4	11.4	24.8	31.5
Nigeria	481,066	2.7	2,640	5,992	9.8	6,446	9.0	18.4	12.5	1.9	17.0	..
Rwanda	8,096	6.9	697	1,759	8.4	1,295	2.5	14.4	30.9	36.9	18.8	51.3
São Tomé and Príncipe	337	4.5	1,811	3,188	..	174	5.3	..	..	97.0	32.4	30.8
Senegal	13,780	6.5	911	2,431	8.2	3,804	0.1	27.8	45.8	38.7	22.6	40.3
Sierra Leone	4,475	-20.3	693	1,591	..	701	8.0	19.8	39.4	4.0	11.0	34.0
Somalia	5,950	..	552	..	..	..	..	14.5	61.3	..	..	..
South Africa	312,798	1.3	5,692	13,165	3.3	50,491	4.6	30.9	31.9	11.8	6.1	63.4
South Sudan	9,015	-6.3	731	1,850	..	..	3.3	9.8	57.6	..	..	..
Sudan	84,067	3.4	2,089	4,173	..	..	16.9	6.9	12.1	6.7	18.0	..
Swaziland	4,060	1.7	3,155	8,427	..	..	5.7	44.4	56.8	..	..	..
Tanzania	44,895	7.0	865	2,667	5.3	7,475	5.6	20.8	28.7	57.8	9.5	37.8
Togo	4,003	5.5	548	1,460	7.8	492	1.8	45.8	60.8	19.2	15.2	46.0
Uganda	26,369	5.0	676	1,825	12.3	2,714	5.2	17.5	29.4	65.5	13.6	42.4
Zambia	21,202	3.2	1,308	3,853	8.5	3,013	10.1	37.0	30.9	7.4	4.8	55.6
Zimbabwe	13,893	1.1	890	1,794	..	..	-2.4	26.2	48.8	52.3	16.7	..
column number	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

Table 1

Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Population						Life expectancy	Human development index (HDI)	Employment	Remittances	Migration		
	total 2015	ages 0-14 (%) 2015	growth (%) 2015	density (per sq. km) 2015	rural (%) 2015	urban (%) 2015	life exp. at birth (years) 2014	score (0-1, 1 is most developed) 2015	employment to pop. ratio (% of total pop. Above age 15) 2014	workers' remittances & compensation received (current US\$) 2011-2015	net migration (number of people) 2012	number of refugees fleeing 2014-2015	number of refugees granted asylum 2014-2015
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	362,560,941	31.2	1.8	42.0	39.5	60.5	72.3	..	40.8	19,895,723,964	-3,615,666	4,792,904	8,998,709
Algeria	39,666,519	28.5	1.9	16.7	29.3	70.7	74.8	0.74	40.0	304,151,072	-143,268	3,541	94,128
Bahrain	1,377,237	21.5	1.1	1788.6	11.2	88.8	76.7	0.82	67.2	..	29,915	373	311
Djibouti	887,861	32.7	1.3	38.3	22.7	77.3	62.0	0.47	..	35,922,064	-15,996	921	20,530
Egypt, Arab Rep.	91,508,084	33.2	2.1	91.9	56.9	43.1	71.1	0.69	42.8	19,570,400,000	-215,681	16,105	236,090
Iran, Islamic Rep.	79,109,272	23.6	1.2	48.6	26.6	73.4	75.4	0.77	39.6	1,329,781,000	-300,001	83,507	982,027
Iraq	36,423,395	41.0	3.2	83.9	30.5	69.5	69.4	0.65	35.4	271,000,000	548,666	377,747	271,143
Israel	8,380,400	27.8	2.0	387.3	7.9	92.1	82.2	0.89	59.1	853,100,000	19,497	962	330
Jordan	7,594,547	35.5	2.4	85.5	16.3	83.7	74.1	0.75	37.2	5,348,309,859	229,617	1,767	2,771,502
Kuwait	3,892,115	22.3	3.6	218.4	1.7	98.3	74.6	0.82	66.5	34,265,895	517,500	978	614
Lebanon	5,850,743	24.0	4.2	571.9	12.2	87.8	79.4	0.77	44.7	7,480,817,046	1,250,000	4,329	1,606,709
Libya	6,278,438	29.8	0.3	3.6	21.4	78.6	71.7	0.72	42.6	..	-501,692	4,317	27,964
Morocco	34,377,511	27.2	1.3	77.0	39.8	60.2	74.0	0.63	45.5	7,066,597,059	-310,624	1,559	1,216
Oman	4,490,541	20.5	5.8	14.5	22.4	77.6	77.1	0.79	61.5	39,011,704	1,211,000	31	151
Qatar	2,235,355	15.5	2.9	192.5	0.8	99.2	78.6	0.85	86.4	437,087,912	363,500	21	133
Saudi Arabia	31,540,372	28.6	2.1	14.7	16.9	83.1	74.3	0.84	52.1	293,333,333	850,000	629	534
Syrian Arab Republic	18,502,413	37.1	-1.4	100.8	42.3	57.7	70.1	0.59	38.9	1,622,538,750	-4,029,996	4,194,554	677,756
Tunisia	11,107,800	23.4	1.0	71.5	33.2	66.8	74.1	0.72	41.3	2,346,621,114	-32,941	1,484	901
United Arab Emirates	9,156,963	13.9	0.8	109.5	14.5	85.5	77.4	0.84	77.6	..	405,000	93	417
West Bank & Gaza	4,422,143	40.2	2.9	734.6	24.7	75.3	72.9	..	30.6	2,182,495,003	-43,750	97,241	2,051,098
Yemen, Rep.	26,832,215	40.3	2.4	50.8	65.4	34.6	63.8	0.50	40.5	3,350,500,000	-50,000	5,832	257,645
SOUTH ASIA	1,744,161,298	29.8	1.3	365.5	67.0	33.0	68.1	..	53.9	48,446,857,698	-6,280,804	3,068,661	2,057,202
Afghanistan	32,526,562	44.0	2.8	49.8	73.3	26.7	60.4	0.47	43.4	268,060,745	473,007	2,632,534	280,267
Bangladesh	160,995,642	29.4	1.2	1236.8	65.7	34.3	71.6	0.57	67.8	15,387,889,721	-2,226,481	11,109	32,472
Bhutan	774,830	26.9	1.3	20.3	61.4	38.6	69.5	0.61	70.7	19,657,305	10,000	21,392	..
India	1,311,050,527	28.8	1.2	441.0	67.3	32.7	68.0	0.61	52.2	70,388,642,797	-2,598,218	10,359	199,937
Maldives	409,163	27.5	2.0	1363.9	54.5	45.5	76.8	0.71	59.4	3,643,527	-53	34	..
Nepal	28,513,700	32.7	1.2	198.9	81.4	18.6	69.6	0.55	81.0	6,729,935,671	-372,369	8,564	38,490
Pakistan	188,924,874	35.0	2.1	245.1	61.2	38.8	66.2	0.54	51.7	19,300,000,000	-1,081,918	262,136	1,505,525
Sri Lanka	20,966,000	24.6	0.9	334.3	81.6	18.4	74.8	0.76	52.4	6,999,731,475	-484,772	122,533	511
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	2,035,129,646	20.3	0.7	127.9	47.1	52.9	74.0	..	67.9	84,688,718,390	-3,728,059	1,023,273	484,782
Australia	23,781,169	18.7	1.3	3.1	10.6	89.4	82.3	0.94	61.2	2,173,991,483	1,023,107	18	35,582
Brunei Darussalam	423,188	23.1	1.4	80.3	22.8	77.2	78.8	0.86	61.3	..	2,102	1	0
Cambodia	15,577,899	31.6	1.6	88.3	79.3	20.7	68.2	0.56	82.2	376,750,842	-149,999	12,948	63
China	1,371,220,000	17.2	0.5	146.1	44.4	55.6	75.8	0.73	68.0	44,445,297,190	-1,800,000	210,815	301,052
Fiji	892,145	28.7	0.6	48.8	46.3	53.7	70.1	0.73	50.6	209,403,767	-28,720	924	13
Hong Kong SAR, China	7,305,700	12.0	0.9	6957.8	0.0	100.0	84.0	0.91	56.8	369,980,847	150,000	25	170
Indonesia	257,563,815	27.7	1.2	142.2	46.3	53.7	68.9	0.68	63.5	8,551,164,469	-700,000	14,429	4,270
Japan	126,958,472	12.9	-0.1	348.3	6.5	93.5	83.6	0.89	56.9	3,670,249,809	350,000	190	2,560
Kiribati	112,423	34.9	1.8	138.8	55.7	44.3	66.0	0.59	..	15,987,395	-2,130	3	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	25,155,317	21.2	0.5	208.9	39.1	60.9	70.1	..	74.7	..	0	1,079	..
Korea, Rep.	50,617,045	14.0	0.4	519.3	17.5	82.5	82.2	0.90	58.8	6,453,500,000	300,000	483	1,173
Lao PDR	6,802,023	34.8	1.7	29.5	61.4	38.6	66.1	0.58	76.7	92,998,445	-117,700	7,420	0
Macao SAR, China	587,606	13.0	1.7	19392.9	0.0	100.0	80.6	..	70.5	48,130,749	35,000	5	0
Malaysia	30,331,007	25.0	1.4	92.3	25.3	74.7	74.7	0.78	58.4	1,642,510,468	450,000	467	99,086
Mongolia	2,959,134	28.2	1.7	1.9	28.0	72.0	69.5	0.73	60.3	255,121,827	-15,001	2,177	6
Myanmar	53,897,154	27.6	0.9	82.5	65.9	34.1	65.9	0.54	76.0	3,236,470,900	-474,278	458,381	0
New Zealand	4,595,700	20.2	1.9	17.5	13.7	86.3	81.4	0.91	63.9	420,525,880	7,265	16	1,349
Papua New Guinea	7,619,321	37.1	2.1	16.8	87.0	13.0	62.6	0.51	70.4	10,441,276	0	288	4,929
Philippines	100,699,395	31.9	1.6	337.7	55.6	44.4	68.3	0.67	60.6	29,973,640,596	-700,000	669	222
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13

Table 1
Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Gross domestic product				Military spending	Debt & inflation		Exports & imports of goods & services		Exports & imports of food		Income inequality
	GDP (current million US\$)	growth (%)	per capita (current US\$)	per capita PPP ¹ (current int'l \$)	% of gov't spending	value of external debt (current million US\$)	annual inflation, consumer prices (%)	exports (% of GDP)	imports (% of GDP)	exports (% of merchandise)	imports (% of merchandise)	GINI* index, scale (0-100, 100 is maximal inequality)
	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2010-2014	2014	2012-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	1,559,937	1.6	4,379	12,173	..	62,448	3.2	29.5	33.0	6.4	17.9	..
Algeria	166,839	3.9	4,206	14,687	14.6	1,438	4.8	30.5	32.0	0.5	20.1	..
Bahrain	32,221	2.9	23,396	46,946	17.7	..	1.8	71.2	44.1	3.2	9.5	..
Djibouti	1,589	6.0	1,814	3,282	..	518	2.9	..	..	..	..	45.1
Egypt, Arab Rep.	330,779	4.2	3,615	10,891	5.7	..	10.4	13.2	21.6	17.1	21.1	..
Iran, Islamic Rep.	425,326	4.3	5,443	17,366	..	..	13.7	24.2	18.9	3.7	14.1	37.4
Iraq	168,607	2.1	4,629	14,895	..	..	-1.2	28.5	21.9	0.0	..	29.5
Israel	296,075	2.5	35,330	35,432	15.7	..	-0.6	31.1	28.3	3.0	7.7	42.8
Jordan	37,517	2.4	4,940	10,880	16.1	9,210	-0.9	37.8	60.0	20.4	18.2	33.7
Kuwait	112,812	-0.4	28,985	71,312	..	..	3.3	67.9	31.3	0.4	15.9	..
Lebanon	47,103	1.5	8,051	13,938	18.2	..	-3.7	56.9	64.9	26.2	17.8	..
Libya	29,153	-10.2	4,643	14,154	..	..	2.6	29.0	108.0	0.0	12.1	..
Morocco	100,360	4.4	2,872	7,821	10.2	28,653	1.6	34.3	46.6	18.9	12.2	..
Oman	70,255	3.5	15,645	38,234	44.3	..	0.1	68.8	46.6	2.3	12.4	..
Qatar	166,908	3.6	74,667	143,788	8.0	..	1.9	55.4	35.5	0.0	9.4	..
Saudi Arabia	646,002	3.5	20,482	53,430	..	..	2.2	33.7	38.8	1.8	14.1	..
Syrian Arab Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	36.7	..	..	21.0	21.0	..
Tunisia	43,015	0.8	3,873	11,397	4.3	16,933	4.9	45.6	56.6	9.7	10.6	35.8
United Arab Emirates	370,293	3.2	40,438	70,238	144.9	..	..	98.0	77.9	1.8	7.6	..
West Bank & Gaza	12,677	12.4	2,867	5,010	..	..	..	18.3	59.2	..	..	..
Yemen, Rep.	35,955	4.2	1,408	3,792	..	5,695	11.0	..	..	23.7	40.4	..
SOUTH ASIA	2,666,094	7.2	1,529	5,654	15.7	200,559	3.5	21.5	25.6	12.8	6.8	..
Afghanistan	19,199	1.5	590	1,934	2.8	1,616	-1.5	7.3	45.9	14.5	9.5	..
Bangladesh	195,079	6.6	1,212	3,333	0.0	20,632	6.2	17.3	24.7	3.9	19.5	32.0
Bhutan	1,962	3.3	2,532	8,077	..	1,194	4.5	44.5	71.5	6.9	13.7	38.7
India	2,073,543	7.6	1,582	6,089	15.7	107,995	5.9	22.9	25.9	11.6	5.8	..
Maldives	3,143	1.5	7,681	12,637	..	623	1.0	104.9	95.8	97.7	21.0	..
Nepal	20,881	3.4	732	2,458	10.1	2,854	7.9	11.7	41.6	26.9	18.3	32.8
Pakistan	269,971	5.5	1,429	5,042	19.5	39,831	2.5	10.9	17.1	19.9	12.1	29.6
Sri Lanka	82,316	4.8	3,926	11,739	13.8	25,815	0.9	20.5	28.0	25.7	13.1	38.6
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	13,067,366	6.5	6,421	12,770	..	351,815	1.3	25.3	22.3	4.7	7.0	..
Australia	1,339,539	2.3	56,328	45,514	6.8	..	1.5	19.8	21.2	17.2	6.7	34.9
Brunei Darussalam	15,492	-0.5	36,608	70,817	..	..	-0.2	71.0	35.7	0.4	15.4	..
Cambodia	18,050	7.0	1,159	3,483	13.4	4,153	1.2	67.6	74.1	3.4	7.7	30.8
China	10,866,444	6.9	7,925	14,239	..	84,296	1.4	22.4	18.8	2.8	6.7	42.1
Fiji	4,386	3.4	4,916	9,159	..	657	1.4	64.2	72.8	66.0	17.7	..
Hong Kong SAR, China	309,929	2.4	42,423	56,719	..	..	3.0	201.2	198.8	16.7	4.9	..
Indonesia	861,934	4.8	3,346	11,035	4.6	133,855	6.4	21.1	20.8	20.3	9.6	35.6
Japan	4,123,258	0.5	32,477	37,322	5.2	..	0.8	17.9	18.9	0.8	10.0	..
Kiribati	145	3.1	1,292	1,859	..	..	..	11.0	93.3	57.9	36.2	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea, Rep.	1,377,873	2.6	27,222	34,549	13.6	..	0.7	45.9	38.9	1.1	5.1	..
Lao PDR	12,327	7.0	1,812	5,675	1.8	4,280	1.3	34.8	44.2	..	..	37.9
Macao SAR, China	46,178	-20.3	78,586	111,270	..	..	4.6	77.8	37.1	27.2	14.9	..
Malaysia	296,218	5.0	9,766	26,891	6.8	..	2.1	71.0	63.4	10.9	8.9	..
Mongolia	11,758	2.3	3,973	12,189	3.6	2,775	5.8	44.9	42.0	0.8	9.0	33.8
Myanmar	64,866	7.0	1,204	..	..	..	10.8	..	..	19.6	8.3	..
New Zealand	173,754	3.4	37,808	36,982	3.5	..	0.2	28.0	27.3	60.6	11.3	..
Papua New Guinea	16,929	8.5	2,268	2,865	..	1,066	5.2	..	..	27.1	11.0	..
Philippines	291,965	5.8	2,899	7,359	7.1	54,206	1.4	27.9	32.9	7.8	11.7	43.0
column number	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

Table 1

Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Population						Life expectancy	Human development index (HDI)	Employment	Remittances	Migration		
	total	ages 0-14 (%)	growth (%)	density (per sq. km)	rural (%)	urban (%)	life exp. at birth (years)	score (0-1, 1 is most developed)	employment to pop. ratio (% of total pop. Above age 15)	workers' remittances & compensation received (current US\$)	net migration (number of people)	number of refugees fleeing	number of refugees granted asylum
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2014	2015	2014	2011-2015	2012	2014-2015	2014-2015
CONTINUED: EAST ASIA & PACIFIC													
Samoa	193,228	37.3	0.7	68.3	80.9	19.1	73.5	0.70	..	140,501,951	-12,690	1	..
Singapore	5,535,002	15.5	1.2	7828.9	0.0	100.0	82.6	0.91	65.6	..	397,936	59	3
Solomon Islands	583,591	39.5	2.0	20.8	77.7	22.3	67.9	0.51	63.7	18,549,182	-11,868	70	3
Thailand	67,959,359	17.7	0.3	133.0	49.6	50.4	74.4	0.73	71.5	5,217,665,437	100,000	227	75,137
Timor-Leste	1,245,015	42.4	2.7	83.7	67.2	32.8	68.3	0.60	36.0	61,586,172	-50,004	13	0
Tuvalu	9,916	..	0.2	330.5	40.3	59.7	..	..	..	4,056,908	..	2	..
Vanuatu	264,652	36.5	2.2	21.7	73.9	26.1	71.9	0.59	..	28,125,315	603	1	0
Vietnam	91,703,800	23.1	1.1	295.8	66.4	33.6	75.6	0.67	75.9	8,600,000,000	-200,002	313,333	0
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	411,338,238	20.3	0.6	18.2	34.9	65.1	71.9	..	55.1	35,406,015,527	2,121,162	580,654	1,671,134
Albania	2,889,167	18.5	-0.2	105.4	42.6	57.4	77.8	0.73	46.3	1,046,987,607	-91,750	10,463	104
Armenia	3,017,712	18.4	0.4	106.0	37.3	62.7	74.7	0.73	52.9	1,491,336,883	-9,876	11,891	3,190
Austria	8,611,088	14.2	0.8	104.3	34.0	66.0	81.3	0.89	57.9	2,813,999,369	147,089	9	55,598
Azerbaijan	9,651,349	21.9	1.2	116.8	45.4	54.6	70.8	0.75	63.2	1,269,964,000	-16,125	10,579	1,299
Belarus	9,513,000	16.1	0.3	46.9	23.3	76.7	73.0	0.80	52.9	695,700,000	120,535	4,299	925
Belgium	11,285,721	16.9	0.5	372.7	2.1	97.9	80.6	0.89	48.8	9,933,945,716	269,998	76	29,179
Bosnia & Herzegovina	3,810,416	13.5	-0.2	74.4	60.2	39.8	76.4	0.73	32.7	1,771,761,939	-2,506	19,628	6,890
Bulgaria	7,177,991	14.1	-0.6	66.1	26.1	73.9	75.4	0.78	47.2	1,684,200,000	-50,000	1,631	11,046
Croatia	4,224,404	14.9	-0.3	75.5	41.0	59.0	77.3	0.82	42.7	2,108,056,587	-20,000	33,669	679
Cyprus	1,165,300	16.6	1.0	126.1	33.1	66.9	80.1	0.85	53.9	248,747,634	35,000	6	5,126
Czech Republic	10,551,219	15.0	0.2	136.6	27.0	73.0	78.3	0.87	55.9	2,692,959,906	29,999	1,311	3,137
Denmark	5,676,002	16.9	0.6	133.8	12.3	87.7	80.5	0.92	58.3	1,246,807,043	96,839	11	17,785
Estonia	1,311,998	16.1	-0.2	31.0	32.5	67.5	77.2	0.86	57.3	445,513,173	-11,850	340	90
Finland	5,482,013	16.3	0.4	18.0	15.8	84.2	81.1	0.88	54.3	806,333,448	107,409	7	11,798
France	66,808,385	18.5	0.5	122.0	20.5	79.5	82.4	0.89	50.2	25,194,757,667	331,555	93	252,264
Georgia	3,679,000	17.3	-1.3	64.4	46.4	53.6	74.7	0.75	56.6	1,481,902,213	-296,323	6,719	442
Germany	81,413,145	12.9	0.5	233.6	24.7	75.3	80.8	0.92	56.9	15,362,079,258	1,249,998	174	216,973
Greece	10,823,732	14.6	-0.6	84.0	22.0	78.0	81.3	0.87	39.1	428,809,249	-136,299	112	7,304
Hungary	9,844,686	14.6	-0.2	108.7	28.8	71.2	75.9	0.83	47.9	4,020,999,033	29,999	1,303	2,867
Iceland	330,823	20.3	1.0	3.3	5.9	94.1	82.1	0.90	70.1	190,575,251	-378	1	99
Ireland	4,640,703	21.8	0.5	67.4	36.8	63.2	81.2	0.92	53.4	598,984,234	-140,001	10	5,853
Italy	60,802,085	13.7	0.0	206.7	31.0	69.0	82.7	0.87	43.1	9,517,018,087	528,269	68	93,715
Kazakhstan	17,544,126	26.7	1.5	6.5	46.8	53.2	71.6	0.79	69.7	228,533,438	159,807	2,242	633
Kosovo	1,797,151	25.7	-0.9	165.1	..	..	71.1	..	..	1,067,633,518	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	5,957,000	31.4	2.1	31.1	64.3	35.7	70.4	0.66	62.4	1,687,703,918	-113,963	2,423	482
Latvia	1,978,440	14.9	-0.8	31.8	32.6	67.4	74.2	0.82	54.8	1,416,314,429	-73,442	215	183
Lithuania	2,910,199	14.5	-0.8	46.4	33.5	66.5	74.0	0.84	54.3	1,373,829,944	-169,529	186	1,007
Luxembourg	569,676	16.4	2.4	220.0	9.8	90.2	82.2	0.89	53.9	1,613,012,653	48,704	2	1,108
Macedonia, FYR	2,078,453	17.0	0.1	82.4	42.9	57.1	75.3	0.75	39.9	306,962,282	-4,999	1,813	614
Malta	431,333	14.0	0.9	1347.9	4.6	95.4	81.7	0.84	48.8	173,445,151	6,252	5	6,095
Moldova	3,554,150	16.0	-0.1	123.8	55.0	45.0	71.5	0.69	39.9	1,533,380,000	-9,529	2,242	335
Montenegro	622,388	18.7	0.1	46.3	36.0	64.0	76.2	0.80	40.4	381,192,065	-2,412	615	6,462
Netherlands	16,936,520	16.5	0.4	503.0	9.5	90.5	81.3	0.79	59.7	1,364,837,762	110,006	64	82,494
Norway	5,195,921	18.0	1.1	14.2	19.5	80.5	81.8	0.94	62.6	609,681,193	235,665	13	47,043
Poland	37,999,494	14.9	0.0	124.1	39.5	60.5	77.3	0.84	51.3	6,780,000,000	-73,809	1,401	15,741
Portugal	10,348,648	14.1	-0.5	113.0	36.5	63.5	80.7	0.83	51.7	359,198,919	-140,000	31	699
Romania	19,832,389	15.5	-0.4	86.2	45.4	54.6	75.1	0.79	52.8	2,932,533,067	-437,201	1,929	2,182
Russian Federation	144,096,812	16.8	0.2	8.8	26.0	74.0	70.4	0.80	60.5	6,869,650,000	1,117,884	71,497	235,750
Serbia	7,098,247	16.3	-0.5	81.2	44.4	55.6	75.5	0.77	40.9	3,370,664,815	-99,999	44,892	43,751
Slovak Republic	5,424,050	15.1	0.1	112.8	46.4	53.6	76.7	0.84	51.6	2,137,565,543	1,199	305	799
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13

Table 1

Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Gross domestic product				Military spending	Debt & inflation		Exports & imports of goods & services		Exports & imports of food		Income inequality
	GDP (current million US\$)	growth (%)	per capita (current US\$)	per capita PPP ¹ (current int'l \$)	% of gov't spending	value of external debt (current million US\$)	annual inflation, consumer prices (%)	exports (% of GDP)	imports (% of GDP)	exports (% of merchandise)	imports (% of merchandise)	GINI* index, scale (0-100, 100 is maximal inequality)
	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2010-2014	2014	2012-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2013
CONTINUED: EAST ASIA & PACIFIC												
Samoa	761	1.6	3,939	5,923	..	317	0.7	27.2	50.5	34.1	24.3	..
Singapore	292,739	2.0	52,889	85,209	25.1	..	-0.5	176.5	149.6	2.9	4.1	..
Solomon Islands	1,157	3.3	1,982	2,186	..	85	-0.6	45.0	53.2	14.1	20.5	..
Thailand	395,282	2.8	5,816	16,305	7.3	27,538	-0.9	69.3	62.7	13.8	6.6	39.3
Timor-Leste	1,412	4.3	1,134	2,259	..	..	0.6	6.5	104.3	30.5	14.4	..
Tuvalu	38	2.0	3,827	3,779	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	815	2.3	3,148	3,042	..	67	2.5	48.0	49.4	85.3	25.0	37.2
Vietnam	193,599	6.7	2,111	6,023	..	38,378	0.6	89.8	89.0	14.8	8.6	38.7
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	2,887,774	-0.7	7,020	18,061	12.8	293,586	4.1	32.6	29.6	7.6	10.6	..
Albania	11,456	2.6	3,965	11,305	..	3,481	1.9	27.1	44.3	5.6	14.5	29.0
Armenia	10,561	3.0	3,500	8,394	16.8	3,163	3.7	29.7	41.3	31.2	19.9	31.5
Austria	374,056	0.9	43,439	47,824	1.6	..	0.9	53.4	49.0	7.4	7.9	30.5
Azerbaijan	53,047	1.1	5,496	17,740	21.0	5,544	4.2	37.8	34.8	3.8	17.5	..
Belarus	54,609	-3.9	5,740	17,661	4.5	17,032	13.5	60.1	59.1	15.3	14.2	26.0
Belgium	454,039	1.4	40,231	43,992	2.2	..	0.6	84.4	82.7	9.7	9.2	27.6
Bosnia & Herzegovina	15,995	3.2	4,198	10,510	2.6	4,830	..	33.9	56.9	8.5	18.0	..
Bulgaria	48,953	3.0	6,820	17,512	4.9	5,981	-0.1	66.5	65.0	15.5	9.7	36.0
Croatia	48,732	1.6	11,536	21,880	4.6	..	-0.5	49.4	46.6	13.3	13.2	32.0
Cyprus	19,320	1.6	22,957	30,734	3.2	..	-2.1	55.4	52.7	31.8	20.2	34.3
Czech Republic	181,811	4.2	17,231	32,167	3.1	..	0.3	84.5	78.1	5.0	6.0	26.1
Denmark	295,164	1.2	52,002	46,635	3.0	..	0.5	53.3	46.9	18.3	13.9	29.1
Estonia	22,691	1.1	17,295	28,095	..	..	-0.5	79.8	75.7	10.1	10.3	33.2
Finland	229,810	0.5	41,921	40,601	3.2	..	-0.2	37.3	37.0	2.4	8.4	27.1
France	2,421,682	1.2	36,248	39,678	4.6	..	0.0	30.0	31.4	11.2	8.6	33.1
Georgia	13,965	2.8	3,796	9,679	12.2	4,916	4.0	45.0	64.9	34.9	13.8	40.0
Germany	3,355,772	1.7	41,219	47,268	4.2	..	0.2	46.9	39.1	5.4	7.8	30.1
Greece	195,212	-0.2	18,036	26,680	4.8	..	-1.7	30.1	30.3	20.8	14.0	36.7
Hungary	120,687	2.9	12,259	25,582	1.9	..	-0.1	89.3	82.0	8.0	5.3	30.6
Iceland	16,598	4.0	50,173	46,547	0.4	..	1.6	53.7	46.6	45.0	11.3	26.9
Ireland	238,020	7.8	51,290	54,654	1.3	..	-0.3	121.4	100.6	10.1	11.7	32.5
Italy	1,814,763	0.8	29,847	35,896	3.4	..	0.0	30.2	27.0	8.7	10.9	35.2
Kazakhstan	184,361	1.2	10,508	25,877	..	13,624	6.7	28.6	24.7	3.3	10.3	26.4
Kosovo	6,386	3.6	3,553	9,712	..	386	..	19.1	49.8	..	..	26.7
Kyrgyz Republic	6,572	3.5	1,103	3,427	14.0	2,368	6.5	37.4	87.7	28.5	14.1	27.4
Latvia	27,035	1.9	13,665	24,286	3.1	..	0.2	58.8	60.2	17.1	13.4	35.5
Lithuania	41,244	1.6	14,172	27,730	9.2	..	-0.9	77.3	77.4	18.1	12.9	35.2
Luxembourg	57,794	4.8	101,450	101,926	1.1	..	0.5	213.8	177.6	10.8	12.3	34.8
Macedonia, FYR	10,086	3.7	4,853	13,908	4.2	2,717	-0.3	48.5	64.8	11.6	11.7	..
Malta	9,643	2.9	22,776	29,526	1.3	..	1.1	93.6	88.9	6.1	9.4	..
Moldova	6,551	-0.5	1,843	5,039	1.0	926	9.7	43.4	73.7	62.7	14.0	28.5
Montenegro	3,993	3.4	6,415	15,486	..	..	1.5	43.3	61.0	..	..	33.2
Netherlands	752,547	2.0	44,433	48,459	2.8	..	0.6	82.8	71.5	15.8	12.9	28.0
Norway	388,315	1.6	74,735	61,472	4.1	..	2.2	37.1	31.5	9.4	9.5	25.9
Poland	474,783	3.6	12,494	26,135	8.6	..	-1.0	49.4	46.6	12.9	8.5	32.4
Portugal	198,931	1.5	19,223	29,214	3.7	..	0.5	40.3	39.6	12.4	15.0	36.0
Romania	177,954	3.7	8,973	21,403	4.2	44,161	-0.6	41.1	41.6	10.4	8.8	27.3
Russian Federation	1,326,015	-3.7	9,057	24,451	15.5	..	15.5	29.5	21.2	4.7	13.9	41.6
Serbia	36,513	0.7	5,144	13,482	5.3	18,350	1.4	47.7	57.4	..	..	29.7
Slovak Republic	86,582	3.6	15,963	28,877	4.3	..	-0.3	93.8	91.4	3.8	5.6	26.1
column number	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

Table 1

Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Population						Life expectancy	Human development index (HDI)	Employment	Remittances	Migration		
	total	ages 0-14 (%)	growth (%)	density (per sq. km)	rural (%)	urban (%)	life exp. at birth (years)	score (0-1, 1 is most developed)	employment to pop. ratio (% of total pop. Above age 15)	workers' remittances & compensation received (current US\$)	net migration (number of people)	number of refugees fleeing	number of refugees granted asylum
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2014	2015	2014	2011-2015	2012	2014-2015	2014-2015
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA													
Slovenia	2,063,768	14.8	0.1	102.5	50.4	49.7	80.5	0.88	52.1	757,635,060	4,324	24	257
Spain	46,418,269	14.9	-0.1	92.8	20.4	79.6	83.1	0.88	44.4	2,643,176,609	-593,069	60	5,798
Sweden	9,798,871	17.3	1.1	24.1	14.2	85.8	82.0	0.91	58.9	3,268,689,157	272,626	18	142,207
Switzerland	8,286,976	14.8	1.2	209.7	26.1	73.9	82.8	0.93	65.0	2,234,903,895	382,267	17	62,620
Tajikistan	8,481,855	34.8	2.2	60.6	73.2	26.8	69.6	0.62	60.7	2,258,643,220	-117,382	741	2,026
Turkey	78,665,830	25.7	1.5	102.2	26.6	73.4	75.2	0.76	44.8	1,400,000,000	2,000,003	63,004	1,587,374
Turkmenistan	5,373,502	28.2	1.2	11.4	50.0	50.0	65.6	0.69	55.3	..	-25,001	498	35
Ukraine	45,198,200	14.9	-0.4	78.0	30.3	69.7	71.2	0.75	55.0	5,850,000,000	195,000	318,786	3,219
United Kingdom	65,138,232	17.8	0.8	269.2	17.4	82.6	81.1	0.91	58.2	4,998,792,885	900,000	141	117,161
Uzbekistan	31,299,500	28.5	1.7	73.6	63.6	36.4	68.3	0.68	55.3	..	-195,001	4,762	125
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN													
ARGENTINA	561,948,237	26.0	1.1	34.4	21.3	78.7	74.6	..	62.7	65,948,683,259	-2,189,855	446,149	82,213
Argentina	43,416,755	25.2	1.0	15.9	8.2	91.8	76.2	0.84	55.9	489,417,096	30,000	312	3,498
Bahamas, the	388,019	20.9	1.3	38.8	17.1	82.9	75.2	0.79	62.7	..	9,672	215	13
Belize	359,287	32.5	2.1	15.8	56.0	44.0	70.1	0.72	58.2	84,744,075	7,594	45	10
Bolivia	10,724,705	32.4	1.5	9.9	31.5	68.5	68.3	0.66	70.6	1,183,636,844	-61,794	593	763
Brazil	207,847,528	23.0	0.9	24.9	14.3	85.7	74.4	0.76	65.0	2,896,909,952	15,924	971	7,490
Chile	17,948,141	20.1	1.0	24.1	10.5	89.5	81.5	0.83	58.0	127,030,067	201,289	604	1,773
Colombia	48,228,704	24.3	0.9	43.5	23.6	76.4	74.0	0.72	60.7	4,679,211,417	-144,998	346,125	213
Costa Rica	4,807,850	22.3	1.1	94.2	23.2	76.8	79.4	0.77	57.8	553,128,508	19,658	418	12,924
Cuba	11,389,562	16.3	0.1	107.0	22.9	77.1	79.4	0.77	54.9	..	-79,999	7,058	280
Dominican Republic	10,528,391	30.0	1.2	217.9	21.0	79.0	73.5	0.72	55.1	5,196,200,000	-153,010	358	608
Ecuador	16,144,363	29.0	1.5	65.0	36.3	63.7	75.9	0.73	65.6	2,387,555,892	-38,001	807	53,817
El Salvador	6,126,583	27.0	0.3	295.7	33.3	66.7	72.8	0.67	58.4	4,285,225,721	-240,415	11,120	35
Guatemala	16,342,897	36.6	2.0	152.5	48.4	51.6	71.7	0.63	65.9	6,587,500,000	-120,001	7,467	164
Guyana	767,085	28.8	0.4	3.9	71.4	28.6	66.4	0.64	54.5	293,505,489	-27,278	703	11
Haiti	10,711,067	33.7	1.3	388.6	41.4	58.6	62.7	0.48	61.5	2,195,560,227	-150,000	37,092	3
Honduras	8,075,060	31.8	1.4	72.2	45.3	54.7	73.1	0.61	60.4	3,666,201,327	-80,000	4,312	26
Jamaica	2,725,941	23.6	0.2	251.7	45.2	54.8	75.7	0.72	55.0	2,360,932,274	-97,000	1,696	22
Mexico	127,017,224	27.6	1.3	65.3	20.8	79.2	76.7	0.76	58.6	26,171,340,166	-523,585	10,664	1,837
Nicaragua	6,082,032	30.0	1.1	50.5	41.2	58.8	74.8	0.63	60.3	1,197,500,000	-135,000	1,434	280
Panama	3,929,141	27.2	1.6	52.9	33.4	66.6	77.6	0.78	62.6	557,400,000	28,105	72	2,271
Paraguay	6,639,123	30.1	1.3	16.7	40.3	59.7	72.9	0.68	67.2	506,640,000	-86,700	94	153
Peru	31,376,670	27.9	1.3	24.5	21.4	78.6	74.5	0.73	73.1	2,725,062,654	-240,000	4,129	1,303
Suriname	542,975	26.8	0.9	3.5	34.0	66.0	71.2	0.71	51.5	6,705,560	-5,000	17	0
Trinidad & Tobago	1,360,088	20.8	0.4	265.1	91.6	8.4	70.4	0.77	61.5	130,993,693	-5,000	371	83
Uruguay	3,431,555	21.4	0.4	19.6	4.7	95.3	77.0	0.79	61.2	116,827,697	-30,000	125	272
Venezuela, RB	31,108,083	28.1	1.3	35.3	11.0	89.0	74.2	0.76	59.5	104,000,000	-69,121	7,954	5,052
NORTH AMERICA													
CANADA	357,335,829	18.7	0.8	19.6	18.4	81.6	79.2	..	58.8	9,780,213,461	6,183,750	5,036	416,385
Canada	35,851,774	16.0	0.9	3.9	18.2	81.8	82.0	0.91	61.5	1,324,338,470	1,175,863	87	149,163
United States	321,418,820	19.0	0.8	35.1	18.4	81.6	78.9	0.92	58.5	7,090,000,000	5,007,887	4,949	267,222
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13

Table 1
Demographics & Economic Indicators

	Gross domestic product				Military spending	Debt & inflation		Exports & imports of goods & services		Exports & imports of food		Income inequality
	GDP (current million US\$)	growth (%)	per capita (current US\$)	per capita PPP† (current int'l \$)	% of gov't spending	value of external debt (current million US\$)	annual inflation, consumer prices (%)	exports (% of GDP)	imports (% of GDP)	exports (% of merchandise)	imports (% of merchandise)	GINI* index, scale (0-100, 100 is maximal inequality)
	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2010-2014	2014	2012-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2013
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA												
Slovenia	42,747	2.9	20,713	31,122	2.8	..	-0.5	77.8	68.5	4.3	8.7	25.6
Spain	1,199,057	3.2	25,832	34,527	5.7	..	-0.5	33.1	30.7	16.2	11.3	35.9
Sweden	492,618	4.1	50,273	46,420	3.5	..	0.0	45.2	40.9	6.3	10.8	27.3
Switzerland	664,738	0.9	80,215	60,535	4.3	..	-1.1	63.5	51.1	4.0	6.2	31.6
Tajikistan	7,853	4.2	926	2,780	..	1,700	5.7	19.2	68.3	..	..	..
Turkey	718,221	4.0	9,130	19,618	6.4	121,616	7.7	28.0	30.8	12.1	5.3	40.2
Turkmenistan	37,334	6.5	6,948	16,499	..	247	..	73.3	44.4	..	..	..
Ukraine	90,615	-9.9	2,115	7,916	5.7	38,748	48.7	52.8	54.8	30.7	10.8	24.6
United Kingdom	2,848,755	2.3	43,734	41,325	5.0	..	0.1	27.4	29.4	6.7	10.1	32.6
Uzbekistan	66,733	8.0	2,132	5,996	..	3,795	..	20.7	22.2	..	..	..
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN												
	4,260,813	-1.1	7,582	14,620	..	568,103	3.1	20.8	23.5	22.3	6.7	..
Argentina	548,055	0.5	12,751	..	..	..	10.6	14.8	14.5	62.4	2.7	42.3
Bahamas, the	8,884	1.2	22,897	23,795	..	..	1.5	43.1	50.3	20.1	16.1	..
Belize	1,760	1.9	4,907	8,527	4.3	1,107	-0.9	60.1	65.5	63.9	22.6	..
Bolivia	33,197	4.0	3,095	6,881	..	4,879	4.1	43.3	42.0	17.4	7.0	48.1
Brazil	1,774,725	-3.8	8,539	15,359	5.7	151,609	9.0	13.0	14.3	37.6	5.1	52.9
Chile	240,216	2.1	13,384	22,316	9.4	..	4.3	30.1	30.3	24.2	9.0	50.5
Colombia	292,080	3.1	6,056	13,801	9.6	58,533	5.0	14.7	24.2	10.9	9.5	53.5
Costa Rica	51,107	2.8	10,630	15,377	0.0	8,688	0.8	35.1	37.2	34.5	10.5	49.2
Cuba	77,150	2.7	6,790	20,649	..	..	..	24.1	20.2	..	..	..
Dominican Republic	67,103	7.0	6,374	14,212	4.0	15,706	0.8	24.6	28.9	26.5	14.4	47.1
Ecuador	100,872	0.3	6,248	11,388	..	13,047	4.0	21.1	24.1	47.8	8.8	47.3
El Salvador	25,850	2.5	4,219	8,602	4.7	9,969	-0.7	26.0	42.0	19.6	17.0	43.5
Guatemala	63,794	4.1	3,903	7,707	3.4	8,003	2.4	21.3	30.0	43.3	14.3	52.4
Guyana	3,166	3.0	4,127	7,506	..	1,010	0.9	45.7	74.8	69.1	14.7	..
Haiti	8,877	1.7	829	1,762	..	982	9.0	19.8	49.7	..	..	60.8
Honduras	20,152	3.6	2,496	5,084	6.7	5,203	3.2	45.1	64.0	54.9	18.1	53.7
Jamaica	14,006	0.9	5,138	9,063	3.0	9,280	3.7	30.1	46.9	18.3	16.7	..
Mexico	1,144,331	2.5	9,009	17,277	..	235,990	2.7	35.3	37.5	6.9	6.0	48.1
Nicaragua	12,693	4.9	2,087	5,190	4.4	3,365	4.0	37.5	55.5	51.5	16.7	..
Panama	52,132	5.8	13,268	22,192	..	15,320	0.1	53.6	61.4	69.7	13.7	51.7
Paraguay	27,623	3.0	4,161	9,184	6.5	2,628	3.1	41.9	40.3	62.2	8.7	48.3
Peru	192,084	3.3	6,122	12,402	6.9	21,753	3.6	21.0	23.6	26.2	11.2	44.7
Suriname	4,878	1.5	8,984	16,970	..	..	6.9	40.6	50.5	3.3	13.7	..
Trinidad & Tobago	27,806	1.0	20,444	32,597	2.1	..	4.7	34.7	25.2	2.5	11.2	..
Uruguay	53,443	1.0	15,574	21,201	5.8	..	8.7	22.3	22.6	65.3	11.1	41.9
Venezuela, RB	371,337	-5.7	12,265	18,309	..	..	121.7	24.8	29.5	0.0	18.4	..
NORTH AMERICA												
	19,503,407	2.3	54,580	54,680	14.1	..	0.6	14.3	17.2	10.7	6.3	..
Canada	1,550,537	1.1	43,249	44,310	6.0	..	1.1	31.5	33.8	12.7	8.3	33.7
United States	17,900,000	2.4	55,837	55,837	15.3	..	0.1	12.6	15.5	10.1	5.9	41.1
column number	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

.. Data not available.

0 Zero, or rounds to zero at displayed number of decimals.

† Purchasing Power Parity: a method of currency conversion that equalizes the purchasing power of different currencies.

* GINI index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 2

MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty

	People living in poverty					Distribution of income by population quintiles					
	below national poverty line (% of total population)	below national rural poverty line (% of rural population)	below national urban poverty line (% of urban population)	below \$2 PPP† per day (%)	below \$1.25 PPP† per day (%)	share held by lowest 20%	share held by second 20%	share held by third 20%	share held by fourth 20%	share held by highest 20%	share of lowest pop. quintile in national consumption (%)
	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2011-2012
World	..	..	..	..	12.7	..	..	..	..	..	..
High-income countries	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Low- & middle-income countries	..	..	..	34.9	14.9	..	..	..	..	..	..
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	..	..	..	67.0	42.7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Benin	36.2	39.7	31.4	75.6	53.1	6.1	9.6	13.4	20.2	50.7	6.1
Botswana	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Burkina Faso	40.1	47.5	13.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Burundi	64.6	68.8	27.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cameroon	37.5	56.8	8.9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cape Verde	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Central African Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Chad	46.7	52.5	20.9	64.8	38.4	4.9	9.7	14.8	21.8	48.8	4.9
Comoros	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Congo, Dem. Rep.	63.6	64.9	61.6	90.7	77.2	5.5	10.0	14.5	21.6	48.4	..
Congo, Rep.	46.5	74.8	..	52.9	28.7	5.7	10.3	15.5	22.6	46.1	5.6
Côte d'Ivoire	46.3	56.8	35.9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Eritrea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ethiopia	29.6	30.4	25.7	71.3	33.5	8.0	12.6	16.3	21.3	41.7	..
Gabon	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Gambia, the	48.4	73.9	32.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ghana	24.2	37.9	10.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Guinea	55.2	64.7	35.4	68.7	35.3	7.6	12.2	16.4	22.4	41.5	7.6
Guinea-Bissau	69.3	75.6	51.0	83.6	67.1	4.5	8.3	12.2	18.3	56.7	..
Kenya	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lesotho	57.1	61.2	39.6	77.3	59.7	2.8	6.8	11.9	20.3	58.2	..
Liberia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Madagascar	75.3	81.5	51.1	92.9	81.8	6.5	10.7	14.6	20.3	48.0	..
Malawi	50.7	56.6	17.3	87.6	70.9	5.5	9.2	13.3	19.8	52.4	..
Mali	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mauritania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mauritius	..	..	..	3.0	0.5	7.4	11.8	15.7	21.2	43.9	7.4
Mozambique	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Namibia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Niger	48.9	55.2	18.6	81.8	50.3	8.9	12.7	16.2	21.4	40.8	9.0
Nigeria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Rwanda	44.9	48.7	22.1	80.7	60.3	5.1	8.3	11.6	17.1	58.0	5.2
São Tomé and Príncipe	..	..	..	69.2	33.9	8.4	12.7	16.8	22.6	39.5	..
Senegal	46.7	57.1	33.1	66.3	38.0	6.1	10.4	15.0	21.7	46.9	6.0
Sierra Leone	52.9	66.1	31.2	80.0	52.3	7.9	11.9	15.8	21.9	42.4	7.8
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
South Sudan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
South Africa	53.8	77.0	39.2	34.7	16.6	2.5	4.7	8.0	15.9	68.9	2.5
Sudan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Swaziland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tanzania	28.2	33.3	15.5	76.1	46.6	7.4	11.1	15.0	20.7	45.8	7.4
Togo	55.1	68.7	35.9	74.5	54.2	4.8	8.7	13.4	21.5	51.6	4.8
Uganda	19.5	22.4	9.6	63.0	33.2	6.1	10.1	14.0	20.4	49.4	5.8
Zambia	60.5	77.9	27.5	78.9	64.4	3.8	6.8	10.5	17.9	61.1	..
Zimbabwe	72.3	84.3	46.5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

Table 2
MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty

	People living in poverty					Distribution of income by population quintiles					share of lowest pop. quintile in national consumption (%)
	below national poverty line (% of total population)	below national rural poverty line (% of rural population)	below national urban poverty line (% of urban population)	below \$2 PPP1 per day (%)	below \$1.25 PPP1 per day (%)	share held by lowest 20%	share held by second 20%	share held by third 20%	share held by fourth 20%	share held by highest 20%	
	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2010-2013	2011-2012
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Algeria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Djibouti	..	..	..	37.0	18.3	4.3	9.8	14.4	21.2	50.3	..
Egypt, Arab Rep.	25.2	32.3	15.3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iran, Islamic Rep.	..	..	..	0.7	0.1	6.8	11.1	15.6	22.0	44.6	..
Iraq	18.9	30.6	14.8	..	..	8.8	13.1	17.1	22.5	38.5	8.8
Jordan	14.4	16.8	13.9	2.0	0.1	8.2	12.1	15.8	21.5	42.4	..
Lebanon	27.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Libya	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Morocco	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Syrian Arab Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tunisia	15.5	..	..	8.4	2.0	6.7	11.6	16.1	22.6	42.9	..
West Bank & Gaza	25.8	19.4	26.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Yemen, Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
SOUTH ASIA	..	..	..	54.5	18.8	..	..	..	..	..	..
Afghanistan	35.8	38.3	27.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Bangladesh	31.5	35.2	21.3	77.6	43.7	8.9	12.5	16.0	21.2	41.4	..
Bhutan	12.0	16.7	1.8	13.5	2.2	6.8	10.8	15.1	21.4	45.9	6.8
India	21.9	25.7	13.7	58.0	21.3	8.2	11.8	15.2	20.5	44.2	..
Maldives	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Nepal	25.2	27.4	15.5	48.4	15.0	8.3	12.1	16.2	21.9	41.4	..
Pakistan	29.5	35.6	18.2	45.0	8.3	9.6	13.2	16.5	21.3	39.5	..
Sri Lanka	6.7	7.6	2.1	14.0	1.7	7.3	11.0	14.7	20.6	46.5	..
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	..	..	..	22.2	7.2	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cambodia	17.7	20.8	6.4	37.0	6.2	9.1	12.7	16.3	21.8	40.2	9.0
China	..	7.2	..	27.2	11.2	4.7	9.7	15.3	23.2	47.1	..
Fiji	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Indonesia	11.3	14.2	8.3	41.7	15.9	7.6	11.3	15.6	21.8	43.7	..
Kiribati	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lao PDR	23.2	28.6	10.0	63.3	30.0	7.3	11.1	15.0	20.8	45.9	7.6
Malaysia	0.6	1.6	0.3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mongolia	21.6	26.4	18.8	4.0	0.4	7.7	12.0	16.3	22.4	41.7	..
Myanmar	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Papua New Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Philippines	25.2	..	13.0	37.6	13.1	5.9	9.5	13.8	21.2	49.6	5.9
Samoa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Solomon Islands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Thailand	10.5	13.9	7.7	1.2	0.1	6.7	10.4	14.8	21.8	46.3	..
Timor-Leste	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tuvalu	26.3	27.5	24.8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	12.7	..	..	38.8	15.4	6.7	11.3	15.7	22.2	44.2	..
Vietnam	13.5	18.6	3.8	13.9	3.2	6.5	10.8	15.3	21.8	45.7	..
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	..	..	..	6.2	2.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Albania	14.3	15.3	13.6	6.8	1.1	8.9	13.2	17.3	22.8	37.8	8.9
Armenia	30.0	29.9	30.0	17.0	2.4	8.5	12.6	16.6	22.0	40.3	8.8
Azerbaijan	6.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

Table 2

MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty

	People living in poverty					Distribution of income by population quintiles					
	below national poverty line (% of total population) 2010-2015	below national rural poverty line (% of rural population) 2010-2015	below national urban poverty line (% of urban population) 2010-2015	below \$2 PPP† per day (%) 2010-2013	below \$1.25 PPP† per day (%) 2010-2013	share held by lowest 20% 2010-2013	share held by second 20% 2010-2013	share held by third 20% 2010-2013	share held by fourth 20% 2010-2013	share held by highest 20% 2010-2013	share of lowest pop. quintile in national consumption (%) 2011-2012
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA											
Belarus	5.1	7.9	3.7	0.0	0.0	9.7	14.1	17.9	22.5	35.8	9.4
Bosnia & Herzegovina	17.9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Bulgaria	22.0	..	..	4.7	2.0	6.2	12.2	16.6	22.4	42.7	6.4
Georgia	14.8	18.8	10.5	28.6	11.5	5.6	10.5	15.4	22.5	46.0	5.3
Kazakhstan	2.8	4.7	1.3	0.3	0.0	10.0	13.8	17.5	22.4	36.4	..
Kosovo	29.7	31.5	26.7	0.3	0.0	9.4	14.2	17.7	22.4	36.4	..
Kyrgyz Republic	30.6	32.6	26.9	20.0	2.9	9.6	13.9	17.3	21.9	37.3	7.7
Latvia	22.5	..	..	0.0	1.4	6.3	12.2	16.5	22.6	42.4	6.2
Lithuania	19.1	..	..	0.0	1.0	6.5	12.2	16.6	22.6	42.0	7.0
Macedonia, FYR	22.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Moldova	11.4	18.8	8.2	2.0	0.1	9.1	13.4	17.3	22.5	37.8	8.5
Montenegro	8.6	9.7	7.9	3.9	1.7	7.1	12.5	16.8	23.1	40.5	8.3
Romania	25.4	..	..	4.1	0.0	8.9	13.8	17.9	23.2	36.3	8.9
Russian Federation	13.4	..	..	0.5	0.0	5.9	10.1	14.5	21.2	48.3	..
Serbia	25.4	..	..	1.7	0.1	8.4	13.3	17.4	22.8	38.2	..
Tajikistan	32.0	36.1	23.5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Turkey	1.6	5.1	0.6	3.1	0.3	5.8	10.5	15.1	22.0	46.6	5.8
Turkmenistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ukraine	8.6	..	..	0.1	0.0	10.3	14.5	17.9	22.2	35.1	..
Uzbekistan	16.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN											
..	..	..	..	12.0	5.6	..	..	..	..	..	..
Belize	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Bolivia	39.3	57.6	30.6	13.4	7.7	3.4	8.7	14.0	21.7	52.2	3.3
Brazil	7.4	..	..	9.1	4.9	3.3	7.6	12.4	19.3	57.4	3.4
Chile	14.4	27.9	12.4	2.1	0.9	4.6	8.3	12.1	18.3	56.7	4.5
Colombia	27.8	40.3	24.1	13.8	6.1	3.4	7.3	11.9	19.6	58.0	3.3
Costa Rica	21.7	27.9	19.4	4.0	1.7	4.1	8.2	12.6	20.7	54.4	4.2
Cuba	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Dominican Republic	41.1	51.2	36.3	9.1	2.3	4.9	8.8	13.2	20.0	53.1	5.0
Ecuador	22.5	35.3	16.4	11.6	4.4	4.6	8.8	13.3	20.6	52.7	4.3
El Salvador	31.8	37.9	28.5	11.5	3.3	5.5	9.8	14.2	20.7	49.8	5.7
Guatemala	59.3	76.1	42.2	26.5	11.5	3.9	7.8	12.0	19.2	57.2	3.9
Guyana	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Haiti	58.5	74.9	40.6	71.0	53.9	2.0	5.5	10.0	18.3	64.3	..
Honduras	62.8	65.0	61.0	34.6	18.9	3.1	7.2	12.1	19.9	57.7	2.6
Jamaica	19.9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mexico	53.2	62.4	50.5	10.3	2.7	4.9	8.8	12.8	19.5	54.1	4.9
Nicaragua	29.6	50.1	14.8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Panama	23.0	..	..	8.0	2.9	3.4	7.7	12.6	20.1	56.2	3.2
Paraguay	22.6	32.0	16.2	6.3	2.2	4.3	8.5	13.2	20.8	53.2	4.1
Peru	22.7	46.0	15.3	9.7	3.7	4.4	9.4	14.6	21.9	49.7	4.2
Suriname	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Uruguay	9.7	3.0	10.1	1.6	0.3	5.1	10.0	15.0	22.4	47.5	5.2
Venezuela, RB	32.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

.. Data not available.

0 Zero, or rounds to zero at displayed number of decimals.

† Purchasing Power Parity: a method of currency conversion that equalizes the purchasing power of different currencies.

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 3
MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger

	Population hungry			Children (under 5) hungry			Nutritional supplements		Exclusive breastfeeding
	million(s) 2011-2015	% of total population 2015	low birth weight newborns (%) 2010-2012	underweight (%) 2010-2014	wasting (%) 2010-2014	stunting (%) 2010-2014	vitamin A coverage rate (% of children under 5) 2010-2014	consumption of iodized salt (% of households) 2010-2013	received by infants under 6 months (%) 2010-2015
World	..	10.8	10.5	14.3	7.5	23.8	..	73.6	..
High-income countries	..	..	7.6	1.1	1.0	3.3	..	..	..
Low- & middle-income countries	..	12.7	11.0	16.2	8.1	26.6	..	73.6	35.9
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	..	18.5	..	19.6	8.3	35.7	74.0	58.4	40.0
Angola	3.2	14.2	..	..	..	..	6.0	..	..
Benin	0.8	7.5	..	18.0	4.5	34.0	99.0	86.0	41.4
Botswana	0.5	24.1	..	..	..	..	70.0	..	..
Burkina Faso	3.7	20.7	14.1	26.2	15.4	35.1	98.0	95.9	50.1
Burundi	..	..	12.9	29.1	6.1	57.5	69.0	96.1	69.3
Cameroon	2.3	9.9	..	15.1	5.8	32.6	96.0	85.1	28.2
Cape Verde	0.1	9.4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Central African Republic	2.3	47.7	13.7	23.5	7.4	40.7	34.0	64.5	34.3
Chad	4.7	34.4	19.9	30.3	15.7	38.7	96.0	53.8	0.3
Comoros	..	..	..	16.9	11.1	32.1	14.0	..	12.1
Congo, Dem. Rep.	..	..	9.5	23.4	8.1	42.6	99.0	58.6	47.6
Congo, Rep.	1.4	30.5	..	11.8	5.9	25.0	99.0	..	32.9
Côte d'Ivoire	2.8	13.3	..	15.7	7.6	29.6	99.0	..	12.1
Eritrea	..	..	..	38.8	15.3	50.3	49.0	..	68.7
Ethiopia	31.6	32.0	..	25.2	8.7	40.4	71.0	15.4	52.0
Gabon	..	5.0	..	6.5	3.4	17.5	2.0	..	6.0
Gambia, the	0.1	5.3	10.2	16.4	11.1	25.0	27.0	22.0	46.8
Ghana	1.4	5.0	10.7	11.0	4.7	18.8	23.0	34.5	52.3
Guinea	2.0	16.4	..	16.3	5.6	35.8	99.0	..	20.5
Guinea-Bissau	0.4	20.7	11.0	17.0	6.0	27.6	98.0	11.7	52.5
Kenya	9.9	21.2	..	11.0	4.0	26.0	28.0	..	61.4
Lesotho	0.2	11.2	..	10.3	2.8	33.2	67.0	..	66.9
Liberia	1.4	31.9	..	15.3	5.6	32.1	0.0	..	55.2
Madagascar	8.0	33.0	..	..	..	..	99.0	..	41.9
Malawi	3.6	20.7	13.5	16.7	3.8	42.4	41.0	62.1	70.2
Mali	..	5.0	18.0	..	..	..	98.0	..	33.8
Mauritania	0.2	5.6	34.7	19.5	11.6	22.0	89.0	7.3	26.9
Mauritius	..	5.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mozambique	6.9	25.3	16.9	15.6	6.1	43.1	99.0	44.8	41.0
Namibia	1.0	42.3	..	13.2	7.1	23.1	62.0	..	48.5
Niger	1.8	9.5	..	37.9	18.7	43.0	95.0	18.6	23.3
Nigeria	12.9	7.0	15.2	19.8	7.9	32.9	80.0	79.8	17.4
Rwanda	3.9	31.6	7.1	11.7	3.0	44.3	95.0	99.3	87.3
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.1	6.6	..	..	..	..	56.0	..	73.8
Senegal	3.7	10.0	18.6	12.8	5.7	19.4	89.0	43.1	33.0
Sierra Leone	1.4	22.3	10.5	18.1	9.4	37.9	8.0	62.6	32.0
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	30.0	..	..
South Sudan	..	..	..	27.6	22.7	31.1	18.0	45.3	45.1
South Africa	..	5.0	..	..	..	..	42.0	..	..
Sudan	..	..	..	33.0	16.3	38.2	99.0	9.5	55.4
Swaziland	0.3	26.8	8.7	5.8	0.8	31.0	43.0	51.6	63.8
Tanzania	16.8	32.1	8.4	13.6	6.6	34.8	88.0	55.7	41.1
Togo	0.8	11.4	11.1	16.2	6.7	27.5	61.0	31.5	57.5
Uganda	10.3	25.5	11.8	14.1	4.8	33.7	66.0	99.0	63.2
Zambia	7.4	47.8	..	14.8	6.3	40.0	93.0	..	72.5
Zimbabwe	5.0	33.4	11.0	11.2	3.3	27.6	32.0	94.0	41.0
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Table 3

MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger

	Population hungry			Children (under 5) hungry			Nutritional supplements		Exclusive breastfeeding
	million(s) 2011-2015	% of total population 2015	low birth weight newborns (%) 2010-2012	underweight (%) 2010-2014	wasting (%) 2010-2014	stunting (%) 2010-2014	vitamin A coverage rate (% of children under 5) 2010-2014	consumption of iodized salt (% of households) 2010-2013	received by infants under 6 months (%) 2010-2015
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	..	8.7	13.8	5.8	7.2	17.2	..	..	32.7
Algeria	..	5.0	..	3.0	4.1	11.7	..	..	25.7
Djibouti	0.1	15.9	..	29.8	21.5	33.5	66.0	..	..
Egypt, Arab Rep.	..	5.0	..	7.0	9.5	22.3	..	..	39.7
Iran, Islamic Rep.	4.0	5.0	7.7	..	..	..	..	..	53.1
Iraq	8.1	22.8	13.4	8.5	7.4	22.6	..	29.0	19.6
Jordan	..	5.0	..	3.0	2.4	7.8	..	..	22.7
Lebanon	..	5.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Libya	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Morocco	1.7	5.0	..	3.1	2.3	14.9	..	..	27.8
Syrian Arab Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	33.0	..	..
Tunisia	..	5.0	6.9	2.3	2.8	10.1	..	..	8.5
West Bank & Gaza	..	..	9.1	1.4	1.2	7.4	..	76.6	38.6
Yemen, Rep.	6.7	26.1	32.0	39.9	16.2	46.8	7.0	..	10.3
SOUTH ASIA	..	16.2	..	29.8	14.9	37.2	62.0	68.9	..
Afghanistan	8.6	26.8	..	..	..	..	95.0	20.4	..
Bangladesh	26.3	16.4	..	32.6	14.3	36.1	0.0	57.6	55.3
Bhutan	..	..	9.9	12.8	5.9	33.6	45.0	..	51.4
India	194.6	15.2	..	..	..	..	61.0	..	..
Maldives	0.1	5.2	..	..	..	..	76.0	..	..
Nepal	2.2	7.8	17.8	29.1	11.2	40.5	85.0	80.0	56.9
Pakistan	41.4	22.0	..	31.6	10.5	45.0	96.0	69.1	37.7
Sri Lanka	4.7	22.0	..	26.3	21.4	14.7	72.0	..	..
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	..	9.9	6.1	5.0	3.6	11.3	..	85.0	30.5
Cambodia	2.2	14.2	11.3	23.9	9.6	32.4	71.0	82.7	65.2
China	133.8	9.3	2.4	3.4	2.3	9.4	..	96.8	..
Fiji	..	5.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Indonesia	19.4	7.6	11.1	19.9	13.5	36.4	84.0	57.6	41.5
Kiribati	..	5.0	8.3	..	..	..	..	..	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	10.5	41.6	..	15.2	4.0	27.9	99.0	..	68.9
Lao PDR	1.3	18.5	14.8	26.5	6.4	43.8	89.0	79.5	40.4
Malaysia	..	5.0	11.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mongolia	0.6	20.5	4.7	1.6	1.0	10.8	79.0	69.9	47.1
Myanmar	7.7	14.2	8.6	..	..	..	94.0	68.8	23.6
Papua New Guinea	..	..	..	27.9	14.3	49.5	15.0	..	..
Philippines	13.7	13.5	15.9	20.2	7.3	33.6	83.0	80.1	27.0
Samoa	..	5.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Solomon Islands	0.1	11.3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Thailand	5.0	7.4	11.3	9.2	6.7	16.3	..	70.9	12.3
Timor-Leste	0.3	26.9	..	..	..	..	40.0	..	62.3
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	0.1	6.4	..	10.7	4.4	28.5	..	..	72.6
Vietnam	..	11.0	5.1	12.1	5.7	19.4	94.0	45.1	24.3
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	..	..	7.4	1.7	1.7	10.0	..	..	..
Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Armenia	0.2	5.8	8.0	5.3	4.2	20.8	..	..	34.6
Azerbaijan	..	5.0	..	4.9	3.1	18.0	58.0	..	12.1
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Table 3
MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger

	Population hungry			Children (under 5) hungry			Nutritional supplements		Exclusive breastfeeding
	million(s) 2011-2015	% of total population 2015	low birth weight newborns (%) 2010-2012	underweight (%) 2010-2014	wasting (%) 2010-2014	stunting (%) 2010-2014	vitamin A coverage rate (% of children under 5) 2010-2014	consumption of iodized salt (% of households) 2010-2013	received by infants under 6 months (%) 2010-2015
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA									
Belarus	..	..	5.1	..	..	..	..	85.4	19.0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	..	..	4.5	1.5	2.3	8.9	..	..	18.5
Bulgaria	..	..	8.8	..	..	..	..	91.9	..
Georgia	0.3	7.4	6.5	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kazakhstan	..	5.0	6.1	3.7	4.1	13.1	..	85.4	31.8
Kosovo	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	0.3	6.0	6.3	2.8	2.8	12.9	97.0	..	41.1
Latvia	..	..	4.6	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lithuania	..	..	4.8	..	..	..	..	..	..
Macedonia, FYR	..	..	5.5	1.3	1.8	4.9	..	..	23.0
Moldova	..	..	5.8	2.2	1.9	6.4	..	44.3	36.4
Montenegro	..	..	5.1	1.0	2.8	9.4	..	..	16.8
Romania	..	..	8.4	..	..	..	..	..	..
Russian Federation	..	..	6.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Serbia	..	..	6.1	1.8	3.9	6.0	..	..	12.8
Tajikistan	2.9	33.2	..	13.3	9.9	26.8	99.0	38.6	34.3
Turkey	..	5.0	..	1.9	1.7	9.5	..	..	30.1
Turkmenistan	..	5.0	4.8	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ukraine	..	..	5.3	..	..	..	..	20.7	19.7
Uzbekistan	1.6	5.0	..	..	..	..	99.0	..	..
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN									
Belize	0.1	6.2	11.1	6.2	3.3	19.3	..	..	14.7
Bolivia	1.8	15.9	..	..	..	..	40.0	..	64.3
Brazil	..	5.0	8.5	..	..	..	..	..	..
Chile	..	5.0	5.9	0.5	0.3	1.8	..	..	..
Colombia	4.4	8.8	9.5	3.4	0.9	12.7	..	..	42.8
Costa Rica	0.3	5.0	7.3	..	..	..	..	..	32.5
Cuba	..	5.0	5.2	..	..	..	..	..	33.2
Dominican Republic	1.3	12.3	..	4.0	2.4	7.1	..	..	4.7
Ecuador	1.8	10.9	8.6	6.4	2.3	25.2	..	..	..
El Salvador	0.8	12.4	8.7	..	..	..	81.0	..	47.0
Guatemala	2.5	15.6	..	..	..	..	19.0	..	53.2
Guyana	0.1	10.6	..	8.5	6.4	12.0	..	..	23.3
Haiti	5.7	53.4	23.0	11.6	5.2	21.9	30.0	18.0	39.7
Honduras	1.0	12.2	9.9	7.1	1.4	22.7	..	..	31.2
Jamaica	0.2	8.1	11.3	2.5	3.0	5.7	..	..	23.8
Mexico	..	5.0	9.2	2.8	1.6	13.6	..	..	14.4
Nicaragua	1.0	16.6	7.6	..	..	..	4.0	..	31.7
Panama	0.4	9.5	8.3	..	..	..	..	..	21.5
Paraguay	0.7	10.4	..	2.6	2.6	10.9	..	93.4	..
Peru	2.3	7.5	6.9	3.5	0.6	18.4	..	88.3	68.4
Suriname	0.1	8.0	13.9	5.8	5.0	8.8	..	..	2.8
Uruguay	..	5.0	8.1	4.5	1.1	11.7	..	..	65.2
Venezuela, RB	..	5.0	8.6	..	..	..	..	..	..
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

.. Data not available.

0 Zero, or rounds to zero at displayed number of decimals.

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 4

MDG 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

	School enrollment			Persistence	Literacy rate	
	primary	secondary	tertiary	to grade	ages	above
	(% net)	(% net)	(% gross)	5 (% of students)	15-24 (%)	age 15 (%)
	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014
World	89.0	66.0	32.9	..	90.6	85.2
High-income countries	95.5	90.4	73.5	..	99.6	98.7
Low- & middle-income countries	88.1	62.5	26.4	..	89.0	81.4
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	77.4	33.7	8.6	..	70.8	60.3
Angola	84.0	12.4	9.9	..	73.0	70.8
Benin	95.9	42.0	15.4	62.7	..	..
Botswana	91.0	62.8	27.5	96.3	97.6	87.3
Burkina Faso	67.5	21.7	4.8	79.1	..	..
Burundi	95.4	24.9	4.4	64.4	..	..
Cameroon	91.6	43.1	11.9	78.7	80.6	71.3
Cape Verde	98.2	69.1	23.0	92.8	98.1	85.3
Central African Republic	70.6	13.6	2.8	56.7	36.4	36.8
Chad	84.4	..	3.4	56.6	50.2	38.2
Comoros	83.2	43.9	8.7	..	86.8	76.6
Congo, Dem. Rep.	..	..	6.6	61.0	83.6	75.0
Congo, Rep.	91.4	..	9.7	..	80.9	79.3
Côte d'Ivoire	74.7	..	8.7	76.3	48.3	41.0
Eritrea	40.6	28.6	2.6	77.6	91.8	71.6
Ethiopia	85.8	..	6.3	44.1	..	..
Gabon	..	..	..	..	88.5	82.3
Gambia, the	67.9	..	..	80.1	70.7	53.2
Ghana	88.6	54.6	15.6	89.8	85.7	71.5
Guinea	74.0	31.8	10.8	66.6	31.4	25.3
Guinea-Bissau	68.2	..	..	..	75.3	57.8
Kenya	84.9	56.5	..	..	..	..
Lesotho	80.2	34.7	9.8	79.6	..	..
Liberia	37.7	16.7	11.6	..	..	..
Madagascar	..	31.1	4.2	40.1	..	..
Malawi	..	32.9	0.8	57.7	72.1	61.3
Mali	59.4	34.6	6.9	56.5	47.1	33.6
Mauritania	74.4	21.5	5.5	75.3	..	..
Mauritius	96.2	..	38.7	98.8	98.1	89.2
Mozambique	87.6	17.9	6.0	48.5	..	..
Namibia	89.7	53.9	..	96.6	..	..
Niger	61.0	15.7	1.7	64.4	23.5	15.5
Nigeria	63.8	..	..	..	..	..
Rwanda	96.1	..	7.5	51.2	82.3	68.3
São Tomé and Príncipe	95.1	47.5	9.8	84.3	..	..
Senegal	71.1	..	7.4	73.3	55.9	42.8
Sierra Leone	97.9	37.3	..	59.7	64.3	45.7
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..
South Sudan	40.6	..	..	..	..	..
South Africa	..	..	19.7	..	98.9	93.7
Sudan	53.8	..	16.9	86.8	88.5	74.3
Swaziland	78.5	34.4	5.3	89.3	93.5	83.1
Tanzania	80.9	..	3.6	83.7	85.9	79.0
Togo	91.2	..	10.1	60.8	79.9	60.4
Uganda	93.7	22.9	4.5	48.2	83.7	70.2
Zambia	87.4	..	..	74.5	..	..
Zimbabwe	88.7	43.3	5.9	..	90.9	83.6
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6

Table 5

MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality & Empower Women

	School enrollment ratio (female to male)			Literacy rate ratio (female to male)		Participation of women	
	primary	secondary	tertiary	ages 15-24	above age 15	in non-agricultural sector (% of employment)	in national parliaments (% of seats held)
	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2013	2012-2015
World	0.98	0.97	0.45	..	0.91	..	22.9
High-income countries	1.00	1.00	0.78	..	1.00	46.9	26.5
Low- & middle-income countries	0.97	0.97	0.37	..	0.88	..	21.6
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	0.93	0.86	0.16	..	0.76	..	23.6
Angola	0.64	0.65	0.25	0.84	0.72	..	36.8
Benin	0.91	0.68	0.13	..	..	25.9	7.2
Botswana	0.97	1.06	0.39	1.04	1.01	41.4	9.5
Burkina Faso	0.96	0.87	0.10	..	..	..	9.4
Burundi	1.01	0.85	0.06	..	..	..	36.4
Cameroon	0.89	0.85	0.17	0.89	0.83	26.4	31.1
Cape Verde	0.95	1.14	0.31	1.01	0.89	..	20.8
Central African Republic	0.74	0.51	0.06	0.55	0.48	..	12.5
Chad	0.77	0.46	0.04	0.85	0.61	..	14.9
Comoros	0.94	1.04	0.14	1.01	0.89	..	3.0
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.91	0.62	0.08	0.84	0.72	..	8.9
Congo, Rep.	1.07	0.87	0.14	0.90	0.84	..	7.4
Côte d'Ivoire	0.87	0.71	0.14	0.66	0.59	20.6	9.2
Eritrea	0.85	0.80	0.04	0.96	0.77	..	22.0
Ethiopia	0.92	0.91	0.10	..	..	38.8	38.8
Gabon	0.97	..	..	1.02	0.94	34.5	14.2
Gambia, the	1.05	0.95	..	0.91	0.72	..	9.4
Ghana	1.00	0.94	0.18	0.94	0.83	31.9	10.9
Guinea	0.88	0.66	0.14	0.58	0.33	18.3	21.9
Guinea-Bissau	0.93	..	..	0.88	0.64	..	13.7
Kenya	1.00	0.93	..	..	..	35.7	19.7
Lesotho	0.98	1.37	0.27	..	..	..	25.0
Liberia	0.92	0.78	0.21	..	..	24.1	11.0
Madagascar	1.00	0.98	0.11	..	..	37.3	20.5
Malawi	1.02	0.91	0.01	0.94	0.71	..	16.7
Mali	0.90	0.76	0.08	0.69	0.57	..	8.8
Mauritania	1.06	0.91	0.11	..	..	..	25.2
Mauritius	1.02	1.02	0.44	1.01	0.94	38.3	11.6
Mozambique	0.92	0.92	0.19	..	..	..	39.6
Namibia	0.97	..	..	..	..	43.0	41.3
Niger	0.86	0.70	0.04	0.44	0.38	..	13.3
Nigeria	0.92	0.89	..	..	..	..	5.6
Rwanda	1.02	1.07	0.17	1.03	0.89	33.6	63.8
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.96	1.10	0.14	..	..	..	18.2
Senegal	1.09	0.91	0.13	0.83	0.64	26.7	42.7
Sierra Leone	1.00	0.85	..	0.76	0.62	..	12.4
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	13.8
South Sudan	0.66	..	..	..	..	..	26.5
South Africa	0.95	1.26	0.27	1.01	0.97	45.7	42.0
Sudan	0.89	0.91	0.43	0.95	0.81	..	30.5
Swaziland	0.92	0.98	0.09	1.03	0.98	..	6.2
Tanzania	1.01	0.91	0.07	0.97	0.88	32.5	36.0
Togo	0.94	..	..	0.84	0.65	..	17.6
Uganda	1.02	0.87	0.13	0.95	0.78	34.7	35.0
Zambia	1.01	..	..	..	..	..	12.7
Zimbabwe	0.99	0.97	0.11	1.03	0.91	33.9	31.5
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Table 4

MDG 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

	School enrollment			Persistence	Literacy rate	
	primary	secondary	tertiary	to grade	ages	above
	(% net)	(% net)	(% gross)	5 (% of students)	15-24 (%)	age 15 (%)
	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	93.9	69.5	34.8	..	91.8	77.9
Algeria	97.3	..	34.6	93.4	..	..
Djibouti	58.8	..	5.0	84.4	..	..
Egypt, Arab Rep.	99.9	76.7	30.3	..	92.0	75.1
Iran, Islamic Rep.	99.2	80.7	66.0	86.2	98.0	83.6
Iraq	..	..	..	..	82.0	79.3
Jordan	87.5	85.5	47.6	98.5	99.1	97.9
Lebanon	86.6	64.8	42.8	96.0	..	..
Libya	..	..	..	..	99.9	90.3
Morocco	98.4	56.1	24.6	92.7	81.5	67.1
Syrian Arab Republic	83.5	47.7	34.5	..	95.9	85.5
Tunisia	98.6	..	34.6	95.7	97.3	79.7
West Bank & Gaza	90.8	80.1	44.0	..	99.4	96.4
Yemen, Rep.	84.8	41.7	10.0	75.4	88.4	67.6
SOUTH ASIA	89.5	..	21.2	..	83.4	66.7
Afghanistan	..	48.8	3.8	..	47.0	31.7
Bangladesh	90.0	52.6	13.4	..	81.1	59.7
Bhutan	85.6	62.8	10.9	87.4	..	..
India	89.5	61.8	23.9	..	86.1	69.3
Maldives	..	..	..	92.6	..	..
Nepal	94.5	59.7	15.8	70.1	84.8	59.6
Pakistan	73.0	41.2	10.4	79.6	72.6	56.8
Sri Lanka	97.2	85.4	20.7	98.2	98.2	91.2
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	94.2	77.1	30.0	..	98.8	94.5
Cambodia	94.7	..	15.9	58.1	..	..
China	..	..	30.2	..	99.6	95.1
Fiji	95.1	83.4	..	98.4	..	..
Indonesia	90.2	75.2	31.3	86.4	98.8	92.8
Kiribati	96.4	..	..	..	..	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	30.3	..	..	..
Lao PDR	95.1	50.9	17.3	77.6	..	..
Malaysia	..	68.7	38.5	..	98.4	93.1
Mongolia	94.9	86.3	64.3	..	98.5	98.3
Myanmar	94.5	48.3	13.5	..	96.1	92.8
Papua New Guinea	86.0	..	..	..	71.6	63.3
Philippines	96.0	67.4	35.8	..	..	..
Samoa	96.1	79.5	..	91.7	99.2	99.0
Solomon Islands	..	42.2	..	80.6	..	..
Thailand	..	79.6	51.4	..	96.6	96.4
Timor-Leste	96.6	51.8	18.1	84.5	79.5	58.3
Tuvalu	84.6	69.8	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	..	51.6	..	..	95.2	84.0
Vietnam	98.0	..	30.5	89.6	..	..
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	92.4	89.0	54.6	..	99.5	98.2
Albania	95.5	85.3	62.7	98.7	99.2	97.2
Armenia	..	..	46.6	..	99.8	99.7
Azerbaijan	95.2	88.0	23.2	..	100.0	99.8
Belarus	93.7	99.5	88.9	..	..	..

Table 5

MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality & Empower Women

	School enrollment ratio (female to male)			Literacy rate ratio (female to male)		Participation of women	
	primary	secondary	tertiary	ages 15-24	above age 15	in non-agricultural sector (% of employment)	in national parliaments (% of seats held)
	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2010-2013	2012-2015
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	0.95	0.94	0.44	..	0.83	16.9	16.9
Algeria	0.94	1.04	0.43	..	..	17.6	31.6
Djibouti	0.87	0.81	0.08	..	..	..	12.7
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.99	0.98	0.33	0.96	0.81	18.6	2.0
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1.04	0.99	0.72	0.99	0.88	15.3	3.1
Iraq	..	..	..	0.97	0.85	..	26.5
Jordan	0.99	1.05	0.63	1.00	0.99	..	12.0
Lebanon	0.91	1.01	0.67	..	..	..	3.1
Libya	..	..	..	1.00	0.88	..	16.0
Morocco	0.95	0.85	0.32	0.83	0.76	21.5	17.0
Syrian Arab Republic	0.97	1.01	0.66	0.98	0.88	15.9	12.4
Tunisia	0.97	1.05	0.48	0.98	0.82	27.7	31.3
West Bank & Gaza	0.99	1.10	0.69	1.00	0.96	16.3	..
Yemen, Rep.	0.84	0.69	0.11	0.82	0.62	11.7	0.0
SOUTH ASIA	1.00	0.94	0.30	..	0.75	19.4	19.3
Afghanistan	0.70	0.56	0.03	0.52	0.39	..	27.7
Bangladesh	1.06	1.08	0.20	1.06	0.89	18.3	20.0
Bhutan	1.01	1.07	0.11	..	..	26.3	8.5
India	1.12	1.01	0.34	0.91	0.75	19.3	12.0
Maldives	..	..	..	..	..	40.5	5.9
Nepal	1.08	1.06	0.24	0.89	0.68	..	29.5
Pakistan	0.85	0.79	0.23	0.80	0.62	..	20.6
Sri Lanka	0.98	1.05	0.25	1.01	0.97	32.4	4.9
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	0.99	1.01	0.38	..	0.95	..	19.7
Cambodia	0.95	..	..	..	..	40.9	20.3
China	1.00	1.02	0.34	1.00	0.95	..	23.6
Fiji	1.01	1.11	..	..	..	..	16.0
Indonesia	1.00	0.97	0.39	1.00	0.94	35.1	17.1
Kiribati	1.04	..	..	..	..	43.9	8.7
Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	16.3
Lao PDR	0.95	0.91	0.28	..	..	34.6	25.0
Malaysia	..	..	..	1.00	0.95	39.2	10.4
Mongolia	0.98	1.03	0.85	1.01	1.00	49.9	14.5
Myanmar	0.97	1.03	0.29	1.00	0.95	..	12.7
Papua New Guinea	0.91	0.76	..	1.15	0.93	..	2.7
Philippines	1.00	1.10	0.48	..	..	41.5	27.2
Samoa	1.00	1.12	..	1.00	1.00	36.7	6.1
Solomon Islands	0.97	0.94	..	..	..	..	2.0
Thailand	0.98	1.07	0.71	1.00	1.00	45.2	6.1
Timor-Leste	0.99	1.08	0.22	0.98	0.83	22.5	38.5
Tuvalu	1.01	1.25	..	..	..	..	6.7
Vanuatu	0.98	1.00	..	1.00	0.97	..	0.0
Vietnam	0.99	..	..	..	..	41.1	24.3
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	1.00	0.98	0.56	..	0.98	46.6	18.0
Albania	0.98	0.93	0.74	1.00	0.98	41.4	20.7
Armenia	..	..	..	1.00	1.00	43.5	10.7
Azerbaijan	0.99	0.99	0.24	1.00	1.00	42.6	16.9
Belarus	1.00	0.98	0.94	..	..	51.1	27.3

Table 4

MDG 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

School enrollment			Persistence	Literacy rate	
primary (% net)	secondary (% net)	tertiary (% gross)	to grade 5 (% of students)	ages 15-24 (%)	above age 15 (%)
2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014

CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

Bosnia & Herzegovina	..	..	..	86.5	99.7	98.3
Bulgaria	94.9	88.2	70.8	..	97.9	98.4
Georgia	99.0	92.1	39.2	98.9	99.8	99.7
Kazakhstan	86.6	95.9	48.5	..	..	..
Kosovo	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	89.7	80.2	47.3	..	..	..
Latvia	97.8	89.9	67.0	93.8	99.8	99.9
Lithuania	98.0	94.3	72.0	..	99.9	99.8
Macedonia, FYR	83.2	..	39.4	..	98.6	97.6
Moldova	87.9	77.2	41.3	..	100.0	99.2
Montenegro	94.2	..	55.3	80.5	99.2	98.4
Romania	87.0	86.8	52.2	..	99.0	98.6
Russian Federation	96.1	..	78.0	..	99.7	99.7
Serbia	96.2	92.2	58.1	..	99.3	98.0
Tajikistan	96.8	83.2	24.5	..	99.9	99.8
Turkey	92.9	87.9	79.0	90.0	99.2	95.3
Turkmenistan	..	..	8.0	..	99.8	99.7
Ukraine	96.2	88.6	82.3	..	99.8	99.7
Uzbekistan	91.9	..	8.9	..	99.9	99.5

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

	92.3	75.4	42.6	..	97.5	91.5
Belize	96.5	69.2	24.2	96.4	..	..
Bolivia	87.7	75.7	..	98.0	99.0	94.5
Brazil	..	..	..	..	98.7	91.5
Chile	92.5	88.6	83.8	98.7	99.4	96.7
Colombia	..	..	51.3	83.5	98.2	93.6
Costa Rica	96.1	78.1	53.0	91.8	99.1	97.4
Cuba	93.2	89.5	41.0	96.7	99.9	99.8
Dominican Republic	83.6	65.5	47.5	82.8	97.5	90.9
Ecuador	94.7	82.5	40.5	90.6	98.6	93.3
El Salvador	94.7	69.5	29.2	87.4	97.2	86.8
Guatemala	86.4	46.7	18.3	77.0	91.9	77.0
Guyana	81.4	82.5	12.5	94.6	..	..
Haiti	..	..	6.5	..	..	..
Honduras	94.0	49.3	21.2	82.3	95.7	87.2
Jamaica	..	73.5	27.4	95.4	96.1	87.9
Mexico	95.6	67.4	29.2	95.7	98.6	94.0
Nicaragua	97.0	48.9	..	..	..	..
Panama	95.9	77.8	38.7	94.0	97.6	94.1
Paraguay	88.5	66.5	35.1	86.7	98.7	94.6
Peru	92.8	78.4	40.5	92.6	98.7	93.8
Suriname	91.4	46.9	..	90.9	98.4	94.7
Uruguay	99.5	72.0	63.1	..	98.9	98.4
Venezuela, RB	90.7	74.8	..	87.7	97.6	94.8

column number | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

Table 5

MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality & Empower Women

School enrollment ratio (female to male)			Literacy rate ratio (female to male)		Participation of women	
primary	secondary	tertiary	ages 15-24	above age 15	in non- agricultural sector (% of employ- ment)	in national parliaments (% of seats held)
2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2014	2010- 2013	2012- 2015

CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

Bosnia & Herzegovina	..	..	..	1.00	0.98	38.0	21.4
Bulgaria	0.99	0.97	0.77	1.00	0.99	49.8	20.4
Georgia	1.01	1.00	0.44	1.00	1.00	47.3	11.3
Kazakhstan	1.00	1.03	0.52	..	..	50.6	26.2
Kosovo	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	0.99	1.01	0.59	..	..	41.5	19.2
Latvia	0.99	0.97	0.72	1.00	1.00	53.2	18.0
Lithuania	1.00	0.96	0.80	1.00	1.00	53.0	23.4
Macedonia, FYR	0.98	0.98	0.53	1.00	0.98	41.6	33.3
Moldova	1.00	1.01	0.53	1.00	0.99	54.6	21.8
Montenegro	1.00	1.01	0.68	1.00	0.98	47.2	17.3
Romania	0.98	0.98	0.59	1.00	0.99	45.5	13.7
Russian Federation	1.01	0.99	0.87	1.00	1.00	50.3	13.6
Serbia	1.00	1.02	0.71	1.00	0.97	45.4	34.0
Tajikistan	1.00	0.90	0.20	1.00	1.00	..	19.0
Turkey	0.99	0.97	0.63	0.99	0.94	26.0	14.9
Turkmenistan	0.98	0.96	0.07	1.00	1.00	..	25.8
Ukraine	1.02	0.98	0.88	1.00	1.00	49.4	12.1
Uzbekistan	0.98	0.99	0.06	1.00	1.00	..	16.0

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

	0.98	1.06	0.53	..	0.99	44.1	29.0
Belize	0.95	1.04	0.38	..	..	..	3.1
Bolivia	0.97	0.99	..	1.00	0.95	36.7	53.1
Brazil	..	..	..	1.01	1.01	47.4	9.9
Chile	0.97	1.02	0.89	1.00	1.00	39.0	15.8
Colombia	..	..	..	1.01	1.00	46.4	19.9
Costa Rica	0.99	1.05	0.50	1.00	1.00	43.4	33.3
Cuba	0.96	1.03	0.52	1.00	1.00	44.8	48.9
Dominican Republic	0.91	1.11	0.79	1.02	1.01	41.6	20.8
Ecuador	1.00	1.04	0.44	1.00	0.98	38.4	41.6
El Salvador	0.95	0.99	0.39	1.01	0.95	32.9	32.1
Guatemala	0.96	0.94	0.29	0.95	0.87	36.9	13.9
Guyana	0.97	0.99	0.19	..	..	..	30.4
Haiti	0.99	..	..	..	..	..	4.2
Honduras	0.98	1.17	0.39	1.01	1.00	..	25.8
Jamaica	..	1.08	0.48	1.05	1.11	47.5	12.7
Mexico	0.99	1.07	0.35	1.00	0.98	40.3	42.4
Nicaragua	0.99	1.13	..	..	..	..	41.3
Panama	0.97	1.06	0.64	0.99	0.99	43.9	18.3
Paraguay	0.97	1.07	0.56	1.00	0.98	43.9	15.0
Peru	1.00	1.00	0.44	1.00	0.94	37.0	22.3
Suriname	0.97	1.31	..	1.01	0.99	..	25.5
Uruguay	0.97	1.14	0.95	1.01	1.01	48.5	16.2
Venezuela, RB	0.98	1.08	..	1.01	1.01	43.7	17.0

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.. Data not available.

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Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 6

MDG 4: Reduce Child Mortality

	Child mortality rate		Immunizations	
	under age 1 (deaths per 1,000 live births)	under age 5 (deaths per 1,000 live births)	measles (% of children 12-23 months)	DPT† (% of children 12-23 months)
	2015	2015	2014	2014
World	31.7	42.5	84.5	86.0
High-income countries	5.8	6.8	93.7	95.7
Low- & middle-income countries	35.2	47.3	83.5	84.9

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	56.3	83.1	72.7	77.2
Angola	96.0	156.9	85.0	80.0
Benin	64.2	99.5	63.0	70.0
Botswana	34.8	43.6	97.0	95.0
Burkina Faso	60.9	88.6	88.0	91.0
Burundi	54.1	81.7	94.0	95.0
Cameroon	57.1	87.9	80.0	87.0
Cape Verde	20.7	24.5	93.0	95.0
Central African Republic	91.5	130.1	49.0	47.0
Chad	85.0	138.7	54.0	46.0
Comoros	55.1	73.5	80.0	80.0
Congo, Dem. Rep.	74.5	98.3	77.0	80.0
Congo, Rep.	33.2	45.0	80.0	90.0
Côte d'Ivoire	66.6	92.6	63.0	67.0
Eritrea	34.1	46.5	96.0	94.0
Ethiopia	41.4	59.2	70.0	77.0
Gabon	36.1	50.8	61.0	70.0
Gambia, the	47.9	68.9	96.0	96.0
Ghana	42.8	61.6	92.0	98.0
Guinea	61.0	93.7	52.0	51.0
Guinea-Bissau	60.3	92.5	69.0	80.0
Kenya	35.5	49.4	79.0	81.0
Lesotho	69.2	90.2	92.0	96.0
Liberia	52.8	69.9	58.0	50.0
Madagascar	35.9	49.6	64.0	73.0
Malawi	43.4	64.0	85.0	91.0
Mali	74.5	114.7	80.0	77.0
Mauritania	65.1	84.7	84.0	84.0
Mauritius	11.8	13.5	98.0	97.0
Mozambique	56.7	78.5	85.0	78.0
Namibia	32.8	45.4	83.0	88.0
Niger	57.1	95.5	72.0	68.0
Nigeria	69.4	108.8	51.0	66.0
Rwanda	31.1	41.7	98.0	99.0
São Tomé and Príncipe	34.6	47.3	92.0	95.0
Senegal	41.7	47.2	80.0	89.0
Sierra Leone	87.1	120.4	78.0	83.0
Somalia	85.0	136.8	46.0	42.0
South Sudan	60.3	92.6	22.0	39.0
South Africa	33.6	40.5	70.0	70.0
Sudan	47.6	70.1	86.0	94.0
Swaziland	44.5	60.7	86.0	98.0
Tanzania	35.2	48.7	99.0	97.0
Togo	52.3	78.4	82.0	87.0
Uganda	37.7	54.6	82.0	78.0
Zambia	43.3	64.0	85.0	86.0
Zimbabwe	46.6	70.7	92.0	91.0

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Table 7

MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health

	Maternal mortality		Maternal health care			Fertility		
	mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	lifetime risk of maternal death (%)	pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)	births attended by skilled health staff (%)	nurses & midwives (per 1,000 people)	births (per woman)	births (per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
World	216	0.56	83.3	70.1	3.3	2.5	44.8	63.3
High-income countries	10	0.02	..	..	8.6	1.7	14.6	..
Low- & middle-income countries	238	0.65	83.1	68.5	2.2	2.6	48.6	62.0

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	547	2.77	78.0	50.0	1.2	5.0	103.0	26.0
Angola	477	3.08	..	..	..	6.1	166.6	..
Benin	405	1.97	82.8	77.2	0.8	4.8	84.6	17.9
Botswana	129	0.37	..	..	2.8	2.8	33.6	..
Burkina Faso	371	2.07	94.9	23.0	0.6	5.5	109.9	17.0
Burundi	712	4.27	98.9	60.3	..	5.9	28.7	21.9
Cameroon	596	2.89	82.8	64.7	..	4.7	106.9	34.4
Cape Verde	42	0.11	..	..	0.6	2.3	73.7	..
Central African Republic	882	3.67	68.2	53.8	..	4.3	93.2	15.2
Chad	856	5.52	53.2	24.3	..	6.2	137.2	5.7
Comoros	335	1.52	92.1	82.2	..	4.5	69.6	19.4
Congo, Dem. Rep.	693	4.09	88.4	80.1	..	6.0	122.9	20.4
Congo, Rep.	442	2.22	92.6	92.5	0.8	4.9	119.2	44.7
Côte d'Ivoire	645	3.17	90.6	59.4	0.5	5.0	135.5	18.2
Eritrea	501	2.33	88.5	34.1	..	4.3	55.7	8.4
Ethiopia	353	1.56	41.2	15.5	0.2	4.4	60.1	34.2
Gabon	291	1.17	94.7	87.1	..	3.9	102.2	31.1
Gambia, the	706	4.11	86.2	64.0	0.6	5.7	113.6	9.0
Ghana	319	1.34	90.5	73.7	0.9	4.2	67.5	26.7
Guinea	679	3.46	85.2	39.3	..	5.0	141.7	5.6
Guinea-Bissau	549	2.62	92.4	45.0	0.6	4.8	91.4	16.0
Kenya	510	2.35	95.5	61.8	0.9	4.3	91.5	58.0
Lesotho	487	1.63	95.2	77.9	..	3.2	92.3	60.2
Liberia	725	3.55	95.9	61.1	0.3	4.7	110.6	20.2
Madagascar	353	1.67	82.1	44.3	..	4.4	117.5	39.8
Malawi	634	3.45	96.1	87.4	0.3	5.1	137.0	58.6
Mali	587	3.74	74.2	40.1	0.4	6.2	175.4	10.3
Mauritania	602	2.74	84.2	65.1	0.7	4.6	79.4	11.4
Mauritius	53	0.08	..	..	..	1.4	28.6	..
Mozambique	489	2.53	90.6	54.3	0.4	5.4	142.5	11.6
Namibia	265	0.98	96.6	88.2	2.8	3.5	77.4	56.1
Niger	553	4.37	82.8	29.3	0.1	7.6	203.6	13.9
Nigeria	814	4.51	60.6	38.1	1.6	5.7	111.9	15.1
Rwanda	290	1.18	99.0	90.7	0.7	3.9	27.0	53.2
São Tomé and Príncipe	156	0.74	97.5	92.5	..	4.6	85.2	40.6
Senegal	315	1.63	96.2	59.1	0.4	5.1	80.3	22.2
Sierra Leone	1,360	5.94	97.1	59.7	0.2	4.6	119.6	16.6
Somalia	732	4.64	..	..	0.1	6.5	105.2	..
South Sudan	789	3.87	61.9	19.4	..	5.0	68.3	4.0
South Africa	138	0.33	..	..	5.1	2.4	46.6	..
Sudan	311	1.39	79.1	23.1	0.8	4.4	76.0	12.2
Swaziland	389	1.31	98.5	88.3	..	3.3	73.6	66.1
Tanzania	398	2.20	87.8	42.6	0.4	5.1	119.4	34.4
Togo	368	1.72	72.7	44.6	0.3	4.6	92.0	19.9
Uganda	343	2.13	93.3	58.0	1.3	5.8	114.8	27.2
Zambia	224	1.26	95.7	64.2	0.8	5.3	93.0	49.0
Zimbabwe	443	1.94	93.7	80.0	1.3	3.9	110.4	66.9

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Table 6

MDG 4: Reduce Child Mortality

	Child mortality rate		Immunizations	
	under age 1 (deaths per 1,000 live births)	under age 5 (deaths per 1,000 live births)	measles (% of children 12-23 months)	DPT ¹ (% of children 12-23 months)
	2015	2015	2014	2014
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	20.8	24.7	86.2	88.1
Algeria	21.9	25.5	95.0	95.0
Djibouti	54.2	65.3	71.0	78.0
Egypt, Arab Rep.	20.3	24.0	93.0	94.0
Iran, Islamic Rep.	13.4	15.5	99.0	99.0
Iraq	26.5	32.0	57.0	64.0
Jordan	15.4	17.9	98.0	98.0
Lebanon	7.1	8.3	79.0	81.0
Libya	11.4	13.4	93.0	94.0
Morocco	23.7	27.6	99.0	99.0
Syrian Arab Republic	11.1	12.9	54.0	43.0
Tunisia	12.1	14.0	98.0	98.0
West Bank & Gaza	18.0	21.1	..	..
Yemen, Rep.	33.8	41.9	75.0	88.0
SOUTH ASIA	41.9	52.5	80.4	82.7
Afghanistan	66.3	91.1	66.0	75.0
Bangladesh	30.7	37.6	89.0	95.0
Bhutan	27.2	32.9	97.0	99.0
India	37.9	47.7	83.0	83.0
Maldives	7.4	8.6	99.0	99.0
Nepal	29.4	35.8	88.0	92.0
Pakistan	65.8	81.1	63.0	73.0
Sri Lanka	8.4	9.8	99.0	99.0
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	14.9	18.0	93.3	92.3
Cambodia	24.6	28.7	94.0	97.0
China	9.2	10.7	99.0	99.0
Fiji	19.1	22.4	94.0	99.0
Indonesia	22.8	27.2	77.0	78.0
Kiribati	43.6	55.9	91.0	75.0
Korea, Dem. Rep.	19.7	24.9	99.0	93.0
Lao PDR	50.7	66.7	87.0	88.0
Malaysia	6.0	7.0	94.0	97.0
Mongolia	19.0	22.4	98.0	99.0
Myanmar	39.5	50.0	86.0	75.0
Papua New Guinea	44.5	57.3	65.0	62.0
Philippines	22.2	28.0	88.0	79.0
Samoa	15.0	17.5	91.0	91.0
Solomon Islands	23.6	28.1	93.0	88.0
Thailand	10.5	12.3	99.0	99.0
Timor-Leste	44.7	52.6	74.0	77.0
Tuvalu	22.8	27.1	96.0	90.0
Vanuatu	23.1	27.5	53.0	64.0
Vietnam	17.3	21.7	97.0	95.0
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	17.8	20.5	95.1	94.7
Albania	12.5	14.0	98.0	98.0
Armenia	12.6	14.1	97.0	93.0
Azerbaijan	27.9	31.7	98.0	94.0
Belarus	3.4	4.6	99.0	97.0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	5.1	5.4	89.0	86.0
Bulgaria	9.3	10.4	93.0	88.0
Georgia	10.6	11.9	92.0	91.0

Table 7

MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health

	Maternal mortality		Maternal health care			Fertility		
	mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	lifetime risk of maternal death (%)	pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)	births attended by skilled health staff (%)	nurses & midwives (per 1,000 people)	births (per woman)	births (per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)
	2015	2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2014	2014-2015	2014	2010-2015
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	90	0.28	86.2	87.6	2.2	2.9	42.3	61.6
Algeria	140	0.42	92.7	96.6	1.9	2.9	10.8	57.1
Djibouti	229	0.70	87.7	87.4	0.8	3.2	21.8	19.0
Egypt, Arab Rep.	33	0.12	90.3	91.5	3.5	3.3	52.4	58.5
Iran, Islamic Rep.	25	0.05	96.9	96.4	1.4	1.7	27.1	77.4
Iraq	50	0.24	77.7	90.9	1.4	4.6	83.2	52.5
Jordan	58	0.20	99.1	99.6	4.0	3.4	23.8	61.2
Lebanon	15	0.03	..	..	2.7	1.7	12.7	..
Libya	9	0.02	..	..	6.8	2.5	6.2	..
Morocco	121	0.31	77.1	73.6	0.9	2.5	32.1	67.4
Syrian Arab Republic	68	0.23	..	..	1.9	3.0	40.0	..
Tunisia	62	0.14	98.1	98.6	3.3	2.2	6.8	62.5
West Bank & Gaza	45	0.21	99.4	99.6	..	4.2	59.1	57.2
Yemen, Rep.	385	1.66	59.8	44.7	0.7	4.2	62.2	33.5
SOUTH ASIA	182	0.50	73.0	51.0	1.4	2.6	34.9	52.9
Afghanistan	396	1.93	47.9	38.6	0.1	4.8	76.7	21.2
Bangladesh	176	0.42	63.9	42.1	0.2	2.2	83.5	62.4
Bhutan	148	0.32	97.9	74.6	1.0	2.0	22.7	65.6
India	174	0.45	..	..	1.7	2.4	25.7	..
Maldives	68	0.17	..	98.8	5.0	2.1	7.3	..
Nepal	258	0.65	68.3	55.6	..	2.2	72.5	49.6
Pakistan	178	0.69	73.1	52.1	0.6	3.6	39.2	35.4
Sri Lanka	30	0.06	..	..	1.6	2.1	15.4	..
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	63	0.12	95.0	92.7	1.8	1.8	22.7	80.5
Cambodia	161	0.47	95.3	89.0	0.8	2.6	51.1	56.3
China	27	0.04	95.6	99.9	1.9	1.6	7.3	87.9
Fiji	30	0.08	..	99.6	2.2	2.6	44.4	44.3
Indonesia	126	0.31	95.4	83.1	1.4	2.5	50.0	62.5
Kiribati	90	0.34	..	..	3.7	3.7	18.0	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	82	0.15	..	..	..	2.0	0.6	70.6
Lao PDR	197	0.67	54.2	41.5	0.9	3.0	64.5	49.8
Malaysia	40	0.08	98.0	98.8	3.3	1.9	13.4	..
Mongolia	44	0.13	98.7	98.9	3.6	2.7	16.3	54.6
Myanmar	178	0.38	83.1	70.6	1.0	2.2	16.7	46.0
Papua New Guinea	215	0.81	..	..	0.6	3.8	55.3	..
Philippines	114	0.35	95.4	72.8	..	3.0	60.8	55.1
Samoa	51	0.20	93.3	82.5	1.9	4.1	25.6	26.9
Solomon Islands	114	0.46	..	..	2.1	4.0	49.5	..
Thailand	20	0.03	98.1	99.6	2.1	1.5	44.6	79.3
Timor-Leste	215	1.22	84.4	29.9	1.1	5.1	47.7	22.3
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	5.8	..	..	..
Vanuatu	78	0.28	75.6	89.4	1.7	3.3	43.4	49.0
Vietnam	54	0.11	95.8	93.8	1.2	2.0	38.1	75.7
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	25	0.05	..	98.3	6.9	1.9	26.8	65.1
Albania	29	0.05	..	..	3.8	1.8	21.5	..
Armenia	25	0.04	99.1	99.5	4.8	1.5	23.5	54.9
Azerbaijan	25	0.06	91.7	97.2	6.5	2.0	58.6	54.9
Belarus	4	0.01	99.7	100.0	10.6	1.6	18.8	63.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina	11	0.01	87.0	99.9	5.6	1.3	9.1	45.8
Bulgaria	11	0.02	..	99.7	4.8	1.5	38.6	..
Georgia	36	0.07	97.6	99.9	3.2	1.8	41.1	53.4

Table 6

MDG 4: Reduce Child Mortality

Child mortality rate		Immunizations	
under age 1 (deaths per 1,000 live births)	under age 5 (deaths per 1,000 live births)	measles (% of children 12-23 months)	DPT† (% of children 12-23 months)
2015	2015	2014	2014

CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan	12.6	14.1	99.0	95.0
Kosovo	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	19.0	21.3	96.0	96.0
Latvia	6.9	7.9	95.0	92.0
Lithuania	3.3	5.2	93.0	93.0
Macedonia, FYR	4.8	5.5	93.0	95.0
Moldova	13.6	15.8	90.0	90.0
Montenegro	4.3	4.7	88.0	91.0
Romania	9.7	11.1	89.0	94.0
Russian Federation	8.2	9.6	98.0	97.0
Serbia	5.9	6.7	86.0	93.0
Tajikistan	38.5	44.8	98.0	97.0
Turkey	11.6	13.5	94.0	96.0
Turkmenistan	43.7	51.4	99.0	98.0
Ukraine	7.7	9.0	79.0	76.0
Uzbekistan	33.9	39.1	99.0	99.0

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

	15.9	18.8	92.1	87.4
Belize	14.2	16.5	95.0	95.0
Bolivia	30.6	38.4	95.0	94.0
Brazil	14.6	16.4	97.0	93.0
Chile	7.0	8.1	94.0	92.0
Colombia	13.6	15.9	91.0	90.0
Costa Rica	8.5	9.7	95.0	91.0
Cuba	4.0	5.5	99.0	96.0
Dominican Republic	25.7	30.9	88.0	91.0
Ecuador	18.4	21.6	85.0	83.0
El Salvador	14.4	16.8	94.0	93.0
Guatemala	24.3	29.1	67.0	73.0
Guyana	32.0	39.4	99.0	98.0
Haiti	52.2	69.0	53.0	48.0
Honduras	17.4	20.4	88.0	85.0
Jamaica	13.5	15.7	92.0	92.0
Mexico	11.3	13.2	97.0	87.0
Nicaragua	18.8	22.1	99.0	98.0
Panama	14.6	17.0	90.0	80.0
Paraguay	17.5	20.5	90.0	87.0
Peru	13.1	16.9	89.0	88.0
Suriname	19.0	21.3	85.0	85.0
Uruguay	8.7	10.1	96.0	95.0
Venezuela, RB	12.9	14.9	89.0	78.0

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Table 7

MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health

Maternal mortality		Maternal health care			Fertility		
mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	lifetime risk of maternal death (%)	pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)	births attended by skilled health staff (%)	nurses & midwives (per 1,000 people)	births (per woman)	births (per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)
2015	2015	2010-2015	2010-2015	2010-2014	2014-2015	2014	2010-2015

CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan	12	0.03	99.2	99.9	8.3	2.7	28.6	51.0
Kosovo	..	..	..	..	..	2.1	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	76	0.26	98.4	98.4	6.2	3.2	40.0	42.0
Latvia	18	0.03	..	..	3.4	1.5	14.0	..
Lithuania	10	0.02	..	..	7.2	1.6	11.6	..
Macedonia, FYR	8	0.01	98.6	98.3	0.6	1.5	17.9	40.2
Moldova	23	0.03	98.8	99.2	6.4	1.3	23.2	59.5
Montenegro	7	0.01	91.7	99.0	5.4	1.7	12.5	23.3
Romania	31	0.04	..	98.5	5.6	1.4	35.1	..
Russian Federation	25	0.04	..	99.7	8.5	1.7	24.1	68.0
Serbia	17	0.03	98.3	98.4	4.5	1.4	19.3	58.4
Tajikistan	32	0.13	78.8	86.4	5.0	3.5	38.3	27.9
Turkey	16	0.03	96.9	97.4	2.4	2.1	28.4	73.5
Turkmenistan	42	0.11	..	..	4.4	2.3	16.7	..
Ukraine	24	0.04	98.6	99.0	7.7	1.5	24.9	65.4
Uzbekistan	36	0.10	..	..	11.9	2.2	17.8	..

LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN

	70	0.15	96.9	92.9	4.3	2.1	65.4	..
Belize	28	0.08	96.2	96.2	2.0	2.6	66.7	55.2
Bolivia	206	0.64	90.1	84.8	1.0	3.0	71.1	..
Brazil	44	0.08	..	98.1	7.6	1.8	67.3	..
Chile	22	0.04	..	99.8	0.1	1.8	48.1	..
Colombia	64	0.13	97.0	99.1	0.6	1.9	51.7	79.1
Costa Rica	25	0.05	98.1	98.4	0.8	1.8	57.0	76.2
Cuba	39	0.06	98.5	99.4	9.1	1.6	46.2	73.7
Dominican Republic	92	0.25	98.0	97.7	1.3	2.5	98.4	69.6
Ecuador	64	0.17	..	93.7	2.2	2.5	76.2	80.1
El Salvador	54	0.11	96.0	98.0	0.4	1.9	65.6	72.0
Guatemala	88	0.31	..	62.8	..	3.2	81.4	..
Guyana	229	0.59	90.7	92.4	0.5	2.6	88.4	34.1
Haiti	359	1.11	90.3	37.3	..	3.0	39.7	34.5
Honduras	129	0.34	96.6	82.9	..	2.4	65.7	73.2
Jamaica	89	0.19	97.7	99.1	..	2.0	60.6	..
Mexico	38	0.09	97.6	96.0	2.5	2.2	63.5	..
Nicaragua	150	0.37	94.7	88.0	1.4	2.3	89.6	80.4
Panama	94	0.24	93.4	91.4	1.4	2.4	75.3	62.8
Paraguay	132	0.37	..	95.8	1.0	2.5	58.0	..
Peru	68	0.17	96.9	90.0	1.5	2.5	49.7	74.6
Suriname	155	0.37	90.9	91.2	..	2.4	46.5	47.6
Uruguay	15	0.03	97.2	98.2	5.5	2.0	56.5	..
Venezuela, RB	95	0.24	..	96.0	..	2.4	79.7	..

column number | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8

.. Data not available.

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† Diphtheria, pertussis, & tetanus (vaccine).

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 8

MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria & Other Diseases

	HIV/AIDS				Correct & comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge		Malaria		Child malaria (under age 5)		Tuberculosis	
	ages 15-49 with HIV (%)	ages 15-49 with new HIV cases (%)	number of AIDS deaths (%)	people on ARV treat- ment (%)	women ages 15-24 (%)	men ages 15-24 (%)	notified malaria cases (per 100,000 people)	malaria deaths (per 100,000 people)	children sleeping under insecticide treated bed nets (%)	children with fever receiving anti-malarial drugs (%)	new TB cases (per 100,000 people)	TB treatment success (% of cases)
	2014	2013	2013	2014	2011-2014	2011-2014	2012	2012	2010-2015	2010-2014	2014	2012-2013
World	0.8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	133	86
High-income countries	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	21	71
Low- & middle-income countries	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	160	87
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	4.5	..	..	41.3	..	..	..	..	43.2	32.4	281	79
Angola	2.4	0.3	11,515	25.0	..	..	18,251	101	25.9	28.3	370	23
Benin	1.1	0.1	2,701	37.0	21.6	31.3	28,854	80	72.7	25.9	61	89
Botswana	25.2	0.9	5,790	62.0	..	..	72	0	..	..	385	73
Burkina Faso	0.9	0.1	5,816	43.0	..	..	34,022	103	75.3	49.2	54	80
Burundi	1.1	0.0	4,669	44.0	..	..	16,722	64	53.8	25.4	126	91
Cameroon	4.8	0.3	43,627	22.0	28.7	33.5	19,943	65	54.8	38.2	220	82
Cape Verde	1.1	0.0	42	36.0	..	..	78	0	..	..	138	88
Central African Republic	4.3	0.3	10,799	18.0	..	..	35,357	115	36.4	34.1	375	70
Chad	2.5	0.1	14,665	23.0	..	..	29,620	153	36.4	42.7	159	74
Comoros	..	..	..	..	19.1	23.9	22,989	70	41.1	26.7	35	94
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1.0	0.1	30,133	23.0	18.6	24.9	26,267	107	55.8	29.2	325	87
Congo, Rep.	2.8	0.1	5,384	17.0	14.4	27.6	34,586	104	31.5	25.0	381	70
Côte d'Ivoire	3.5	0.1	27,944	31.0	15.7	24.6	20,666	71	37.2	17.5	165	80
Eritrea	0.7	0.0	910	49.0	..	..	1,507	4	20.4	1.5	78	89
Ethiopia	1.2	0.0	45,171	50.0	23.9	34.2	13,467	48	30.1	26.3	207	89
Gabon	3.9	0.2	2,080	46.0	29.8	36.1	25,114	67	38.8	25.9	444	55
Gambia, the	1.8	0.1	429	23.0	..	..	29,030	84	47.0	6.7	174	86
Ghana	1.5	0.0	10,074	33.0	19.9	27.2	27,201	67	46.6	48.5	165	85
Guinea	1.6	0.2	5,445	27.0	22.5	33.8	38,424	105	26.0	28.1	177	79
Guinea-Bissau	3.7	0.3	2,292	19.0	22.5	21.7	28,253	96	80.6	28.0	369	77
Kenya	5.3	0.4	58,446	55.0	54.2	63.7	14,475	50	54.3	27.0	246	86
Lesotho	23.4	2.2	16,133	35.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	852	70
Liberia	1.2	0.1	2,678	21.0	35.7	28.5	28,637	69	38.1	55.7	308	40
Madagascar	0.3	0.0	5,537	2.0	22.9	25.5	8,971	41	62.3	11.3	235	82
Malawi	10.0	0.4	47,826	50.0	44.2	51.1	27,662	63	65.5	39.1	227	82
Mali	1.4	0.0	5,549	24.0	..	..	21,260	92	69.0	22.5	58	74
Mauritania	0.7	..	..	14.0	6.3	..	23,691	67	18.4	19.7	111	71
Mauritius	0.9	0.1	857	29.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	22	88
Mozambique	10.6	1.0	82,365	42.0	30.2	51.8	27,774	71	35.7	29.9	551	88
Namibia	16.0	0.9	6,585	50.0	61.6	51.1	33	0	5.6	8.4	561	86
Niger	0.5	0.0	2,926	22.0	14.1	25.4	33,109	131	20.1	19.2	98	79
Nigeria	3.2	0.2	209,626	22.0	24.2	33.5	28,430	107	25.4	27.3	322	86
Rwanda	2.8	0.1	4,535	68.0	..	..	5,673	33	67.7	12.0	63	85
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.8	0.0	235	41.0	42.2	43.2	12,228	43	61.1	1.4	97	73
Senegal	0.5	0.0	1,760	38.0	29.4	30.7	28,250	59	43.2	6.7	138	87
Sierra Leone	1.4	0.1	3,148	20.0	28.8	30.0	18,399	109	49.0	48.3	310	87
Somalia	0.5	0.1	2,526	5.0	..	..	7,501	33	..	..	274	86
South Sudan	2.7	0.2	12,598	6.0	..	..	29,527	55	45.8	31.9	146	72
South Africa	18.9	1.4	195,263	45.0	25.3	23.2	464	2	..	..	834	78
Sudan	0.2	0.0	3,101	7.0	..	..	14,691	16	..	65.0	94	82
Swaziland	27.7	2.2	4,542	59.0	49.1	50.9	308	1	1.5	1.7	733	75
Tanzania	5.3	0.3	78,293	43.0	40.1	46.7	19,959	50	72.0	53.7	327	91
Togo	2.4	0.1	6,641	33.0	..	..	24,086	83	42.8	18.3	58	88
Uganda	7.3	0.8	63,040	50.0	38.1	39.5	25,776	58	74.3	64.5	161	75
Zambia	12.4	0.7	27,028	57.0	41.5	46.7	26,650	79	40.6	39.9	406	85
Zimbabwe	16.7	1.0	63,859	51.0	56.4	51.7	16,905	18	26.8	3.0	278	80
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 8

MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria & Other Diseases

	HIV/AIDS				Correct & comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge		Malaria		Child malaria (under age 5)		Tuberculosis	
	ages 15-49 with HIV (%)	ages 15-49 with new HIV cases (%)	number of AIDS deaths	people on ARV treat- ment (%)	women ages 15-24 (%)	men ages 15-24 (%)	notified malaria cases (per 100,000 people)	malaria deaths (per 100,000 people)	children sleeping under insecticide treated bed nets (%)	children with fever receiving anti-malarial drugs (%)	new TB cases (per 100,000 people)	TB treatment success (% of cases)
	2014	2013	2013	2014	2011-2014	2011-2014	2012	2012	2010-2015	2010-2014	2014	2012-2013
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	0.1	..	..	17.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	39	88
Algeria	0.1	0.0	1,371	57.0	..	..	1	0	..	..	78	91
Djibouti	1.6	0.0	662	16.0	..	..	9,771	28	..	..	619	75
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.1	0.0	407	19.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	86
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.1	0.0	4,391	8.0	..	..	243	0	..	..	22	87
Iraq	..	..	..	..	3.5	..	..	..	..	..	43	88
Jordan	..	..	..	..	8.6	..	..	..	..	..	6	88
Lebanon	0.1	..	..	43.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	16	71
Libya	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	40	59
Morocco	0.1	0.0	1,444	25.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	106	89
Syrian Arab Republic	0.1	..	..	15.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	17	80
Tunisia	0.1	0.0	130	24.0	19.7	..	..	..	..	..	33	91
West Bank & Gaza	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	91
Yemen, Rep.	0.1	0.0	446	19.0	..	..	3,307	10	..	1.2	48	90
SOUTH ASIA	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	183	89
Afghanistan	0.1	0.0	292	4.0	1.8	..	2,447	0	..	..	189	88
Bangladesh	0.1	0.0	485	14.0	9.1	14.4	6,057	14	..	0.6	227	93
Bhutan	..	0.0	31	..	..	..	58	0	..	..	164	91
India	..	0.0	127,232	..	..	..	2,768	4	..	..	167	88
Maldives	..	0.0	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	41	84
Nepal	0.2	0.0	3,251	27.0	36.4	33.9	142	0	..	0.6	158	91
Pakistan	0.1	0.0	2,174	5.0	4.2	5.2	3,071	2	..	3.4	270	93
Sri Lanka	0.1	0.0	92	19.0	..	..	32	0	..	..	65	85
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	144	91
Cambodia	0.6	0.0	2,161	71.0	37.6	45.9	2,219	4	..	0.3	390	93
China	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	0	..	..	68	95
Fiji	0.1	0.0	16	32.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	67	77
Indonesia	0.5	0.1	29,116	8.0	11.4	10.3	5,817	10	..	0.8	399	88
Kiribati	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	497	86
Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	278	0	..	..	442	92
Lao PDR	0.3	0.0	119	30.0	24.0	27.6	3,485	10	43.2	1.9	189	87
Malaysia	0.5	0.1	5,899	21.0	..	..	961	1	..	..	103	76
Mongolia	..	0.0	14	..	22.8	20.7	..	..	..	..	170	89
Myanmar	0.7	0.0	10,507	36.0	..	..	5,467	11	11.1	..	369	87
Papua New Guinea	0.7	0.1	1,514	44.0	..	..	14,384	40	..	..	417	67
Philippines	0.1	..	..	24.0	..	..	55	0	..	0.1	288	90
Samoa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	19	83
Solomon Islands	..	..	..	..	..	..	7,168	6	..	..	86	94
Thailand	1.1	0.0	18,447	61.0	55.7	..	723	1	..	..	171	81
Timor-Leste	..	..	..	..	..	..	9,432	16	41.0	5.7	498	84
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	190	78
Vanuatu	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,799	4	51.0	5.1	63	85
Vietnam	0.5	..	..	37.0	..	..	..	..	9.4	1.2	140	89
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	62	81
Albania	..	0.0	15	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	19	88
Armenia	0.2	0.0	188	19.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	45	81
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 8

MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria & Other Diseases

	HIV/AIDS				Correct & comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge		Malaria		Child malaria (under age 5)		Tuberculosis	
	ages 15-49 with HIV (%)	ages 15-49 with new HIV cases (%)	number of AIDS deaths	people on ARV treatment (%)	women ages 15-24 (%)	men ages 15-24 (%)	notified malaria cases (per 100,000 people)	malaria deaths (per 100,000 people)	children sleeping under insecticide treated bed nets (%)	children with fever receiving anti-malarial drugs (%)	new TB cases (per 100,000 people)	TB treatment success (% of cases)
	2014	2013	2013	2014	2011-2014	2011-2014	2012	2012	2010-2015	2010-2014	2014	2012-2013
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA												
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.0	537	22.0	..	..	68	0	..	..	77	82
Belarus	0.5	0.1	952	20.0	56.1	50.9	..	..	..	..	58	87
Bosnia & Herzegovina	..	..	..	..	47.6	47.4	..	..	..	..	42	82
Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	27	85
Georgia	0.3	0.0	110	39.0	..	..	40	0	..	..	106	80
Kazakhstan	0.2	..	..	25.0	36.2	34.1	..	..	..	..	99	89
Kosovo	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	0.3	0.0	327	19.0	19.8	24.0	0	0	..	..	142	85
Latvia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	49	83
Lithuania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	62	80
Macedonia, FYR	..	0.0	5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	91
Moldova	0.6	0.1	878	18.0	36.0	28.1	..	..	..	..	153	80
Montenegro	..	..	..	..	47.7	36.9	..	..	..	..	21	87
Romania	..	0.0	540	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	81	85
Russian Federation	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	84	68
Serbia	..	0.0	118	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	24	78
Tajikistan	0.4	0.0	896	16.0	8.7	..	2	0	..	2.1	91	88
Turkey	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	0	..	..	18	86
Turkmenistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	64	72
Ukraine	1.2	0.0	13,392	22.0	49.9	45.8	..	..	..	..	94	71
Uzbekistan	0.2	0.0	2,662	34.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	82	83
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN												
Belize	1.2	0.1	114	56.0	42.9	..	36	0	..	..	37	36
Bolivia	0.3	0.0	1,181	21.0	..	..	523	0	..	..	120	85
Brazil	..	0.0	15,833	..	..	..	1,381	1	..	..	44	72
Chile	0.3	0.0	654	64.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	16	47
Colombia	0.4	0.0	..	40.0	..	..	1,090	1	..	..	33	71
Costa Rica	0.3	0.0	269	53.0	33.1	..	640	0	..	..	11	88
Cuba	0.3	0.0	191	70.0	60.9	58.6	..	..	..	..	9	84
Dominican Republic	1.0	0.0	1,694	39.0	46.4	..	28	0	..	..	60	83
Ecuador	0.3	0.0	1,629	41.0	..	..	552	0	..	..	54	75
El Salvador	0.5	0.0	603	51.0	31.1	..	503	0	..	..	41	93
Guatemala	0.5	0.0	2,607	37.0	..	..	191	0	..	..	57	84
Guyana	1.8	0.1	194	44.0	51.5	40.2	12,376	24	7.4	7.4	103	67
Haiti	1.9	0.1	6,399	44.0	34.6	27.6	1,670	5	12.0	2.5	200	81
Honduras	0.4	0.0	1,547	43.0	33.1	34.7	377	0	..	0.2	43	89
Jamaica	1.6	0.1	1,270	31.0	42.8	35.6	..	..	..	..	5	77
Mexico	0.2	0.0	5,563	50.0	..	..	48	0	..	..	21	80
Nicaragua	0.3	..	..	29.0	..	..	149	0	..	..	58	84
Panama	0.6	0.1	501	54.0	37.1	..	66	0	..	..	46	80
Paraguay	0.4	0.1	344	29.0	..	..	0	0	..	..	43	68
Peru	0.4	0.0	2,822	46.0	..	..	1,854	1	..	..	120	79
Suriname	1.0	0.0	114	43.0	..	..	500	1	43.4	0.0	38	77
Uruguay	0.7	0.0	454	37.0	34.5	..	..	..	..	..	30	79
Venezuela, RB	0.6	0.0	4,403	41.0	..	..	2,683.0	2	..	..	24	81
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

.. Data not available.

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Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 9
MDG 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

	Land use			Agriculture		Energy use		Water, sanitation, & shelter			
	nationally protected land area (% of land area)	forest area (% of land area)	agricultural land area (% of land area)	cereal yield (kg per hectare)	fertilizer consumption (kg per hectare of arable land)	CO ₂ emissions (metric tons per capita)	GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2011 PPP\$ per kg of oil equivalent)	pop. with access to improved sanitation facilities (%)	rural pop. with access to improved water source (%)	urban pop. with access to improved water source (%)	slum pop. (% of urban pop.)
	2014	2015	2013	2014	2013	2011	2011-2014	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2014
World	14.8	30.8	37.7	3,886	119.9	4.9	7.6	67.5	84.6	96.5	..
High-income countries	15.7	28.9	36.0	5,809	133.7	11.2	8.9	99.4	98.9	99.7	..
Low- & middle-income countries	14.7	32.0	37.9	3,372	118.3	3.4	6.9	61.2	83.6	95.4	..
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	15.3	25.7	43.9	1,476	18.0	0.8	5.7	29.7	55.9	86.8	..
Angola	7.0	46.4	47.5	889	8.8	1.4	10.5	51.6	28.2	75.4	55.5
Benin	28.1	38.2	33.3	1,460	5.5	0.5	4.7	19.7	72.1	85.2	61.5
Botswana	29.2	19.1	45.7	398	82.7	2.3	13.7	63.4	92.3	99.2	..
Burkina Faso	15.5	19.6	45.0	1,226	14.3	0.1	..	19.7	75.8	97.5	65.8
Burundi	6.9	10.7	79.2	1,330	7.4	0.0	..	48.0	73.8	91.1	57.9
Cameroon	10.9	39.8	20.6	1,623	6.7	0.3	8.3	45.8	52.7	94.8	37.8
Cape Verde	2.6	22.3	20.8	36	..	0.9	..	72.2	87.3	94.0	..
Central African Republic	18.1	35.6	8.2	1,649	..	0.1	..	21.8	54.4	89.6	93.3
Chad	17.8	3.9	39.7	941	..	0.0	..	12.1	44.8	71.8	88.2
Comoros	10.2	19.9	71.5	1,447	..	0.2	..	35.8	89.1	92.6	69.6
Congo, Dem. Rep.	12.1	67.3	11.6	763	1.3	0.1	2.3	28.7	31.2	81.1	74.8
Congo, Rep.	35.2	65.4	31.1	910	2.3	0.5	10.3	15.0	40.0	95.8	46.9
Côte d'Ivoire	22.9	32.7	64.8	3,254	36.1	0.3	4.8	22.5	68.8	93.1	56.0
Eritrea	5.0	15.0	75.2	626	0.8	0.1	8.8	15.7	53.3	73.2	..
Ethiopia	18.4	12.5	36.3	2,325	19.2	0.1	2.6	28.0	48.6	93.1	73.9
Gabon	20.5	89.3	20.0	1,688	6.1	1.4	12.7	41.9	66.7	97.2	37.0
Gambia, the	4.2	48.2	59.8	745	0.5	0.2	..	58.9	84.4	94.2	34.8
Ghana	15.1	41.0	69.0	1,703	35.8	0.4	11.2	14.9	84.0	92.6	37.9
Guinea	29.2	25.9	59.0	1,543	1.6	0.2	..	20.1	67.4	92.7	43.3
Guinea-Bissau	16.4	70.1	58.0	1,262	..	0.1	..	20.8	60.3	98.8	82.3
Kenya	12.4	7.8	48.5	1,628	52.5	0.3	5.6	30.1	56.8	81.6	56.0
Lesotho	0.5	1.6	74.2	755	..	1.1	..	30.3	77.0	94.6	50.8
Liberia	2.5	43.4	28.0	1,077	..	0.2	..	16.9	62.6	88.6	65.7
Madagascar	5.0	21.4	71.2	2,437	3.9	0.1	..	12.0	35.3	81.6	77.2
Malawi	16.8	33.4	61.4	2,188	43.2	0.1	..	41.0	89.1	95.7	66.7
Mali	8.4	3.9	33.8	1,551	27.9	0.1	..	24.7	64.1	96.5	56.3
Mauritania	1.0	0.2	38.5	1,206	..	0.6	..	40.0	57.1	58.4	79.9
Mauritius	4.5	19.0	42.4	3,765	192.0	3.1	15.7	93.1	99.8	99.9	..
Mozambique	17.2	48.2	63.5	703	9.3	0.1	2.5	20.5	37.0	80.6	80.3
Namibia	37.9	8.4	47.1	421	3.8	1.2	12.3	34.4	84.6	98.2	33.2
Niger	17.6	0.9	35.4	436	0.7	0.1	5.8	10.9	48.6	100.0	70.1
Nigeria	14.2	7.7	77.7	1,594	17.8	0.5	7.0	29.0	57.3	80.8	50.2
Rwanda	9.4	19.5	74.7	1,920	9.3	0.1	..	61.6	71.9	86.6	53.2
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.0	55.8	50.7	471	..	0.6	..	34.7	93.6	98.9	86.6
Senegal	25.2	43.0	46.3	1,110	11.0	0.6	8.4	47.6	67.3	92.9	39.4
Sierra Leone	10.9	42.2	54.7	1,721	..	0.2	..	13.3	47.8	84.9	75.6
Somalia	0.6	10.1	70.3	730	..	0.1	..	23.5	8.8	69.6	73.6
South Sudan	20.8	..	..	1,254	..	..	32.8	6.7	56.9	66.7	95.6
South Africa	8.9	7.6	79.8	4,320	57.7	9.3	4.7	66.4	81.4	99.6	23.0
Sudan	1.7	8.1	45.8	683	12.8	0.3	10.3	23.6	50.2	66.0	91.6
Swaziland	4.0	34.1	71.0	938	..	0.9	..	57.5	68.9	93.6	32.7
Tanzania	32.0	52.0	44.8	1,660	4.7	0.2	4.8	15.6	45.5	77.2	50.7
Togo	25.0	3.5	70.2	1,146	11.7	0.3	2.8	11.6	44.2	91.4	51.2
Uganda	16.0	10.4	71.9	2,019	2.2	0.1	..	19.1	75.8	95.5	53.6
Zambia	37.9	65.4	31.9	2,755	42.1	0.2	5.6	43.9	51.3	85.6	54.0
Zimbabwe	26.6	36.4	41.9	789	36.8	0.7	2.2	36.8	67.3	97.0	25.1
column number	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 9

MDG 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

	Land use			Agriculture		Energy use		Water, sanitation, & shelter			
	nationally protected land area (% of land area)	forest area (% of land area)	agricultural land area (% of land area)	cereal yield (kg per hectare)	fertilizer consumption (kg per hectare of arable land)	CO ₂ emissions (metric tons per capita)	GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2011 PPP\$ per kg of oil equivalent)	pop. with access to improved sanitation facilities (%)	rural pop. with access to improved water source (%)	urban pop. with access to improved water source (%)	slum pop. (% of urban pop.)
	2014	2015	2013	2014	2013	2011	2011-2014	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2014
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	6.8	2.5	22.8	2,305	70.5	3.9	8.2	89.6	88.7	95.0	..
Algeria	7.9	0.8	17.4	1,378	15.3	3.3	10.7	87.6	81.8	84.3	..
Djibouti	1.3	0.2	73.4	2,000	..	0.6	..	47.4	64.7	97.4	65.6
Egypt, Arab Rep.	11.2	0.1	3.8	7,162	636.4	2.6	11.4	94.7	99.0	100.0	10.6
Iran, Islamic Rep.	7.3	6.6	28.3	1,963	32.8	7.8	5.4	90.0	92.1	97.7	..
Iraq	0.4	1.9	21.3	2,187	43.6	4.2	10.2	85.6	70.1	93.8	47.2
Jordan	2.1	1.1	11.9	1,455	681.9	3.3	9.5	98.6	92.3	97.8	12.9
Lebanon	2.7	13.4	64.3	3,384	456.5	4.5	10.5	80.7	99.0	99.0	..
Libya	0.3	0.1	8.7	829	4.3	6.2	7.2	96.6	..	..	..
Morocco	33.6	12.6	68.1	1,454	52.4	1.7	12.7	76.7	65.3	98.7	13.1
Syrian Arab Republic	0.7	2.7	75.8	1,063	21.3	2.8	..	95.7	87.2	92.3	19.3
Tunisia	5.4	6.7	64.0	1,833	41.1	2.4	11.1	91.6	93.2	100.0	8.0
West Bank & Gaza	..	1.5	43.5	1,675	..	0.6	..	92.3	81.5	50.7	..
Yemen, Rep.	0.8	1.0	44.6	963	21.5	0.9	11.3	53.3	46.5	72.0	60.8
SOUTH ASIA	6.6	17.5	56.8	3,066	149.3	1.4	8.8	44.8	90.9	95.3	..
Afghanistan	0.5	2.1	58.1	2,021	5.1	0.4	..	31.9	47.0	78.2	62.7
Bangladesh	4.6	11.0	70.0	4,406	208.7	0.4	13.2	60.6	87.0	86.5	55.1
Bhutan	47.3	72.3	13.6	3,131	15.2	0.8	..	50.4	100.0	100.0	..
India	5.4	23.8	60.6	2,981	157.5	1.7	8.4	39.6	92.6	97.1	24.0
Maldives	0.7	3.3	26.3	2,405	201.5	2.9	..	97.9	97.9	99.5	..
Nepal	22.9	25.4	28.7	2,748	57.7	0.2	5.9	45.8	91.8	90.9	54.3
Pakistan	10.8	1.9	47.1	2,747	135.3	0.9	9.4	63.5	89.9	93.9	45.5
Sri Lanka	23.2	33.0	43.7	3,801	160.0	0.8	21.0	95.1	95.0	98.5	..
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	15.6	29.8	48.0	5,243	..	5.3	6.0	74.9	90.1	96.9	..
Cambodia	26.0	53.6	32.9	3,029	14.2	0.3	7.5	42.4	69.1	100.0	55.1
China	17.0	22.2	54.8	5,886	364.4	6.7	5.3	76.5	93.0	97.5	25.2
Fiji	4.4	55.7	23.3	2,443	56.7	1.4	..	91.1	91.2	99.5	..
Indonesia	14.7	50.2	31.5	5,096	204.6	2.3	11.4	60.8	79.5	94.2	21.8
Kiribati	22.2	15.0	42.0	..	..	0.6	..	39.7	50.6	87.3	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	2.5	41.8	21.8	4,308	..	3.0	..	81.9	99.4	99.9	..
Lao PDR	16.7	81.3	10.1	4,508	..	0.2	..	70.9	69.4	85.6	31.4
Malaysia	18.4	67.6	23.9	3,906	1,726.6	7.9	7.8	96.0	93.0	100.0	..
Mongolia	17.2	8.1	72.9	1,647	43.6	6.9	5.9	59.7	59.2	66.4	42.7
Myanmar	7.2	44.5	19.3	3,707	16.8	0.2	..	79.6	74.4	92.7	41.0
Papua New Guinea	3.1	74.1	2.6	4,971	95.2	0.7	..	18.9	32.8	88.0	..
Philippines	11.0	27.0	41.7	3,637	71.5	0.9	13.9	73.9	90.3	93.7	38.3
Samoa	6.8	60.4	12.4	..	1.8	1.3	..	91.5	99.3	97.5	..
Solomon Islands	2.2	78.1	3.9	4,104	..	0.4	..	29.8	77.2	93.2	..
Thailand	18.8	32.1	43.3	3,103	167.7	4.5	7.5	93.0	98.0	97.6	25.0
Timor-Leste	8.7	46.1	25.6	2,923	..	0.2	..	40.6	60.5	95.2	..
Tuvalu	2.4	33.3	60.0	..	..	..	..	83.3	97.0	98.3	..
Vanuatu	4.2	36.1	15.3	662	..	0.6	..	57.9	92.9	98.9	..
Vietnam	6.5	47.6	35.1	5,577	373.8	2.0	7.7	78.0	96.9	99.1	..
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	9.8	38.9	28.2	2,872	41.7	8.0	5.7	86.0	92.6	98.7	..
Albania	2.3	28.2	43.3	4,893	87.5	1.6	12.4	93.2	95.2	94.9	..
Armenia	24.8	11.7	59.1	3,026	45.2	1.7	7.7	89.5	100.0	100.0	14.4
column number	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 9

MDG 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

	Land use			Agriculture		Energy use		Water, sanitation, & shelter			
	nationally protected land area (% of land area)	forest area (% of land area)	agricultural land area (% of land area)	cereal yield (kg per hectare)	fertilizer consumption (kg per hectare of arable land)	CO ₂ emissions (metric tons per capita)	GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2011 PPP [†] \$ per kg of oil equivalent)	pop. with access to improved sanitation facilities (%)	rural pop. with access to improved water source (%)	urban pop. with access to improved water source (%)	slum pop. (% of urban pop.)
	2014	2015	2013	2014	2013	2011	2011-2014	2011-2015	2011-2015	2011-2015	2014
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA											
Azerbaijan	14.0	13.8	57.7	2,344	17.6	3.6	11.3	89.3	77.8	94.7	..
Belarus	8.6	42.5	43.0	3,721	255.7	6.7	5.9	94.3	99.1	99.9	..
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1.3	42.7	42.1	3,977	91.4	6.2	5.7	94.8	100.0	99.7	..
Bulgaria	40.5	35.2	46.0	4,861	136.3	6.7	6.9	86.0	99.0	99.6	..
Georgia	8.3	40.6	36.7	2,008	94.5	2.0	8.0	86.3	100.0	100.0	..
Kazakhstan	3.3	1.2	80.4	1,173	2.9	15.8	5.0	97.5	85.6	99.4	..
Kosovo	..	..	..	..	..	..	6.6	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	6.9	3.3	55.2	2,276	27.5	1.2	4.5	93.3	86.2	96.7	..
Latvia	18.2	54.0	30.0	3,486	99.5	3.8	9.9	87.8	98.3	99.8	..
Lithuania	16.8	34.8	46.1	3,975	84.5	4.5	10.5	92.4	90.4	99.7	..
Macedonia, FYR	9.7	39.6	50.0	3,900	69.2	4.5	8.8	90.9	98.9	99.8	..
Moldova	3.8	12.4	74.8	3,164	24.7	1.4	5.3	76.4	81.4	96.9	..
Montenegro	4.1	61.5	16.6	3,452	324.7	4.1	8.7	95.9	99.2	100.0	..
Romania	23.8	29.8	60.4	4,069	56.2	4.2	11.6	79.1	100.0	100.0	..
Russian Federation	11.4	49.8	13.2	2,443	15.2	12.6	4.9	72.2	91.2	98.9	..
Serbia	6.8	31.1	58.0	5,966	155.4	6.8	6.2	96.4	98.9	99.4	..
Tajikistan	21.9	2.9	34.8	3,153	58.7	0.4	8.1	95.0	66.7	93.1	..
Turkey	0.2	15.2	49.9	2,831	113.5	4.4	12.0	94.9	100.0	100.0	11.9
Turkmenistan	3.2	8.8	72.0	2,783	..	12.2	2.7	..	..	..	..
Ukraine	4.0	16.7	71.2	4,401	45.8	6.3	3.3	95.9	97.8	95.5	..
Uzbekistan	3.4	7.6	62.9	4,801	203.9	3.9	3.5	100.0	80.9	98.5	..
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN											
	26.5	53.7	35.1	3,981	148.6	2.6	10.9	81.4	83.1	97.1	..
Belize	36.7	59.9	7.0	3,216	172.8	1.7	..	90.5	100.0	98.9	10.8
Bolivia	24.8	50.6	34.8	1,938	9.7	1.6	7.8	50.3	75.6	96.7	43.5
Brazil	28.4	59.0	33.4	4,641	175.7	2.2	10.6	82.8	87.0	100.0	22.3
Chile	18.3	23.9	21.2	6,128	579.1	4.6	10.0	99.1	93.3	99.7	..
Colombia	23.1	52.7	40.4	3,291	648.6	1.6	18.4	81.1	73.8	96.8	13.1
Costa Rica	27.4	54.0	35.6	3,727	699.9	1.7	13.5	94.5	91.9	99.6	5.5
Cuba	12.4	30.1	59.6	2,787	49.4	3.2	19.4	93.2	89.8	96.4	..
Dominican Republic	23.0	41.0	48.7	4,007	80.2	2.2	16.3	84.0	81.9	85.4	12.1
Ecuador	25.8	50.5	30.3	3,627	229.1	2.4	10.8	84.7	75.5	93.4	36.0
El Salvador	8.4	12.8	76.4	2,486	159.2	1.1	11.3	75.0	86.5	97.5	..
Guatemala	31.8	33.0	34.7	2,118	255.5	0.7	9.1	63.9	86.8	98.4	34.5
Guyana	8.7	84.0	8.5	4,206	44.6	2.4	..	83.7	98.3	98.2	33.1
Haiti	0.3	3.5	66.8	1,144	..	0.2	4.1	27.6	47.6	64.9	74.4
Honduras	21.6	41.0	28.9	1,658	88.3	1.1	7.0	82.6	83.8	97.4	27.5
Jamaica	15.9	31.0	41.0	1,139	68.5	2.9	7.8	81.8	89.4	97.5	..
Mexico	12.9	34.0	54.9	3,582	78.8	3.9	10.8	85.2	92.1	97.2	11.1
Nicaragua	37.1	25.9	42.1	1,945	34.4	0.8	7.7	67.9	69.4	99.3	..
Panama	20.6	62.1	30.4	2,897	82.7	2.6	18.2	75.0	88.6	97.7	25.8
Paraguay	6.5	38.6	54.3	3,277	96.9	0.8	10.8	88.6	94.9	100.0	..
Peru	31.4	57.8	19.0	4,007	105.0	1.8	16.0	76.2	69.2	91.4	34.2
Suriname	14.7	98.3	0.5	4,433	97.2	3.6	..	79.2	88.4	98.1	7.3
Uruguay	2.7	10.5	82.1	3,951	163.2	2.3	14.3	96.4	93.9	100.0	..
Venezuela, RB	53.9	52.9	24.5	4,074	179.8	6.4	7.8	94.4	77.9	95.0	..
column number	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12

.. Data not available.

0 Zero, or rounds to zero at displayed number of decimals.

[†] Purchasing Power Parity: a method of currency conversion that equalizes the purchasing power of different currencies.

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 10

MDG 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, Low & Middle Income Countries

	Net official development assistance (ODA) received			Management of capital flows		Investment in infrastructure		Technology transfer		Public spending (% of GDP)		Corruption perceptions index (CPI)
	total (current million US\$)	per capita (current US\$)	as % of central gov't expense	total debt service (% of exports of goods, services, & income)	foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	electricity produced from renewable sources, excl. hydro-electric (%)	specialized hospital beds (per 1,000 people)	internet users (per 100 people)	mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	for education	for public health	degree of corruption perceived to exist in government, score (0-100, 0 is most corrupt)
	2014	2011-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2011-2015	2013-2014	2010-2012	2013-2014	2014	2010-2014	2011-2014	2015
World	161,075	22.2	..	..	2.7	5.4	..	40.7	96.9	13.5	16.0	..
High income	431	0.4	..	..	2.9	7.7	4.2	83.0	121.7	12.1	18.0	..
Low & middle income	160,643	26.6	..	8.9	2.4	3.2	..	32.2	91.6	16.2	..	..
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	46,536	47.8	..	7.3	2.1	0.9	..	19.2	71.0	16.6	12.2	..
Angola	231	9.5	0.8	10.7	1.5	0.0	..	21.3	63.5	8.7	5.0	15
Benin	600	56.7	56.5	5.1	2.7	0.6	0.5	5.3	99.7	22.2	9.6	37
Botswana	100	44.9	1.7	2.3	2.7	0.1	1.8	18.5	167.3	..	8.8	63
Burkina Faso	1,120	63.7	62.4	2.8	1.5	..	0.4	9.4	71.7	16.2	11.2	38
Burundi	502	46.4	..	13.7	0.2	..	1.9	1.4	30.5	17.2	13.2	21
Cameroon	852	37.4	..	2.7	2.1	1.0	1.3	11.0	75.7	13.8	4.3	27
Cape Verde	230	447.6	..	4.8	4.6	..	2.1	40.3	121.8	15.0	11.7	55
Central African Republic	610	127.0	110.6	..	0.2	..	1.0	4.0	24.5	7.8	14.2	24
Chad	388	28.6	..	..	5.5	..	..	2.5	39.8	12.5	9.0	22
Comoros	74	96.1	..	0.7	0.8	..	..	7.0	50.9	18.5	8.7	26
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2,398	32.0	192.8	3.1	-1.4	0.0	..	3.0	53.5	16.8	11.1	22
Congo, Rep.	106	23.5	81.8	..	17.4	0.0	..	7.1	108.1	29.0	8.7	23
Côte d'Ivoire	922	41.6	20.5	11.6	1.4	0.9	..	14.6	106.2	20.7	7.3	32
Eritrea	83	27.8	..	..	1.5	0.6	0.7	1.0	6.4	..	3.6	18
Ethiopia	3,585	37.0	103.3	7.2	3.5	4.3	6.3	2.9	31.6	27.0	15.7	33
Gabon	111	66.0	..	..	4.4	0.4	6.3	9.8	171.4	..	7.4	34
Gambia, the	100	51.7	..	7.1	3.3	..	1.1	15.6	119.6	10.3	15.3	28
Ghana	1,126	42.1	21.5	5.1	8.4	0.0	0.9	18.9	114.8	21.7	6.8	47
Guinea	561	45.7	..	4.2	1.3	..	0.3	1.7	72.1	14.1	9.0	25
Guinea-Bissau	109	60.4	..	0.3	1.7	..	..	3.3	63.5	16.2	7.8	17
Kenya	2,665	59.4	26.9	11.0	2.3	24.8	1.4	43.4	73.8	20.6	12.8	25
Lesotho	104	49.1	..	2.8	4.3	..	..	11.0	85.0	..	13.1	44
Liberia	744	169.3	..	0.7	25.0	..	0.8	5.4	73.4	8.1	11.9	37
Madagascar	583	24.7	46.3	2.5	5.2	..	0.2	3.7	41.2	14.0	10.2	28
Malawi	930	55.7	..	4.2	2.2	..	1.3	5.8	33.5	16.3	16.8	31
Mali	1,234	72.2	79.7	3.0	1.2	..	0.1	7.0	149.1	18.2	5.6	35
Mauritania	257	64.8	..	5.6	9.2	..	..	10.7	94.2	11.4	6.0	31
Mauritius	49	38.8	1.7	26.8	1.8	17.3	3.4	41.4	132.2	20.9	10.0	53
Mozambique	2,103	77.3	58.7	2.6	25.3	0.0	0.7	5.9	69.8	19.0	8.8	31
Namibia	227	94.3	6.5	..	2.2	0.0	..	14.8	113.8	26.2	13.9	53
Niger	918	48.0	..	2.5	7.3	0.9	..	2.0	44.4	21.7	7.6	34
Nigeria	2,476	14.0	8.1	0.8	0.6	0.0	..	42.7	77.8	..	8.2	26
Rwanda	1,034	91.2	110.8	3.4	4.0	..	..	10.6	64.0	16.6	9.9	54
São Tomé and Príncipe	39	207.0	106.3	15.1	8.0	..	2.9	24.4	64.9	12.3	12.4	42
Senegal	1,107	75.4	45.0	8.9	2.5	1.7	..	17.7	98.8	20.7	8.0	44
Sierra Leone	911	144.2	..	1.2	11.6	..	..	2.1	76.7	15.1	10.8	29
Somalia	1,109	105.5	..	..	8.7	..	..	1.6	50.9	..	..	8
South Sudan	1,964	164.9	..	..	-3.1	0.4	..	15.9	24.5	3.9	4.0	..
South Africa	1,070	19.8	0.9	8.6	0.5	0.2	..	49.0	149.2	19.1	14.2	44
Sudan	872	22.2	..	4.4	2.1	0.0	0.8	24.6	72.2	..	11.6	12
Swaziland	86	67.7	..	1.3	-3.0	..	2.1	27.1	72.3	22.4	16.6	..
Tanzania	2,648	51.1	40.9	1.9	4.4	0.6	0.7	4.9	62.8	17.3	12.3	30
Togo	208	29.3	24.1	2.2	1.3	4.5	0.7	5.7	64.6	19.4	7.8	32
Uganda	1,633	43.2	58.5	2.1	4.0	..	0.5	17.7	52.4	11.8	11.0	25
Zambia	995	63.3	28.5	3.7	7.8	0.0	2.0	17.3	67.3	..	11.3	38
Zimbabwe	758	49.7	..	..	3.0	0.5	1.7	19.9	80.8	8.7	8.5	21
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 10

MDG 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, Low & Middle Income Countries

	Net official development assistance (ODA) received			Management of capital flows		Investment in infrastructure		Technology transfer		Public spending (% of GDP)		Corruption perceptions index (CPI)
	total (current million US\$)	per capita (current US\$)	as % of central gov't expense	total debt service (% of exports of goods, services, & income)	foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	electricity produced from renewable sources, excl. hydro-electric (%)	specialized hospital beds (per 1,000 people)	internet users (per 100 people)	mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	for education	for public health	degree of corruption perceived to exist in government, score (0-100, 0 is most corrupt)
	2014	2011-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2011-2015	2013-2014	2010-2012	2013-2014	2014	2010-2014	2011-2014	2015
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	32,597	91.5	..	..	2.0	0.5	0.8	32.7	100.2	..	..	..
Algeria	158	4.0	0.3	0.4	-0.4	0.0	..	18.1	92.9	..	9.9	36
Djibouti	163	185.6	..	6.1	9.6	..	1.4	10.7	32.4	12.3	14.1	34
Egypt, Arab Rep.	3,532	39.4	2.3	12.7	2.1	0.9	0.5	31.7	114.3	..	5.6	36
Iran, Islamic Rep.	81	1.0	..	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.1	39.4	87.8	19.7	17.5	27
Iraq	1,370	38.8	..	..	2.1	0.0	1.3	11.3	94.9	..	6.5	16
Jordan	2,699	363.9	12.7	8.5	3.4	0.1	1.8	44.0	147.8	..	13.7	53
Lebanon	820	146.0	6.6	16.6	5.0	0.0	3.5	74.7	88.3	8.6	10.7	28
Libya	210	33.6	..	..	2.5	0.0	3.7	17.8	161.1	..	4.9	16
Morocco	2,247	66.2	4.4	15.1	3.1	5.3	0.9	56.8	131.7	..	6.0	36
Syrian Arab Republic	4,198	223.6	..	3.1	..	0.0	1.5	28.1	63.9	..	4.8	18
Tunisia	921	83.8	6.4	8.7	2.3	2.0	2.1	46.2	128.5	21.6	14.2	38
West Bank & Gaza	2,487	579.0	238.8	..	0.9	..	..	53.7	72.1	..	..	..
Yemen, Rep.	1,164	44.5	..	2.6	-0.4	0.0	0.7	22.6	68.5	..	3.9	18
SOUTH ASIA	15,444	9.0	..	17.5	1.9	4.4	0.7	16.6	75.4	18.4	4.8	..
Afghanistan	4,823	152.5	79.1	0.6	0.3	..	0.5	6.4	74.9	18.4	12.0	11
Bangladesh	2,418	15.2	11.8	5.2	1.7	0.3	0.6	9.6	80.0	13.8	5.7	25
Bhutan	130	169.6	..	12.1	1.7	..	1.8	34.4	82.1	17.8	8.0	65
India	2,984	2.3	0.6	18.6	2.1	5.0	0.7	18.0	74.5	14.1	5.0	38
Maldives	25	61.8	8.6	2.3	10.3	..	..	49.3	189.4	15.3	26.6	..
Nepal	880	31.2	29.7	8.2	0.1	0.0	..	15.4	81.9	22.1	11.2	27
Pakistan	3,612	19.5	5.3	19.1	0.4	0.0	0.6	13.8	73.3	11.3	4.7	30
Sri Lanka	488	23.5	4.6	14.7	0.8	2.3	3.6	25.8	103.2	8.8	11.2	37
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	9,417	4.7	..	3.8	2.4	3.6	3.6	42.1	100.8	15.5	..	..
Cambodia	799	52.2	38.4	1.5	9.4	0.8	0.7	9.0	132.7	13.1	6.1	21
China	-960	-0.7	..	1.9	2.3	3.6	3.8	49.3	92.3	..	10.4	37
Fiji	92	103.8	..	1.9	7.6	..	..	41.8	98.8	14.0	9.2	..
Indonesia	-388	-1.5	0.0	23.1	1.8	4.5	0.9	17.1	128.8	17.6	5.7	36
Kiribati	79	716.1	..	..	1.2	..	1.3	12.3	17.4	..	5.8	..
Korea, Dem. Rep.	153	6.1	..	..	..	0.0	13.2	0.0	11.2	..	..	8
Lao PDR	472	70.6	36.3	10.6	8.8	..	1.5	14.3	67.0	15.4	3.4	25
Malaysia	12	0.4	0.0	5.8	3.7	0.9	1.9	67.5	148.8	21.5	6.4	50
Mongolia	315	108.1	13.6	21.2	1.7	1.7	6.8	27.0	105.1	12.2	6.7	39
Myanmar	1,380	25.8	..	0.6	4.8	0.0	..	2.1	54.0	..	3.6	22
Papua New Guinea	577	77.4	..	7.0	-0.2	..	..	9.4	44.9	..	9.5	25
Philippines	676	6.8	0.0	7.5	2.0	13.1	1.0	39.7	111.2	20.3	10.0	35
Samoa	93	483.4	61,027.9	7.9	2.1	..	..	21.2	55.5	..	15.1	..
Solomon Islands	199	346.9	..	2.8	1.9	..	1.3	9.0	65.8	17.5	12.5	..
Thailand	351	5.2	0.4	5.2	2.0	5.0	2.1	34.9	144.4	21.4	23.2	38
Timor-Leste	247	203.8	..	..	3.0	..	5.9	1.1	119.4	7.7	2.4	..
Tuvalu	34	3,476.2	..	..	1.7	..	..	37.0	38.4	..	16.9	..
Vanuatu	98	380.1	52.0	1.9	1.6	..	..	18.8	60.4	21.8	17.9	..
Vietnam	4,218	46.5	..	4.2	6.1	0.1	2.0	48.3	147.1	21.4	14.2	31
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA	10,367	25.3	..	23.7	1.8	1.0	..	56.1	128.2	13.2	10.6	..
Albania	280	96.8	..	8.2	8.6	0.0	2.6	60.1	105.5	12.1	9.4	36
Armenia	265	88.3	11.9	31.7	1.7	0.1	3.9	46.3	115.9	9.4	7.0	35
Azerbaijan	215	22.6	1.8	5.2	7.6	0.3	4.7	61.0	110.9	6.5	3.9	29
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 10

MDG 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, Low & Middle Income Countries

	Net official development assistance (ODA) received			Management of capital flows		Investment in infrastructure		Technology transfer		Public spending (% of GDP)		Corruption perceptions index (CPI)
	total (current million US\$)	per capita (current US\$)	as % of central gov't expense	total debt service (% of exports of goods, services, & income)	foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	electricity produced from renewable sources, excl. hydro-electric (%)	specialized hospital beds (per 1,000 people)	internet users (per 100 people)	mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	for education	for public health	degree of corruption perceived to exist in government, score (0-100, 0 is most corrupt)
	2014	2011-2014	2010-2014	2010-2014	2011-2015	2013-2014	2010-2012	2013-2014	2014	2010-2014	2011-2014	2015
CONTINUED: EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA												
Belarus	120	12.6	0.6	12.0	2.9	0.4	11.3	59.0	122.5	12.4	13.8	32
Bosnia & Herzegovina	632	165.5	8.5	11.8	1.7	0.0	3.5	60.8	91.3	..	14.1	38
Bulgaria	..	..	..	14.7	3.6	6.6	6.4	55.5	137.7	10.7	11.0	41
Georgia	563	151.0	16.4	23.3	8.9	0.0	2.6	48.9	124.9	6.7	5.0	52
Kazakhstan	88	5.1	..	35.1	2.2	0.0	7.2	54.9	172.2	12.6	10.9	28
Kosovo	580	319.7	..	8.8	5.6	0.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kyrgyz Republic	624	106.9	31.2	14.2	11.6	0.0	4.8	28.3	134.5	17.8	11.9	28
Latvia	..	..	..	..	2.7	10.0	5.9	75.8	116.8	8.7	9.8	55
Lithuania	..	..	..	..	1.5	23.8	7.0	72.1	147.0	12.3	13.4	61
Macedonia, FYR	211	101.5	5.2	17.6	1.9	0.1	4.5	68.1	105.5	..	12.9	42
Moldova	517	145.5	19.5	14.7	4.1	0.1	6.2	46.6	108.0	18.8	13.3	33
Montenegro	102	163.9	..	12.6	17.5	0.0	4.0	61.0	163.0	..	9.8	..
Romania	..	..	..	28.8	2.2	8.9	6.1	54.1	105.9	8.4	12.8	46
Russian Federation	..	..	..	..	0.4	0.0	..	70.5	155.1	11.1	9.5	29
Serbia	371	52.0	6.8	41.4	6.4	0.1	..	53.5	122.1	9.6	13.9	..
Tajikistan	356	42.9	..	38.2	5.0	0.0	5.5	17.5	95.1	16.4	6.8	26
Turkey	3,442	44.4	1.2	25.0	2.3	4.6	2.5	51.0	94.8	..	10.5	42
Turkmenistan	34	6.5	..	..	11.4	0.0	4.0	12.2	135.8	20.8	8.7	18
Ukraine	1,404	30.9	1.1	25.2	3.4	0.7	9.0	43.4	144.1	13.9	10.8	27
Uzbekistan	324	10.5	..	..	1.6	0.0	4.4	43.6	78.4	..	10.7	19
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN												
	9,659	17.4	..	15.6	3.7	5.6	1.8	48.0	110.6	15.9	..	..
Belize	36	102.4	7.1	8.4	3.4	..	1.1	38.7	50.7	22.9	13.8	..
Bolivia	672	63.6	..	7.3	1.5	0.7	1.1	39.0	96.3	16.9	11.8	34
Brazil	912	4.4	0.2	21.6	4.2	8.2	2.3	57.6	139.0	15.6	6.8	38
Chile	241	13.5	0.4	..	8.5	9.8	2.1	72.4	133.3	19.1	15.9	70
Colombia	1,221	25.6	1.0	19.5	4.1	3.1	1.5	52.6	113.1	15.9	18.1	37
Costa Rica	54	11.2	0.4	21.1	6.1	21.4	1.2	49.4	143.8	..	23.3	55
Cuba	262	23.0	..	..	..	3.7	5.3	30.0	22.5	..	18.0	47
Dominican Republic	167	16.0	1.5	18.5	3.3	1.0	1.7	49.6	78.9	..	17.4	33
Ecuador	160	10.1	..	13.8	1.1	1.5	1.6	43.0	103.9	10.3	10.2	32
El Salvador	98	16.0	3.3	19.0	2.0	33.5	1.1	29.7	144.0	15.9	16.7	39
Guatemala	277	17.3	4.6	14.5	1.8	20.3	0.6	23.4	106.6	20.6	17.8	28
Guyana	159	208.5	..	4.9	3.7	..	..	37.4	70.5	10.3	9.4	29
Haiti	1,084	102.5	..	0.7	1.2	0.0	..	11.4	64.7	..	6.1	17
Honduras	604	75.8	12.7	14.4	6.5	12.8	0.7	19.1	93.5	19.2	15.4	31
Jamaica	92	33.9	2.3	33.0	5.7	7.4	1.7	40.5	107.4	21.8	8.1	41
Mexico	807	6.4	..	12.2	2.6	4.5	1.5	44.4	82.2	19.0	11.6	35
Nicaragua	430	71.6	33.2	14.8	6.6	41.4	0.9	17.6	114.6	22.8	24.0	27
Panama	-196	-50.8	..	5.0	11.0	0.4	2.2	44.9	158.1	13.0	14.6	39
Paraguay	60	9.2	2.0	12.9	1.0	0.0	1.3	43.0	105.6	19.6	11.9	27
Peru	325	10.5	1.1	10.9	3.6	1.5	1.5	40.2	103.6	16.2	15.0	36
Suriname	13	23.4	3.5	..	4.0	..	3.1	40.1	170.6	..	11.8	36
Uruguay	89	25.9	0.1	..	3.3	10.5	2.5	61.5	160.8	14.9	20.8	74
Venezuela, RB	41	1.3	..	..	0.6	0.0	0.9	57.0	99.0	..	5.8	17
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

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Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 11

MDG 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, High-Income Countries

	Commitment to development index (CDI)	Net official development assistance (ODA)								Climate resilience		Policy coherence	
		commitment to fostering global development, score (5 is average commitment)	total (current million US\$)	as % of OECD/DAC donors' GNI*	given to LDCs† (% of OECD/DAC donors' GNI*)	disbursed multilaterally (current million US\$)	committed for economic infrastructure (current million US\$)	committed for agriculture (current million US\$)	given to build trade capacity (%)	given that is untied (%)	aid activities for climate change mitigation (current million US\$)	aid activities for climate change adaptation (current million US\$)	Agriculture support estimate (% of GDP)
											2015	2014	2014
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA													
Equatorial Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA													
Bahrain	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.3
Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kuwait	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Oman	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Qatar	..	..	..	..	230	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	..	53	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Arab Emirates	..	..	..	..	6.0	1,268.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC													
Australia	5.2	4,203	0.3	0.1	1,579	229	121.1	14.1	98.7	255	338	0.1	..
Brunei Darussalam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Hong Kong	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Japan	4.1	9,188	0.2	0.1	4,647	7,940	719.3	68.6	89.5	4,787	2,329	1.3	..
Korea, Rep.	4.3	1,851	0.1	0.1	610	813	219.2	33.6	61.7	34	56	2.1	..
Macao SAR, China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
New Zealand	5.4	502	0.3	0.1	127	80	34.7	42.3	98.2	59	61	0.3	..
Singapore	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA													
Austria	5.1	1,144	0.3	0.1	412	34	23.4	28.9	57.6	48	34	..	..
Belgium	5.1	2,385	0.5	0.2	678	153	97.9	22.7	95.1	205	253	..	..
Croatia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cyprus	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Czech Republic	4.8	209	0.1	0.0	39	2	4.9	24.6	36.6	2	4	..	..
Denmark	6.1	2,996	0.9	0.3	979	179	219.2	31.0	96.6	482	371	..	..
Estonia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Finland	5.6	1,635	0.6	0.2	634	102	53.5	30.4	80.8	79	66	..	..
France	5.5	10,371	0.4	0.1	2,455	2,136	443.5	37.0	89.6	2,166	1,173	..	..
Germany	5.2	16,249	0.4	0.1	2,936	6,488	1,014.1	40.3	97.5	5,688	2,790	..	..
Greece	4.4	248	0.1	0.0	17	0	..	0.5	26.2	0	0	..	..
Hungary	4.8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	..	35	0.2	0.1	16	4	5.1	42.2	100.0	6	10	1.1	..
Ireland	5.1	809	0.4	0.2	279	5	44.2	15.9	100.0	49	86	..	..
Italy	5.0	3,342	0.2	0.1	1,042	57	44.5	24.3	91.0	93	57	..	..
Luxembourg	4.8	427	1.1	0.4	150	26	13.7	21.9	98.8	32	31	..	..
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands	5.6	5,572	0.6	0.2	1,843	895	74.2	31.0	98.3	119	338	..	..
Norway	5.7	5,024	1.0	0.3	2,424	446	179.5	36.5	100.0	903	341	0.8	..
Poland	4.5	437	0.1	0.0	40	2	183.9	5.4	99.0	3	3	..	..
Portugal	5.4	419	0.2	0.1	34	47	0.4	13.2	15.0	12	3	..	..
Slovak Republic	4.5	81	0.1	0.0	11	0	0.7	11.1	26.8	0	0	..	..
Slovenia	..	62	0.1	0.0	10	0	0.0	8.1	..	1	1	..	..
Spain	5.1	1,893	0.1	0.0	457	23	99.2	21.4	89.6	58	149	..	..
Sweden	5.8	6,223	1.1	0.3	2,517	190	133.2	21.3	98.7	702	776	..	..
Switzerland	4.5	3,548	0.5	0.1	1,231	201	131.9	23.4	98.5	225	342	0.9	..
United Kingdom	5.5	19,387	0.7	0.2	9,364	717	236.7	20.5	100.0	536	477	..	..
LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN													
Bahamas, the	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Trinidad & Tobago	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
NORTH AMERICA													
Canada	5.0	4,196	0.2	0.1	2,741	117	255.0	34.4	100.0	85	131	0.5	..
United States	4.6	32,729	0.2	0.1	8,909	1,261	1,293.0	20.1	67.0	818	905	0.5	..
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	..

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† Least Developed Countries: United Nations classification referring to 48 countries with lowest human development scores.

* Gross National Income

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 12

United States: National Hunger and Poverty Trends

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
TOTAL POPULATION (MILLIONS)	293.0^a	295.8^a	298.6^a	301.6^a	304.4^a	307.0^a	309.3^a	311.6^a	313.9^a	316.1^a	318.9^a	321.4^a
FOOD INSECURITY PREVALENCE (%)												
All U.S. households	11.9	11.0	10.9	11.1	14.6	14.7	14.5	14.9	14.5	14.3	14.0	12.7
with hunger ^b	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.1	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.0
Adults	11.3	10.4	10.4	10.6	14.4	14.5	14.2	14.5	14.1	14.0	13.7	12.0
with hunger ^b	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.7	5.4	5.4	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.1	5.2	4.5
Children	19.0	16.9	17.2	16.9	22.5	23.2	21.6	22.4	21.6	21.4	20.9	17.9
with hunger ^b	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.9	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.2	0.7
PERCENT OF FEDERAL BUDGET SPENT ON FOOD ASSISTANCE^c												
	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.95	2.95	2.82
PERCENT OF FEDERAL BUDGET SPENT ON SAFETY NET PROGRAMS^c												
	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12.0	11.0	10.0
TOTAL INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS)												
	6.8	6.9	6.7	6.8	6.6	6.4	6.2	6.0	..	6.0	..	..
White	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.2	..	5.1	..	..
White, non-Hispanic	5.7	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.5	..	5.3	5.2	..	5.1	..	..
Hispanic	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.3	5.1	4.6	..	4.7	..	..
African American	13.8	13.7	12.9	13.3	12.7	12.4	11.0	10.6	..	10.5	..	..
Asian/Pacific Islander	4.7	4.9	4.6	4.8	4.5	4.4	3.9	3.8	..	3.7	..	..
American Indian/Alaska Native	8.5	8.1	8.3	9.2	8.4	8.5	4.6	4.5	..	4.0	..	..
TOTAL POVERTY RATE (%)												
	12.7	12.6	12.3	12.5	13.2	14.3	15.1	15.0	15.0	14.5	14.8	13.5
Northeast	11.6	11.3	11.5	11.4	11.6	12.2	12.8	13.1	13.6	12.7	12.6	12.4
Midwest	11.6	11.4	11.2	11.1	12.4	13.3	13.9	14.0	13.3	12.9	13.0	11.7
South	14.1	14.0	13.8	14.2	14.3	15.7	16.9	16.0	16.5	16.1	16.5	15.3
West	12.6	12.6	11.6	12.0	13.5	14.8	15.3	15.8	15.1	14.7	15.2	13.3
White	10.8	10.6	10.3	10.5	11.2	12.3	13.0	12.8	12.7	12.3	12.7	11.6
White, non-Hispanic	8.6	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.6	9.4	9.9	9.8	9.7	9.6	10.1	10.1
Hispanic	21.9	21.8	20.6	21.5	23.2	25.3	26.6	25.3	25.6	23.5	23.6	21.4
African American	24.7	24.9	24.3	24.5	24.7	25.8	27.4	27.6	27.2	27.2	26.2	24.1
Asian	9.8	11.1	10.1	10.2	11.6	12.5	12.1	12.3	11.7	10.5	12.0	11.4
American Indian/Alaska Native	..	..	..	..	24.2	..	..	23.9 ^d	..	..	..	..
Elderly (65 years and older)	9.8	10.1	9.4	9.7	9.7	8.9	9.0	8.7	9.1	9.5	10.0	8.8
Female-headed households	28.4	28.7	28.3	28.3	28.7	29.9	31.6	31.2	30.9	30.6	30.6	28.2
Children under age 6 in households	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.8	21.3	23.8	25.3	24.5	24.4	22.2	23.5	21.4
TOTAL CHILD POVERTY RATE (18 YEARS AND UNDER) (%)												
	17.8	17.6	17.4	18.0	19.0	20.7	22.0	21.9	21.8	19.9	21.1	19.7
White	14.8	14.4	14.1	14.9	15.8	17.7	18.5	18.6	18.5	12.7	17.9	17.2
White, non-Hispanic	10.5	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.6	11.9	12.3	12.5	12.3	10.7	12.3	12.1
Hispanic	28.9	28.3	26.9	28.6	30.6	33.1	34.9	34.1	33.8	30.4	31.9	28.9
African American	33.6	34.5	33.4	34.5	33.9	35.4	37.8	37.4	36.7	38.3	36.0	32.9
Asian ^d	10.0	11.1	11.4	11.9	13.3	13.3	13.6	13.3	13.3	10.1	14.0	12.3
TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%)												
	5.5	5.1	4.6	4.6	5.8	9.3	9.6	8.9	8.1	7.2	6.2	5.3
White	4.8	4.4	4.0	4.1	5.2	8.5	8.7	7.9	7.2	6.5	5.3	4.6
Hispanic	7.0	6.0	5.2	5.6	7.6	12.1	12.5	11.5	10.2	8.7	7.4	6.6
African American	10.4	10.0	8.9	8.3	10.1	14.8	16.0	15.8	14.0	13.3	11.3	9.6
Asian	4.4	4.0	3.0	3.2	4.0	7.3	7.5	7.0	5.9	4.8	5.0	3.8
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

Table 12
United States: National Hunger and Poverty Trends

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION (%)												
Total population												
Under \$15,000	11.3	11.4	10.9	11.1	11.6	11.6	12.4	12.7	12.7	12.5	12.6	11.6
\$15,000 to \$24,999	10.4	10.6	10.3	10.4	10.7	10.8	11.3	11.0	11.4	11.2	10.9	10.5
\$25,000 to \$34,999	10.5	9.7	9.6	10.2	10.3	10.5	10.6	10.9	10.4	9.8	10.1	10.0
\$35,000 to \$49,999	13.3	13.7	14.3	12.9	13.8	13.8	13.1	13.6	13.5	13.1	13.1	12.7
\$50,000 to \$74,999	17.6	17.8	17.6	17.9	17.2	17.3	17.2	17.5	17.4	17.1	17.0	16.7
\$75,000 to \$99,999	12.8	12.6	12.5	12.3	12.5	12.4	12.2	11.4	11.8	11.9	11.5	12.1
\$100,000 to \$149,999	13.7	13.6	13.9	14.4	13.6	13.3	13.0	12.7	12.8	12.9	13.4	14.1
\$150,000 to \$199,999	5.6	5.4	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.9	5.7	6.2
\$200,000 and over	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.2	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.7	5.6	6.1
White												
Under \$15,000	9.3	9.3	8.9	8.9	9.4	9.3	9.8	10.1	10	10.1	10.4	9.3
\$15,000 to \$24,999	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.7	9.9	9.9	10.5	10.1	10.4	10.3	10.0	9.6
\$25,000 to \$34,999	9.7	9.2	9.1	9.5	9.6	9.7	9.8	10.2	9.8	8.8	9.4	9.4
\$35,000 to \$49,999	12.7	13.2	13.6	12.4	12.9	13.6	12.8	13.2	13.0	12.5	12.6	12.2
\$50,000 to \$74,999	17.7	18.0	17.7	18.0	17.7	17.8	17.5	18.0	17.9	17.8	17.4	16.7
\$75,000 to \$99,999	13.6	13.6	13.4	13.0	13.5	13.2	13.1	12.3	12.8	13.0	12.3	13.0
\$100,000 to \$149,999	15.2	15.0	15.4	16.0	15.1	14.8	14.6	14.1	14.3	14.2	14.8	15.9
\$150,000 to \$199,999	6.3	6.2	6.4	6.4	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.3	6.0	6.8	6.5	7.1
\$200,000 and over	5.6	5.9	6.2	6.2	5.7	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.7	6.5	6.7	6.9
Hispanic												
Under \$15,000	13.5	13.9	13.6	13.9	15.1	14.7	15.8	15.8	16.4	15.3	14.6	13.6
\$15,000 to \$24,999	13.2	13.7	13.3	12.9	13.6	13.9	13.9	13.7	14.4	14.7	14.1	13.0
\$25,000 to \$34,999	14.2	12.1	11.3	13.5	13.1	13.5	14.1	14.0	13.1	14.4	12.4	12.7
\$35,000 to \$49,999	15.9	17.3	17.7	15.4	17.1	15.7	14.8	16.6	15.8	15.1	15.6	15.1
\$50,000 to \$74,999	19.3	18.7	18.6	19.0	17.0	17.6	17.6	17.3	17.4	15.7	18.0	18.1
\$75,000 to \$99,999	10.3	10.4	10.9	11.1	9.8	10.5	10.2	9.1	9.7	10.0	10.7	10.8
\$100,000 to \$149,999	8.7	8.9	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.1	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.8	9.7	9.7
\$150,000 to \$199,999	2.8	2.7	3.3	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.2	3.0	2.8	3.2	2.8	3.7
\$200,000 and over	2.1	2.2	2	2	1.9	2.2	1.8	1.9	2	2.9	2.2	3.2
African American												
Under \$15,000	21.6	21.6	20.8	21.2	21.2	21.6	23.9	24.4	23.6	22.9	22.4	21.7
\$15,000 to \$24,999	12.7	14.7	13.9	13.2	13.4	13.9	14.0	14.5	15.2	14	14.4	14.2
\$25,000 to \$34,999	12.9	11.2	11.3	12.3	12.6	13.3	12.4	12.3	11.7	12.4	12.7	11.9
\$35,000 to \$49,999	15.3	15.0	16.2	14.0	16.0	14.8	14.3	13.4	14.3	14.7	14.4	13.6
\$50,000 to \$74,999	15.5	15.9	15.8	16.6	15.7	15.3	15.0	15.3	15.0	15.1	15.1	15.9
\$75,000 to \$99,999	10.0	9.2	9.2	9.6	9.0	9.6	9.3	8.5	8.6	7.6	8.2	8.9
\$100,000 to \$149,999	7.9	8.1	8.4	8.8	8.0	7.6	7.3	7.4	7.7	8.4	8.1	8.8
\$150,000 to \$199,999	2.4	2.8	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.9	2.7	2.8
\$200,000 and over	1.6	1.5	2	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.6	2	2	2.3
Asian												
Under \$15,000	9.2	10.1	8.9	9.2	10.9	10.8	10.1	9.9	10.3	10.4	10.3	9.7
\$15,000 to \$24,999	6.9	7.5	6.9	7.4	7.6	6.9	8.4	8.6	7.1	7.9	7.0	6.7
\$25,000 to \$34,999	7.9	6.5	7.2	7.6	7.5	8.2	7.8	8.3	7.4	5.2	7.7	6.2
\$35,000 to \$49,999	9.6	9.3	10.1	9.3	11.5	9.9	9.5	10.8	10.6	10.4	9.7	10.2
\$50,000 to \$74,999	17.9	17.6	16.9	16.5	14.1	15.9	17.7	17.0	17.4	16.8	15.6	15.5
\$75,000 to \$99,999	13.4	12.6	12.7	12.7	12.9	12.6	11.7	12.6	12.4	12.4	11.8	12.2
\$100,000 to \$149,999	17.7	18.6	17.7	19.3	17.4	16.9	16.5	17.7	16.9	16.9	18.4	16.8
\$150,000 to \$199,999	9.2	8.2	10.3	9.2	9.7	8.9	9.9	7.5	8.8	8.5	9.7	10.5
\$200,000 and over	8.3	9.7	9.3	8.9	8.5	9.9	8.4	7.8	9.1	11.5	9.8	12.1
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

... Data not available.

0 Zero, or rounds to zero at displayed number of decimals.

a U.S. Census Bureau estimate.

b Data from 2005 onward is referred to by the USDA as "very low food security" instead of "food insecure with hunger."

c Data refer to fiscal year.

d 3-year average: 2001-2003 for 2003, and 2007-2011 for 2011

Sources for tables on page 191.

Table 13

United States Hunger, Poverty, and Nutrition Program Participation, by State

	Food insecurity, 2015		Poverty, 2015				Participation in federal food assistance programs				
	people food insecure (avg. %)		poverty rate below 100% of the poverty level (%)		poverty rate below 50% of the poverty level (%)		SNAP (monthly participants, preliminary), June 2016	WIC (total participants), FY 2015	school breakfast program (total participants), FY 2015	national school lunch program (total participants), FY 2015	summer food service program (avg. daily attendance), FY 2015
	total	with hunger	all	under 18	all	under 18					
UNITED STATES	13.7	5.4	14.7	19.2	6.5	8.4	43,376,981	8,023,742	14,092,053	30,493,586	2,572,410
Alabama	17.6	7.3	18.5	22.2	8.1	7.2	826,733	132,133	254,270	531,306	49,907
Alaska	13.3	4.4	10.3	11.8	4.2	6.3	86,218	19,682	25,111	53,617	5,850
Arizona	14.9	6.0	17.4	25.4	8.2	11.6	..	167,072	308,723	647,391	16,007
Arkansas	19.2	7.4	19.1	20.1	7.9	11.0	948,201	84,220	180,503	320,995	31,081
California	12.6	4.5	15.3	19.2	6.7	8.1	401,790	1,265,005	1,691,546	3,271,857	128,051
Colorado	12.1	5.1	11.5	13.4	5.1	4.9	4,121,975	90,954	185,014	378,229	20,180
Connecticut	13.1	6.3	10.5	14.0	5.0	7.1	471,792	51,295	95,009	280,152	28,276
Delaware	11.9	3.2	12.4	16.5	5.8	7.2	427,190	18,998	47,974	97,978	10,425
District of Columbia	13.2	4.8	17.3	26.8	9.2	16.2	149,564	14,526	34,499	52,668	28,713
Florida	12.7	5.4	15.7	24.3	6.7	11.0	132,051	483,811	786,519	1,675,731	163,445
Georgia	14.9	5.6	17.0	28.4	7.7	14.0	3,239,056	264,299	626,930	1,236,154	101,239
Hawaii	9.7	3.0	10.6	14.0	5.4	6.8	1,690,889	31,616	37,814	109,591	5,860
Idaho	13.8	5.1	15.1	17.3	6.0	7.6	46,513	40,506	77,465	156,992	19,775
Illinois	11.1	4.3	13.6	14.8	6.2	6.3	174,275	247,594	423,306	1,108,557	70,835
Indiana	14.8	6.1	14.5	19.0	6.6	7.2	180,441	154,485	272,047	768,262	64,068
Iowa	10.6	4.5	12.2	12.8	5.5	4.0	1,915,113	63,481	98,260	381,709	16,703
Kansas	14.6	5.5	13.0	19.1	5.6	4.2	720,795	62,850	115,827	345,398	28,280
Kentucky	17.6	7.3	18.5	24.2	7.7	11.3	377,888	116,179	283,065	525,267	33,013
Louisiana	18.4	7.7	19.6	24.4	8.8	12.5	249,276	128,935	267,794	548,567	36,126
Maine	15.8	7.4	13.4	19.4	5.2	6.7	659,155	21,781	93,782	100,243	13,327
Maryland	10.7	3.8	9.7	13.7	4.7	3.7	926,178	142,841	264,688	434,494	70,273
Massachusetts	9.7	4.5	11.5	14.5	5.4	5.9	188,093	113,262	169,164	515,426	59,617
Michigan	14.9	6.4	15.8	20.4	6.9	9.2	725,871	244,829	399,379	842,748	90,980
Minnesota	9.9	3.8	10.2	7.4	4.4	3.0	772,479	119,403	214,810	613,740	52,801
Mississippi	20.8	7.9	22.0	27.8	10.4	12.7	1,455,946	89,449	203,931	384,628	36,528
Missouri	15.2	6.7	14.8	12.0	6.4	6.2	478,960	134,780	280,757	603,698	40,411
Montana	12.2	5.6	14.6	17.1	6.3	6.6	555,306	18,476	31,311	81,872	9,037
Nebraska	14.8	5.6	12.6	14.7	5.2	6.6	782,374	37,601	70,327	241,037	12,177
Nevada	14.2	5.6	14.7	18.5	6.6	6.5	118,581	73,144	93,917	216,351	11,966
New Hampshire	10.1	4.3	8.2	8.5	3.6	2.3	175,603	14,705	20,577	88,737	15,304
New Jersey	11.1	4.7	10.8	16.5	5.0	6.9	440,560	161,664	302,617	695,655	48,516
New Mexico	14.4	5.7	20.4	27.4	8.7	14.9	96,846	55,234	149,737	216,778	29,383
New York	14.1	4.9	15.4	20.9	6.9	8.9	869,546	471,869	673,332	1,698,511	438,929
North Carolina	15.9	6.2	16.4	23.1	7.1	8.6	477,982	248,860	455,912	903,946	63,390
North Dakota	8.5	2.9	11.0	15.0	5.4	9.7	2,953,595	12,415	24,948	90,355	3,997
Ohio	16.1	6.6	14.8	20.7	6.8	8.8	1,543,856	244,201	441,117	1,035,551	50,719
Oklahoma	15.5	6.4	16.1	18.8	7.0	7.4	54,736	112,892	225,681	440,455	16,793
Oregon	16.1	6.6	15.4	16.5	6.9	7.0	1,591,757	98,304	141,989	294,408	39,454
Pennsylvania	12.4	4.8	13.2	18.9	5.9	8.3	614,624	245,979	355,146	1,035,498	78,961
Rhode Island	11.8	5.0	13.9	13.3	5.8	5.3	720,694	20,728	32,379	76,254	10,705
South Carolina	13.2	4.6	16.6	18.8	7.2	12.7	1,850,791	114,562	266,238	483,026	66,560
South Dakota	11.5	4.5	13.7	19.4	6.7	10.5	..	19,474	28,962	107,332	5,891
Tennessee	15.1	6.0	16.7	21.4	7.3	9.5	169,824	150,116	376,866	676,703	47,959
Texas	15.4	6.0	15.9	21.0	6.6	9.9	765,549	886,409	1,902,636	3,379,274	139,673
Utah	11.9	4.5	11.3	11.8	4.8	2.7	95,154	58,995	76,546	334,253	6,803
Vermont	11.4	5.1	10.2	16.3	4.5	5.9	1,094,374	13,733	22,704	49,159	8,018
Virginia	9.8	4.3	11.2	13.4	5.4	7.0	3,791,472	139,632	284,825	702,670	57,328
Washington	12.9	4.8	12.2	16.6	5.8	7.1	218,587	176,133	189,557	521,071	43,904
West Virginia	15.0	6.2	17.9	20.2	8.0	8.5	78,064	41,701	150,485	194,379	10,118
Wisconsin	11.3	4.7	12.1	17.7	5.2	8.3	817,945	105,504	185,070	541,726	94,796
Wyoming	13.2	5.3	11.1	11.8	4.5	6.4	27,187	10,995	14,683	51,854	4,334
Puerto Rico	..	..	46.1	..	25.8	..	995,501	165,042	122,012	297,247	28,217
column number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

.. Data not available.

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Sources for tables on page 191.

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Community of Christ engages the church and others in a response to the needs of hungry people throughout the world. Its primary purpose is to support programs of food production, storage and distribution; fund projects to provide potable water; supply farm animals; instruct in food preparation and nutrition; and educate in marketing strategies for produce. It also seeks to advocate for the hungry and educate about the causes and alleviation of hunger in the world.

1001 W. Walnut
Independence, MO 64050-3562
Phone: (816) 833-1000, ext. 2216
www.cofchrist.org

Cooperative Baptist Fellowship is a fellowship of Baptist Christians and churches who share a passion for the Great Commission of Jesus Christ and a commitment to Baptist principles of faith and practice. The Fellowship's purpose is to serve Christians and churches as they discover and fulfill their God-given mission. One of the Fellowship's strategic initiatives is engaging in holistic missions and ministries among the most neglected in a world without borders.

2930 Flowers Road South, Suite 133
Atlanta, GA 30341
Phone: (770) 220-1600
www.thefellowship.info

Covenant World Relief is an effective and efficient humanitarian aid ministry of the Evangelical Covenant Church with a 60-year history. Covenant World Relief collaborates with partners around the world to provide relief, rehabilitation, and transformational community development. These partnerships empower local ministries, increase local involvement, reduce overhead and facilitate an immediate response to disaster and human suffering. Our charge is to love, serve and work together with the poor, the powerless, and the marginalized.

Covenant World Relief/Evangelical Covenant Church
8303 West Higgins Road
Chicago, Illinois 60631
Phone: (773) 784-3000
www.covchurch.org/cwr
Blog: <http://blogs.covchurch.org/cwr>
Facebook: <http://www.facebook.com/covenantworldrelief>

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America World Hunger is the anti-hunger program of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It responds to hunger and poverty in the United States and around the world by addressing root causes. Through a comprehensive program of relief, development, education, and advocacy, people are connected to the resources they need to lift themselves out of poverty. The international work of ELCA World Hunger is carried out through ELCA companion relationships as well as through trusted partners like Lutheran World Relief (LWR) and The Lutheran World Federation (LWF). Because of these long-held connections to partners around the world, ELCA World Hunger efforts are efficient and effective. The domestic work of ELCA World Hunger is carried out primarily through the Domestic Hunger Grants Program (relief, development, and community organizing projects).

8765 W. Higgins Road
Chicago, IL 60631-4190
Phone: (800) 638-3522, ext. 2709
www.elca.org

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations was founded with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, improve agricultural productivity and better the condition of rural populations. FAO is also a source of knowledge and information, helping developing countries and countries in transition modernize and improve agriculture, forestry and fisheries practices.

Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00153 Rome, Italy
Phone: +39 06 57051
www.fao.org

Foods Resource Bank is a Christian response to world hunger. Its goal is for hungry people to know the dignity and hope of feeding themselves by making it possible for them, through sustainable smallholder agricultural programs, to produce food for their families with extra to share, barter or sell. Foods Resource Bank endeavors to build networks with various agricultural communities in “growing projects” in the United States, allowing participants to give a gift only they can give. These volunteers grow crops or raise animals, sell them in the United States and the resulting money is used by implementing members (denominations and their agencies) to establish food security programs abroad.

4479 Central Avenue
Western Springs, IL 60558
Phone: (312) 612-1939
www.FoodsResourceBank.org

Presbyterian Hunger Program provides a channel for congregations to respond to hunger in the United States and around the world. With a commitment to the ecumenical sharing of human and financial resources, the program provides support for the direct food relief efforts, sustainable development and public policy advocacy. The Presbyterian Hunger Program helps thousands of Presbyterian Church (USA) congregations become involved in the study of hunger issues, engage with the communities of need, advocate for just public policies and business practices, and move toward simpler corporate and personal lifestyles.

100 Witherspoon Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Phone: (502) 569-5832
Fax: (502) 569-8963
www.pcusa.org/hunger

Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word is an international congregation of women religious. Who we are and what we do is grounded in a dynamic belief that our loving God became fully human in the person of Jesus. In this act of becoming human, God invites all creation to share in Divine Life. This belief compels us to act to make God’s love real in the world by promoting human dignity, especially among the most vulnerable.

4503 Broadway Street
San Antonio, Texas 78209
Phone: (210) 828-2224
www.amormeus.org

Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth was founded in 1858 by Mother Xavier Ross in Leavenworth, Kan., the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth minister in the continental United States, Peru and South Sudan. Our Sisters are educators, administrators, pastoral ministers, counselors and fill many other roles—serving people of all ages and with various needs.

4200 South 4th Street
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-5054
Phone: (913) 682-7500
Fax: (913) 364-5401
www.scls.org

United Church of Christ (National) supports 1.2 million members in congregations and other settings of the United Church of Christ in developing relationships with the greater church community that are global, multiracial and multicultural, open and affirming, and accessible to all. Programs of United Church of Christ national setting include Volunteer Ministries and National Disaster Ministries, as well as ministries of Refugee & Immigration, Health & Wholeness Advocacy, and One Great Hour of Sharing and Neighbors in Need special mission offerings.

700 Prospect Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
Phone: 216-736-2100
<http://ucc.org>

United Methodist Committee on Relief is the not-for-profit global humanitarian aid organization of the United Methodist Church. UMCOR is working in more than 80 countries worldwide, including the United States. Our mission, grounded in the teachings of Jesus, is to alleviate human suffering—whether caused by war, conflict or natural disaster, with open hearts and minds to all people. UMCOR responds to natural or civil disasters that are interruptions of such magnitude that they overwhelm a community's ability to recover on its own. We partner with people to rebuild their communities, livelihoods, health, and homes. In times of acute crisis, we mobilize aid to stricken areas—emergency supplies, fresh water, and temporary shelter—and then stay, as long as it takes, to implement long-term recovery and rehabilitation.

475 Riverside Drive, Room 330
New York, NY 10115
Phone: (212) 870-3808
umcor@gbgm-umc.org
www.umcor.org

Friends:

(Donations under \$5,000)

Catholic Relief Services

www.crs.org

Church of the Brethren, Global Food Crisis Fund

www.brethren.org

Church World Service

www.churchworldservice.org

Congressional Hunger Center

www.hungercenter.org

Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)

www.disciples.org

The Deaconess Foundation

Deaconess.org

The Episcopal Church

www.episcopalchurch.org

International Orthodox Christian Charities

www.iocc.org

Lutheran World Relief

www.lwr.org

Salvation Army National Corporation

www.salvationarmyusa.org

Sisters of Charity of Nazareth

<https://scnfamily.org>

World Renew

www.worldrenew.net

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
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